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A TRANSLATION OF AND INTRODUCTION TO THE "DIRECT PERCEPTION" CHAPTER OF GO-RAMS-PA'S "SDE BDUN MDO DAN BCAS PA'I DGONS PA PHYIN CI MA LOG PAR 'GREL PA TSHAD MA RIGS PA'I GTER GYI DON GSAL BAR BYED PA"

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A TRANSLATION OF AND INTRODUCTION TO THE "DIRECT PERCEPTION" CHAPTER OF GO-RAMS-PA'S <u>SDE BDUN MDO DAṄ BCAS PA'I DGOṄS PA PHYIN CI MA LOG PAR 'GREL PA TSHAD MA RIGS PA'I GTER GYI DON GSAL BAR BYED PA</u>

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ABSTRACT

A TRANSLATION OF AND INTRODUCTION TO
THE "DIRECT PERCEPTION" CHAPTER OF GO-RAMS-PA'S
SDE BDUN MDO DAṄ BCAS PA'I DGOṄS PA PHYIN CI MA LOG PAR
'GREL PA TSHAD MA RIGS PA'I GTER GYI DON GSAL BAR BYED PA

BRUCE JOHN STEWART

The main purpose of this work is to present the Buddhist logicians' theory of perception as it was understood by the Tibetan tradition. Besides Tibetan materials, various Sanskrit materials are utilized, especially the original Sanskrit version of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika. The standard Sanskrit-Tibetan word indices have also been used.

In this study one finds an examination of the theory of perception developed by the Buddhist logicians Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The basis of this examination is an original translation of the "Direct Perception" chapter of the fifteenth century, A. D. text written by Go-rams-pa, entitled Sde bdun mdo daṅ bcas pa'i dgoṅs pa phyin ci ma log par 'grel pa tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed. This text focuses its discussion on the Pramāṇayuktinidhi written by Sa-skya Paṇḍita in the thirteenth century, A. D. The verses of the Pramāṇayuktinidhi upon which Go-rams-pa comments, have also been translated and inserted into the translation at the section where Go-rams-pa discusses them. Also

included in the study is an introduction which discusses many of the central aspects of direct perception. In the introduction, Go-rams-pa's treatment of certain aspects of the perceptual theory of the Buddhist logicians is compared with that of other Tibetan authors, such as Tsoṅ-kha-pa and 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa.

In the "Direct Perception" chapter Go-rams-pa makes use of a great range of both Sanskrit and Tibetan materials which makes his work both complicated and rich. Consequently, his treatment is a more developed and detailed presentation of the perceptual topics presented formerly in Th. Stcherbatsky's Buddhist Logic.

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In Memory of

Nima Sang Po

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I most gratefully wish to thank my doctoral advisor at Columbia University, Professor Alex Wayman, for his constant guidance through each phase of writing this dissertation. I hope this work will justify the time that he gave most generously to me during my study at Columbia. I also wish to thank Mrs. Hideko Wayman for reading through my introduction and suggesting some corrections. I am indebted to Dr. Joel Brereton for guiding me through my initial study of Sanskrit and to Dr. Christopher George for introducing me to the study of the Tibetan language. My friend Remmel T. Nunn of the Franklin Library was a constant source of encouragement and our numerous philosophical discussions have had a direct bearing on this dissertation.

I am especially grateful to Khen po Abbey and the students of Sakya College for making my stay in India so rewarding. It was during my stay at Sakya College in 1978 that I was first introduced to the works of Sa-skya Paṇḍita and Go-rams-pa. I would also like to thank Geshe Jamspal for all of his time and energy.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife Charlien, for her assistance in the preparation of this manuscript. More importantly, however, I am indebted to Charlien for all of the love which she has shared with me during these last years.

INTRODUCTION - PART I

The present study will focus on an important aspect within the field of Buddhist logic. More specifically, this inquiry concentrates on the theory of perception developed by the Buddhist logicians Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The basis of our presentation will be an original translation of the "Direct Perception" (mṅon sum; pratyakṣa) chapter of Go-rams-pa's Sde bdun mdo daṅ bcas pa'i dgoṅs pa phyin ci ma log par 'grel pa tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed. The title means "Illumining the Pramāṇayuktinidhi which unerringly explains the purport of (Dharmakīrti's) Seven Books and (Dignāga's) Sūtra." It is generally abbreviated to Rigs gter gsal byed. Before discussing the Pramāṇayuktinidhi and Go-rams-pa's commentary on it, a brief discussion about the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti to which Go-rams-pa's title refers is called for.

Dignāga (circa A.D. 480-540)[1] is best known as "the pupil of Vasubandhu who proved greater than his teacher in logic"[2] and the father of medieval logic in India. Most of Dignāga's works, sometimes numbered to be over one-hundred, are lost

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1. This is the date which E. Frauwallner has suggested in his article "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic," Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Süd-und Ost-Asiens, Vienna, Bd. V (1961), pp.125-148. Cf. also M. Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1968, p.4. Professor Hattori has placed the dates for Dignāga at A.D.470-530.

2. E. Obermiller, trans., Bu-ston's History of Buddhism, two parts, Heidelberg, 1932, II, p.149.

in their original Sanskrit, but the Tibetan and Chinese Tripiṭaks contain translations of many of them. The Tōhoku Catalogue of the Tibetan Bstan-'gyur gives a list naming Dignāga as the author of twenty-two different works on the various subject within Buddhist thought.[1] The Pramāṇasamuccaya with its self-commentary was Dignāga's last and greatest work;[2] in this work he condensed his ideas into six chapters. It is the Pramāṇasamuccaya which Go-rama-pa's title refers to as "(Dignāga's) Sūtra"; this appelation indicates the reverence in which the Tibetan tradition held this text.

By the time Dharmakīrti (mid seventh century A.D.) turned his attention to the study of logic Dignāga had died. Hence, he studied logic under Īśvarasena, a direct pupil of Dignāga. According to tradition Īśvarasena conceded that Dharmakīrti understood Dignāga's system better than he himself did. And with Īśvarasena's consent Dharmakīrti began composing his own works.

Dharmakīrti composed seven logical works as a primary commentary on the Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga.[3] The "Seven Books" of Dharmakīrti became the basic works for the

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1. See Hattori, Dignāga..., pp.6-11. Prfofessor Hattori presents the list of Dignaga's works in The Tōhoku Catalogue.

2. Ibid., p.3.

3. F.D. Lessing and A. Wayman, Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric Systems, Motilal Banarsidass, 1980,p.73.

study of logic by Buddhists in Tibet, surpassing the work of Dignāga. The Seven Books of Dharmakīrti are as follows:

1. Pramāṇavārttika (Tshad ma rnam 'grel).
2. Pramāṇaviniścaya (Tshad ma rnam ṅes).
3. Nyāyabindu (Rigs thigs).
4. Sambandhaparīkṣā ('brel ba brtag pa)
5. Hetubindu (Gtan tshig thigs pa).
6. Vādanyāya (Rtsod pa'i rigs pa).[1]
7. Santānāntara (Rgyud gźan grub pa).

There appears to be two slightly different understandings as to the placement of Dharmakīrti's Seven Books (Sde bdun). According to the view which Stcherbatsky presents the Pramāṇavārttika is the chief one among the seven works, "containing the body of the system; the remaining six are subsidiary, its 'six feet'."[2] The second way of understanding these seven works may be found in Mkhas grub rje's "Fundamentals of the Buddhist Tantras", to wit,

> The seven logical treatises by Dharmakīrti are the primary commentary on that work [i.e. the Pramāṇasamuccaya]. The three chief treatises are comparable to a trunk (i.e. main part of body)... The remaining four treatises are comparable to limbs....[3]

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1. Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, two vols., Dover ed., 1962, I, p.37: Stcherbatsky refers to this text as Codanāprakaraṇa.

2. Ibid.

3. Lessing and Wayman, Introduction...,p. 73; Cf. E. Obermiller, trans., Bu-ston's History..., I, pp.44-45.

<u>The Pramāṇayuktinidhi and its author</u>:

The <u>Pramāṇayuktinidhi</u> was written by Sa-skya Paṇḍita (1182-1251 A.D.).[1] Sa-skya Paṇḍita was born into the Khon family, lords of the Sa-skya monastery and lands situated in the Gtsang province in the valley of the Grum river in south central Tibet.[2] J.E. Bosson has presented an extensive account of the life of Sa-skya Paṇḍita in his study of Sa-skya Paṇḍita's <u>Subhāṣitaratnanidhi</u>.[3] For the purpose of this study, however, we need only be concerned with the events in Sa-skya Paṇḍita's life which relate to his understanding of Buddhist logic and the writing of the <u>Pramāṇayuktinidhi</u>.

After first receiving the teaching of the <u>Pramāṇaviniścaya</u> from Rtsegs-ston Dbaṅ-phyug Seṅ ga, it is stated that Sa-skya Paṇḍita was not satisfied with what was being taught. He thought that foreign elements had crept into the teaching and that pure Buddhist logic was not being taught. After this initial instruction he studied logical topics with the following teachers; the Kashmiri Paṇḍita Śākyaśrībhadra, the Nepali Paṇḍita Sanghaśrī, Danaśrī, and Sugataśrī.[4]

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1. George N. Roerich, trans., <u>The Blue Annals</u>, parts I and II (Bound in One), Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1976, p.103.

2. Giuseppe Tucci, <u>Tibetan Painted Scrolls</u>, Rome, Libreria dello Stato, 1949, p.154.

3. James E. Bosson, <u>A Treasury of Aphoristic Jewels</u>, Indiana University Publications--Uralic and Altaic Series,Vol.92, Bloomington, Indiana, 1969, pp.2-7.

4. <u>Collected Works of Jaya-Pandita Blo-Bzan-hphriṅ-las, Reproduced by Lokesh Chandra</u>, New Delhi, 1981, Vol.1, p.145.

Although Sa-skya Paṇḍita studied with various scholars Śākyaśrībhadra appears to be his real guru; Sa-skya Paṇḍita was ordained as a monk under his patronage, receiving the title dharmasvāmin.[1] It is noteworthy, that The Blue Annals also mentions that Tsoṅ-kha-pa received his initiation through the lineage of Śākyaśrībhadra.[2]

Having received instruction in logic from many teachers Sa-skya Paṇḍita then re-translated the Pramāṇavārttika and the other logical treatises. It was after Sa-skya Paṇḍita's re-translation, that the Pramāṇavārttika superseded the position of the Pramāṇaviniścaya as the foremost logical text in Tibet.[3] Sa-skya Paṇḍita's authority is further established when The Blue Annals includes him in its list setting forth the lineage of Pramāṇavarttika. It may be useful to present the entire passage from The Blue Annals, to wit;

> The Muni (Thub-pa, Śākyamuni), Dharmatrata (dGra-bcom Chos-skyobs), Pan-chen Me waṅ-ga, Vasubandhu (db Yig-gnen), Dignāga (Phyogs-glaṅ), Īśvarasena (dBaṅ-phyug-sde), Dharmakīrti (Chos-grags), Devendrabodhi (Lha-dbaṅ blo), Śākyabodhi (Śākya blo), Virītadeva ('Dul-ba-lha), Dharmakīrti (Chos-grags), Prajñākara-gupta (Śer-'byuṅ), Ravigupta (Ñi-ma sbas-pa), Yamari, Jñānaśrīmitra, Dharmottara (Chos-kyi mchog), Ānanda (Śaṅkarānanda), Wam-ku pandita, Kha-che paṇ-chen Śākyasrī, Sa-paṇ[4] (Sa-skya paṇḍita Kun-dga' rgyal-

1. Roerich, The Blue Annals, p.34.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p.335.

4. Sa-skya Paṇḍita's name is often abbreviated to Sa-paṇ.

mtshan), 'U-yug-pa, Zaṅ-btsuṅ mDo-sde dpal, 'Jam-dbyaṅs Sa-skya-pa, dPal-ldan-pa, 'Jam-dbyaṅs sTon-gzon, Nor-bzaṅs-dpal, Grags-rin-pa 'Jam-sñon-pa, Chos-seṅ-ba (Chos-kyi seṅ-ge), rÑo-thog-pa Chos-kyi bzaṅ-po, mKhan-chen rin-po che rGyal-mtshan bzaṅ-po. Furhter, from Chos-seṅ-ba: bSam-grup ye śes of rGyal lha-khaṅ (in 'Phan-yul); then the teacher bSam-grub bzaṅ-po-ba. Other followers of the Pramāṇavārtika (Tshad-ma rnam-'grel) make no mention of them, but the mKhan-chen rin-po-che rGyal-mtshan bzaṅ-po has stated that after a thorough examination (of the sources), he had discovered them (i.e. the above listed teachers). This is the Lineage of the Pramāṇavārtika.[1]

Tradition shows that Sa-skya Paṇḍita wrote the Pramāṇa-yuktinidhi after studying the various Tibetan and Indian commentaries of the Pramāṇa Sūtra and the 'Seven Books' and realizing that most of the commentators had not thoroughly understood the writings of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Sa-skya Paṇḍita is said to have written the Pramāṇayuktinidhi without relying upon the earlier Indian and Tibetan commentaries, presenting his own views of Buddhist logic which faithfully follow the true purport of Dharmakīrti.[2]

As to the question of whether the Pramāṇayutinidhi was originally composed in Sanskrit or Tibetan there appears to be really little doubt. Even though this work bears a Sanskrit title in addition to its Tibetan title,[3] and is often referred to by the Sanskrit title, there is no real evidence to support the tradition which maintains that it was originally written

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1. Roerich, The Blue Annals, pp.346-347.

2. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, Sakya College, Mussoorie, India, 1975, Introduction.

3. Cf. Sa-skya Paṇḍita, Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter, Sa-skya pa bka 'bum, Vol.5: Tokyo, 1968, Fol.1.a.

in Sanskrit.[1] The view put forth by the Sa-skya tradition, that some students of Śākyaśrībhadra translated the Pramāṇayutinidhi into Sanskrit from Tibetan, and took it to India, appears to this writer to be more reasonable. According to the Sa-skya tradition the Pramāṇayuktinidhi was the first indigenous Tibetan text to be translated into Sanskrit.[2]

The Pramāṇayuktinidhi constitutes a topical commentary analyzing the main philosophical problems which are encountered in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The text is written in extremely terse verse. Without the guide of a commentary it would be quite difficult for the non-specialist in logical topics to follow the Pramāṇayuktinidhi. While neither the Pramāṇayuktinidhi nor Sa-skya Paṇḍita's self commentary on it mention a date of composition, 'Phags-pa bla-ma states that Sa-skya Paṇḍita started to work on it in his thirty-eighth year, that would be 1219.[3] And according to tradition, the seat on which he sat while writing the Pramāṇayuktinidhi is located in the building Dus mchod bla brang at Sa skya and now has a statue of Sa-skya Paṇḍita on it.[4]

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1. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p.323.

2. Cf. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, Introduction.

3. See L.W.J. van der Kuijp, "Tibetan Contributions to the 'Apoha' Theory; The Fourth Chapter of the Tshad-ma rigs-pa'i gter," Journal of the American Oriental Society, 99.3, (1979), p.409.

4. Alfonsa Ferrari, Mkhyen brtse's Guide to the Holy Places of Central Tibet, Serie Orientale Roma, 16, Roma, 1958,p.23.

The *Pramāṇayuktinidhi* or *Tshad ma rigs gter* (A Treasury of Authoritative Reasoning) contains eleven chapters, each one focusing on a specific problem. The following is a list of the chapter headings which will indicate the range of topics covered by Sa-skya Paṇḍita in this work:

1. *The Object of Cognition* (*śes bya'i yul*).
2. *The Cognition as Cognizer* (*śes byed kyi blo*).
3. *Generalization and Separateness* (*spyi daṅ bye brag*).
4. *Affirmation and Differentiation* (*sgrub daṅ gźan sel*).
5. *The Object of Expression and the Expressor* (*brjod-bya daṅ rjod byed*).
6. *Relation* (*'brel pa*)
7. *Opposition* (*'gal ba*)
8. *Definition* (*mtshan ñid*).
9. *Direct Perception* (*mṅon sum*).
10. *Inference for Oneself* (*raṅ don rjes dpag*).
11. *Inference for Others* (*gźan don rjes dpag*).

In the present study we are concerned with the ninth chapter, "Direct Perception". In his commentary on the ninth chapter Go-rams-pa does not indicate the verse upon which he is commenting at any one particular time. Therefore, Sa-skya Paṇḍita's verses have been inserted in the translation. The root-text verses are typed single spaced and contained

in parentheses just at the point where Go-rams-pa begins commenting upon them.[1]

Go-rams-pa and the Rigs gter gsal byed:

Go-rams-pa was born in 1429 in the eastern province of Do-kham. Unlike Sa-skya Paṇḍita who was born into a family of Sa-skya abbots and landowners, Go-rams-pa came from a poor family in the village of Go,[2] near Dege. After entering monastic life when he was quite young, Go-rams-pa first studied with Śes rab dpal ba. In 1447, when Go-rams-pa was eighteen, he travelled to central Tibet where he visited many shrines and studied with many of the most renowned teachers of his day: Ṅor chen kun-dga'-bzaṅ-po, Roṅ-ston Śes-bya kun-rig, Mus-chen Sems-dpa'-chen-po Kun chog-rgyal-mtsan, and Saṅs-rgyas-'phel, and others. He studied Prajñā-pāramita literature under the guidance of Roṅ-ston Śes-bya-kun-rig at Nālanda monastery. At Dreyul-kyits'al monastery,

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1. In addition to the Tshad ma rigs gter tradition of studying various logical topics there also developed a second method which may be called Blo-rig. In this method the study is divided into seven different aspects, to wit; mṅon-sum (Direct Perception), rjes dpag (inference), bcas śes (deciding cognition), log śes (deviant cognition), yid dpyod (mental analysis), snaṅ la ma ṅes (cognition uncertain as to appearance). This system of studying logical topics appears to be more prevalent with the Dge lugs pa tradition than with the Sakya pa. Cf. A. Wayman, trans,. "A Guided tour through the seven books of Dharmakīrti," I am indebted to Professor Wayman for making this manuscript available to me. (This will appear as a significant portion of Dr. Wayman's forthcoming work A Millennium of Buddhist Logic [4th to 14th], to be completed in 1983-84), p.10. Also cf.: Sherpa Tulku, et al, translators, A Compendium of Ways of Knowing, Dharma Series, Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, Dharamsala, India, 1976.

2. This would appear how Go-rams-pa received his name.

Go-rams-pa studied the entire collection of _sūtras_ and their commentaries, under the abbot Saṅs-rgyas-'phel.[1]

In 1473 Go-rams-pa founded the monasterty of Thub-ston-rnam-rgyal-gling at Rta-nag. Many other monasteries throughout Tibet became associated with Go-rams-pa's monastery. At Rta-nag, Go-rams-pa emphasized the study of the principal eighteen texts (_grags-chen-bco-brgyad_) which were required by the Sa-skya tradition for the _geshe_ degree. From 1483 until 1486 Go-rams-pa served as the Grand Abbot of Ṅor. Go-rams-pa died in 1489.

Go-rams-pa is the author of many works on various subjects. We need not dwell on his entire list of works, however, a few can be cited. He put forth his own views on _Prajñāpāramita_ doctrine, while commenting on the _Abhisamayālaṅkāra_, in his _Sbas-don rab-gsal_. He composed a commentary on Nāgārjuna's _Mūlamādhyamakakārikā_ entitled _Rtśa-ser 'grel-pa_. The _Ṅo-mtshar gsum-ldan_ is his best known work on the Abhidharma and the _Rgya-mtsho'i sñiṅ-po_ his most renowned writing on the Vinaya.

In the field of logic Go-rams-pa has written several works. He presents a systematic explanation of logical terms in _Tshad ma rnam 'grel ba kun-tu-bzaṅ-po'i od-zer_. In his _Kun-tu bzaṅ-po'i ṅag-don_, Go-rams-pa explained the reasons

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1. Much of the information included here regarding Go-rams-pa's career is contained in the introduction to the _Rigs gter gsal byed_. Some of the other information is from notes which I made during my conversations with the monks at Sakya College, during my stay in India in 1978.

for each statement in Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika. In addition to Rigs gter gsal byed, Go-rams-pa wrote a second commentary on Sa-skya Paṇḍita's Pramāṇayutinidhi, entitled, Tshad-ma rigs pa'i gter gyi-dka-ba'i-gnas-rnam-par-bśad pa sde-bdun-rab-gsal. The title means: "The explanation of the difficult sections of the Pramāṇayuktinidhi known as the ultimate elucidation of (Dharmakīrti's) seven books." It is generally abbreviated to Sde-bdun rab-gsal.[1]

In his Rigs gter gsal byed, Go-rams-pa follows Sa-skya Paṇḍita's eleven chapter divisions; he has, however, grouped the chapters under larger category titles, as follows:

A. Establishing the Object of the Cognition.

1. The Object of the Cognition.
2. The Cognition as Cognizer.

B. The Methods of Comprehending the Object by the Cognition.

3. The Method of Comprehending the Object through Generalization and Separateness.
4. The Method of Comprehending the Object Through Appearance and Differntiation.
5. The Method of Comprehending the Object of Expression and the Expressor.
6. The Method of Comprehending the Object

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1. Both the Rigs gter gsal byed and the Sde-bdun rab gsal are still used at the present time by the Sakya pa when instructing monks in the field of Buddhist Logic.

Through Relation.

7. The Method of Comprehending the Object Through Opposition.

C. Establishing the Self-existence of the Authorities as Cognizer.

8. Establishing the Definition.

D. The Significance of Each Term.

9. Direct Perception.

10. Inference for Oneself.

11. Inference for Others.

In the translation below (Part III) the "Direct Perception" chapter is presented in full. The Sakya College edition of the Rigs gter gsal byed, published in Mussoorie, India in 1975, has been employed as the basic source for this translation. Whenever a question arose as to the accuracy of the Sakya College edition, the edition of the Rigs gter gsal byed contained in the Sa-skya- pa'i bka-bum, Vol.II, published in Tokyo in 1969, was consulted.

As far as this writer is aware there have been no translations published of any portion of the Pramāṇayuktinidhi or of Go-rams-pa's Rigs gter gsal byed. The fourth chapter of the Pramāṇayuktinidhi has been edited by L.W.J. van der Kuijp and published in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, 99.3 (1979); he has not included a translation of any of the materials.

In the "Direct Perception" chapter of the *Rigs gter gsal byed* Go-rams-pa has quoted extensively from the Tibetan translations of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya*; usually Go-rams-pa merely quotes the first *pāda* of a particular verse without identifying it. Whenever he has made reference to a verse of Dharmakirti, the verse has been identified and the original Sanskrit has been included. In the cases where Go-rams-pa has repeated references to a particular verse the original Sanskrit has been provided if the textual context warranted repetition. Professor Ernst Steinkellner's recent publication of a *Verse-Index of Dharmakīrti's Works (Tibetan Versions)* made the task of tracing the quotations painless. Professor Steinkellner has succeeded in providing a useful instrument for those studying the Tibetan *tshad ma* tradition.

INTRODUCTION - PART II

Authority and Direct Perception

Although Dignāga provides a significant reference concerning the term "pramāṇa" (Tib. tshad ma) in his Pramāṇa-samuccaya, to wit, the identification of pramāṇa with the result (phala, Tib. 'bras bu), it is Dharmakīrti who presents the standard definition of pramāṇa at the outset of his Pramāṇavārttika.[1] Dharmakīrti states, "an authority is a non-deceptive cognition" and "besides it (an authority) reveals a (previously) unknown object."[2] In this definition the prior characteristic may be considered as the general description of an authoritative cognition: this is evidently the case as both Dharmottara and Vinītadeva, citing only the prior characteristic, state, "right knowledge (samyag-jñāna= pramāṇa) is a non-deceptive (avisaṁvādaka) cognition."[3]

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1. Regarding Dignāga's statement see Masaaki Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception, Harvard University Press, 1968, p. 28; and also verse 8. in Hattori's Appendix containing Sanskrit fragments of the Pramanasamuccaya's Pratyaksa chapter. Here I am of course referring to the outset of the Pramāṇa-vārttika according to the ordering of the chapters as found in the Sanskrit edition available with Manorathanandin's commentary edited by Dwarikadas Shastri, Varsnasi, 1968; For a discussion of the difference between the Sanskrit and Tibetan ordering of the Pramānavārttika' four chapters see Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, two vols., Dover ed., 1962, pg. 38-39; and also Alex Wayman, "Reflections on the Study of Buddhist Logic", Indologica Taurinensia, Vol. V, 1977, pg. 292-296.

2. D. Śhaṣtri, p.3.:pramānamavisaṁvādi jñanam; and p. 8. ajñatārthaprakaśo vā.

3. Th. Stcherbatsky, ed. Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu with its Nyāyabindu-tīkā by Dharmottara, Bibliotheca Buddhica, VII, St. Petersbourg, 1918, p.3: avisaṁvādakaṁ jñanaṁ samyagjñanam; and L. De La Vallée Poussin, ed. Tibetan Translation of the Nyayabindu of Dharmakīrti with the commentary of Vinitadeva, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1907, p.33: mi slu ba' śes pa ni yaṅ dag pa' śes pa.

However the prior characteristic is not sufficient to delimit the specific authority. It is the latter characteristic which is necessary to specify, i.e. clarify, the meaning of the prior characteristic, and hence, indicate the particular authority involved.[1] Moreover, in the later Tibetan tradition this two-fold definition evolved into the stock phrase " a non-deceptive new cognition" (gsar-du-mi-blsu-be rigs pa).[2]

Dharmakīrti emphasizes the empirical concern of the Logicians' epistemology when he explains the intention of the 'non-deceptive' character of the authoritative cognition, namely, "non-deception is the rule of purposive activity (arthakriyā)."[3] The commentarial literature presents two differing interpretations regarding the 'non-deceptive' character. Whereas Prajñākaragupta takes it to mean "the completion of a purposive activity (with regards to the object cognized), such as burning, cooking, etcetera."[4] Dharmottara on the other hand understands the non-

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1. This is to be explained below.

2. See 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa's Blo rigs kyi rnam gźag ñun gsal legs bśad gser gyi phren mdzes, The Collected works of 'Jam dbyaṅs bźad pa, Reproduced from the prints from the Bkra-sis-'khyil blocks by Ngawang Gelek Demo, New Delhi, 1972, p.336.;and also Tibetan Buddhist Studies of Kloṅ-rdol bla-ma Nag-dbaṅ-blo-bźan, two vols, ed. by Dr. Lokesh Chandra, Mussoorie, 1963,I, p. 375.

3. D. Shastri, The Pramānavārttika...,p.3, verse 2.b-c.; arthakriyāsthitiḥ aviśaṁvādanam.

4. Rāhula Sāṅkrityāyana, Pramānavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta; Patna, 1953, p. 4; arthasyadāhapākādeḥ kriyanispattis.

deceptive character of a right knowledge as a cognition "pointing out an object which is capable (samartha) of purposive activity."[1] Dharmottara's use of samartha rather than nispatti (completion) appears to be a wise choice. Prajñākaragupt's interpretation holds true in the instances where one has a cognition of a fire and subsequently either burns some fuel or cooks dinner. However, what of those other instances where there is a cognition of a fire, but for some reason the fuel is never burned nor the dinner cooked. Dharmottara's use of 'capable' takes these and other instances into consideration. Kamalaśīla, in his Pañjikā to the Tattvasaṁgraha, also follows Dharmottara's idea of capability and goes on to state that it is not the completion, since obstacles may appear.[2]

The Members of the Class Authority:

While it was necessary to turn to Dharmakīrti for the standard definition of pramāṇa, it is Dignāga who presents the description of the membership which constitutes the class authority. Immediately after the opening salutory verse in his Pramāṇasamuccaya Dignāga states:

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1. Stcherbatsky, ed. Dharmakīrti's...., p.3.;arthakriyāsamarthavastupradarśakaṁ.

2. Ganganatha Jha, trans., The Tattvasaṁgraha of Śāntaraksita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla, two vols., Baroda Oriental Institute,I, p.657.

> There are two authorities-- direct perception and inference. The sanctionable is two characters.[1]

The two characters which are accepted by the Buddhist Logicians as delimitating the sanctionable is the inherent character (svalaksana,Tib. rań gi mtshan ñid) and the generalizing character (sāmānyalaksana, Tib. spyi'i msthan ñid).

According to the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti lineage it is only pratyaksa which could directly perceive the inherent character of an object. While anumāna could only cognize the generalizing character of the object, indirectly through the **three marks** (trirūpa) of the evidence (liṅga) which refers to that object.[2] This strict division in areas of participation between the two authorities is referred to as pramāna-vyavasthā and contrasts with the Indian realists pramāna-samplava (coalescence of authority). These two divergent systems are delineated in Uddyotakāra's Nyāya-vārtika. In the Nyāya-vārtika Uddyotakāra states that his school, i.e Naiyāyika,

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1. For Sanskrit see Hattori's Appendix containing Sanskrit fragments; (His verse 2.a-b) pratyaksamanumānaṁ ca pramāne prameyaṁ laksanadvayaṁ. And for the Tibetan see Alex Wayman, A Millennium of Buddhist Logic (4th to 14th), forthcoming, Appendix 1.

2. Dignāga's Pramānasamuccaya, Tibetan version trans. by Vasudhararaksitā and Seń-rgyal, (Block print edition), New Delhi, 1977, Chapter 2, pg. 27 (Inference For Oneself). Briefly the three characteristics of the mark are; its presence in the object of the inference and in what is similar to it, and its absence in dissimilar instances. Cf. Pramānasamuccaya Ch. 2, p.31; and Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p.51 ff.

does not accept that there are only two authorities nor that there are only two objects of these authorities.[1] Furthermore, Uddyotakāra states that the Naiyāyikas do not maintain that the authorities cannot coalesce, that is, each authority is not bound only to a single aspect of the object.[2] According to this Indian realist, the Naiyāyikas accept four authorities (pratyakṣa, anumāṇa, upamāna, and śabda) and three kinds of objects, namely, individuals, generals, and mixed things or as Stcherbatsky translates it: an individual thing as possessor of generals.[3]

The Relationship Between the Class and Its Members:

Having presented the definition of an authority (pramāṇa) and having stated that, according to the Logicians, there are only two members to the class of authoritative cognitions; it remains to determine of what variety is the relationship between the class and its members, namely, the relationship between authority and direct perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāṇa). Since, however, the primary concern in this examination is direct perception, our focus will be basically directed to this area, dealing only tangentially with inference.

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1. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p.302.
2. Ibid., p.303.
3. Ibid., p.303.

It is well known that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's definition of pratyakṣa differed. In the Pramāṇasamuccaya Dignāga defines direct perception as "free from constructive thought" (kalpanāpoḍhaṁ).[1] Whereas Dharmakīrti not only has kalpanāpoḍham, but also adds 'without delusion' to his definition of direct perception.[2] Actually Dharmakīrti was reinstating the characteristic 'without delusion' from the earlier Hetuvidyā section of Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmi.[3] It was Dharmakīrti's definition of direct perception as "free from constructive thought and without delusion" that eventually predominated and became the standard definition to be found in both the later Buddhist Sanskrit and Tibetan literature.

There appears to be differing views among the commentators regarding the relationship between the class authority and its members: this divergence of views is evident in both the Indian and Tibetan literature. There is the view which maintains that the component characteristics of the definition of direct perception represent varieties of the two conditions

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1. Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, Ch.I. p.3.; and Hattori, p. 25.

2. Tilmann Vetter, Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya; 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣa, Wien, 1966, p.40.; and see also Stcherbatsky, II, p.14.

3. Alex Wayman, "A Reconsideration of Dharmakīrti's Deviation from Dignāga on Pratyakṣābhāsa," Annals (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute) (Diamond Jubilee Volume), Poona, 1977-78, p.4.; and see also Stcherbatsky, I, p.155.

which delimit the class authority. Vinītadeva, a member of the Philological school of commentators initiated by Devendrabuddhi,[1] establishes himself as a proponent of this position while explaining the significance (<u>artha</u>) of the term 'right knowledge' in Dharmakīrti's introductory verse in the <u>Nyāyabindhu</u>, to wit:

> Right knowledge is a non-deceptive cognition, that is to say, that (knowledge) which is non-deceptive regarding a purposive activity is without delusion and that (i.e. a knowledge which is without delusion) is nothing but right knowledge.[2]

And furthermore, while commenting on the definition of direct perception Vinītadeva explains:

> <u>Abhrānta</u> means 'without delusion', that is to say, not wayward (=non-deceptive) regarding the object that has been reached.[3]

In his <u>Pañjikā</u>, Kamalaśīla like Vinītadeva maintains the interpretation that the <u>abhrānta</u> characteristic of <u>pratyakṣa</u> corresponds to the <u>avisaṁvādin</u> (non-deceptive) characteristic of <u>pramana</u>, to wit:

> The expression 'without delusion' should be understood as 'non-deceptive'.[4]

Both Vinītadeva and Kamalaśīla are compelled to maintain the view that 'without delusion' (<u>abhrānta</u>) and 'non-deceptive' (<u>aviamvādin</u>) correspond, because both commentators believe

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1. Stcherbatsky, I, p.40.

2. De La Vallee Poussin, ed. p. 33.: <u>mi slu ba' śes pa'ni yaṅ dag pa' śes pa ste. gaṅ don byed pa la slu bar mi byed pa yin gyi ma nor ba gaṅ yin pa de ni yaṅ dag pa' śes pa ma yin no</u>.

3. Ibid., p. 40.: <u>hkhrul ba med pa ni ma khrul ba ste. thob bar byed pa' yul la phyin ci ma log</u>.

4. Ganganatha Jha, trans., I, p.657.

that the definition was composed by Dharmakīrti so as to be acceptable to both the Sautrantika and the Yogācāra schools.[1] As to what is meant by Yogācāra we must note Vinītadeva wrote a commentary on Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi of Vasubandhu.[2] According to Vinītadeva, if right knowledge were defined differently it would contradict the Yogācāra school. As Vinītadeva explains his Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā:

> Thus, 'without delusion' should be accepted in regard to the object that has been reached (prapaka-visaya) and not in regard to the consciousness-support object (ālambana-visaya). If 'without delusion' is accepted in regard to the consciousness-support object, then this would contradict the Yogācāra school. Because the Yogācāra claim that every cognition of the consciousness-support (object) is delusive. If (the meaning of without delusion is other) than that, the treatise (i.e. Nyāya-bindu) would contradict that school. But the treatise is written following the Sautrāntika and the Yogacāra. And 'without delusion' as the characteristic of 'non-deception' in regard to the object that has been reached, is acceptable to both (the Sautrāntika and the Yogacara).[3]

The passage cited above from Vinītadeva's Ṭīkā indicates his understanding of the term 'without delusion'. It is also significant in another respect, to wit, regarding the often held view that the Yogacara deny the existence of

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1. De la Vallée Poussin, ed.,p.34; and Jha, trans.,I, p.657.

2. Hence Vinītadeva is probably referring to the Vasubandhu type of Yogacāra rather than the Yogacāra following Asaṅga or the Laṅkāvatāra Sutra.

3. De La Vallée Poussin, ed.,p.40: 'di ltar ma 'khrul ba ñid ni thob par byed pa'i yul la khas blañ bar bya'i/ dmigs pa'i yul la ni ma yin no// gal te dmigs pa'i yul la ma 'khrul ba ñid khas len na/ des na 'dir rnal 'byor spyod pa'i lugs bsal bar byas par 'gyur te/ 'di ltar rnal 'byor spyod pa'i ni dmigs pa'i ses pa thams cad ni 'khrul ba yin par 'dod de/ de bas na de'i lugs bsal bar rab tu byed pa rdzom par 'gyur te/ rab tu byed pa ni mdo sde pa dañ rnal 'byor spyod pa'i rjes su sñegs par rdzom par 'dod la/ gñi ga yañ thob par byed pa'i yul la mi bslu ba'i mtshan ñid ni ma 'khrul pa yin par khas len to/ ; See also Jha, trans., p. 657.

an external object. A great deal of research regarding the Yogācāra school has come to the conclusion that this school of Buddhism is espousing an extreme Idealist view: denying the existence of an external object.[1] This conclusion is all the more important, if it were found to be correct, because it has been stated by Stcherbatsky and others that the Yogācāra philosophy had a great influence on the development of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti lineage. And indeed, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti did not deny an external object, in fact, it is for them the svalakṣaṇa. The svalakṣaṇa is at times referred to as paramārtha-sat ('absolute existence') for the Buddhist Logicians.

In a cogent paper entitled "Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians," Professor Wayman, dealing with the problem of the external object in the Yogācāra school, has brought together a great deal of material from both the Indian and Tibetan sources. Through his efforts in this paper Professor Wayman has helped dispell the common attribution to the Yogācāra that consciousness is the sole reality. Although a great deal of the research in that paper bears on our topic, at this point we will limit our attention to Professor Wayman's discussion of the term ālambana.

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1. Stcherbatsky may be placed at the head of this group. See Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana, Mouton and Co., The Hague, 1965, p.32.

After translating a passage from Sthiramati's commentary on Vasubandhu's Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa which begins, "Now what is vijñāna? It is defined as representation (vijñapti) of a consciouness-support (ālambana).", Professor Wayman rightly points out that in the passage "there is no denial of an ālambana in the meaning of a sense object."[1] Continuing, Dr. Wayman aptly refers to Jñānagarbha's commentary on the Maitreya chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, in order to aid his discussion of verse 3 of the Sanskrit text of Vasubandhu's Viṃśatikā. The verse in question alludes to the Buddhist mythological theory of the five or six destinies (gati) when stating, "furthermore, like the hungry ghosts (preta), so with all, there is no certainty in the stream of consciousness, upon seeing the stream of pus, and so."[2] In his commentary, Jñānagarbha presents the standard illustration of the stream of water which animals, hungry ghosts, men, and gods, all see differently, the hungry ghosts seeing it full of pus, the gods seeing it as lapis lazuli, etcetera. Jñānagarbha is illustrating the badly reported (i.e.delusive) nature of the external object: the external object, that is, the stream itself was not denied. "Hence," Professor Wayman

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1. Alex Wayman, "Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians," The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Vol. II, No. 1, 1979, p.67.

2. Ibid., p. 68.

summarizes,

> the point is not to deny an external object, but rather to affirm the representation of it as a group fabrication; and so the common denial of an external object means in these terms that there is no object of which the representation is a faithful copy.[1]

It is clear that Vinītadeva like Vasubandhu does not deny the existence of the external object. Rather, he is emphasizing that according to the Yogācāra all cognitions of the external object (i.e. ālambana) are delusive, or as Professor Wayman stated, "there is no object of which the representation is a faithful copy." Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the term 'without delusion' which Vinītadeva mentions as being the characteristic of 'non-deceptive' in regard to the cognition that causes on to reach the object, is for the Yogācāra, that cognition which is 'without delusion' regarding the representation (vijñapti). And that representation exists not in the external world, but in the mind-only (cittamātra).

A final remark about Vinītadeva's passage before turning to Dharmottara and his differing view of the relation between the class authority and the members of that class. While Dr. Wayman concludes, in his paper "Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians", that there is no unqualified denial of an external object, he concedes that his own delvings into the

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1. Ibid., p. 68.

Yogācāra literature for the purpose of his comparision of the Yogācāra with the Buddhist logicians, have considered that school only up to Vasubandhu and his commentator Sthiramati. Moreover, Professor Wayman mentions that a scholar with whom he has communicated has agreed with him about the absence of a denial of the external object in the early Yogācāra materials, but feels that the later Yogācāra school definitely denies the external object.[1] However, in light of Vinītadeva's remarks we are justified in cautiously extending Professor Wayman's conclusions beyond the period of Vasubandhu and Sthiramati;[2] since Vinītadeva is generally considered to have been active during the eighth century A.D., which is approximately three centuries later than Vasubandhu. And Vinītadeva certainly indicates that at least some members of the Yogācāra school still accept the existence of the 'consciousness-support' (ālambana) in the meaning of an external sense object. Since it is that cognition of the 'consciousness-support' which Vinītadeva declares to be delusive for the Yogācāra.

Whereas Vinītadeva clearly understands the term 'abhrānta' as a variety of 'avisaṁvādin', Dharmottara states that, "in this case (i.e. in definition of direct

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1. Ibid., p.78.

2. Taking Vasubandhu's dates as c. 420-500 A.D. See Junjiro Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, Honolulu, University of Hawaii, 2nd. edition 1949, p. 11. And regarding Sthiramati's dates Hattori notes p. 5 "that Sthiramati lived at the time Of King Guhasena of Vallabhī, who was on the throne from A.D. 558 to 566."

perception) one should not take 'without delusion' as an equivalent of 'non-deceptive'."[1] Dharmottara, who according to Stcherbatsky was the founder of the Cashimere school of commentators who interpreted Dharmakirti's text philosophically, presents his opinion thus, "'without delusion' means without waywardness regarding the nature of a given thing which possesses purposive activity".[2]

Furthermore, the Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā-ṭippaṇī states that Dharmottara understands the nature of the given thing (vasturūpa) to be equal to the 'consciousness support' (ālambana).[3] And in light of what was stated above, to wit, all cognitions of the consciousness-support in the meaning of sense objects are delusive according to the Yogācāra, it is evident that Dharmottara also does not

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1. Stcherbatsky, ed. Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu, p. 7.; na tvavisaṁvādakamabhrāntamiha grahītavyam. Cf. also Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p. 18.

2. Stacherbatsky, ed. Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu. p. 7.; abhrāntamarthakriyākṣame vasturūpe 'viparyastamucyate. Cf. also Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p. 16.

3. Th. Stcherbatsky, ed. Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī; (A Commentary On Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā); Bibliotheca Buddhica. XI, St. Petersbourg, 1909, p.19. Although there is a statement of authorship which attributes the composition of this work to Dharmottara I am slightly reluctant to accept this as valid, because it was not customary for the author of a Ṭīkā to also compose the Ṭippaṇī.

concur with Vinītadeva's notion that Dharmakīrti's definition of direct perception was composed to satisfy both the Sautrāntika and the Yogācāra school. In fact, once again the author of the Nyāyabindu-tīkā-tippanī confirms this when he states, "there is no fault in stating that the Ācarya, without any particular reason, composed the definition (of direct perception) following the doctrine of (only) the Sautrāntika." [1]

Is Our Interpretation of Vinītadeva's Position Tenable:

If our interpretation of Vinītadeva's position is to bear the weight of analysis, namely, that the component characteristics of the specific authorities represent varieties of the two conditions that delimit the class of authoritative cognitions, we should be able to establish quite an extensive correspondence. From Vinītadeva's statement presented above, it has been established that for him the avisaṁvādin characteristic of the definition of pramāna relates to the abhrānta characteristic of the definition of pratyaksa. As regards anumāna (inference), it is accepted as the second variety of the two member class authority: it too, according to our interpretation of Vinītadeva's schema, should have a variety of avisaṁvādin.

Like pratyaksa, anumāna is a cognition of an object. And again, as in his definition of pratyaksa, Dignāga does

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1. Stcherbatsky, ed. Nyāyabindutīkātippanī, p. 19.; bāhyanayena sautrāntikamatānusārenacayenā lakṣanaṁ kṛtamityadoṣah.

Vinītadeva commenting on the same verse also clearly educes the nature of the 'equal force' and hence, the occasion of avisaṁvādin in inference. Vinītadeva, agreeing with Dharmottara states that "direct perception and inference have 'equal force'". Moreover, he explicitly depicts that to which the 'equal force' refers, the commentator states:

> authority: like that, inference also, being related with an object by means of identity and causation, is non-deceptive (avisaṁvāda) and therefore is an authority....Both (direct perception and inference) are equally non-deceptive.[1]

Pratyakṣa and anumāna differ in non-deceptive character, namely, pratyakṣa's by virtue of having an arthakriyā object: and anumāna's by virtue of having an object that has the three marks of evidence. Śāntarakṣita corroborates this position in his Tattvasaṁgraha stating:

> When previously (in the definition of inference it was stated as being produced) from the evidence that has the three marks, what is intended is that it is non-deceptive. And that characteristic is that which characterizes authority.[2]

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1. De La Vallée Poussin, ed.,p.38-39.;ji ltar mṅon sum don gyis skyes par byed pa yin pas mi slu ba ste/ de'i phyir tshad ma yin pa de bźin tu rjes su dpag pa yaṅ de'i bdag ñid daṅ/ de las byun ba gñis gyis don daṅ 'grel bas mi slu ba ste/ de'i phyir tshad ma yin no/...gñi ga yaṅ mi slu ba kho nar ni 'dra na/

2. Embar Krishnamacharya, ed., Tattvasaṁgraha of Śāntaraksita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. 30., Baroda, 1926, two vols., I, p.428.;
   trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvaṁ nanu saṁvādilakṣaṇam /
   tallakṣaṇaṁ ca mānatvaṁ tatkiṁ //

not provide any indication in his definition of anumāna that he is concerned that the inferential cognition should be non-deceptive, to wit:

> Accordingly, inference for oneself consists in cognizing an object through the evidence that has three marks.[1]

Dharmakīrti also follows Dignāga in defining svārthānumāna; hence, he provides not a clue to the presence of avisaṁvādin in the instance of inference.[2]

However, upon turning to the commentarial literature Dharmottara provides an initial reference which directs us to uncovering the correspondence in question. Commenting on the conjunction ca in verse 3 (i.e. pratyakṣānumānam ca) of the pratyakṣa chapter in the Nyāyabindu, he states:

> The word ca attributed equal force to direct perception and inference.[3]

Continuing, he presents examples of the 'equal force' residing in the two authorities, that is:

> As the direct perception which causes one to reach the object is an authority, because it is invariably connected with the object. Like that, inference also, because it is invariably connected with an object, is an authority which causes one to reach an object.[4]

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1. Dignāga's Pramānasamuccaya, Ch.2.,p.27.; de ltar raṅ don ni/ tshul gsum rtagś las don mthoṅ ba'o/

2. See Stcherbatsky, ed. Dharmakīrti's, Ch. 2. v.3.

3. Ibid., p.6.; cakārah pratyaksānumānayostulyabalatvaṁ samuccinoti. Cf. also Stcherbatśky, Buddhist Logic, II, p. 14.

4. Ibid., p.6.; yathārthāvinābhāvitvādarthaṁ prāpayatpratyaksaṁ pramanaṁ 'tadvadarthāvinābhāvitvādanumānamapi paricchinnaṁarthaṁ prāpayatpramānamiti . Cf. also Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p. 14.

And Kamalaśīla, summing up his commentary on Śāntarakṣita's verse, explains:

> Where there is the (characteristic of being produced from) the evidence having the three marks, there is non-deceptiveness: and where there is non-deceptiveness, there is authoritativeness.[1]

In order for the evidence to be considered valid and hence, capable to produce a non-deceptive cognition of an inferable object, it must fulfill three conditions: it must be present in the object of the inference and in what is similar to it, and absent in their absence.[2] In the passage, Vinītadeva mentions two of the three types of marks, identity and causation. Why he omits the third type, non-perception (anupalabdhi) does not warrant investigation for the purpose of this discussion. It suffices that we have established the presence of avisaṁvādin in inference.

It is obvious that both commentators are quite in agreement regarding the 'equal force' of the two authorities, that is, the 'equal force' of both direct perception and inference lies in their being non-deceptive. The problem then, seems to be that when scholars like Vinītadeva and Kamalaśīla accepted the characteristic abhrānta as a variety of avisaṁvāda, Dharmottara misunderstood them to make abhrānta equivalent to avisaṁvada; in the sense of having the same breadth and depth.

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1. Ibid., p. 428.; yatra trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvaṁ tatrāvisaṁvāditvaṁ yatrāvisaṁvāditvaṁ tatra pramāṇyaṁ.

2. Dignāga's Pramānasamuccaya, Ch.II, kārikā 5cd, p.31.; rjes dpag bya dān de mthun la/ yod dan med ñid la med p'o/

Dharmottara's misconception is evident as he attempts to show the error in the adversary's position: wherein he understands 'without delusion' (abhrānta) to be taken as equivalent to 'non-deceptive' (avisaṁvāda). Dharmottara starts out well enough, stating that "direct perception is not other than just (a type of) right knowledge: and in that case, its non-deceptive condition is met with just because it is an(instance of) right knowledge."[1] However, pursuing his point, assuming the adversary position as holding abhrānta and avisaṁvāda as equivalents, Dharmottara demonstrates the purposelessness of the definition of direct perception under that equivalency, to wit, "that non-deceptive knowledge which is called direct perception is devoid of constructive thought and is non-deceptive."[2] Dharmottara errs by inserting the generic term avisaṁvāda which is the characteristic of the class authority, into the specific instance of defining a member of the class. Hence, he assumes that both avisaṁvāda and abhrānta are equivalant, co-extensive. However, whereas the direct perception which is abhrānta by definition,[3] is at the same time an authority

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1. Stcherbatsky, ed. Dharmakīrti's, p. 7.; samyagjñānameva pratyaksa, 'nānyat/ tatra samyagjñānatvādevavisaṁvādakatve labdhe.' Cf. also Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, 18.

2. Stcherbatsky, ed. Dharmakīrti's, p. 7.;...pratyaksākhyaṁ yadavisaṁvādakaṁ jñānaṁ tatkalpanapodhamavisaṁvādakaṁ... Cf. also Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p. 18.

3. In this example I have included the phrase "which is abhrānta by definition," in order to side step the controversy between those who accept pratyakṣabhāsa as pratyakṣa and those who do not. Cf. For a discussion of this examination I refer the interested reader to Dr. A. Wayman's paper "A Reconsideration of Dharmakīrti's 'Deviation' from Dignāga on Pratyaksābhāsa," Annals (Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute) (Diamond Jubilee Volume), Poona, 1977-78, pp. 387-396.

(pramāṇa) which is avisaṁvāda: the authority which is avisaṁvāda by definition is not necessarily abhrānta, for instance inference (anumāna).

On the other hand, Vinītadeva's use of the generic term non-deceptice (mi slu ba) in a passage cited above is not objectionable. His stating, "as direct perception...is non-deceptive...: like that, inference also,...is non-deceptive," is perfectly within reason. As was indicated previously, a direct perception which is by definition without delusion, is non-deceptive: so also, in the case of inference which is by definition brought about through the evidence having the three marks. Therefore, whereas direct perception's non-deceptive character is represented as a cognition which is without delusion in respect to the knowledge that causes one to reach an object: inference's non-deceptive character is manifest as the cognition produced through the evidence having the three marks. And though each specific member of the class has a variety of the characteristic non-deceptive, direct perception's 'without delusion' cannot be applied to inference and inference's quality of being produced through the evidence having the three marks certainly cannot be applied in the case of direct perception.

The Latter Characteristic of an Authoritative Cognition:

In the preceeding section we have examined the prior characteristic of the class authority and have seen that it was variously applied to the paradigm of direct perception. Despite the fact that Dharmottara and Vinītadeva differently

interpreted the relation of the class character <u>avisaṁvādin</u> to the <u>abhrānta</u> characteristic of the particular authority, i.e. direct perception, it is significant that both commentators devoted a great amount of energy to this discussion. However, upon turning to the latter characteristic of the class authority, to wit, "besides it (an authority) reveals the unknown object-entity," both writers are conspicuously silent. Dharmottara does not state, as we would expect him to, that this latter characteristic should not be designated as equivalent to a characteristic of the particular authority: and hence, following the line of thought which he applied to the prior characteristic of the class authority. Nor does Vinītadeva state that a variety of this latter characteristic is to be interpreted in the particular authority: and consequently, appling the same view which he utilized with regards to the prior characteristic of the class authority.

The effort extended by both Dharmottara and Vinītadeva in the area of the characteristic <u>avisaṁvādin</u> is understandable, since both commentators considered it to be the more significant of the two characteristics of an authority. As stated above both writers similarly declared that "a right knowledge (<u>samyag-jñāna</u>) is a non-deceptive (<u>avisaṁvādaka</u>) cognition." Neither commentator makes any similar remark regarding the latter characteristic which is now being considered. Furthermore, the other relevant Indian authors such as, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, also do not

discuss this latter characteristic: whereas, Kamalaśīla states in his Pañjikā that "the cognition which is non-deceptive is authoritative."[1]

In the Tibetan literature our author, Go-rams-pa, does not add anything to our understanding of the latter characteristic, for, he simply repeats the Indian commentators in accepting the avisaṁvādaka characteristic as primary. We may infer Go-rams-pa's intentions from a statement he makes in the second chapter of the Rigs gter gsal byed, entitled "The Cognition as Cognizer".[2] In that chapter, while discussing the problem of the non-authoritative cognition (apramāṇa; tshad min), Go-rams-pa states the "(the general definition of a non-authoritative cognition is) a cognition which lacks non-decption."[3] Hence, Go-rams-pa's remark is functionally equivalent to those of his Indian predecessors: both are indicating the pivotal position of the non-deceptive character of an authoritative cognition.

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1. Embar Krishnamachary, ed., p.428; pramāṇamavisaṁvādijñānam. See also Jha, trans., p.720.

2. Śes byed kyi blo. For the list of the chapters in the Rigs gter gsal byed see Part I of this Introduction.

3. Go-rams-pa's Sde bdun mdo daṅ bcas pa'i dgoṅs pa phyin ci ma log par 'grel pa tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa, Sakya College, Mussoorie, India, 1975, p. 18.; mi bslu ba ma yin pa'i śes pa'o/

Dharmottara et al. hold that if a cognition is non-deceptive it is sufficient to be considered right knowledge (i.e. authoritative). The way Go-rams-pa says it is, if a cognition lacks non-deception, no more is needed to decide its non-authority. Hence, the Indian commentators state it in the anvaya form,[1] while Go-rams-pa puts it in the vyatireka form.[2]

Tsoṅ-kha-pa, however, provides some significant information regarding the circumstances of the latter definition of the class authority. Before addressing Tsoṅ-kha-pa's contribution on this point, a preliminary statement indicating certain similarities between Tsoṅ-kha-pa and Go-rams-pa should be presented. Within the study of Buddhist epistemology, Tsoṅ-kha-pa like Go-rams-pa, understands mind (buddhi T. blo), awareness (vidyā, T. rig-pa), and cognition (jñāna, T. śes-pa) as having the same meaning (don gcig).[3] The

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1. According to Tsoṅ-kha-pa (1357-1419) the anvaya-vyāpti is defined as "the evidence that is the mark of certainty in only the similar case (sapaksa)." See Alex Wayman, trans., "A guided tour through the seven books of Dharmakīrti," (This translation which Dr. Wayman has kindly made available to me will appear as a significant portion of his forthcoming work A Millennium of Buddhist Logic [4th to 14th], to be completed and readied for press in his sabbatical year research 1983-84), p.28.

2. Again according to Tsoṅ-kha-pa the vyatireka-vyāpti is defined as "the evidence that is the mark of certainty only not being in the dissimilar case (asapaksa), according to the method of proof." See Wayman, trans., "A guided...", p.22.

3. Cf. Wayman, trans., "A guided...", p.9, and Go-rams-pa's Sde bdun..., p.14-15.

Sde bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gñer yid kyi mun sel, or as Professor Wayman entitled his translation "A guided tour through the seven books of Dharmakīrti", constitutes an abbreviated form of logical treatise providing the main terms, varieties, and examples, of Buddhist logic; so Tsoṅ-kha-pa merely mentions the three as synonymous. Go-rama-pa proceeding a mite further, explains that while mind is equivalent to an awareness, a cognition is an awareness which clarifies.[1] In his self-commentary (raṅ-'grel) to the Tsahd ma rigs-pa'i gter, Sa-skya Paṇḍita states that the "mind is an awareness which clarifies an object."[2]

Moreover, both Tsoṅ-kha-pa and Go-ram-pa use a similar methodology in examining the mind, qua awareness, qua cognition. Both writers understand the variegation of the mind as being authoritative or non-authoritative, as being with constructive thought or as being without constructive thought, and as having delusion or as not having delusion.[3] Go-rams-pa, further states that the mind is explained as either being with constructive thought or without constructive when it is variegated by way of the object, while it is explained as being either delusive or non-delusive when variegated by way of nature (ṅo bo).[4]

1. Go-rams-pa's Sde bdun..., p.15,

2. Sa-skya Paṇḍita's Tshad-ma rigs-pa'i gter-gyi raṅ-gi 'grel pa, Sa-skya-pa'i bka'-'bum, Vol. 5, Tokyo, 1968, p.168.

3. Cf. Wayman, trans., "A guided...", p.16.; and Go-rams-pa's Sde bdun..., p.15.

4. Go-rams-pa's Sde bdun..., p.15.

Now, having mentioned the above similarities, what of Tsoṅ-kha-pa and what was called the "latter characteristic" of the definition of authority? The two Indian commentators and Go-rams-pa have concentrated their energies upon the prior characteristic of the definition of an authority, to wit, "an authority is a non-deceptive cognition," and have explained the non-deceptive character as pivotal. But Tsoṅ-kha-pa, beginning his discussion of the variegation of the mind with an examination of 'authority' and 'non-authority', states:

> Authority (pramāṇa) is defined as the cognition which comprehends newly its own object....Non-authority (a-pramāṇa) cognition is defined as the cognition (buddhi) that does not comprehend newly its own object.[1]

Hence, Tsoṅ-kha-pa has shifted his emphasis to the second definition of an authoritative cognition, namely, "it (an authority) reveals a (previously) unknown object."

When Tsoṅ-kha-pa shifts his emphasis to the "latter characteristic" it does not seem that he disagrees with the aforementioned Indian commentators and Go-rams-pa. Tsoṅ-kha-pa does not explicitly contradict or deny the validity of the statements made by those writers.[2] As will be shown Tsoṅ-kha-pa attempts to gain greater clarity by viewing all. After defining authority as the cognition

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1. Wayman, "A guided...", pg.9-10.

2. To wit; "a right knowledge is a non-deceptive cognition," and "(the general definition of a non-authoritative cognition is) a cognition which is not non-deceptive."

which cognizes its own object, Tsoṅ-kha-pa continues:

> Therefore, the meaning of (the verse) stating, Authority is a cognition without deception," is not only non-deception: because it (authority) is a cognition which has been stated as that which "cognizes newly". The (verse) stating "Or (besides) it clarifies the (previously) unknow object," laid down clearly the meaning of the prior verse.[1]

Tsoṅ-kha-pa's prefacing the presentation of the prior characteristic of authority by stating his general definition of authority, appears to allude to the "latter characteristic", and so he cautions the student to beware of incomplete conclusions. Whereas one may ascertain that a cognition is aright knowledge by means of the non-deceptive character, it is only by means of the second characteristic, newly, that one may gain clarification as to which of the two varieties of authority is involved: whether it is direct perception or inference. Accordingly, Tsoṅ-kha-pa understands this clarification to be the baliwick of the second definition of authority.

For Tsoṅ-kha-pa the prior definition alone is not enough to bring forth the proper degree of clarity, to wit, differentiation. In order to have a right knowledge differentiated as a particular authoritative cognition there must also be present a variety of the latter characteristic of the class authority. Tsoṅ-kha-pa's advocacy for this

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1. After viewing Tsoṅ-kha-pa's passage in light of the present discussion I have translated it slightly different from Dr. Wayman; cf. Tsoṅ-kha-pa's Sde bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gñer yid kyi mun sel źes bya ba, Sarnath, 1969, p.16.; and Wayman, "A guided...", p.9.

position is evident as he concludes his discussion of authority, answering the query, "What is the meaning of 'or' [vā] (in the second definition of authority)? He states:

> As to the meaning of the prior verse (i.e. an authority is a non-deceptive cognition), it is not sufficent (to indicate) that there is to be no fault of non-pervasion (as found) in the 'derived from speech' (śābda) authority, but also (= "or") there should be no fault of the pervasive feature (as found) in the cognition of conventional existence. That is meaning (of "or").[1]

It is our understanding that while the prior characteristic is not capable to insure that the two faults mentioned in the passage do not occur, it is Tsoṅ-kha-pa's intention that we understand the latter characteristic of authority as that which guards against these faults. And once we accept this to be a function of the latter characteristic, it appears reasonable to this writer that as we have established the corresponding variegations of the prior characteristic 'non-deceptive' in both direct perception and inference, so also, we may establish a correspondence between the latter characteristic 'newly' and the individual authorities.

The method of establishing the correspondence in question is most judicially accomplished if we first understand that the two faults are of differing natures, each corresponding to particular autnority. The latter instance, to wit, "there

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1. Once again cf. Tsoṅ-kha-pa's Sde bdun..., p.16.;and Wayman, "A guided...", p.10.

should be no fault of the pervasive feature (as found) in the cognition of conventional existence," refers to the faulty condition which is to be guarded against in the case of direct perception. While the prior example, "there is to be no fault of non-pervasion (as found) in the 'derived belief' (śābda) authority," refers to that faulty condition which is to be prevented in the case of inference.

With respect to direct perception, what is that pervasive feature found in the cognition of conventional existence which is to be prevented? In his self-commentary to the Pramāṇasamuccaya, while commenting on verse 6 of the "Direct Perception" chapter, Dignāga states:

> Cognition of conventional existence is a falsification of direct perception....thus functioning through a conctructive thought (kalpana).[1]

And likewise, Dignāga states:

> ...delusive cognition is a falsification of direct perception because of functioning through a constructive thought....The cognition in terms of inference, its results and so on, is not direct perception, because of being constructive thought.[2]

Evidently the feature which pervades not only the cognition of conventional existence, but the other two falsifications of direct perception as well, is constructive thought. It

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1. Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya,p.5; kun rdzob tu yod pa'i śes pa ni...brtags ñas 'jug pa'i phyir mṅon sum ltar snaṅ ba'o/

2. Ibid., p.5; ...'khrul pa'i śes pa ni...rtog pa'i phyir mṅon sum ltar snaṅ ba'o/...rjes su dpag pa daṅ de'i 'bras bu la sogs pa'i śes pa ni...rtog pa'i phyir mṅon sum ma yin no/

is the constructive thought which the latter characteristic of the authority is sufficent to guard against, preventing a falsification of direct perception. Thus, within the particular instance of direct perception the "free from constructive thought" aspect of the definition corresponds to the 'newly' characteristic of the definition of the class authority.

Briefly considering the case of inference--we certainly would not consider the presence of 'constructive thought' in inference to be a fault , since it is accepted by the Buddhist Logicians that inference consists of constructive thought. As the Tattvasaṁgraha informs, certain non-Buddhist schools, namely the Mīmāmsaka, hold that the knowledge of the 'derived from speech' authority is valid because of the eternalness of the sentence.[1] The fault of non-pervasion found in the 'derived from speech' authority which the latter characteristic ,newly, prevents, is the absence of perceiving the invariable connection of what is derived from speech and the object to which it refers. Śāntarakṣita explains that the concomitance of all things can be recognized only by their function.[2] And Kamalaśīla declares the phrase "by their function" to mean "by existence, by being present", and "only what exists can be invariably connected, not what does not exist".[3]

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1. Ganganatha Jha, trans., Vol. II;p.742ff.

2. Ibid., p.744.

3. Ibid., p.744.

It is only in the well established instances like fire and smoke, that is to say, when the fire exists whenever there is smoke, that invariable connection can be perceived.[1] With respect to the 'derived from speech' authority, there is no such pervasion between the word and the object spoken of. As Kamalaśīla states, "the word 'Dates' is heard in one place--the city of Pāṭaliputra for instance,-- and yet the thing,--the dates themselves--do not exist there."[2] The threefold pervasion (i.e. invariable connection) of the valid evidence can abide in only what exists presently, such as the cognition of smoke: and hence must be cognized 'newly'.

Two Different Interpretations of the Relationship Between Pramāṇa and Pratyakṣa:

As mentioned above there developed in the Tibetan philosophical literature a pedagogical style known as Blo-rigs (mental processes).[3] Within the materials devoted to this subject there would often occur a discussion of authority (pramāṇa) and direct perception (pratyakṣa). Just such a discussion takes place in the fourteenth chapter (pha) of the Gsuṅ-'bum (Collected works) of the eighteenth century scholar Kloṅ-rdol-bla-ma Ṅag dbaṅ-blo-bzaṅ, entitled "Tshad-ma rnam 'grel dtan tshig rig pa las byun ba'i miṅ gi

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1. Ibid., p.744.

2. Ibid., p.745.

3. This is the term which Stcherbatsky uses. Although I am not satisfied with this gloss it will suffice for the present. See Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p.322,note 5.

grans".[1] After presenting the standard definition of mind and its seven variegations,[2] including the valid instances of direct perception authority and inferential authority, Klon-rdol-bla-ma begins his explanation with a discussion of direct perception. He takes the qualities which delimit a direct perception and the characteristics which define an authority as being separate sets which have to occur within a common substratum, i.e. an awareness, for there to exist a direct perception-authority. This position is evident when Kloṅ-rdol-bla-ma states:

> The defintion of direct perception authority is an awareness which occurs as the common substratum being devoid of constructive thought and without delusion, while (cognizing) newly (its own object) without deception.[3]

Following the definition of direct perception authority this author presents its variegations and then further indicates his desire to separate authority and direct perception with an illustration, to wit:

> While an eye-cognition is an authority, if there is an eye-cognition, it is not necessarily an authority. For example, like the eye-cognition perceiving a snowy mountain as blue. Furthermore, while a direct perception is an authority, if there

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1. Tibetan Buddhist Studies, II, p.363.

2. Like Tsoṅ-kha-pa and Go-rams-pa, Kloṅ-rdol bla-ma also states; rigs pa blo yi mtshan ñid/. Cf. Wayman, trans., "A guided...", p.9, and Go-rams-pa' Sde bdun..., p.14.

3. Tibetan Buddhist Studies, II, p.375; rtog pa daṅ bral źin ma 'khrul ba yaṅ yin gsar du mi bslu ba yaṅ yin pa'i gźi mthun par gyur pa'i rig pa/ mṅon sum tshad ma'i mtshan ñid/

> is a direct perception, it is not necessarily an authority. (For example,) while all deciding cognitions devoid of constructive thought, like the second moments of direct perception authority, are direct perceptions; and likewise, all the sense cognitions which are cognitions that do not comprehend the appearance are direct perceptions. These direct perceptions are not authorities.[1]

Putting aside the question of whether these examples utilized in Kloṅ-rdol-bla-ma's passage are valid, his position on the question of the relationship between direct perception and authority is clear. Accordingly, for Kloṅ-rdol-bla-ma, though a direct perception is (may be) an authority, it does not follow that if there is direct perception, it is a direct perception authority. Since for Kloṅ-rdol-bla-ma an awareness may be devoid of constructive thought and without delusion, while at the same time not serving as a substratum-awareness which cognizes 'newly' its own object without deception. Hence, for Kloṅ-rdol-bla-ma, *avisaṁvādaka* (*bslu med*) and *abhrānta* (*ma 'khrul ba*) would have no correlational correspondence, nor would *ajñātārthaprakāśa* (*ma śes don-gsal*) and *kalpanāpoḍha* (*rtog pa daṅ bral*).

On the other hand, however, our author Go-rams-pa clearly indicates that he understands the characteristics of both authority and direct perception to be correlational.

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1. *Ibid.*, p.375; *mig śes tshad ma yin kyaṅ mig śes yin na tshad ma yin mi dgos te/ dper na gñas ri sṅon por snaṅ ba'i mig śes bźin/ mṅon sum tshad ma yin kyaṅ mṅon sum yin tshad yin na tshad ma yin mi dgos te/ mṅon sum tshad ma skad gcig gñis pa lta bu rtog med dpyad śes thams cad daṅ/ snaṅ la ma ṅes pa'i dbaṅ śes thams cad mṅon sum yin kyaṅ/ mṅon sum tshad ma ma yin na/*

At the very outset of the "Mṅon sum" (Direct perception) chapter of the Rigs gter gsal byed, while discussing the definition of 'direct perception', Go-rams-pa refutes the definition of those scholars who have "divided direct perception (pratyakṣa) and direct perception as authority (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa)." According to Go-rams-pa, some scholars like Phya pa, etcetera, define direct perception (pratyakṣa) as "an awareness (samvid) which is free from constructive thought and without delusion." While they define direct perception authority as "(a pratyakṣa) deciding the superimposition by the force of the immediate experience in relation to a previously uncognized object".[1]

Go-rams-pa refutes the separation of pratyakṣa and pratyakṣa-pramāṇa for two reasons. First of all, he states that it is wrong "because the division into two is not proved form the texts (i.e. Pramāṇasamuccaya, Pramāṇavārttika, etcetera)." And secondly, the separation is incorrect because "there is no exclusion (of any pratyakṣa) in relation to a previously uncognized object and there is no possiblity of a direct perception deciding that there is a superimpostion."[2] The first reason is self-evident and requires no explanation. As regards the second reason, since for Go-rams-pa the

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1. Go-rams-pa's Sde bdun...,p.125.

2. Ibid. p. 125.

component characteristics of the definition of direct perception are varieties of the component characteristics of the definition of the class authority, no pratyakṣa is excluded from fulfilling the authoritative condition of "cognizing a previously uncognized object." It is the "free from constructive thought" characteristic in the definition of pratyakṣa that satisfies this condition. Furthermore, it is inadmissible that there is a direct perception which is deciding that there is a superimposition. Since a direct perception by definition must be devoid of constructive thought, there must be the absence of any judgment which would be capable of deciding anything.

The Definition of Direct Perception

Like most other Indian and Tibetan Buddhist logicians after Dharmottara,[1] Go-rams-pa follows Dharmakīrti's well-known definition of direct perception. Understanding the true definition of direct perception as "a cognition which is free from constructive thought and without delusion," Go-rams-pa quotes the Pramāṇaviniścaya (Prat.4.a.) as his source, to wit, pratyakṣaṃkalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam.[2] And again, as he emphasized the unity of direct perception and direct perception authority while rejecting the incorrect definitions of direct perception put forth by those scholars who promulgated a division thereof, here also while commenting on Dharmakīrti's definition of direct perception Go-rams-pa states:

> Therefore, the definition of a direct perception as authority (pratyaksa-pramāna) is the same as the definition of direct perception (pratyaksa);...Surely that (i.e.pratyaksa) is recognized as being an authority; because it is not stated that there is a different definition for direct perception as authority.[3]

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1. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, two vols., Dover ed., 1962, I.,p.155.

2. See Tilmann Vetter, Dhramakīrti's Pramānaviniscaya; 1. Kapitel: Pratyaksa, Wien, 1966, p.40. See also below Part III, Translation of Text.

3. Go-rams-pa, Sde bdun mdo daṅ bcas pa'i dgoṅs pa phyin ci ma log par 'grel pa tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa, Sakya College, Mussoorie, India, 1975, p.125.

<u>The Intention of Both Characteristics Taken Together</u>:

Go-rams-pa appears to have distinctly followed Dharmottara's lead when he understands the intention of both characteristics of the definition of direct perception to be that of disspelling the wrong conceptions held by others, regarding the nature of direct perception. Go-rams-pa goes so far as to borrow Dharmottara's phraseology, to wit, <u>vipratipattinirākaraṇa</u> (<u>log rtog sel ba</u>).[1] According to the <u>Rigs gter gsal ba</u>, both characteristics of the definition are intended to contradict the Vaiśeṣika and Naiyāyika, "who mistakenly accept sense cognition (<u>indriya-vijñāna</u>) as 'without delusion' while possessing constructive thought."[2] In Professor Shastri's <u>Critique of Indian Realism</u>, however, we find a seeming exception to Go-rams-pa's criticism in the likes of Vācaspatimiśra, the ninth century Brahmanical scholar. Though Shastri censures Vācaspatimiśra for misinterpreting Gotama, the Nyāya founder, and his definition of perception, and as a result, states that there are two kinds of perception, to wit,

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1. Cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, ed. <u>Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu with it's Nyāyabindu-ṭīka by Dharmottara</u>, Bibliotheca Buddhica, VII, St. Petersbourge, 1918, p.7. and Go-rams-pa's <u>Sde bdun mdo daṅ dcas pa'i dgoṅs pa phyin ci ma log par 'grel pa tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa</u>, as represented below Part III, Tibetan Text, p. .

2. See below <u>Part III, Translation of Text</u>, p. .

"indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and determinate (savikalpaka),"[1] it is interesting to note this exception.

Without significantly digressing we will briefly consider how Vācaspatimiśra arrived at his conclusion. After presenting Gotama's definition of perception as follows: "perception is a cognition produced by the sense-object contact, which is (i) unnamable (avyapadeśya), (ii) uncontradicted (avyabhicārin), and (iii) definite or determinate (vyavasāyātmaka),"[2] Shastri explains that Vācaspatimiśra (mis)interprets part of the sūtra, namely, indriyārtha-sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam avyabhicāri (the uncontradicted knowledge produced by sense-object contact) as the definition of perception.[3] Furthermore, Shastri states that Vācaspatimiśra misunderstands the remaining two words of the sūtra, avyapadeśya and vyavasāyātmaka, as indicating two kinds of perception.[4]

The Critique of Indian Realism explains that the exact meaning of the term avyapadeśya in Gotama's definition has presented difficulty to many of the most well known Nyāya commentators: Jayanta's Nyāya-mañjarī, which discussed as many as six alternative interpretations of this term, is cited to indicate the lack of clarity regarding the meaning

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1. D. N. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism; A Study of the Conflict Between the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika and the Buddhist Dignāga School, Agra University, Agra, 1964, p. 431.

2. Ibid., p. 426.

3. Ibid., p.426-431.

4. Ibid., p.431.

of this term. According to Shastri, it was the first term's (i.e. avyapadeśya) natural intimation of the notion of an indeterminate perception having no verbal element and the third term's (i.e. vyavasāyātmaka) suggestion of an affinity with the term adhyavasāya, used in Buddhist epistemology to designate the determinate knowledge, which led Vācaspatimiśra to interpret them as indicating two varieties of perception. Furthermore, Shastri states that Vācaspatimiśra's interpretation "does violence" to the text of Gotama's sūtra, where the word avyabhicārin occurs in between the words avyapadeśya and vyavasāyātmaka. For the author of the Critique of Indian Realism it is obvious that all three terms are attributes of perception; hence, "the knowledge which is held to be unnamable (free from verbal element) is also held to be vyavasāyātmaka, definite or determinate, the former word can in no way suggest indeterminate perception."[1]

Moreover, Shastri explains that Vācaspatimiśra's interpretation of avyapadeśya as indicating a type of perception does not agree with Vātsyāyana, the earliest commentator on the Nyāya-sūtras, nor with Uddyotakara or any one of the six alternative interpretations of this term given by Jayanta. Thus he concludes that "Vācaspatimiśra's interpretation is, therefore, his own innovation."[2] So, while

1. Ibid., p.431.

2. Ibid.

Vācaspatimiśra would appear at first glance to contradict Go-rams-pa's criticism, upon examination it is evident that the Nyāya do accept sense cognition as without delusion while possessing constructive thought.

The Intention of 'Without Delusion':

The intention of the characteristic 'without delusion' in the definition of direct perception is understood quite similarly in all the textual sources consulted. For Go-rams-pa the term 'without delusion' is for the purpose of "the exclusion (vyāvṛtti) of the heterogeneous class (jāti)."[1] Go-rams-pa emphatically delimits that heterogeneous class of perceptions which abhrānta excludes as those delusive cognitions produced "through the causes of error (vibhrāmakāraṇa) situated in a sense organ (indriyagata), the one situated in the object (viṣayagata), the one situated in a place (bahyāśraya), etcetera."[2]

Moreover, Professor Wayman in his chapter entitled "Millennium Two" identifies folio 21 a-4 in Bu-ston's commentary on the Pramāṇaviniścaya as going with Dharmakīrti's self-commenatry on the term abhrānta in his definition of pratyakṣa and its relationship with pratyakṣābhāsa.[3] In-

1. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.125.

2. Ibid., p.126.

3. Alex Wayman, A Millennium of Buddhist Logic (4th to 14th) (This manuscript was kindly made available to me by Dr. Wayman. It is to be completed 1983-1984), p.8.

terestingly, Professor Wayman states: "P-Vin-Bu 21-4,ff. goes with P-Vin-Prat (Vetter,p. 40.3-5) about 'falsification of perception'(pratyaksābhāsa), indicating that Dharmakīrti added the abhrānta to differentiate 'falsification of perception' from'perception'."[1] Hence, as summarized by Wayman, Bu-ston's understanding of the term abhrānta is like that of Go-rams-pa.

Dharmottara, agreeing with both Go-rams-pa and Bu-ston regarding the intention of 'without delusion', presents an interesting example of the exclusive nature of abhrānta. According to Dharmottara, when the term abhrānta is not added to the definition of direct perception, the vision of a moving tree by a passenger travelling on a ship would be included by some persons as an instance of direct perception. The 'devoid of constructive thought' characteristic would not guard against such an instance, since here there would be an underlying reality which is not a construct. However, even thought a man acted upon his perception and reached a tree, which in turn supported his perception, his perception is a delusion, it is not direct perception.[2] According to Dharmottara that tree is not reached because

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1. Ibid.

2. See Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p. 16; and also Stcherbatsky, Dharmakirti's Nyayabindu..., p.7.

> that (cognition) determines a tree pertaining to various places, while a tree fixed in a single place is reached. Therefore, whatever place the moving tree is seen, that place is not reached. And the place which is reached is not that seen. No object whatsoever is reached from that (delusive cognition).[1]

However, Dharmottara's commitment to this single interpretation of abhrānta is somewhat weakened by the following: At the outset of his discussion of the intention of the definition of direct perception, he clearly states that both of the characteristics of the definition taken together are intended to clear away misconceptions--not to distinguish direct perception from inference.[2] For Dharmottara "the term 'without constructive thought' alone prevents inference."[3] However, following his discussion of its ability to exclude, Dharmottara explains that the term 'without delusion' might also be for the sake of distinguishing direct perception from inference. In this instance Dharmottara refers to the fact that every inference consists of constructive thought (kalpanā) and hence, is delusive when compared with pure sensation--the source of actual cognition. Dharmottara's statement stems

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1. Stcherbatsky, ed. Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu..., p.7; nānādeśagamī hi vṛkṣastenaparicchinnaḥ/ ekadeśaniyataśca vṛkṣo 'vāpyate/ tato yaddeśo gacchadvṛkṣo dṛṣṭastaddeśo navāpyate/ yaddeśaścāvāpyate sa na dṛṣṭa iti/ na tasmātkaścidartho 'vāpyate/; See also Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II, p.17.

2. Stcherbatksy, Buddhist Logic, II, p.16.

3. Stcherbatsky, ed. Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu...; kalpanāpoḍhagrahaṇenaivānumānaṁ nivartiatam/

from Dignāga, who, as F.Th. Stcherbatsky explains, accepts two kinds of delusion, an empirical and a transcendental one.[1] While the moving tree is an empirical delusion excluded from the realm of direct perception by the term abhrānta, the standing tree, although an empirical reality, is a delusive constructive thought when compared with the svalakṣaṇa. For Dignāga

> the whole matter of inference and the inferable depends on the relation of the factual base (dharmin) and the feature (dharma)--a relation just brought about by the intellect; it does not refer to an external existence and non-existence.[2]

Finally, Vinītadeva and Śāntarakṣita similarly hold that the abhrānta characteristic is intended for the purpose of exclusion. While Vinītadeva's explanation that, "the term "abhrānta is mentioned in order to exclude the delusive cognitions of a person having 'cauls' of the eyes,"[3] may at first sight appear as having no relationship to Śāntarakṣita's explanation that "the mentioning of abhrānta has been made for the purpose of

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1. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, II,p.18. note 1.

2. Vācaspati Miśra's Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-tīkā, ed. by G.S. Tailanga, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benāres, 1898, p.127; sarvo 'yam anumānānumeyabhāvo buddhyārūdhena dharmadharmibhāvena na bahih sadasattvam apeksate. And cf. also H.N. Randle, Fragments From Dignaga, The Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1926, p.51-52.

3. L. De La Vallée Poussin, ed. Tibetan Translation of the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti with the commentary of Vinitadeva, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1907, p.40; smras pa ma khrul ba smos pa ni re źig rab rib can gyi śes pa 'khrul ba rnam par bcad par bya ba'i phyir.

excluding the cognitions of kesondraka (a net of hair), etcetera."[1] Upon a closer examination of the two cases, however, the establishment of a not insignificant relationship becomes apparent. In his translation of the above passage in Śāntarakṣita's Tattvasaṃgraha, Ganganatha Jha has asterisked the word keśoṇḍraka. In a rare note, he states that "it is not clear what is meant by this,"[2] that is to say, by Śāntarakṣita's use of the term keśoṇḍraka. Turning to Go-rams-pa, however, we are able to detect the connection between taimira (i.e. caul of the eye) and keśoṇḍraka. First of all, in his discussion of those falsifications of direct perception (pratyakṣābhāsa) which do not have constructive thought, Go-rams-pa initially explains the delusive sense cognition: stating that they are "like the sense cognitions appearing as keśondraka (skra śad 'dsag)."[3] Following this he identifies Dignāga's Pramāṇa-samuccaya, Prat. 6.d. as explaining the corresponding physical manifestations of those sense cognitions appearing as keśondraka,

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1. Embar Krishnamacharya, ed., Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. 30., Baroda, 1926, two vols., I, verse 1312 a-first half c; keśondrakādivijñānanivṛttyarthamidaṃ kṛtam/ abhrāntagrahaṇaṃ/

2. Ganganatha Jha, trans., The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla, two vols., Gaekwad's Oriental Series, No. 80 and 83, Baroda Oriental Institute, I, p.657.

3. See Rigs gter gsal byed, p.158.

to wit, Go-rams-pa states, "as shown (in the Pramāna-samuccaya, Prat.6.d.) thus:

> pratyaksābhāsam sataimiram //
> The falsification of direct perception along with sensory affliction."[1]

From Go-rams-pa's illustration it is evident that the examples of Vinītadeva and Śāntaraksita are related, to wit, each writer is using only one component of the complete metaphor.

Finally, it is interesting to note that there are other textual instances, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, which utilize differing variations of this taimira-kesondraka metaphor. Since a discussion of this metaphor is of a more literary nature and only tangentially related to out analysis, at this time merely the textual locations will be noted. Although it is not in the context of discussing the falsification of direct perception, Manorathanandin draws upon the relationship of taimira and keśa while commenting on the early verses of the "Direct Perception" chapter of the Pramānavārttika.[2] And significantly, Gotama, in his Nyāya Sūtras, also looks to this same type of metaphor, stating:

> keśasamūhe taimirikopalabdhivattadupalabdhih//[3]

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1. Ibid.

2. Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., Pramānavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the Commentary 'Vrtti' of Acharya Manorathanandin, Varanasi, 1966, p.103.

3. Ganganatha Jha, ed., Nyāyasutra of Gotama, Poona Oriental Series No. 58, Poona, 1939, Book IV, Ch. 2. v.13.

The Intention of 'Devoid of Constructive Thought'

It has already been stated above that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti differed with regard to the definition of direct perception; Dharmakīrti alone had insisted on stating the 'non-delusive' character of the definition, while the requirement that a direct perception be free from constructive thought was common to the definition of both scholars. The question then, which can now be addressed is what constitutes their respective notions concerning the nature of that constructive thought, the freedom from which serves as a differentia of an authoritative direct perception?

Turning first to Dignāga, he clearly presents his discussion of this topic in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, while answering the self-posed question, "What then, is this constructive thought?" Dignāga states:

> (Direct perception is free from the) constructive thought which expresses a name, class, etcetera.[1]

Dignāga elaborates upon and expands his discussion of constructive thought in his self-commentary on the above verse. In addition to the constructive thought which expresses a name and class, Dignāga includes that which expresses a quality (guṇa), that which expresses an action (kriyā), and

1. Dignāga's Pramānasamuccaya, Tibetan version, trans. by Vasudhararaksitā and Seṅ-rgyal, (Block print edition), New Delhi, 1977, p. 3; rtogs pa źes bya ba 'di ji lta bu źig yin ze na/ miṅ daṅ rigs sogs su sbyor ba'o/

that which expresses a substance (dravya).[1] Examples of each form of constructive thought are also presented in the self-commentary as follows: with regard to proper nouns (yadṛcchā-śabda), e.g. "Ḍittha", the constructive thought expresses a thing distinguished by a name (nāman), with regard to class-words (jāti-śabda), e.g. "cow" (go), the constructive thought expresses a thing distinguished by the class 'cow', with regard to quality-words (guṇa-śabda), e.g. "white", the constructive thought expresses a thing distinguished by the quality 'white', with regard to the action-words (kriyā-śabda), e.g."cooking"(pācaka), the constructive thought expresses a thing distinguished by the action, and with regard to substance-words (dravya-śabda), e.g."stick-holder" (daṇḍin), the constructive thought expresses a thing distinguished by the substance.[2]

In the Rigs gter gsal byed Go-rams-pa states that the constructive thought which is absent in a pratyakṣa is the "constructive thought which apprehends (in one sweep) the word and the thing (śabda-artha)."[3] Furthermore, Go-rams-pa quotes two verses from Dharmakīrti as his authoritative source, not Dignāga, to wit, Pramāṇavārttika, Prat.287 a-b:

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid. See also Masaaki Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception, Harvard University Press, 1968, p.83-86.

3. See below Part III, Translation of Text, S.C. p.125.

> Whatever the cognition and wherever is its apprehension of the word and thing, in that, there is constructive thought.

and Pramāṇaviniścaya-sva-vṛtti, Prat.4.b.:

> Constructive thought is a distinct cognition, the content of which is capable of commingling with verbalization.[1]

It is clear that Dharmakīrti's definition of constructive thought, and in turn that of Go-rams-pa, was not directly carried over from Dignāga: in fact upon a superficial examination they might be considered to be unrelated or contradictory.

Śāntarakṣita, however, reasonably unfolds the relationship between Dignāga's definition and that of Dharmakīrti. At the outset of his chapter entitled "Examination of the Definition of Direct Perception" Śāntarakṣita concurs with Dharmakīrti's definition of constructive thought, that is to say, "constructive thought is a distinct cognition commingling with verbalization."[2] Shortly thereafter, in his Pañjikā, Kamalaśīla plays the classic straw man interjecting a query which allows Śāntarakṣita to develop his notion of the relationship between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. In his query Kamalaśīla states:

> Others not only explain the constructive thought as 'the distinct cognition commingling with ver-

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1. Ibid.

2. Embar Krishnamacharya, ed. Tattvasaṃgraha...,; p.366, verse 1214, secon half b-c; abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpanā. Cf. aslo Ganganatha Jha, trans., The Tattvasaṃgraha..., p.614.

> balization, but also as that which is capable of being related to class, quality, action, etcetera. Why do you not accept that?[1]

It is the hybrid nature of Kamalaśīla's statement which most strongly indicates the conciliatory direction of the discussion. Kamalaśīla clearly expected the reader of his Pañjikā to be familiar with the relevant sections of both Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya and Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya and Nyāya-bindu.[2] The reference to Dharmakīrti is immediately evident as Kamalaśīla begins his statement by stating abhilāpinīṁ pratītim kalpanāṁ; virtually lifting the essential idea contained in the phrase abhilāpasaṁsargayogyapratibhāsapratītiḥ kalpanā, which occurs in both the Pramāṇaviniścaya and the Nyāya-bindu. With regard to Dignāga, Kamalaśīla's phrase jātiguṇakriyādisambandha clearly refers to the Pramāṇasamuccaya, Prat. 2d. second half, to wit, jātyādiyojanā.[3] In addition, it also refers to Dignāga's Sva-vṛtti on that phrase which explains the term adī as indicating guna, kriyā, and dravya.

In his statement, Kamalaśīla provides a foundation for establishing a correspondence between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's

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1. Emabar Krishnamacharya, ed., Tattvasaṁgraha...,p. 368; nanu canye 'pi na kevalamabhilāpinīṁ pratītiṁ kalpanaṁ varnayanti, kintu jātigunakriyādisambandhayogyāmapi/; See also Ganganatha Jha, trans., The Tattvasaṁgraha...,p.617.

2. See Vetter, Dharmakirti's Pramānaviniścaya, p. 40; rtog pa ni brjod pa daṅ 'drer ruṅ ba'snaṅ ba'i śes pa/; And also Stcherbatsky, ed., Dharmakirti's Nyayabindu..., p.7, Ch.I, verse 5.

3. See Dignāga's Pramānasamuccaya,..., p.3. And see also above p. , note 1.

understanding of constructive thought.[1] First of all, it is evident that he has substituted Dharmakīrti's term abhilāpa for Dignāga's term nāma. If Kamalaśīla intended to avoid establishing any relation he most likely would have simply used nāma in the first half of his statement and thus restrict the disussion to Dignāga's statement nāmajatyādiyojanā. By substituting abhilāpa for nāma it is reasonable to assume that the Tattvasaṃgraha and the tradition represented therein understands the terms to be functionally equivalent. Moreover, when one glances back again at Kamalaśīla's statement, understanding the substitution of the terms, his division of the statement indicated by the phrases "Others not only" and "but also", provides for the further alignment of the two positions of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The point is that Kamalaśīla's passage implies a group which refers only to constructive thought as a cognition commingling with verbalization. Dharmakīrti's sole advocacy of the 'distinct cognition commigling with verbalization' characteristic of constructive thought is clear from his definition quoted above, whereas, Dignāga's sole support for this characteristic is not immediately apparent from his statement nāmajātyādiyojanā. However, with the understanding that Kamalaśīla has substituted abhilāpa for nāma, his statement introduces a situation where

1. This is in fact what Kamalaśīla had done in his commentary on Śāntarakṣita's verse 1220-- There Kamalaśīla wishes to direct his remarks to only Dignāga's position; hence, he uses the phrase nāmajātyādiyojanā kalpaneti.

one may conclude that Dignāga's verse is not meant to put forth his view alone.

Hence, with the substitutive terms abhilāpa and nāma serving as functional equivalents and the Tattvasaṃgraha's understanding of constructive thought as "a distinct cognition commingling with verbalization" we may group the three scholars, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and Śāntarakṣita, as that intimated group to which Kamalaśīla refers. And through the explanation provided by Śāntarakṣita this does indeed turn out to be the case. Picking up the Tattvasaṃgraha's argument with verse 1219 in the Pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā chapter, which directly follows Kamalaśīla's query, Śāntarakṣita declares that the view of those who "understand constructive thought to be that which is capable of being associated with the class, etcetera, cannot be right." The reason why that position cannot be right is "because the class, etcetera have all been rejected (apās) and because they are not perceived."[1] Continuing, Śāntarakṣita states that "since the class, etcetera is never perceived and their association never appears, how can their connection with objects be possible--like milk and water."[2]

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1. Embar Krishnamacharya, ed., Tattvasaṃgraha...,p.368; jātyādiyojanāyogyāmapyanye kalpanāṃ viduḥ / sā jātyāderapāstatvādadṛsteśca saṅgatā//; An see also Ganganatha Jha, trans., Tattvasaṃgraha...,p.617.

2. Embar Krishnamacharya, ed., Tattvasaṃgraha...,p.368; jātyādīnāmadṛṣṭatvattadyogapratibhāsanāt/ kṣīrodakādivaccārthe ghaṭanā ghatate katham //; And see also Gānganatha Jha, trans., Tattvasaṃgraha...,p.618.

After explaining the relevance of the milk-water metaphor with regard to the case in question, Kamalaśīla again interjects a significant query, to wit:

> If then, 'constructive thought' is that which expresses class, etcetera, is not right, how is it that the author of the definition (i.e. Dignāga in his Pramānasamuccaya) stated the "constructive thought as that which expresses name, class, etcetera?"[1]

It is following this query that Śāntaraksita presents his two alternative understandings of Dignāga's statement: nāmajātyādiyojanā. It should be pointed out that both alternatives presented by Śāntaraksita align the positions of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and in turn that of Śāntaraksita himself as well as Go-rams-pa.

The first alternative according to Śāntaraksīta is that "two kinds of constructive thought appear in the twofold assertion in order to describe the position to be accepted and that which is to be rejected."[2] Kamalaśīla explains that the 'twofold assertion' which is contained in the Ācarya's phrase nāmajātyadiyojanā, indicates the constructive thought which expresses a name (nāmayojanākalpanā) and the constructive thought which expresses a class, etcetera (jātyādiyojanākalpanā).[3]

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1. Embar Krishnamacharya, ed., Tattvasaṁgraha...,p.368; yadi tarhi jātyādiyojanā kalpana na yuktaiva, tatkathaṁ laksanakārenoktaṁ nāma jātyadiyojanā kalpaneti.; And see alsô Ganganâtha Jha, Tattvasaṁgraha...,p.618.

2. Embar Krishnamacharya, ed., Tatttvasaṁgraha..., p.368; heyopadeyavisayakathanaya dvayoktitah/ parāparaprasīddheyaṁ kalpanā dvividhôditā //; And see also Ganganatha Jha, trans., Tattvasaṁgraha...,p.618.

3. See Kamalaśīla's commentary to verse 1221, Embar Krishnamacharya, ed., Tattvasaṁgraha...,p. 369.

The former position which according to these materials expresses the view of Dignāga is to be accepted, while the later position most likely representing the view of Kumārila and others is to be rejected. If, indeed, this was not the proper interpretation of Dignāga's statement regarding the nature of constructive thought, then, Kamalaśīla states, "the phrase used (by Dignāga) would have been either 'expresses a name, etcetera' or 'expresses a class, etcetera'."[1] Therefore, with the understanding of the substitutive relationship of the terms nāma and abhilāpa, Śāntarakṣita has presented his first case for the similitude of the views of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

While Śāntarakṣita's second alternative takes a slightly differnt angle from the first in explaining the expression nāmajātyadiyojanā, it more aptly develops the notion that the two definitions of constructive thought presented by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are of the same kind. This is clearly evidenced as Śāntarakṣita states that "the name, class and all the rest are expressed by the said constructive thought; thus that spoken of (in Dignāga's definition) is the same as the constructive thought spoken of (by Dharmakīrti) as 'the clear cognition commingling with verbalization'."[2] In the final

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1. Ibid., p.369;...anyathā nāmādiyojanā yadi vā jātyādiyojanetyeva vacyaṁ syāt .

2. Ibid., p.369; nāmajātyādayaḥ sarve yojyante vā'nayeti sā / tathoktā kalpanā prokta pratītirabhilāpinī// Cf. Vetter, Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya...,p.40.

analysis Śāntarakṣita basis his conciliatory position on the fact that "in every case a thing is spoken of through being expressed by a name."[1] Once again Kamalaśīla concretizes Śāntarakṣita's efforts as he answers the query of a would be interlocutor who wants to know how Śāntarakṣita's statement can be verified in terms of Dignāga's examples. More specifically, how can one explain Dignāga's examples concerning the instance of proper nouns, like Diṭṭha, and the rest, according to Śāntarakṣita's understanding. In answer to this question Kamalasīla states:

> (When Śāntaraksita says) 'In every case', he means even in the case of words denoting class, etcetera.--What is menat is as follows: Just as when proper noun words are pronounced, the object distinguished by the name is meant, so also in the case of words denoting class, etcetera,--like 'cow'--the object distinguished by the name is meant; this is applicable in every case with regard to (Dignāga's) verse.[2]

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1. Embar Krishnamacharya, ed., Tattvasaṁgraha..., p.369; sarvatra nāmnā yukto'rtha ucyata iti yojanat/

2. Ibid., p.369-370; sarvatreti/ jātyādisabdeṣvapi/ etaduktaṁ bhavati---yathā yadrcchāsabdeṣu prayujyamānesu nāmnā visiṣto 'rtha ucyate, evam jātyādisabdeṣu gaurityādisu nāmnā visiṣto 'rtha ucyate ityetat sarvatra granthe yojanīyamiti/

The Variegations of Direct Perception

According to the Rigs gter gsal byed the basis of the variegation of direct perception "is only a non-delusive cognition."[1] This attitude further illustrates Go-rams-pa's position that the intention of abhrānta is to differentiate, that is to say, exclude falsification of direct perception from authoritative direct perception.

Go-rams-pa establishes the variegation of direct perception as four: directly aligning his position with that of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Following the order of presentation found in the two ācārya's own materials, Go-rams-pa states the four varieties of direct perception as follows: 1. sense direct perception (indriya-pratyakṣa, T. dbaṅ po mṅon sum), 2. mental direct perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa,T. yid gi mṅon sum), 3. introspective direct perception (svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa, T. raṅ rig mṅon sum), 4. yogin's direct perception (yogi-pratyakṣa, T.rnal hbyor mṅon sum).[2]

While the order of presenting the varieties of direct perception is generally the one which Go-rams-pa follows,

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1. Go-rams-pa's Sde bdun mdo daṅ bcas pa'i dgoṅs pa phyin ci ma log par 'grel pa tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa, Śakya, College, Mussoorie, India, 1975, p.128, And see also below Part III, Translation of Text, S.C.,p.128.

2. Ibid.

there are two significant instances of an alternative ordering which can be mentioned at this time. The first instance occurs in the fourteenth chapter of Kloṅ-rdol bla-ma Ṅag dbaṅ-blo bzaṅ's Gsuṅ-'bum, to wit:

> There are four variegations: 1. the authoritative sense direct perception--like the sense cognition cognizing blue. 2. the mental direct perception authority--like the five cognitions of the(five) sense direct perceptions. 3. the authoritative direct perceptions of those learned ones--like the first moment which comprehends as a direct perception, the selflessness (of persons and things). 4.When according to the Cittamātra there is the authoritative introspective direct perception.[1]

In the above passage the sense and mental direct perceptions are in the usual order; it is the third and fourth variety which are reversed. Kloṅ-rdol-bla ma's third variety, the authoritative direct perception of those learned ones, is easily identifiable as Go-rams-pa's fourth variety, to wit, the yogin's direct perception; hence, leaving the introspective direct perception normally placed third, as the fourth member according to Kloṅ-rdol-bla ma's ordering.

The second instance is found in Līlavajra's Śrī-guhyagarbha-mahātantrarāja-ṭīkā-nāma, a commentary on the Guhyagarbhatantra, while he is explaining a verse portion from the eleventh chapter of that Tantra which

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1. Tibetan Buddhist Studies of Kloṅ rdol bla-ma Ṅag-dbaṅ-blo-bzaṅ, two vols., ed. by Dr. Lokesh Chandra, Mussoorie, 1963, I, p.375; ...dbye na/sṅo 'dzin dbaṅ śes lta bu dbaṅ mṅon tshad ma daṅ/ mṅon śes lṅa lta bu/ yid mṅon tshad ma/ bdag med mṅon sum du rtogs pa'i mkhyen pa skad gcig daṅ pa'o lta bu'i mkhyen pa de mṅon sum tshad ma/ sems tsam pa ltar na raṅ rig mṅon sum tshad ma daṅ bži yod/

reads, "Yoga, mantra, taking hold of, and siddhi."[1] First of all, Līlavajra remarks that this statement from the *Guhyagarbhatantra* is "ordinarily explained in two ways, to wit, 'stage of generation' and 'stage of completion'." Although the reversal of the two direct perceptions occurs as Līlavajra explains the term 'taking hold of', his entire explanation of the verse portion will be presented in order to preserve the contextual mood. Taking each term in succession he states

> Yoga is threefold: 1. intrinisic nature, 2. path, 3. self-originated. The path is generally twofold: 1. *yoga* of *mudra*, and 2. *yoga* of gnosis. In this tantra it is just the two truths indivisible. Mantra is of two kinds, by way of protecting the mind and the great empowerment. Taking hold of, is of two kinds: taking hold of, as *yogi-pratyaksa*; and taking hold of in high degree, as *svasaṃvedana-pratyaksa*. *Siddhi*-s are of two kinds: ordinary and superior.[2]

Not only does Līlavajra's reversal of *yogi-pratyakṣa* and *svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa* suggest the latter's superiority in this situation, his labelling of it as 'taking

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1. Līlavajra, *Śrī-guhyagarbha-mahātantranrāja-tīkā-nāma*, Peking Tibetan Tripitaka, Tokyo-Kyoto, 1956; Vol.82, Fol. 181.a.

2. *Ibid.*; *rnal 'byor ni rnam pa gsum ste/ raṅ pa źin daṅ/ lam daṅ lhun gyis brub pa'o/ lam la spyi ru gñis te/ phyag rgya'i rnal 'byor daṅ/ ye śes kyi rnal 'byor ro/ de la rgyud 'di ni bden gñis me byed pa kho na'o/ sṅags la gñis te/ yid skyob pa daṅ/ byin gyis brlabs chen po'i phyir ro/ 'chaṅ ba la gñis te/ rnal 'byor gyis mṅon sum ni 'chaṅ ba'o/ raṅ rig pa'i mṅon sum du sin tu 'chaṅ ba'o/ dṅos grub kyuṅ gñis te/ thun moṅ daṅ mchog ste/ źar las 'byuṅ ba'i phyir smos pa'o/*

hold of in high degree' clearly indicates that the reversal is not simply the result of his personal predilection, lacking a doctrinal foundation. And, indeed the reversal of the normal ordering of these two direct perceptions is found to be consistent throughout much of the Tantric literature which discusses this topic. For the present, however, it is sufficient that the reversal merely be noted, since the reasons for placing svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa after yogi-pratyakṣa will be examined below, in the section entitled "Yogin's Direct Perception".

The Proper Number of Variegations of Direct Perception:

Although both Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and following their lead Go-rams-pa, established the number of variegations of direct perception at four, one does not find the acceptance of four variegations to be consistent among the different Buddhist tenet systems. However, while the number of variegations of direct perception accepted differs among the tenet systems, where it has been possible to establish a correspondence, the literature appears to be consistent as to the number accepted by each system.

In the second verse of the Pramāṇayuktinidhi's "Pratyakṣa"(mṅon sum) chapter, Sa-skya Paṇḍita presents a terse statement indicating an instance where the different tenet systems are accepting dissimilar varigations of direct

perception, to wit:

> There are four authoritative direct perceptions in the view of the Sautrāntika; three according to the Vaibhāṣika and two according to the Vijñānavādin.[1]

Sa-skya Paṇḍita clarifies his statement somewhat in his self-commentary to the Pramāṇayuktinidhi. Therein he states that the "Vaibhāṣika do not accept introspective direct perception";[2] hence, leaving one to infer the Vaibhāṣika-s acceptance of the three pratyakṣa-s, to wit, sense, mental, and the yogin's direct perception. Also in the self-commentary Sa-skya Paṇḍita explains that the two direct perceptions to which his root-verse refers, as being accepted by the Vijñānavādins, are introspective direct perception and the yogin's direct perception;[3] hence, leaving one to infer that the Vijñānavādins do not accept sense and mental direct perception.

However, making such an inference as is suggested above, regarding what the Vijñānavādins do not accept as a direct perception, appears to be somewhat hasty when examined in conjunction with Go-rams-pa's comments on

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1. Sa-skya Pandita, Tshad-ma rigs-pa'i gter, Sa-skya-pa'i bka'-'bum, Vol.5, Tokyo, 1968, Fol.16.a.; mṅon sum bži po mdo sde'i lugs/ bye brag smra gsum rnam rig gñis/. And see also below Part III, Translation of Text, S.C., p.128.

2. Sa-skya Paṇḍita, Tshad-ma rigs-pa'i gter-gyi raṅ-gi 'grel-pa, Sa-skya-pa'i bka'-'bum, Vol.5, Tokyo, 1968, Fol.107.b.

3. Ibid.

Sa-skya Paṇḍita's description of the differing variegations. Go-rams-pa first explains that it is not correct to interpret Sa-skya Paṇḍita's statement literally, that is to say, for one to blindly assume that from among the four tenet systems it is only the Sautrāntika who accepts four varieties of direct perception, while the Vijñānavādins simply accept svasaṃvedana and yogi-pratyakṣa. The reasoning behind Go-rams-pa's statement is as follows: since the Ālambanaparīkṣā explains the conditions (pratyaya) of sense direct perception according to the view of the Vijñānavādin,[1] their acceptance of sense direct perception is implied.[2]

Moreover, Go-rams-pa states that since even in the self-commentary to the Pramāṇayuktinidhi, Sa-skya Paṇḍita himself mentions that when sense direct perception is accepted, then it is necessary to accept mental direct perception, one cannot interpret his statement literally. For if one interprets his statement literally, then Sa-skya Paṇḍita would contradict his original verse by what he states in his own commenatry.[3]

Now then, if one is not to interpret Sa-skya Paṇḍita

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1. For a discussion of the three conditions (pratyaya) see below Sense Direct Perception; And also below Part III, Translation of Text, S.C.,p.129.

2. See below Part III, Translation of Text, S.C. 129.

3. Ibid.

literally, when does the situation justify accepting just a two-fold variegation of direct perception for the Vijñānavādin? And when is one correct in asserting that they do accept four types of direct perception?

According to Go-rams-pa, the Vijñānavādin's position varies depending upon whether their attitude is being considered from the conventional (saṃvṛti) view or is the result of an examination of the absolute meaning (paramārtha). Indeed, from the conventional point of view both the sense and mental direct perceptions are accepted by the Vijñānavādins as authorities for the external object.[1] But with regard to the absolute meaning, which according to Go-rams-pa, Sa-skya Paṇḍita's statement represents, neither the sense nor the mental direct perception can be considered as an authority for the external object.[2] As it was already explained above, for the Vijñānavādins all cognitions of the external object are delusive; hence, they are ineligible to be authorities. Therefore, according to the Vijñānavādin, it is introspective direct perception of the sense and mental cognition (on the inner side of the mind) and the yogin's direct perception of the 'privileged object' that are accepted authorities in the absolute meaning.

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.

And agreeing with the Pramāṇayuktinidhi's division the Tibetan author Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ, in his Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bźag pa rin po che'i phreṅ ba states

> ...(Both the followers of scripture and followers of reasoning accept the presence of four kinds of direct perceptions. Introspective direct perception and yogic direct perception are necessarily non-delusive (i.e.authoritative) consciousnesses.[1]

Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ's agreement with Sa-skya Paṇḍita becomes clear if we examine this passage in light of Go-rams-pa's explanation. More specifically, inferring the former reference to the four-fold variegation to be aligned with the conventional view, while the later reference delimiting svasaṁvedana and yogi-pratyakṣa as authoritative consciousness is to be taken according to the absolute view.

In addition, Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ pa again agrees with Sa-skya Paṇḍita's establishment of the Sautrāntika's variegation as four and the Vaibhāṣika's as three. Concerning the Sautrāntika he states that

> Authoritative direct perceptions are four-fold: sense direct perception, mental direct perception, introspective direct perception, and yogic direct perception.[2]

And according to Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ the Vaibhāṣikas assert

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1. Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ-po, Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bźag pa rin po che'i phreṅ ba, The Imperial Printing Press, Dharmsala, (No date), p.49-50; mṅon sum bzi'i rnam bźag khas len źiṅ/ raṅ rig mṅon sum daṅ rnal 'byor mṅon sum gñis la ma 'khrul pa'i śes pas khyab/

2. Ibid.,p.36; mṅon sum gyi tshad ma la/ dbaṅ po'i mṅon sum/ yid kyi mṅon sum/ raṅ rig mṅon sum/ rnal 'byor mṅon sum gyi tshad ma daṅ bźi yod do//

> sense direct perception, mental direct perception, and yogin's direct perception; but, they do not accept introspection as an (authoritative) direct perception.[1]

It should be mentioned, however, that Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ divides the Sautrāntika as well as the Vijñānavādin into two types. Both tenet systems are divided into followers of scripture (_āgama-anusārin_) and followers of reason (_yukti-anusārin_). Moreover, Dharmakīrti's seven treatises of logic serve as the authoritative source for the followers of reason in both tenet systems. But it is Vasubandhu's _Abhidharmakośa_ which functions as the authority for the Sautrāntika's _āgama-anusārin_-s while the Vijñānavādin's _āgama-anusārin_-s look to five divisions of Asaṅga's _Yogācārabhūmi_.[2]

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1. _Ibid._, p.22; _daṅ po la (i.e.mṅon sum kyi tshad ma)/ dbaṅ po'i mṅon sum/ yid gyi mṅon sum/ rnal 'byor mṅon sum daṅ gsum yod kyuṅ/ raṅ rig mṅon sum khas mi len no/_

2. _Ibid._,Cf. p.30 and p.45.

Sense Direct Perception

The Definition and the Three Conditions:

Whereas Dharmakīrti's definition of sense direct perception provides nothing more than the phrase indriyajñānam (knowledge produced by the sense) [1] Go-rams-pa expands the definition of sense direct perception to

> whatever outward directed cognition, free from constructive thought and devoid of delusion, arisen directly from the formed sense organ which is its governing condition (adhipati-pratyaya).[2]

It is significant to note that Tsoṅ-kha-pa also concurs with Go-rams-pa's definition,[3] indicating the uniformity between the Sa-skya-pa and dGe-lug-pa interpretation of the pramāṇa system.

Directly related to the understanding of sense direct perception is the awareness and knowledge of the three conditions which are necessary for its occurrence. These three conditions are as follows: the governing condition (adhi-pati-pratyaya); the similar immediately preceding condition

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1. Th. Stcherbatsky, ed. Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu with it's Nyāyabindu-tīkā by Dharmottara, Bibliotheca Buddhica, VII, St. Petersbourg, 1918, p. 10.

2. Go-ram-pa, Sde bdun mdo daṅ bcas pa'i dgoṅs pa phyin ci ma log par 'grel pa tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa, Sakya College, Mussoorie, India, 1975, p. 130; And cf. below Part III, Translation of Text.

1. See Tsoṅ-kha-pa, Sde bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gñer yid kyi mun sel źes bya ba, Sarnatha, 1969,p.19; And cf. also Alex Wayman, "A guided tour through the seven books of Dharmakīrti," (This will appear as a significant portion of Dr. Wayman's forthcoming work A Millennium of Buddhist Logic [4th to 14th] ,to be completed in 1983-84),p.12.

(sabhāgasamanantara-pratyaya); and the support condition (ālambana-pratyaya). The system discussed here does not include the fourth condition, the hetu-pratyaya , within the framework of sense direct perception.

The Governing Condition:

Go-rams-pa clearly delimits those "formed sense organs" which serve as the sphere of adhipati-pratyaya as having five varieties, to wit, eye, ear,nose, tongue, and body.[1] Unlike the Naiyāyikas, who accept the mind as a separate sense organ, the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti system does not. Addressing the status of the mind while commenting on Dharmakīrti's definition of the sense direct perception, Vinītadeva states that

> Only the five sense organs, like the eye, etcetera, are accepted as the sense organs. The mind is not (accepted as a sense organ); because "mind-direct perception" is shown separately (as a varieagtion of pramāṇa).[2]

Furthermore, following Sa-skya Paṇḍita, Go-rams-pa states that the adhipati-pratyaya of the sense direct perception is "that condition which mainly and directly generates the part which is able to apprehend each object of the sense direct perception."[3] And once again Go-rams-pa

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1. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.130.

2. L. De La Vallee Poussin, ed. Tibetan Translation of the Nyayabindu of Dharmakirti with the commentary of Vinitadeva, Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta, 1907,p.44;...migs la sogs pa'i dbañ po lṅa rnams la dbañ por 'dod gyi yid kyi dbañ po ni ma yin ni/ yid kyi mṅon sum ni logs sig tu bstan pa'i phyir ro/

3. Cf. Sa-skya Pandita, Tshad am rigs-pa'i gter, Sa-skya-pa'i bka'-'bum, Vol:5, Tokyo, 1968, p.162, Fol. 16.b.; dbañ po yul la 'dzin nus te/: And Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.134.

alignes himself with Tsoṅ-kha-pa when he provides the literal definition of the governing condition. Expanding Tsoṅ-kha-pa's definiton of the governing condition as "what generates the feature independently";[1] Go-rams-pa states that the formed sense organ is defined as the sphere of the governing condition

> because it is the sense which generates independently the ability to apprehend the object in the sense cognition.[2]

While establishing only the five formed sense organs as valid spheres of the adhipati-pratyaya, the Rigs gter gsal byed criticizes certain other notions of what constitutes a adhipati-pratyaya. Accordingly, Go-rams-pa explains that the Abhidharmist's positing the adhipati-pratyaya as the "external object" and the Vijñānavādin's positing it as the capability which is in the store-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) are both wrong.[3] They are wrong because when the other conditions for a particular sense cognition are present, but the capability existing in these formed sense bases is lacking, no sense cognition will arise.[4]

Though not accepting the Abhidharmist or Vijñānavadin view, Go-rams-pa concedes that the "capability" is not completely different from consciousness nor un-

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1. See A. Wayman, trans., "A guided...",p.3.

2. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.134.

3. Ibid., p.131. See also Triṃśikā Vijñaptikārikā of Vaubandhu, verse 15 a-b; pañcanaṁ mulavijñane yathapratyayam udbhavaḥ /

4. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, 131.

conscious matter (jaḍa). But to state that the adhipati-pratyaya is the consciousness alone, as the Vijñānavādin's postulating the capability as the ālaya-vijñāna would do, is shown to be incorrect by means of two examples. First of all, if the sense consciousness was able to be a adhi-pati-pratyaya there would be the possibility of the fallacy of as infinitum, because in that case the sense consciousness would be present prior to the arising of the sense cognition. And secondly, in the case of a mental-cognition (mano-vijñāna), if consciousness is permitted to be the adhipati-pratyaya, then the mental cognition would not have to depend on the sense-bases at all.[1]

Go-rams-pa explains that the perceptual process of the sense direct perception occurs in the following manner:

> In the first place the immediate sense object is perceived. From that a sense consciousness results. This sense-consciousness, that is, the perception which apprehends the object, serving as the basis for the sense direct perception is then perceived.[2]

This production of the sense direct perception is shown to be dependent on the capability present in the formed sense organs by way of the positive concomitance (anvaya) as well as negative concomitance (vyatireka), as in the case of smoke and fire.[3]

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1. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.131.
2. This synopsis based on the discussion on p.131 of Rigs gter gsal byed.
3. For a discussion of the terms anvaya and vyatireka see, Yuichi Kajiyama, An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy: An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākara-gupta, Kyoto University, 1966,p.67-72.

Just as in the case of fire and smoke, where the smoke itself a result or effect of the fire, becomes the cause of one's confirmation of a fire through the concomitance of the two entities. Here also in the perceptual process, where the sense consciousness itself a result of the perception of the immediate sense object, becomes the cause qua condition of the sense direct perception. That is to say, the sense consciousness qua result that is the "cognition which apprehends the object" is the capability present in the formed sense organs, upon which the sense direct perception is dependent.

The Adhipati-pratyaya and the Designation of Sense Direct Perception:

Go-rams-pa rhetorically inquires as to the purpose of designating sense direct perception in general and eye cognition in particular according to the governing condition; when the sense direct perception is held to be equally arisen from the three conditions. In order to answer this question he cites Sa-skya Paṇḍita who explains the reasoning as follows:

> Because as sense organ is an unshared cause (asādhāraṇa-hetu), there is a sense cognition, like the sound of the drum.[1]

And Sa-skya Paṇḍita is directly following Dignāga who states

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1. Sa-skya Paṇḍita, Rigs gter, p.162, Fol. 16.b., Mṅon sum, 4.c-d; dbaṅ po thun moṅ min rgyu'i phyir/ dbaṅ śes yin te rṅa sgra bźin/. See also Rigs gter gsal byed, p.133.

> its name (pratyaksa) is designated by the sense organs because of their being unshared causes.[1]

Dharmakīrti also following Dignāga considers that the sense organ is the"indicator" (gamaka) of the perception.[2]

The problem of designating a perception was not new to Dignāga, et al. In the fifth century Vasubandhu posed a a question in his Abhidharmakośa similar to the one which Go-rams-pa asked almost a millennium later. Vasubandhu wanted to know why a consciousness (vijñāna) is called eye-consciousness (cakṣus-vijñāna), etcetera, in accordance with the name of the sense and not with that of the object.[3] One of the reasons he presented was that the sense organ is the unshared cause (asādhāraṇa-hetu) of vijñāna. For example when someone experiences an eye-consciousness its unshared cause must be his own formed eye sense organ, because the object, rūpa, etcetera, is the cause of eye-consciosness in other persons also, as well as of the mental perception (mano-vijñāna) in himself and others.[4]

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1. Dignāga, Pramānasamuccaya, Tibetan version, trans.by Vasudhararakṣita and Señrgyal, (Block print edition), New Delhi, 1977, p.4, Chapter I, Mñon sum, 3.a-b; thun moṅ min pa'i rgyu yi phyir/ de yi tha sñad dbaṅ pos byas/

2. Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., Pramānavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the commentary 'Vrtti' of Acharya Manorathanandin, Varanasi, 1966, p.158, Pratyakṣa Chapter, 192: samiksya gamakatvaṁ hi vyapadéso niyujyate/ taccaksavyapadeśe'sti taddharmaśca niyojyatām/.

3. L. de La Vallée Poussin, trans., L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, in six parts, Paris, 1923-1931, p.96.

4. Ibid.

Earlier yet, this same discussion may be found in the third century A.D. work by Harivarman entitled Satya-siddhiśāstra. In the second chapter entitled "Duḥkha-Satya-Skandha", Harivarman states that a "consciousness is distinguished by its sense-organs thus: eye-consciousness, ear consciousness." Moreover, he states that the "sense organ is the unshared cause whereas the object is the common cause."[1]

The Similar Immediately Preceding Condition:

In terms of a sense direct perception the Rigs gter gsal byed defines the samanantara-pratyaya as

> a consciousness which mainly generates, as a clear cognition, a perception which is its result, uninterrupted by another feature.[2]

By limiting the role of the samanantara-pratyaya to that of consciousness, as opposed to rūpa, etcetera, Go-rams-pa has in this instance aligned his position with that of the Abhidharmakośa. Vasubandhu states that the

> thoughts and thought derivatives that are produced, with the exception of the last, are samanantara-pratyaya.[3]

While the citta and caitasika dharma-s are considered to

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1. N. Aiyaswami Sastri, trans., Satyasiddhiśāstra of Harivarman, two vols., Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1978, II, p.99.

2. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.133.

3. N.N. Law, ed., Sphutārthābhidharmakośa-vyākhyā of Yaśomitra, Calcutta Oriental Series No. 31, Luzac and Co., 1949, Chapter II, kārika 62 a-b.,p.165; cittacaittā acarama utpannāh samanantaraḥ /; Cf. also de La Vallée Poussin, trans., Chapitre II, p.300.

be 'similar immediately preceding conditions', Vasubandhu excludes the other dharmas, such as material form (rūpa), because there is not the similarity between the cause and the effect.[1]

Any group of thought (citta) or thought derivative (caitasika) dharmas which happen to be present at any one moment, endure only for that one instant. However, at the moment they disintegrate a similar group arises. In this manner the preceding group conditions the activity of its successor. Hence, the stream of consciousness as represented by citta and caitasika dharmas is considered more uniform and inter-related than any other stream, to wit, rūpa, and other sense objects.[2]

Two different phases of form, however, are not related by means of 'similar immediately preceding condition'. The relation called 'similar immediately preceding condition' implies uniformity and contiguity between the condition and the conditioned. The relation between two different phases of form does not possess either of these two conditions. For instance, an effect, following a form (rūpa) of the Realm of Desire (kāmadhātu) could arise at the same time as two forms, one of the Realm of Desire and the other of the Realm of Form (rūpadhātu). Whereas, following a thought of the Realm of Desire, a thought of the Realm of Desire and a thought of the Realm of Form never arise at the same time. The advent of forms is mixed, but the 'similar immediately preceding condition' does not present a mixed result; therefore, material dharmas are not 'similar immediately preceding conditions'.[3]

1. de La Vallée Poussin, trans., L'Abhidharmakośa..., Chapitre II, p. 300.

2. Ibid., p.301.

3. Ibid., p.300-301.

The prefix sam is employed to indicate that an immediately preceding consciousness, such as eye, ear, etcetera, will give rise to a succeeding homogenous condition, such as eye-sense direct perception, ear-sense direct perception, etcetera. While the term anantara (immediate) emphasizes the fact that the preceding consciousness and the succeeding homogenous state are uninterrupted by another dharma. And because that consciousness as the cause generates the perception, it is defined as a condition (pratyaya).[1]

If as Go-rams-pa states, the samanantara-pratyaya is a consciousness which produces the subsequent perceptual-consciousness, or as Vasubandhu states, that it is the produced thought and thought derivative which are the samanantara-pratyaya of a succeeding thought, etcetera; what of the situation in which a person is in a state where there is no consciousness? More specifically, what would be the the similar immediately preceding condition of the consciousness arising from one of the five unconscious conditions, such as non-ideational equipoise (asaṃjñā-samāpatti) and cessation equipoise (nirodha-samāpatti).

An excellent textual example of just such an unconscious condition can be found in F.D. Lessing and A. Wayman's translation of Mkhas Grub Rje's Rgyud sde spyi'i rnam par gzag pa rgyas pas brjod Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric Systems . In the second chapter of that work entitled "Setting

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1. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.133. And cf. also de La Vallée Poussin, trans., L'Abhidharmakośa, Chapitre, II, p.300.

the Wheel of the Law", there is a discussion of the bhikṣus of Vaiśālī who were committing the ten transgressions and of the second council of Vaiśālī which was convened to expell them for those transgressions.[1]

After a preliminary discussion between the arhat-s Yaśas and Sarvakāmin, wherein it was determined that the bhikṣus of Vaiśālī had indeed committed the ten transgressions and should in turn be expelled, Yaśas was sent forth to inform the other arhat-s in various places that they should come to the council in order to vote on the fate of those transgressing bhikṣus. As Yaśas visited the various arhat-s by means of his magical power he said to them, " when I strike the gong (gaṇḍi) you must come from every quarter."[2] After returning to Vaiśālī, Yaśas struck the gong and thereupon all but one of the seven hundred bhikṣu Arhat-s assembled there. Regarding that one Arhat who did not show up, Mkhas Grub Rjes states:

> In Pātaliputra, the Arhat named Kubjita did not not hėar the gong because he was in the trance known as cessation equipoise (nirodha-samāpatti).[3]

Furthermore, while the seven hundred Arhat-s,less one, who had assembled at Vaiśālī, were deciding the fate of erring bhikṣus, Mkhas Grub Rjes reports that "at that time the

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1. See F.D. Lessing and Wayman, translators, Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric System, 2nd edition, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1978,p.63.

2. Ibid.,p.65.

3. Ibid.

Arhat Kubjita emerged from his equipoise."[1]

This textual example is consistent with Go-rams-pa's explanation. Since Kubjita is in the"cessation equipoise", an unconscious condition resulting from the cessation of thought and thought derivatives, there was no consciousness available to serve as a similar immediately preceding condition of an ear-sense direct perception. However, just as there was no consciousness present to serve as a *samanantara-pratyaya* for Kubjita's *indriya-pratyakṣa* while in the trance known as "cessation equipoise", should there not also be the absence of a consciousness qua *samanantara-pratyaya* for the first moment of consciousness as Kubjita emerges from that "cessation-equipoise"?

Addressing just this problem, Go-rams-pa states that it is not right to accept the theory which holds that the *samanantara-pratyaya* of consciousness arising from an unconscious condition, in this case *nirodha-samāpatti*, to be the initial occurrence of consciousness. Nor does he feel that it is completely right to accept the store-consciousness (*ālaya-vijñāna*) as the *samanantara-pratyaya* of consciousness arising from an unconscious condition.[2] The former is wrong because there is the possibility of a lengthy interval between the result, the emergence of consciousness, and the cause, the initial occurrence of

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1. *Ibid*.

2. Go-rams-pa, *Rigs gter gsal byed*, p.133.

consciousness.[1] According to the Rigs gter gsal byed such an interval is not proper; because "nothing whatsoever is able to obstruct the direct result's arising from the direct cause."[2] Although the latter theory is cogent in the view of the Vijñānavādin, it is not cogent in the view of the Sautrāntika; since the Sautrāntika do not adhere to the notion of the ālayavijñāna which is explained by Hsüan Tsang as the only consciousness present in the nirodha-samāpatti.[3] It is the ālayavijñāna, also called sarvabījaka,[4] containing the seeds for the arising consciousnes which is considered the samanantara-pratyaya for the Vijñānavādin, but not for the Sautrāntika.

Go-rams-pa states that in the view of the Sautrāntika, even in those unconscious conditions such as the nirodha-samāpatti an indistinct (avyakta) mental-consciousness is present. It is that indistinct mental-consciousness which acts as the samanantara-pratyaya for the arising consciousness.[5]

Textual roots for Go-rams-pa's contention concerning the Sautrāntika's position can be found in Harivarman's

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1. Ibid.

2. Ibid.,p.138.

3. Wei Tat, trans., Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun by Hsüan Tsang, Causeway Hill, Hong Kong, 1973, p.229.

4. Ibid., p.107

5 Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.134.

Satya-siddhiśāstra a millennium earlier. Discussing the differences between a dead person and a person who has entered into cessation-equipoise, Harivarman quotes an unidentified Sūtra which states that

> in respect of dead person [sic] these three elements: life-force (āyus), temperature and consciousness are utterly ceased; but in the case of the person, who enters into the cessation-trance the mind alone ceased but the life-force and temperature are there as unseparated from the body.[1]

And therefore, according to Harivarman, while a persons mind per se ceases during the cessation-equipoise, the other two elements are present.[2] And moreover, when a person is arising from the unconscious condition he states

> his previous mind revives as a result of his life-force and temperature which are operating.[3]

Hence, it is not unreasonable to conclude that Harivarman's two elements present during an unconscious condition, may have evolved through the millennium to the point of being referred to as an "indistinct mental consciousness" which is present during an unconscious condition.

The Support Condition:

Designated as consisting of five varieties, that is, from the sense direct perception apprehending form (rūpa)

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1. N.A. Sastri, trans., Satyasiddhiśāstra..., p.405. In this passage Sastri's 'cessation-trance' is obviously our 'cessation-equipose'.

2. Ibid. p.406.

3. Ibid.

to the sense direct perception apprehending touch (*sparśa*);[1] Go-rams-pa delimits the *ālambana-pratyaya* of the sense direct perception as

> that 'external object' which directly generates the principal image of the object in the perception.[2]

The sole point which the *Rigs gter gsal byed* takes up with regard to the *alambana-pratyaya* is as follows: while the Abhidharmists regard all *dharma*-s as the support-condition,[3] the view posited by Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and in turn Go-rams-pa, is that just the 'external object' which delivers the aspect is to be considered as the support-condition.[4]

There appears to be at least two immediately evident reasons for the difference between the Abhidharmists notion of the *ālambana-pratyaya* and that of Dignāga, et al. First of all, whereas adherents of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti system included only the five senses, eye, etcetera, the Abhidharmists included a sixth, to wit, *mano-vijñāna*.[5] Therefore, while the *ālambana-pratyaya* for the five senses in the Logicians' system, was limited to the 'external ob-

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1. Go-rams-pa, *Rigs gter gsal byed*, p.130.

2. *Ibid*,, p.134.

3. de La Vallée Poussin, trans., *L' Abhidharmakośa*...,p.306.

4. Go-rams-pa, *Rigs gter gsal byed*, p. 134.

5. Cf. de La Vallée Poussin, trans. *L'Abhidharmakośa*...,p. 307; And Vinītadeva's remark about the status of mind as a sense organ, quoted above.

ject' classified as rūpa; the Abhidharmists inclusion of mano-vijñāna extended the scope of the support-condition to all dharma-s, both rūpa and non-rūpa, such as the a-saṃskṛta-dharma-s and the saṃskṛta-dharma-s of the past and future.[1]

A likely second reason for the difference between the Abhidharmist and Logicians' notion of the ālambana-pratyaya can be seen upon an examination of their respective attitudes toward the nature of an ālambana-pratyaya. The Abhidharmists hold that

> even when a manifest-object is not taken as a support-condition for the visual-consciouness, it is a support; because whether or not it is taken as a support, its nature remains the same. Just as kindling is always called fuel even when it is not burning.[2]

The followers of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti lineage, on the other hand, would not agree with this Abhidharmic description of the ālambana-pratyaya. The Rigs gter gsal byed states that only in so far as an 'external object' delivers the image is it considered as the support-condition.[3]

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1. de La Vallée Poussin, trans., L'Abhidharmakośa..., Chapitre II, p.306-307.

2. Ibid., p.307;même quand un visible n'est pas pris comme object (ālambyate) par la connaissance visuelle, il est object, car, qu'il soit pris ou ne soit pas pris comme object, sa nature reste la meme. De meme que le combustible (indhana)est combustible, meme quand il n'est pas en combustion.

3. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.134.

Therefore, while for the Abhidharmist all *dharma*-s are considered to be *ālambana-pratyaya*, whether or not they are delivering the image, since they are always potential conditions; for the Logicians only the 'external object' which in fact delivers the image is recognized as the support-condition.

Mental Direct Perception

The Definition:

Both Go-rams-pa and Tsoṅ kha-pa concur about a great deal of the basic structure of mental direct perception. Like indriya-pratyakṣa, both scholars claim mānasa-pratyakṣa to be an outward-directed perception which is free from constructive thought and delusion.[1] Moreover, both the Rigs gter gsal byed and Sde bdun la 'jug pa accept the mental direct perception as a cognition

> arisen from and on-going with the mind sense organ (mano-indriya) and an individual governing condition and the immediately preceding condition.[2]

The variegation of mental direct perception as fivefold is also consistent , that is to say, the mental direct perception through the mind organ apprehending form (rūpa) and the other sense objects.[3]

The Three Conditions of Mental Direct Perception:

As is evident from the above section, the textual

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1. Cf. Alex Wayman, trans., "A guided tour through the seven books of Dharmakīrti," (This translation which Dr. Wayman has kindly made available to me will appear as a significant portion of his forthcoming work A Millennium of Buddhist Logic [4th to 14th] , to be completed and readied for press in his sabbatical year research 1983-1984),p.12. And Go-rams-pa, Sde bdun mdo daṅ bcas pa'i dgoṅs pa phyin ci ma log par 'grel pa tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal bar byed pa, Sakya College, Mussoorie, India, 1975, pg. 128, 136, and 138.

2. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.135. And compare Wayman, trans., "A guided...," p.12.

3. Cf. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, 135. And Wayman, trans., "A guided...," p.12.

discussions of mānasa-pratyakṣa make reference to the same conditions as does indriya-pratyakṣa, to wit, adhipati-pratyaya, samanantara-pratyaya, and ālambana-pratyaya. However, for all intents and purposes the analogy halts at this point. If one were to attempt to extricate the place and function of each condition of mental direct perception on the basis of their respective positions in sense direct perception, the task would remain less than satisfactory.

For instance, what about the individual governing condition? If on the basis of the analogy of sense direct perception, where the operational sphere of the adhipati-pratyaya of each of the five sense direct perceptions is considered to be their respective formed sense-organ, one assumed that the sphere of the adhipati-pratyaya of mānasa-pratyakṣa was the mind-sense organ (mano-indriya), then this assumption would be wrong. According to the materials examined it is each respective sense-consciousness apprehending its respective object which is the adhipati-pratyaya for the mental direct perception, just as it was for the sense direct perception.[1] Go-rams-pa clearly states that the mind-perception (mano-vijñāna) cannot be the governing condition of the mind direct perception, "because when there is mind direct perception it is necessarily a mind direct perception cognizing

1. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p. 135. And see also Wayman, trans., "A guided...," p. 12.

the (external) object."[1] Therefore,unlike each one of the five respective indriya-pratyakṣa-s which have their respective sense-consciousness (indriya-vijñāna) serving as their governing condition, mind direct perception does not have mind consciousness (mano-vijñāna) serving as its adhipati-pratyaya.

Regarding the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya), both the Pramāṇaviniścaya and the Pramāṇavārttika declare it to be the sense-consciousness (indriya vijñāna), to wit:

> arisen from the immediately preceding condition which is the sense-consciousness.[2]

and

> Therefore, (the mānasa-pratyaksa) produced from the immediately preceding condition, which is the sense-consciousness.[3]

And Go-rams-pa takes the sense-consciousness stated as the immediately preceding condition of mental direct perception by the Pramāṇaviniścaya and Pramāṇavārttika to be the same

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1. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.135.

2. Tilmann Vetter, Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya; 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣa, (German translation and Tibetan text), Wien, 1966, p. 58; dbaṅ ses de ma thag rkyen las/ byuṅ zin.../ According to Vetter this verse is a vulgate of Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 243.

3. Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., Pramānavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the commentary 'Vrtti' of Acharya Manorathanandin, Varanasi, 1966,p.174,'Pratyaksa Chapter, verse 243 a-b; tasmādindriyavijñānānantarapratyayodbhavam/. Note that Dharmakīrti uses indiryavijñāna and not indriyapratyakṣa. Cf. also Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p. 135.

sense-consciousness which he considers to be the *adhipati-pratyaya* of *mānasa-pratyakṣa*, to wit:

> The immediately preceding condition is that governing condition itself, explained as what is posited as the immediately preceding condition in the sense of generating the mental direct perception as a clear experience.[1]

Furthermore, he declares that both the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and the *Pramāṇavārttika* understand the immediately preceding condition of the mental direct perception as well as the governing condition of it to be a single-'material'. This single-'material' is, according to Go-rams-pa, the immediately preceding condition itself, to wit, the sense-consciousness.[2]

The *Rigs gter gsal byed* explains that the support-condition (*ālambana-pratyaya*) of the first moment of sense direct perception cannot be the support condition of the first moment of mental direct perception; because it has completely passed away at the time of the immediately preceding condition of mental direct perception, due to its momentary nature. However, through the process of cause and effect, its affiliated second moment is the apprehensible object (*grahyārtha*) of both the first moment of mental direct perception and the second moment of sense direct perception.[3] Similarly, the *Sde bdun la 'jug pa* states:

> At the second moment, the mind (*manas*) perceives the perception of the (five) senses,... arisen by way of a single sense perception that

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1. Go-rams-pa, *Rigs gter gsal byed*, p. 135.

2. *Ibid*.

3. *Ibid*., p.135-136.

> takes its individual grasped object in sequence manner (grogs su yod pa) and from the immediately preceding condition.[1]

Mental Direct Perception as an Authority:

Whereas indriya-pratyakṣa is clearly considered to be an authority (pramāṇa) in virtually all the materials examined, both Buddhist and non-Buddhist, the case is not so clear for mānasa-pratyakṣa. Beginning even with the Nyāya-binduṭīkā, Dharmottara expresses his concerns about its rightful place as an authority when he explains that there are no real means to prove mental-direct perception directly.[2] However, in the end Dharmottara has no real problem accepting it because there is no contradiction when it is taken within the scope of Dharmakīrti's definition, to wit:

> Mental perception is produced by sense-cognition which is its immediately preceding condition--which has for its associative (condition) the object immediately following its own object.[3]

Moreover, because mental direct perception can be established

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1. Wayman, trans., "A guided...," p.12. Cf. Tsoṅ-kha-pa, Sde bdun la 'jug pa'i sgo don gner yid kyi mun sel źez bya ba, Sarnath, 1969, p. 20.

2. Th. Sthcherbatsky, ed. Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu with its Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā by Dharmottara, Bibliotheca Buddhica, VII, St. Petersbourg, 1918, p.11; na tvasya prasādhakam-asti pramāṇam/.

3. Ibid., p.10, verse 9; svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena samanantarapratyayena janitaṁ tanmanovijñānam / See also Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, two vols., Dover ed., 1962, II, p.26.

as a tenet of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti system, Dharmottara accepts it as an authority.[1]

On the other hand, such scholars as Jitārī left mental direct perception out from the classification of perception in his Hetutattvanirdeśa.[2] While Kamalaśīla, has at least in one instance presented an explanation of mental direct perception which could lead one to construe it as being identical with yogi-pratyakṣa. In his Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā, Kamalaśīla states that mental direct perception is the intellectual intuition of persons who, by repeated practice of meditation upon the true nature of all things, have attained omniscience.[3]

Within the Tibetan tradition, however, mental direct perception is securely established as an independent instance of one of the four authorities. Sa-skya Paṇḍita, Tsoṅ-kha-pa, 'Jam-dbyaṅ-bźad-pa, and Kloṅ-rdol bla-ma all take mental direct perception as the second variety among the four valid pramāṇa-s.[4] According to Go-rams-pa, mental

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1. Ibid., p.11; etacca siddhāntaprasiddhaṁ mānasaṁ pratyakṣa.

2. G. Tucci, ed., Hetutattvanirdeśa of Jitārī, Minor Buddhist Texts., part I, Serie Orientale Roma IX, Rome, 1956, p.273.

3. Ganganatha Jha, trans., The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla, two vols., Baroda Oriental Institute, II, p.1499.

4. See Sa-skya Paṇḍita, Tshad ma rigs-pa'i gter, Sa-skya-pa'i bka'-'bum, Vol. 5, Tokyo, 1968, p.162, Fol.16.a. Prat. 5; (For Tsoṅ kha-pa) see A. Wayman, trans., "A guided...,"p.12; Also see 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa, Blo rigs kyi rnam gzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdez, The Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyans-bźad-pa, New Delhi, 1975, Vol. 15., p.355-356; And also see Tibetan Buddhist Studies of Kloṅ-rdol bla-ma, Mussoorie, 1963, two vols., II, p.375.

direct perception is actually an authority "because of apprehending with a non-delusive cognition."[1]

The arguements against the authority of mental direct perception are of a more direct nature from the non-Buddhist opponents. Dharmakīrti presents verse 239 of the Pramāṇavārttika's "Pratyakṣa" Chapter as putting forth the criticisms of the outsiders (i.e. non-Buddhists). That verse reads as follows:

> (If) when one apprehends the previously experienced, his mind has no authority, then when one apprehends the not-yet-seen, there would be vision of the object-entity even by the blind, etcetera.[2]

As to the identity of the proponents behind these criticisms, there are at hand references to at least two of them. In his work on Bu-ston's commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya, Dr. Alex Wayman has uncovered a passage wherein Bu-ston introduces the above Pramāṇavārttika verse as showing the challenge by a person identified as Vyādi (T.Rnam phug pa).[3] While S.C. Das has an entry for a Rnam phug pa who was a member of one of the non-Buddhist schools of Magadha and who wrote a treatise entitled

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1. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.136.

2. Shastri, ed., Pramāṇavārttika...,p.172-173; pūrvānubhūta-grahaṇe manasasyapramāṇatā/ adṛṣṭagrahaṇe 'ndhāderpi syād-arthadarśanam.

3. Alex Wayman, A Millennium of Buddhist Logic (4th to 14th), (Professor Wayman has kindly made this manuscript available to me. This work is to be completed during his sabbatical year 1983-1984), p. 16.

Rnam phug pa'i grub mtha,[1] no other information as to his identity has come to light. On the other hand, the author of the Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā-ṭippaṇī has identified the well known Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school as putting forth the criticisms in verse 239.[2]

Since the exact nature of the perceptual process will be discussed below, we need only briefly mention at this point how the two criticisms presented in verse 239 are thwarted. First of all, mental direct perception apprehends the second moment of the object. And this second moment is different from the first moment of the object which was cognized by sense direct perception. The mental direct perception is in this way not perceiving what was already perceived, and hence; is not violating the "newly" characteristic of authority (pramāṇa). However, a mental direct perception is produced by dint of the sense direct perception. Therfore, a blind person cannot have a mental direct perception because they do not have the requisite sense direct perception, and hence; the second criticism present in verse 239 is avoided.

Mental Direct Perception's Lack of Continuity:

Go-rams-pa suggests that mental direct perception's

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1. Sarat Chandra Das, A Tibetan-English Dictionary, (Revised edition), Motilal Banarsidass, 1973, p.762.

2. Th. Stcherbatsky, ed., Nyāyabinduṭīkāṭippaṇī; (A Commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā), Bibliotheca Buddhica, XI, St. Petersbourg, 1909, p.26.

inability to bring forth certainty by its own force, due to its lack of continuity, is at least a partial reason why some people may consider it to be non-authoritative.[1] In the conventional world something which lacks continuity is not thought to be an authority. In order to illustrate his point, Go-rams-pa cites the case of an atom in perception. While "the atom (paramaṇu) is the object of sense cognition...in convention it is not mentioned as the object."[2] The point here seems to be as follows: when a person operating from the conventional view has a sense perception of a pot, he recognizes the pot as the object of the sense perception, because his untutored intellect falsely understands its gross form to statically continue in time. The atom, on the other hand, is actually the object of the perception even though its continuity cannot be detected in convention.[3]

Moreover, the Rigs gter gsal byed explains that while the mental direct perception lacks continuity the sense direct perception has continuity.[4] Go-rams-pa bases his position on the Pramāṇayuktinidhi which states:

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1. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p. 136.

2. Ibid.

3. A similar sort of argument is presented by Mokṣākaragupta, see An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy: An Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākaragupta by Yuichi Kajiyama, p.46.

4. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.143.

> The sense arises from the formed sense organ; therefore, the sense-cognition (indriya-jñana) has continuity. There is no mental sense (mano-indriya) by way of a mental sense; therefore, it lacks continuity.[1]

The continuity which is attributed to the sense cognition is not to be understood in the sense of the eternalism (śaśvata) put forth by various non-Buddhist schools.[2] Rather it is continuous in the sense of having "the continuity of uninterrupted production in the same class (sajāti)."[3] In other words, the sense direct perception has continuity because the later one arises from the earlier formed sense organ as the sphere of its governing condition: the earlier formed sense organ is in the same class as the later sense direct perception. The mental direct perception, however, lacks continuity because there is no later one arising from an earlier mental sense as the sphere of its governing condition: as explained above the governing condition and the immediately preceding condition for the mental direct perception is the sense cognition. And the sense cognition is not of the same class as the following mental direct perception; therefore, it lacks continuity.[4]

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1. Ibid.,p.142. And see also Sa-skya Pandita, Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter, p. 162, Fol. 16.b., Prat. verse 7.

2. For an introductory discussion of the topic of eternalism in the non-Buddhist schools see D.N. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism, Agra University, 1964, p.39-48,and p.126-153.

3. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.142.

4. Ibid., p. 143

The Authority of Mental Direct Perception as Indicated by Textual Citations:

Go-rams-pa presents four textual passages in order to substantiate mental direct perception as an independent authority. Taking as the foundation of his position the canonical citation found in the Nyāyabindu-tīkā-tippanī, to wit:

> Bhisus the cognition of form (rūpa) is twofold--that based on the eye (caksus, etcetera) and that based on the mind (manas).[1]

Following this āgama quotation the Rigs gter gsal byed presents Dignāga's passage concerning the status of mental direct perception:

> There is also the mental (awareness) of the [2]

Dignāga's own commentary upon this passage is also presented:

> Also the mental (awareness) has a consciousness-support (ālambana) of the sense object form, etcetera; promoted by the image of experience, that is without constructive thought.[3]

And finally, Go-rams-pa appeals to Dharmakirti's Pramāna-viniścaya, to wit:

> Also the mental (awareness) arises from the sense cognition which is the immediately preceding condition and it freshly apprehends the object.[4]

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1. Ibid., p. 138. This same āgama citation is quoted in the Nyayabindutīkā-tippanī, p.26; and also Tarkabhāsā, p. 47.

2. Ibid. See also Dignāga's Pramānasamuccaya, Tibetan version, trans. by Vasudhararaksita and Señ-rgyal, New Delhi, p.4.

3. Ibid. And again see Dignāga, p.4.

4. Vetter, Dharmakīrti's Pramānaviniścaya, p.58

The Process of Mental Direct Perception:

Based on the Pramāṇayuktinidhi Go-rams-pa presents three different versions of the occasion of the arising of mental direct perception following sense direct perception.[1] In the Rigs gter gsal byed Go-rams-pa not only presents three different version of the arising process, he also attributes each version to a particular author and explains the validity or non-validity of each version according to his system. The importance that Sa-skya Paṇḍita's and Go-rams-pa's presentations of these three versions had on the development of the native Tibetan epistemological tradition is quite evident from the treatment it receives at the hands of the seventeenth century dGe-lug-pa Lama 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bzad-pa. In his Blo-rigs, 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa devotes four complete folios to the discussion of the various versions of the arising of mental direct perception.[2] In the Pramāṇayuktinidhi, however, Sa-skya Paṇḍita devotes but a single verse to state his position, to wit:

> spel ma daṅ ni rgyun gyi mtha'/
> gñis ga la yaṅ gnod gyed yod /
> des na dbaṅ po dbaṅ śes kyi /
> rgyu yin yid kyi rkyen du 'gyur /[3]

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1. Go-rams-pa actually discusses more than three perceptual theories, however, what is being discussed here is his presentation of the three theories by earlier Indian commentator/scholars. This discussion begins on p.137 of the Rigs gter gsal byed.

2. 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa, Blo-rigs..., p.357-364, Fol.28.a-31.b.

3. Sa-skya Paṇḍita, Tshad ma rigs-pa'i gter, p.162, Fol. 16.b., Prat.8.; See also Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.137.

Go-rams-pa attributes the first version to Prajñā-karagupta on the authority of the Kaśmīrian Paṇḍita. While neither Go-rams-pa nor 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa mention Prajñā-karagupta by name, both authors attribute this version to the Ālaṁkāra.[1] Ālaṁkāra is the abbreviated appellation for Pranjñākaragupta's commentary entitled Pramāṇavārtikabhā-shya or Vārtikālaṁkāra. Go-rams-pa explains Prajñākara-gupta's perceptual process as follows:

> Initially there is one moment (ksana)of sense direct perception; after that onē m̄oment of mental direct perception arises, and after that the second moment of sense direct perception arises, so on and so forth. At the beginning there is apprehending by the sense direct perception, at the end mental perception concludes.[2]

'Jam-bdyaṅs-bźad-pa accurately presents Go-rams-pa's interpretation of Prajñākaragupta's process and states that according to Go-rams-pa's interpretation the sense direct perception and the mental direct perception "are alternately produced."[3]

The Rigs gter gsal byed does not accept the perceptual model ascribed to the Ālaṁkāra as being correct,

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1. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.137. And 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa, Blo-rigs, p.358, Fol. 28.b. Both authors identify the proponent of this version as rgyan (=S. Alaṁ-kāra).

2. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p. 137.

3. 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa, Blo-rigs, p.358, Fol. 28.b.;spel mar skye ba. For the time being I have adopted Th. Stcherbatsky's translation of alternate for spel ma; the Mahāvyutpatti gives the Sanskrit miśraka (mixed) for spel ma.

> because the three conditions of the second moment of sense direct perception are complete in the first moment of sense direct perception, nothing whatsoever is able to obstruct the direct result arising from the direct cause (complete in the first moment).[1]

The point of Go-rams-pa's rejection seems to be the following: according to Go-rams-pa's position there is no logical explanation for the hiatus between the first moment of the sense direct perception and the second moment of the sense direct perception being filled by the first moment of mental direct perception. And likewise, the hiatus between the first moment of mental direct perception and the second moment of mental direct perception being filled by the second moment of sense direct perception. Because once all of the causes and conditions are present during the first moment of sense direct perception there is no possible way for the production of the second moment of sense direct perception to be postponed until after the first moment of mental direct perception has arisen. For Go-rams-pa this predicament would hold true for each moment of perception if the alternate production of the sense direct perception and mental direct perception were to be accepted.

While 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa also does not accept the "alternation view" of the perceptual process as being the correct one, he does not believe that the Rigs gter gsal byed is correct in attributing this theory of production

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1. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.137-138.

to Prajñākaragupta. The author of the Blo rigs states that not even in one Tibetan commentary ('grel pa) or subcommentary of the Ālaṁkāra can Prajñākaragupta be found to support the alternation view. In order to further substantiate his position that the alternation view of the perceptual process is not put forth by the Ālaṁkāra, 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa refers to Mkhas-grub-rje's Sde bdun yid kyi mun sel and Rgyal tshab's Rigs gter dar ṭīk.[1] The Blo rigs quotes Mkhas-grub-rje as follows:

> That the Ālaṁkāra's author explained the sense and mental direct perception's alternate arising is known exclusively upon a reputation current among scholars (nowadays). (The alternation view) does not appear in any Tibetan translation of the Ālaṁkāra or in the literature following it.[2]

And Rgyal-tshab is similarly quoted as stating:

> The alternation view does not appear in the translation of the Ālaṁkāra present now.[3]

'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa, furthermore, states that to declare the Ālaṁkāra's acceptance of the alternate production of sense and mental direct perception cannot be right because he feels that the Ālaṁkāra professes the simultaneity

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1. 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa, Blo-rigs, p.359, Fol. 29.a. Columbia has just recently begun receiving the Collected Works of these two authors, unfortunately the two texts referred to have not been among the materials received.

2. Ibid.; (Sde bdun yid kyi mun sel las) dbaṅ yid spel nas skye bar Rgyan mkhan pos bźed do/ źes mkhas pa rnams la grags pa tsam du zad kyi/ bod du 'gyur ba'i Rgyan rjes 'braṅs daṅ bcas pa'i gźuṅ lugs gaṅ na 'ṅ mi gsal lo/

3. Ibid. (Rigs gter dar ṭīk las kyaṅ/) spel mar skye ba da lta 'gyur ba'i Rgyan gyi 'grel pa na mi snaṅ ṅo/

of the sense direct perception and the mental direct perception.[1] A detailed examination into exactly what perceptual model is present in the Ālaṁkāra, be it the alternation, or simultaneity view, or otherwise, is beyond the scope of this dissertation and will have to be postponed for a further study. One point, however, can be mentioned regarding 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa's attitude toward the Ālaṁkāra's view as he perceives it. Although he accepts Prajñākaragupta's view in the Ālaṁkāra to be advocating the simultaneous production of the sense and mental direct perceptions, 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa does not accept the simultaneity view as correctly representing the position of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti lineage.[2] 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa refutes the authoritativeness of Prajñākaragupta's theory of the simultaneity of sense and mental direct perception on the basis of the following:

1. Not only does it come to pass in the view of the Ālaṁkāra that the sense direct perception and the mental direct perception are simultaneous, but Prajñākaragupta also accepts a smidgen of

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1. Ibid., p.360, Fol. 29.b.

2. Ibid. 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa does not mention Dignāga or Dharmakīrti by name, but instead refers to phrase "Mdo daṅ Sde bdun". This is of course indicating Dignaga's Pramanasamuccaya or Pramāna-sūtra(Mdo) as it was known in the Tibetan materials. And Dharmakīrti's"Seven Books"(Sde bdun). For a discussion of the"Seven Books"see Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, I, p. 37-47.

constructive thought in mental direct perception. And in consequence of this situation Prajñākaragupta is forced to accept the presence of constructive thought even at the time of sense direct perception.

2. The Blo rigs points out that this situation contradicts both Dignāga's Pramāṇa-Sūtra and Dharmakīrti's Seven Books which maintain the absence of constructive thought in direct perception.[1]

The Second Perceptual Process:

The second model of the perceptual process presented by the Rigs gter gsal byed is attributed to Dharmottara and like the first is considered to be invalid. Go-rams-pa explains Dharmottara's theory of the perceptual process as follows:

> At the end of the on-going of (a particular) sense direct perception one moment of mental direct perception arises, but not before. Because every eye cognition which clearly illuminates a form (rūpa) when the eye is apprehending a form amounts to eye cognition. Otherwise, it would be difficult to justify the term 'eye cognition'.[2]

Dharmottara's model is held to be invalid because "the three conditions for the mental direct perception are ful-

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1. Ibid.

2. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p. 137.

filled before the completion of the sense direct perception." And in light of this, Go-rams-pa states that "there is nothing obsructing the mental direct perception's arising (during the sense direct perception)."[1] Moreover, Go-rams-pa also rules out the possibility that the presence of the sense direct perception could be obstructing the arising of mental direct perception; again he refers to the same reason that it is impossible to obstruct the direct result's arising from its direct cause. If it were possible that the sense direct perception's presence could obstruct or block the arising of mental direct perception, then according to Go-rams-pa "it would be obstructed even at the conclusion of the continuity" of the sense direct perception.[2] 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa, on the other hand, considers Dharmottara's view of the perceptual process to be the only right one from among the three models presented. He considers Dharmottara's view to be correctly established in accordance with the Dharmakīrti's "Seven Books".[3]

The Third Perceptual Process:

The third perceptual process presented in the Rigs gter gsal byed is attributed to the Great Brahman(bram ze

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1. Ibid., p.138.

2. Ibid.

3. 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa, Blo-rigs, p.362, Fol. 30.b.

chen-po).[1] According to Sa-skya Paṇḍita and Go-rams-pa, it is only the Great Brahman's version of the perceptual process which is to be taken as the valid representation of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti system.[2]

And once again as in the Rigs gter gsal byed's discussion of the Ālaṁkāra's theory, Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad pa feels that Go-rams-pa mistakenly indentified the supposed proponent of a particular theory, in this case the Great Brahman as advocating the third variety of perceptual process. According to the Blo-rigs it cannot be admitted that the Great Brahman accepted the method ascribed to him, because that ascribed method is not shown to be his by means of either the Tibetan translation of his texts or by Ārya Paṇḍitas. 'Jam-dbyaṅs--bźad-pa finds support for his position in the Sde bdun kyi mun sel and quotes that work thus:

> It is just a reputation among earlier (scholars) that the Great Brahman supported such a position. The origin (of this erroneous attribution) is not found in any Tibetan translations of the (Great) Brahman.[3]

'Jam-dbyaṅs-bzad-pa criticism notwithstanding, Go-rams-pa explains the valid perceptual model thus:

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1. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.137.

2. Sa-skya Paṇḍita's view is evident in his Tshad ma rigs gter gsal byed, Mṅon sum, verse 9.c-d. This verse is quoted below in Part III, Translation of Text, while translating page 137 of Go-rams-pa's Rigs gter gsal byed.

3. 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bzad-pa, Blo-rigs, p.360, Fol. 29.b.; (Sde bdun yid kyi mun sel las/ bram ze chen pa'o bź ed pa yin źes sṅa ma dag la grags pa tsam ma gtogs bram ze'i bod du 'gyur ba'i gźun lugs gaṅ na 'ṅ khuṅs med ciṅ/

> Initially only moment of sense direct perception arises. And after that there arises an equal number of sense direct perceptions and mental direct perceptions, until the continuity of the sense direct perception is complete.[1]

According to the Rigs gter gsal byed, the mānasa-pratyakṣa cannot arise prior to or simultaneously with the first moment of the indriya-pratyakṣa. Go-rams-pa feels that this is clearly the case because by definition, when there is a mānasa-pratyakṣa it is necessarily arisen from the sense direct perception which is its samanantara-pratyaya.[2]

Furthermore, Go-rams-pa believes that the perceptual model attributed to the Great Brahman does not fall prey to the criticism made against Dhramottara's model, because in the Great Brahman's view the mānasa-pratyakṣa arises after only the first instant of indriya-pratyakṣa.[3] Hence, the resulting mental direct perception follows immediately upon the presence of the three conditions which are its causative factor; its arising is not delayed until the completion of the indriya-pratyakṣa's duration as in Dharmottara's view.

Nor does Go-rams-pa feel that the model which he accepts is susceptible to the faults of the "alternation

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1. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p. 137.

2. Ibid., p. 138.

3. Ibid., p. 139.

view" attributed to the Ālaṁkāra. While according to the view attributed to the Ālaṁkāra, the second moment of sense direct perception arises following the first moment of mental direct perception and not following the first moment of sense direct perception; according to the perceptual model attributed to the Great Brahman, the production of the perceptual moments of indriya and mānasa-pratyakṣa do not alternate.[1] After the initial moment of sense direct perception the subsequent moments of indriya and mānasa pratyakṣa arise in, what may be considered, as a parallel flow.[2] In this perceptual model the second moment of sense direct perception arises from the first moment of sense direct perception; hence, skirting the fault present in the Ālaṁkāra's alternation view, to wit, that the direct result does not arise from its direct cause.[3]

Schematically the three perceptual models may be presented as follows:


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1. Ibid.


2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 137.


Ālaṁkāra's View[1]
Invalid



Dharmottara's View[2]
Invalid



Great Brahman's View
Valid



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1. When discussing this view with Dr. Wayman, he pointed out that according to this view the first moment of mental direct would be the beginning of pratīti (distinct cognition). Furthermore, Dr. Wayman indicated that according to this system pratīti is capable of coalescing with kalpanā; cf. 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bžad-pa's comments above and also Dharmakīrti's Nyāya-bindu, Prat. 5.

2. I must thank Dr. Wayman for suggesting to change Dharmottara's perceptual flow from a downward to an upward direction. Although invalid according to Go-rams-pa's tradition, Dharmottara's view is quite close to the threshold concept of perceptual change current in modern psychology. Not all sensory stimulation produces a noticeable difference in the perceiver. Only the sensory stimulation with enough intensity to produce a just noticeable difference (JND) in the perceiver will cross the threshold point and cause a change in the observer's perception. Cf. Robert Isaacson, et al., Psychology: The Science of Behavior, Harper and Row, New York, 1965, p. 164-168.

Introspective Direct Perception

Who accepted it and who did not:

Like mental direct perception the topic of introspective direct perception generated a great many discussions about whether or not it was to be accepted as an authority (pramāṇa). The position which a school held with regard to introspection would often indicate its attitude toward the topic of consciousness in general. Stcherbatsky's agreement with this position is indicated by the following quotation, to wit, "we cannot deny the validity of Introspection, the Buddhist now declared,...if we deny introspection, we must deny consciousness itself."[1] The importance that introspection played within Indian philosophy in general and Buddhist philosophy in particular, after its development at the hands of Dignāga, et al., is also pointed out by Stcherbatsky stating, "the problem of introspection afterwards divided all India as well as the Buddhists into two camps, its advocates and its opponents."[2] And more recently A. Wayman reiterates this stating, "...especially the varieties of 'mind' and of 'introspection' occasioned numerous arguments of the Buddhist logicans, not only with the Hindu and Jain philosophers, but also with other Buddhist thinkers, in particular the

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1. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, two vols., Dover ed., 1962, I, p. 12.

2. Ibid.

Yogācārin followers of Asaṅga's school."[1]

Regarding the Buddhist tenet systems, the Tibetan author Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ po, in his Grub mtha' rin chen phreṅ ba, states the status of svasaṁvedan within each system. For Dkon mchog-'jigs med-dbaṅ-pa the view which the followers of a particular system held towards the authority of svasamvedana was of such paramount importance that he included it within the definition of the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika. He defines a Vaibhāṣika as "a person propounding Hīnayāna tenets who does not accept introspection and who claims the external object as being truly established."[2] And according to Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ-po a Sautrāntika is "a person propounding Hīnayanā tenets who accepts both introspection and the external object as true."[3]

The Grub mtha' rin chen phreṅ ba does not include reference to svasaṁvedana when initially defining the followers of the Cittamātra and Mādhyamika schools. In these two systems the situation is not so well defined; within each school there were differing opinions as to the authority of introspection.

Only after defining a Mādhyamika as "a person propounding Buddhist [lit.inside] tenets who claims that there are no

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1. Alex Wayman, "Reflections on the Study of Buddhist Logic," Indologica Taurinensia (Torino, Italy), Vol.V, 1977,p.301.

2. Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ-po, Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzag pa rin po ch'i phreṅ ba, Imperial Printing Press, Dharmsala, p.17; raṅ rig mi 'dod ciṅ phyi don bden grub tu 'dod pa'i theg dman gyi grub mtha' smra ba'i gaṅ zag de.

3. Ibid,p.30; raṅ rig daṅ phyi don gñis ka bden źin gyis khas len pa'i theg dman gyi grub mtha' smra ba'i gaṅ zag de.

truely established dharmas, not even atoms",[1] and dividing the Mādhyamika into two types, does Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dban-po discuss svasaṁvedana's position within this school. Having first divided the Mādhyamika into the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika and Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika,[2] Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ-pa then further divides the former into Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādkyamika and Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika.[3] Accordingly, the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika is defined as "a Mādhyamika who does not claim the external object and accepts intropsection."[4] And the definition of a Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamika is "a Mādhyamika who does not accept intropsection and accepts the external object as established by way of its self-existence."[5] As for the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, when discussing the object possessors according to that school, the Grub mtha' rin chen phreṅ ba simply states that "they do not accept introspective direct perception."[6]

Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ-pa also divides the Yogācāra into two: those who follow scripture (āgama-anusārin), and

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1. Ibid., p.56; bden grub kyi chos rdul tsam yaṅ med par khas len pa'i naṅ pa'i grub mtha' smra ba'i gaṅ zag de.

2. dbu ma raṅ rgyud pa daṅ/ thal 'gyur ba gñis.

3. rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma raṅ rgyud pa daṅ/ mdo sde spyod pa'i dbu ma raṅ rgyud pa gñis.

4. Grub mtha' rin chen phreṅ ba, p.57; phyi don khas mi len źiṅ/ raṅ rig khas len pa'i dbu ma pa

5. Ibid.; raṅ rig khas mi len źiṅ/ phyi don raṅ gi mthsan ñid kyis grub par khas len pa'i dbu ma pa.

6. Ibid.,p.70; raṅ rig mṅon sum mi 'dod.

those who follow reason (yuktyanusārin). The former, accepting the ālayavijñāna as the basis of the personality (pudgala), are those who follow five divisions of Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmi. The former, accepting the mano-vijñāna as the basis of the personality, are those who follow the seven treatises of logic by Dharmakīrti. Without indicating which division of the Yogācāra is being referred to, the Grub mtha' rin chen phreṅ ba states that the four kinds of direct perception are accepted according to that school.[1] In his article entitled, "Reflections on the Study of Buddhist Logic," however, A. Wayman has referred to the medium length Grub mtha' composed by Lcaṅ-skys Rol-pa'i-rdo-rje, where it is stated that the "Yogācārins who follow reason accept the four kinds of direct perception." And "the Yogācārins who follow scripture reject the belief in introspection while accepting the other three."[2] Hence, it appears that Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ-pa was referring to the followers of reason when he stated the "Yogācāra accept the four kinds of direct perception."

Also in that article Dr. Wayman has put forth the theory that the Buddhist logicians replaced the rejected "store-consciousness"(ālayavijñāna) of the Asaṅga type Yogācāra with their "introspective direct perception". He bases his reasoning in part,on the fact that the logicians had "already re-

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1. Ibid., p.48-49.

2. A. Wayman, "Reflections...,"p.302.

placed the Buddhist 'perception' (*vijnāna*) with the term 'direct perception' (*pratyakṣa*).[1] Unfortunately, the present study is unable to shed any further light on this idea. Go-rams-pa refers to the term *ālayavijñāna* only on a few occasions; none of which are related to this topic.

The Definition:

Initially Go-rams-pa simply states that introspective direct perception "is the apprehension-image (*grāhakākāra*) delimiting (*paricchedaka*) its bare nature(*svarūpa*)."[2] And Tsoṅ-kha-pa defines introspective direct perception as "the one that grasps only on the inner side (of the mind) while based on all cognition as imagery (*ākāra*)."[3] Although Go-rams-pa's base definition of introspection is not as descriptive as Tsoṅ-kha-pa's, from other statements in the *Rigs gter gsal byed* it is evident that he concurs with it. For instance, when on page 128 Go-ram-pa discusses the object-sign by which the variegation of direct perception is made, he states that "there is introspective direct perception which cognizes an inner (object)." And when discussing the term 'introspection' on page 144 Go-rams-pa states "every cognition (*jñāna*) has an intropsective direct perception regarding its bare nature."

Go-rams-pa's stating "every cognition" and Tsoṅ-kha-pa's

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1. Ibid.,p.303.

2. Go-rams-pa, *Sde bdun mdo daṅ bcas pa'i dgoṅs pa phyin ci ma log par 'grel pa tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal byed pa*, Sakya College, Mussoorie, India, 1975, p. 144.

3. Alex Wayman, trans., "A Guided Tour through the Seven Books of Dharmakīrti," (forthcoming, 1983-84)p.13.

stating "all cognition" is most likely referring to Dharmakīrti's terse comment in the Nyāyabindu, to wit, "all thoughts (citta) and thought derivatives (caitta) are self-cognized." So intimately woven is cognition with introspection, that Go-rams-pa makes the propositional statement, "given a cognition, then there is an intropsective direct perception of its bare nature."

The Object qua Sanctionable of Introspection:

When introspection is a direct perception we know two things about it; first that it is devoid of constructive thought and without delusion and second, that it has a svalakṣaṇa (inherent character) as a sanctionable (prameya). Furthermore, whereas indriya and mānasa are cognizing the outer external object, svasaṁvedana pratyakṣa cognizes an inner object. Go-rams-pa more precisely explains what constitutes the inner object qua sanctionable of svasaṁvedana as he answers the query, "What is the inherent character to be cognized?" On page 159 of the Rigs gter gsal byed he states "that at the time of introspective direct perception the inherent character is taken as the cognition (jñāna) which is comprehensible (samvedya)." This is once again similar to Tsoṅ-kha-pa's statement "based on all cognition". Hence, when Dharmakīrti states in the Nyāya-

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1. Th. Stcherbatsky,ed., Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu with its Nyāyabindu-tīkā by Dharmottara, Bibliotheca Buddhica,VII., St. Petersbourg, 1918, p.11; sarvacittacaittanāmatmasaṁvedam.

2. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.144.

3. Ibid.,p.128.

bindu that "all thoughts and thought derivatives are self-cognized," it appears that he is stating what introspection has as object.

Saṁvṛti and Paramārtha and the Object of Introspection:

When discussing the object of introspection it is necessary to be aware of the distinction between the conventional (saṁvṛti) and the absolute sense (paramārtha). While introspection has an object in the conventional sense it does not have one in the absolute sense. Go-rams-pa brings this problem to light when discussing a statement which Sa-skya Paṇḍita made in his self-commentary to his Tshad ma rigs gter. This statement was thought by some to contradict Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika. Sa-skya Paṇḍita's statement, "introspective direct perception does not have an object," is thought to gainsay the authority of Dharmakīrti's verse (PV. Prat. 365):

> This rule of sanctionable, authority, and result is applicable everywhere, for example the experience of rāga, etcetera, when the authority has an inner object.[1]

Go-rams-pa explains that when one ponders introspection with the absolute principle there is indeed no object; because at that time the apprehensible-image is not the object of the apprehension-image. This is so, because according to the absolute principle the"single cognition is not separated into the three: apprehended, apprehender, and awareness."[2] While

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1. This verse is presented in the translation of the Rigs gter gsal byed, p.146-147.

2. Ibid., p.147.

in the conventional sense the introspective direct perception has an object; because, "the three: the apprehensible image, apprehension-image, and awareness are recognized as the authority (pramāṇa), the result (phala), and the sanctionable (prameya)."[1] In order to support his contention Go-rams-pa analyzes two of Dharmakīrti's verses (i.e. PV. Prat.354 and 357); dividing each verse so that it makes reference to the conventional as well as the absolute principle.[2]

Moreover, it is interesting to note that while a direct perception must be devoid of constructive thought, an introspective direct perception may have constructive thought as an object; and so it is stated by Dignāga in his Pramāṇa-samuccaya (Prat.5.c-d):

> Even constructive thought is admitted as self-intuition because the constructive thought there is not toward an (external) object.[3]

Hence, while the judgment 'this is a jar' is a constructive thought, it can be the object for introspection when it is not toward an external object. And Mokṣākaragupta quoting the Pramāṇavārtikālaṁkāra states "every knowledge is correct in its own nature, but it may be erring in relation to (the external object which is) another."[4] Even a delusive cognition

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1. Ibid., p.148.

2. I refer the interested reader to page 148 of the Rigs gter gsal byed for this analysis.

3. Cf. A. Wayman, A Millennium of Buddhist Logic, (forthcoming, 1983-84), Appendix I.

4. Yuichi Kajiyama, An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy; an Annotated Translation of the Tarkabhāṣā of Mokṣākara-gupta, Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, No.10, 1966,p.52.

can be the object of introspection. Mokṣākaragupta hints at this when he states, "likewise, erroneous knowledge is in itself non-erroneous."[1] And Go-rams-pa further develops this idea as he discusses the sanctionable for those Cittamātrins. who claim the image as false, stating:

> when the superimposition of the apprehended object is made the sanctionable, then superimposition would be for introspection-as-result.[2]

The point which Go-rams-pa is making is that it does not matter whether the internal image is considered to be a true apprehended image or a false superimposition. What does matter, however, is that the introspective direct perception cognizes it with a cognition devoid of constructive thought and without delusion.

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1. Ibid.

2. *Rigs gter gsal byed*, p.167.

The Yogin's Direct Perception

As one might expect Go-rams-pa's presentation of the yogin's direct perception (yogi-pratyakṣa; rnal 'byor mṅon-sum), more than his presentation of the sense, mental, or introspective direct perception, emphasizes certain religio-philosophical concerns central to the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist tradition. Within the Rigs gter gsal byed's examination of the yogin's direct perception one encounters references to such topis as mahākaruṇa ('great compassion'), śūnyatā ('voidness'), nairātmya ('selflessness'), and the Buddhist's thought about the natural condition of consciousness. Moreover, in this section there is a brief but poignant discussion of what constitutes omniscience (sarvajñā; kun mkhyen) and and those who are omniscient, according to the Buddhist of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti lineage.

The Definition and Its Variegation:

Like sense, mental, and introspective direct perception, the yogin's direct perception is a cognition which is free from constructive thought and free from delusion. In terms of its object and its basis, however, the yogin's direct perception is unlike the other three kinds of direct perception. Whereas, indriya and mānasa pratyakṣa cognize the outer external object, and svasaṁvedana pratyakṣa cognizes the inner object, yogi-pratyakṣa is said to "lack a cognition of an inner or outer (object)."[1] And while indriya and mānasa

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1. Go-rams-pa, Sde bdun mdo daṅ bcas pa'i dgoṅs pa phyin ci ma log par 'grel pa tshad ma rigs pa'i gter gyi don gsal byed pa, Sakya College, Mussoorie, India, 1975, p. p.128.

have their basis in the sense organs, the yogin's direct perception has its basis in intense contemplation (samādhi). Moreover, it is noteworthy that the yogin's direct perception's functional independence from the sense organs casts some doubt on Kamalaśīla's remark which identifies yogin's direct perception with mental direct perception.[1]

The yogin's direct perception is that

> cognition which is non-delusive regarding the 'privileged object' (samyag-artha); having consciousness-support in the salient samadhi arisen in that contemplation of the 'privileged object' amounting to its specific governing-condition.[2]

Just as the governing-condition of a particular sense direct perception designates the variegation of it, so too in the case of the yogin's direct perception.[3] Hence, depending on the nature of "the salient samādhi arisen in that contemplation of the 'privileged object'", there is the variegation of yogi-pratyakṣa as the following three:

A. The yogi-pratyakṣa of the Hearer (śrāvaka).

B. The yogi-pratyakṣa of the Solitary Realizer (pratyeka-buddha).

C. The yogi-pratyakṣa of the Mahāyāna Nobles (ārya).[4]

Not only has Go-rams-pa variegated the yogin's direct

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1. Cf. Ganganatha Jha, trans., The Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalaśīla, two vols., Baroda Oriental Institue, I, p.664.

2. See Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.149.

3. Cf. Rigs gter gsal byed, p.133 and Introduction, Part II, "Sense Direct Perception".

4. Go-rams-pa, Rigs gter gsal byed, p.149.

perception, but he has also rated them; following the expected line of thought he takes the Mahāyāna variety to be superior to the two other types which constitute Hīnayāna varieties. It is most likely because of the superiority of the Mahāyānist's yogi-pratyakṣa that it is said to require the most time to attain. While the necessary "three existences" of the Śrāvakas and the "one-hundred eons" required of the Pratyekabuddhas do not exactly paint an image of faint hearted practitioners, the "three incalculable eons" needed to attain the yogi-pratyakṣa of the Mahāyānist leaves one feeling the task all but impossible.[1]

If the time required were not enough to dissuade the would be practitioners, the Rigs gter gsal byed futher states that once the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas attain their respective yogic-direct perceptions, they are still not able to comprehend any knowable (jñeya) as direct perception. This is "because they have not abandoned the propensities of nescience (avidyā); and because their means is provided with meager compassion (karuṇā)."[2] For the Mahāyānist, however, be their toil long, in the end they comprehend all knowables in direct perception. Go-rams-pa reports that their success is due to the fact they have abandoned the propensities of nescience, and they have practiced the means imbued with 'great compassion'."[3] It is 'great com-

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1. See Rigs gter gsal byed, p.150.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

passion' serving as the cooperative condition (sahakārin-pratyaya) and insight (prajñā) understanding selflessness (nairātmya) serving as the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) which support the yogin's knowledge which realizes noumenon.

How Many Fish Are In the Sea?

Discussions of omniscience and the omniscient person are quite visible in the Indian and Tibetan Buddhist literature. Śāntarakṣita has an extensive discussion of omniscience in the twenty-sixth chapter of his Tattvasaṃgraha, with considerable elaboration by Kamalaśīla in his Pañjikā. And in Ratnakīrti's Nibandhavāli we find one entire tract devoted to the discussion of establishing omniscience.[1] The discussion of these topics which one finds in the Rigs gter gsal byed is slight when compared with most others.[2] Nevertheless, within the brief section addressing omniscience, Go-rams-pa makes his position known as being similar to that of Dharmakīrti.

Accordingly, answering an unnamed objector who denies omniscience "because there is no end to the number of things which may be known," Go-rams-pa states that omniscience is established as "the knowledge of required meanings." And further, he states that the omniscient person is established as "the wise ones who know all the required meanings of what may be known."[3] Regarding the exact nature of what it

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1. Cf. Ratnakīrti's Sarvajñasiddhi in his Nibandhavāli, ed. by A. Thakur, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series Vol. III.

2. See Rigs gter gsal byed, p.156.

3. Ibid.

means to know all the required meanings, Go-rams-pa quotes the Pramāṇavārttika, to wit:

> He who knows the truth of what is to be rejected and what is to be accepted, together with the means, is accepted as the authority; but not one who knows everything.[1]

The omniscient person may very well possess the ability to see great distances, or know how many insects there are in the sky or how many fish are in the sea. But, that is not reason why one would seek him out, as Dharmakīrti states

> Let him see far or not, but let him see the desired truth.[2]

Go-rams-pa does not elaborate on what constitutes "the truth of what is to be rejected and what is to be accepted, together with the means." Manorathanandin, however, in his commentary on the Pramāṇavārttika,[3] as well as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla,[4] do state what constitutes "the truth to be rejected, etc." According to these authors Dharmakīrti is making a direct reference to the Four Noble Truths. One who is omniscient (i.e. the Buddha) knows;

1. We are to reject the truth of suffering (duḥkha-satya).
2. We are to accept the truth of the cessation

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1. Cf. Rigs gter gsal byed, p.156. And also Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, 34.

2. Cf. Rigs gter gsal byed, p.156. And also Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, 35.

3. Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the commentary 'Vṛtti' of Acharya Manorathanandin, Varanasi, 1966,p.19.

4. Ganganatha Jha, trans., The Tattvasaṃgraha..., II,p.1473.

of suffering (nirodhasatya).

3. The means to each, to wit, the truth of the origins of suffering (samudayasatya), and,

4. The truth of the path (margasatya), i.e., the eight-fold path.

Yogi-pratyakṣa and svasaṁvedana-pratyakṣa:

It was indicated above in the discussion of The Variegations of Direct Perception that the usual order of the direct perceptions is: sense (indriya), mental (mānasa), introspection (svasaṁvedana), and yogic (yogi). This usual ordering seems logical for two reasons; first, the first three direct perceptions are common to all ordinary men, while only the yogin has the yogic direct perception. And second, unlike the other three direct perceptions, the yogin's direct perception has access to the 'privileged object' and can view the voidness (śūnyatā) of persons and phenomena. This usual ordering of the variegations of direct perception, however, is not always found. In Līlavajra's commentary on the Guhyagarbhatantra we find just such an exception. In the eleventh chapter of his commentary Līlavajra states:

> Taking hold of, is of two kinds: taking hold of, as yogi-pratyaksa; and taking hold of in the high degree, as svasaṁvedana-pratyakṣa.[1]

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1. See above The Variegations of Direct Perception for complete reference. I must thank Professor Wayman for drawing my attention to this passage.

The practice of placing introspective direct perception above the yogin's direct perception is also found in other works such as, Sarvarahasya-tantra[1] and the Hevajratantra.[2] Worthy of note is that the reversal of svasaṃvedana and yogi-pratyakṣa seems to occur most frequently in the Tantric type materials.

A solution as to why these two direct perceptions are reversed may be found at least in part in 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa's large Grub mtha. In that work 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa cites Vajragarbha's commentary on the Hevajratantra[3] which associates four differing characteristics with the four direct perceptions as follows: "to indicate (i.e. direct perception of the sense organs), to take hold of (or to digest) (i.e. that of the mind, manas), to attain (i.e. that of the yogin), and to experience (or to understand) (i.e. that of introspection)."[4] Hence, while the yogin may "attain" the privileged object' through his yogi-pratyakṣa, he only comes to "experience" it through his introspective direct perception.

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1. Sarvarahasya-nāma-tantrarāja, Peking Tibetan Tripitaka, Tokyo-Kyoto, 1956, Vol.5. See verses 16, 26, 31, and 55. Once again I am indebted to Professor Wayman for drawing these verses to my attention.

2. Hevajra-tantra, ed. and trans. by D.L. Snellgrove, London, 1959.

3. This would be Vajragarbha's Hevajrapiṇḍārthaṭīkā.

4. 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa, Grub mtha' chen mo, Section Ca, 41b-1, ff. Cf. also A. Wayman, "Reflections on the Study of Buddhist Logic," Indologica Taurinensia, Italy, 1977.

PART III

Go-rams-pa's Sectional Titles:

Here I have collected together the sectional titles which occur in the 'Direct Perception' chapter of the Rigs gter gsal byed. This may be useful as a table of contents for the chapter. It should be noted that Go-rams-pa's manner of setting forth the sectional titles for this chapter is similar to the style common in Tibetan philosophical literature in general. For instance, Go-rams-pa's style is like to one employed by Tsoṅ-kha-pa in his Lam rim chen mo.[1] This procedure of presenting the sectional titles begins by stating a set of titles, as, for example, three in number, and then for example, he will state that the first one is of two kinds. At this point he goes on to discuss the first kind, stating, "the first (is as follows)." Then later when coming to the place where the second variety is to be discussed, Go-rams-pa will sometimes give the title again or he will simply state, "the second (is as follows)." In the translation below I have replaced his "the second (is as follows) with the sectional heading he provided in the initial listing.

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1. Cf. Alex Wayman, Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real; Buddhist Meditation and the Middle View; From the Lam rim chen mo of Tson-kha-pa, Columbia University, New York, 1978, pp. 74-79.

Go-rams-pa's Sectional Titles for the Mňon sum Chapter of the Tshad ma rigs-pa'i gter gsal byed pa

A. Direct Perception (S.C.124)

1. Right Direct Perception (S.C.125)

A. The Defintion (S.C.125)

1. Rejecting the incorrect definitions of others (*Ibid.*)

2. Establishing our own definition (*Ibid.*)

A. Establishing the real defintion (*Ibid.*)

B. Establishing the purpose of the definition (*Ibid.*)

1. Establishing the purpose of "devoid of constructive thought"(*Ibid.*)

2. Establishing the purpose of "without delusion" (S.C.126)

3. The purpose of both "devoid of constuctive thought" and "without delusion" taken together (S.C.127)

B. The variegation of what is defined (*Ibid.*)

1. The basis of what is variegated (*Ibid.*)

2. The bare nature of what is variegated (*Ibid.*)

3. The object-sign by which the variegation is made (*Ibid.*)

4. The significance of the manner of making the variegation (S.C. 128)

5. What is the proper number of the variegation (*Ibid.*)

C. The meaning of the term (S.C.130)

1. Sense direct perception (*Ibid.*)

A. The definition of the definable (*Ibid.*)

B. Variegation of the terms (*Ibid.*)

C. The authority which ascertains the definition in the term (Ibid.)

1. Making certain the meaning of 'arisen from the formed sense organ' (S.C.131)

   A. Determining the sense which is the governing condition (Ibid.)

   B. Proving what is arisen from that (Ibid.)

2. Making certain the meaning of 'outward-directed perception' (S.C.132)

3. Making certain the meaning of 'free from constructive thought' (Ibid.)

4. Making certain the meaning of 'devoid of delusion' (Ibid.)

D. The literal definition of the definable (Ibid.)

1. Defining the definable in general (Ibid.)

2. Establishment of the three conditions (S.C.133)

   A. The similar immediately preceding condition (Ibid.)

      1. The definition (Ibid.)

      2. The literal defintion of that which is defined (Ibid.)

      3. Removal of doubts concerning the term (Ibid.)

   B. The governing condition (S.C.134)

      1. The definition (Ibid.)

      2. The term (Ibid.)

      3. The literal meaning (Ibid.)

C. The support condition (*Ibid.*)

1. The defintion (Ibid.)

2. The term (*Ibid.*)

2. Mental Direct Perception (*Ibid.*)

A. Determining its bare nature (S.C. 135)

1. Pondering its definition (*Ibid.*)

2. Pondering its variegation (*Ibid.*)

3. Pondering the three conditions (*Ibid.*)

B. Establishing its self-presence (S.C.136)

1. The method of arising (*Ibid.*)

2. Proving it as an authority (*Ibid.*)

3. Pondering the occasion of its arising (S.C.137)

A. Laying out the various explanations (*Ibid.*)

B. Determining the valid position (S.C.138)

1. Determining the method of arising (*Ibid.*)

2. Considering the procedure of direct perception (S.C.139)

C. Eliminating disputes (S.C.140)

1. Eliminating the disputes of Outsiders (*Ibid.*)

2. Eliminating the disputes of other commentators (*Ibid.*)

3. Eliminating the disputes of other Tibetans (*Ibid.*)

A. Eliminating the fallacies amounting to the incorrect designation of the three procedures of direct perception (*Ibid.*)

B. Eliminating the fallacy that there is no distinction between arousing and not

arousing a certain cognition (S.C.141)

3. Introspective direct perception (S.C.143)

A. Pondering the definition (S.C.144)

B. Pondering the term (Ibid.)

C. Pondering the establishment (Ibid.)

1. Pondering whether there is pervasion or non-pervasion (Ibid.)

2. Pondering whether there is a contradiction between inward perception and outward-directed perception (S.C. 146)

3. Pondering the presence or absence of an object in self-intuition (ibid.)

4. Yogin's direct perception (S.C.149)

A. Determining the self-presence (Ibid.)

1. The definition of yogi-pratyakṣa (Ibid.)

2. The variegation of yogi-pratyakṣa (Ibid.)

3. Pondering the cause of yogi-pratyakṣa (S.C.150)

A. The cause of the two knowledges (Ibid.)

B. The time necessary for attaining the yogin's direct perception (Ibid.)

C. The means (Ibid.)

B. The rule by which yogi-pratyakṣa is an authority toward an object (S.C.151)

C. The reasons for proving yogic direct perception (S.C.152)

1. Proving the nature (Ibid.)

A. Proving the nature of what has already passed away (Ibid.)

B. Proving the nature of what will occur in the

future (Ibid.)

1. Presenting the evidence (_Ibid_.)

2. The proving rules (S.C.153)

A. Proving the _pakṣadharma_ (_Ibid_.)

1. Proving the 'steadfast basis' (_Ibid_.)

A. Proving that one does not encounter the end of previous cognitions (_Ibid_.)

B. Proving that one does not encounter the end of later cognitions (_Ibid_.)

1. Proving that there is no clear encounter possessing the positing of self (_Ibid_.)

2. Proving that there is no clear encounter lacking the positing of self (S.C.154)

2. Establishing that which becomes distinct automatically due to the repeated practice (_Ibid_.)

3. Establishing 'that contemplation' (S.C.155)

B. Proving the pervasion (_Ibid_.)

2. Realizing the defintion of yogi-pratyakṣa (_Ibid_.)

3. Refuting those who claim we have incorrectly realixed yogi-pratyaksa (_Ibid._)

A. Refuting those who claim or 'perfection of abandonment' is not valid (_Ibid_.)

B. Refuting those who claim our 'perfection of knowledge' is not valid (S.C.156)

1. To refute those who deny the possibility of repeated practice (Ibid.)
2. To refute those who deny omniscience even given repeated prectice (Ibid.)

2. Falsification of direct perception (S.C.157)
   A. Definition (Ibid.)
   B. Variegation of falsification of direct perception (Ibid.)
      1. Falsification of direct perception attended with constructive thought (Ibid.)
      2. Falification of direct perception which is not attended with constructive thought (S.C.158)

3. Authority-as-result (Ibid.)
   A. Establishing the method by which the authority proceeds as result (Ibid.)
   B. Establishing the authority-as-result (S.C.160)
      1. The requirement for stating the authority-as-result (Ibid.)
         A. The requirement for the exclusion of what is incorrect (S.C.161)
            1. The gerneral requirement for exclusion (Ibid.)
            2. The respective requirement for exclusion (Ibid.)
         B. The requirement for the inclusion of what is correct (Ibid.)
      2. The given authority-as-result which possesses the requirement (Ibid.)
         A. Establishment of the authority-as-result in general (Ibid.)

1. The refutation of the schools which claim the authority-as-result as being separate realia (Ibid.)
   A. To state their claim (<u>Ibid</u>.)
   B. To refute that claim (S.C.162)
      1. General refutation (<u>Ibid</u>.)
      2. Respective refutation (<u>Ibid</u>.)
2. The establishment of the schools which claim that the authority and the result are not separate realia (S.C.163)

B. Establishment of the respective authority-as-result (S.C.165)

Three Great Systematizers (<u>Ibid</u>.)

α. Dharmottara (<u>Ibid</u>.)

β. Devendrabuddhi (<u>Ibid</u>.)

γ. Sa-skya Paṇḍita (S.C.166)

Four explanations following Sa-skya Paṇḍita's system (S.C.168)

1. The authority-as-result which cognizes the external object (<u>Ibid.</u>)
2. Authority-as-result as explained by the Vijñāna-vādins (S.C.170)
   A. The absolute sense (<u>Ibid</u>.)
   B. The conventional sense (S.C.172)
      1. Establishment by scripture (<u>Ibid</u>.)
      2. Establishment by means of principle (S.C.174)
      3 Setting forth the conventional menaing (Ibid.)
3. To explain the introspection-as-result (S.C.175)

A. Brief explanation (*Ibid.*)

B. Extensive explanation (S.C.176)

1. The essential point of the section (*Ibid.*)

2. The sanctionable (S.C.177)

3. Word (s) (*Ibid.*)

4. Authority (*Ibid.*)

5. Result (S.C.178)

6. 'Pondered or 'not pondered' (*Ibid.*)

7. Testimony of scripture (*Ibid.*)

C. Answer to challenges (S.C.180)

4. Determination of authority-as-result going with the definition of introspection (*Ibid.*)

3. The reasoning which established the introspection and the two marks of the cognition (S.C.181)

A. Establishing the two marks (S.C.*Ibid.*)

1. The method of establishment according to which personality (*Ibid.*)

2. The method of establishment according to which cognition (*Ibid.*)

3. The bare nature of the two marks which are to be established (S.C.182)

4. The explanation of the reasoning which establishes the two marks (*Ibid.*)

B. The particular explanation of the difficult points establishing introspection (*Ibid.*)

1. Determination of the 'respondent' who uses the evidence of an associate consciousness-support as certain (*Ibid.*)
2. Determination of the bare nature of the evidence used (S.C.183)
3. The establishment of the marks of just that evidence (S.C.184)
4. Answering challenges about that evidence (Ibid.)
   A. Answering challenges about the marks of evidence (*Ibid.*)
   B. Answering challenges about the tenets of the Cittamātra (S.C.185)
      1. The method which establishes the smoke and fire as the cause and effect (S.C.186)
      2. The valid method which establishes the result-evidence (*Ibid.*)

TIBETAN TEXT

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བའི་ངེས་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་སེལ་བའི་སྒྲུབ་ངག་ཡང་དག་སྒྲུབ་ངག་
ཡིན་ཏེ། སྒྲ་རྟག་འཛིན་གྱི་འཁྲུལ་རྒྱུ་དང་བྲལ་བའི་སྒྲ་ འཛིན་
མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་བྲལ་བའི་ངེས་ཤེས་དེས་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་ངེས་
པའི་ཚེ། སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་བྱེད། འཁྲུལ་རྒྱུ་
ཡོད་ན་ཀྱི་རྟགས་ལས་སྒྲ་མི་རྟག་པར་ངེས་པའི་ཚེ་སྒྲ་མི་
རྟག་པར་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དགག་རྟགས་ལ་
བརྟེན་པའི་རྗེས་དཔག་གམ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་དྲངས་པའི་
ངེས་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་དགག་པ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྩོལ་བ་མཁས་པས་
དག་འཛིན་དབང་པོའི་མངོན་སུམ་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བའི་རང་རིག
མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་དྲངས་པའི་ངེས་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་ས་ཕྱོགས་སུ་བུམ་
པ་མེད་པར་ངེས་པའི་ཚེ་བུམ་པས་དག་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་བྱེད།
པོ་ལ་བ་སྦྱངས་པས་བུམ་པ་ཚད་མས་མ་དམིགས་པའི་རྟགས་
ལས་ས་ཕྱོགས་སུ་བུམ་པ་མེད་པར་ངེས་པའི་ཚེ་བུམ་པས་
དག་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་ནི། མངོན་སུམ་
ཕྱོགས་རྟགས་མེད་ན་སློབ་དཔོན་གྱིས་གཞུང་གི་ཆ་འགའ་ར།
ཕྱོགས་ལས་རྟོགས་པའི་དོན་གྱིས་གོ་བ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་
དང་འགལ་ལོ་ཞེ་ན་སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། དེ་ནི་མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་བྱེད་
པ་འམ་ཚུལ་གསུམ་ གོམས་པ་ལས་བློ་བུར་བའི་རྗེས་དཔག
སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་དགོངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །མཚན་ཉིད་བརྟག་པའི་རབ་
ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་སྟེ་རབ་བྱེད་བརྒྱད་པ་བཤད་ཟིན་ཏོ།། ༄ །།གཉིས་
པ་མཚན་གཞི་སོ་སོའི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། མངོན་སུམ་དང་།
རྗེས་དཔག་གོ །དང་པོ་ལ་གཉིས་སྟེ། མངོན་སུམ་ལ

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ལོག་ཕྱོགས་མངོན་སུམ་ལྟར་སྣང་། ཚད་མ་དང་འབྲས་བུའོ། །
དང་པོ་ལ་གསུམ་སྟེ། མཚན་ཉིད། མཚོན་བྱའི་དབྱེ་བ། མཚན་
གཞི་སོ་སོའི་ངོ་བོའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་དགག་བཞག་གཉིས་ལས། དང་
པོ་ནི། ཕྱ་པ་སོགས་མངོན་སུམ་དང་། མངོན་སུམ་ཚད་མ་སོ་སོར་
ཕྱེ་ནས། དང་པོའི་མཚན་ཉིད། རྟོག་པ་དང་བྲལ་ཞིང་མ་འཁྲུལ་
བའི་རིག་པ། ཕྱི་མའི་མཚན་ཉིད། སྔར་མ་རྟོགས་པའི་དོན་ལ་
གསར་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་གཅོད་པ་ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་མི་འཐད་
དེ། གཉིས་སུ་ཕྱེ་བ་གཞུང་ལས་མ་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། སྔར་
མ་རྟོགས་པ་ལ་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་མེད་ཅིང་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་གཅོད་པ་མངོན་
སུམ་གྱི་རང་ལྡོག་ལ་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ལ་མཚན་
ཉིད་དངོས་དང་། དེའི་དོན་ངེས་པར་བྱ་བ་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི།
ལོག་རྟོག་སེལ་བའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ན་རྟོག་བྲལ་མ་འཁྲུལ་བའི་རིག་
པའམ། རིགས་མི་མཐུན་སེལ་བའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ན། མ་འཁྲུལ་
པའི་རིག་པ་དེ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཞེད། དེ་ཉིད་
མངོན་སུམ་ཚད་མའི་མཚན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྣམ་ངེས་ལས།
མངོན་སུམ་རྟོག་བྲལ་མ་འཁྲུལ་བ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།
དེ་ཉིད་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ནས། མངོན་སུམ་ཚད་མ་
ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་གཞན་མ་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ་
གསུམ་སྟེ། རྟོག་བྲལ་གྱི་དོན་ངེས་པར་བྱ་བ། མ་འཁྲུལ་བའི་དོན་
ངེས་པར་བྱ་བ། གཉིས་ཀའི་དོན་ངེས་པར་བྱ་བའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་
བྲལ་བྱ་རྟོག་པ་ནི། སྒྲ་དོན་འཛིན་པའི་རྟོག་པ་སྟེ། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་
ལས། ཤེས་གང་གང་ལ་སྒྲ་དོན་འཛིན། །དེ་ནི་དེ་ལ་རྟོག་པ་ཡིན།།

ཞེས་དང་། རྣམ་ངེས་ལས། རྟོག་པ་ཉི་བརྗོད་པ་དང་འབྲེར་སྣང་
བའི་ཤེས་པ་སྟེ། ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །འོ་ན་སྣང་བ་སྨོས་པའི་
དགོས་པ་གང་ཞེ་ན། རྒྱ་གར་བ་ཁ་ཅིག །བརྡ་ལ་མ་བྱང་བའི་
བྱིས་པའི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་རྟོག་པ་བསྡུ་བའི་ཆེད་དུ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྒྲ་དོན་འཛིན་
པའི་བློ་དེས། དེ་ལ་མ་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་སྨྲ་བ་ནི་ཅིག་ཤེས་
ལ་ཡང་མཚུངས་ཏེ། སྣང་བ་འཛིན་པའི་བློ་དེས་བརྡ་བྱེད་གཞན་པོའི་
རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་རྟོག་པ་ལ་མ་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར། གལ་ཏེ་སྣང་བ་འཛིན་པའི་
རིགས་ལ་འཇོག་པས་སྐྱོན་མེད་ཅེ་ན། སྒྲ་ལ་ཡང་མཚུངས་ཏེ།
འབྲེལ་པ་འཛིན་པའི་རིགས་ལ་འཇོག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །མདོར་ན་
འདིར་བསྟན་གྱི་བྲལ་བྱ་རྟོག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད། སྒྲ་དོན་འདྲེས་
པ་འཛིན་པའི་དང་། སྒྲ་དོན་འདྲེས་རུང་འཛིན་པའི་དང་། སྒྲ་
དོན་འཛིན་པའི་དང་། དོན་སྤྱི་འཛིན་པའི་ཞེན་བློ་རྣམས་ཁྱད་
པར་མེད་པར་ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །དེ་དང་བྲལ་བའི་རྐྱེན་ནི། རང་
ལྡོག་ལ་རྟོག་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད་མི་ལྡན་པ་སྟེ། དེའི་དོན་ཡང་རང་
མཚན་གཞིར་བཟུང་བའི་ཚེ་སྣང་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་དེ་མཚོན་བའོ།།
གཉིས་པ་ནི། ཁ་ཅིག །རྣམ་རིག་པ་ལྟར་མི་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་འདོད་
པ་དང་། ཁ་ཅིག །དེ་ཉིད་དམ་པ་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱེད་པ་ལ་འདོད་པ་དང་།
ཁ་ཅིག །གཟུང་དོན་ལ་མ་འཁྲུལ་བ་ལ་འདོད་པ་ཡོད་ཀྱང་།
རིགས་པས་གནོད་པས། རང་ལུགས་ནི། རྣམ་ངེས་ལས།
དེ་ལ་མ་འཁྲུལ་བ་ནི་རབ་རིབ་དང་། མྱུར་དུ་བསྐོར་བ་དང་། གྲུར་
ཞུགས་པ་དང་འཁྲུལ་པ་ལ་སོགས་པས་འཁྲུལ་པར་མ་བསྐྱེད་
ཅིང་། ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ལྟར། དབང་པོ་དང་། ཡུལ་དང་།

བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པའི་འཁྲུལ་རྒྱུས་འཁྲུལ་པར་མི་སྐྱེད་པའོ། །
འོ་ན་རྟོག་པ་ཡང་མ་འཁྲུལ་བར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། འཁྲུལ་རྒྱུ་དང་བྲ
གྱིས་འཁྲུལ་པར་མི་སྐྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། མ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། སོགས་
ཕྱེངས་ནས། ཐོག་མེད་བག་ཆགས་ལས་བྱུང་བའི། །རྣམ་པར་
རྟོག་པས་ཡོངས་སྒྲིབ་པ། །ཞེས་དང་། གཞི་དེ་འཁྲུལ་པ་བཟློག་
མེད་པའི། །དུས་ཅན་མཐོང་བ་སེམས་ཀྱིས་སྤྱོད་ཡུལ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་
པའི་སྐབས་ནས་བསྟན་པའི་འཁྲུལ་རྒྱུ་དེ་ཡོད་ཉེ་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
གསུམ་པ་ནི། འོ་ན་རྟོག་བྲལ་དང་མ་འཁྲུལ་བ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡང་
རིགས་མི་མཐུན་སེལ་བ་ལ་དགོངས་སམ། ལོག་རྟོག་སེལ་བ་
ལ་དགོངས་པ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། ཡང་དག་པ་ནམ་འཁྲུལ་བའི་ཤེས་
པས་རིགས་མི་མཐུན་མཐའ་དག་སེལ་ནུས་ཀྱང་། རྟོག་བྲལ་
སྨོས་པ་ནི་བྱེ་བྲག་པ་དང་རིགས་པ་ཅན་པ་སོགས། དབང་ཤེས་
རྟོག་པ་དང་བཅས་བཞིན་དུ་མ་འཁྲུལ་བར་འདོད་པའི་ལོག་རྟོག་
དང་། ཁ་ཅིག །འདུག་ཡུལ་ལ་མ་འཁྲུལ་བས་ཀྱང་མ་འཁྲུལ་
བས་གོ་ཆོད་པས་རྗེས་དཔག་ཀྱང་མ་འཁྲུལ་བ་ཡིན་ནམ་སྙམ་
པའི་ལོག་རྟོག་བཟློག་པའི་ཆེད་དུ་སྨོས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་
པ་མཚོན་བྱའི་དབྱེ་བ་ལ་ལྔ་སྟེ། གང་ལ་དབྱེ་བའི་གཞི། གང་
དབྱེ་བའི་ངོ་བོ། གང་གིས་འབྱེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན། ཇི་ལྟར་དབྱེ་
བའི་དོན། ཇི་སྙེད་ཕྱེ་བའི་གྲངས་སོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། མ་འཁྲུལ་
བའི་ཤེས་པ་ཚད་མ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། དབང་པོ་དང་། ཡིད་
དང་། རང་རིག་དང་། རྣལ་འབྱོར་གྱི་མངོན་སུམ་སྟེ་བཞིའོ། །
གསུམ་པ་ནི། ཡུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས། ཡུལ་གཞན་རིགས་པ་དོན་རིག་

གི་མངོན་སུམ་གཉིས། རང་རིག་པ་རང་རིག་གི་མངོན་སུམ།
རང་གཞན་མེད་པར་རིག་པ་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་མོ། །རྟེན་
ཀྱི་སྒོ་ནས་དབང་པོ་ལ་བརྟེན་པ་དོན་རིག་གཉིས། གཞན་དབང་
ཙམ་ལ་བརྟེན་པ་རང་རིག ། ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན་ལ་བརྟེན་པ་རྣལ་འབྱོར་
མངོན་སུམ་མོ། །གང་ཟག་གི་སྒོ་ནས་སོ་སྐྱེའི་མངོན་སུམ་དང་།
འཕགས་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་གཉིས་སོ། །བཞི་པ་ནི་གཅིག་པ་
སྐབས་སུའི་ཐ་དད་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བཞི་ཀ་ཡང་དངོས་པོ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་ལ་ལྡོག་པ་ཐ་དད་པ་ཙམ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། མངོན་
སུམ་གཞན་གསུམ་རྫས་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྫས་ཐ་དད་
ཀྱང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། མངོན་སུམ་གཞན་གསུམ་པོ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་
དང་ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་ན་མངོན་སུམ་གཞན་
གསུམ་པོ་རྫས་ཐ་དད་དང་། དེ་གསུམ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་དང་
ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་ལ། ཡུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་ནོ། །ལྔ་པ་ནི།
མངོན་སུམ་བཞི་པོ་མདོ་སྡེའི་ལུགས། །བྱེ་བྲག་སྨྲ་གསུམ་
རྣམ་རིག་གཉིས། །ཞེས་གསུངས་ཏེ། འདི་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག །སྨྲ་
རྗེ་བཞིན་དུ། རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ལུགས་ལ། དབང་ཡིད་ཀྱི་མངོན་
སུམ་གཉིས་མེད་པས། བཞིར་ཕྱེ་བ་མདོ་སྡེ་པ་ཁོ་ནའི་ལུགས་
ཡིན་ཞེས་སྨྲའོ། །དེ་ནི་མི་འཐད་དེ། དམིགས་བརྟག་ལས།
སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་ལུགས་ལ། དབང་མངོན་གྱི་རྐྱེན་གསུམ་
བཤད་པས་དབང་མངོན་ཁས་ལེན་ཕྱིར། དབང་མངོན་
འདོད་ན་ཡིད་མངོན་ཀྱང་འདོད་དགོས་པར་རིགས་པ་མཚུངས་
འབྲེལ་ཉིད་ལས་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཁ་ཅིག་གཞུང་དེའི་དོན།

སྣང་ཡུལ་ལ་མ་འཁྲུལ་བ་བའི་མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་
ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། དབང་ཡིད་ཀྱི་མངོན་སུམ་
གཉིས། གང་ལ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་སོང་བའི་སྣང་ཡུལ་དེ་ལ། མ་
འཁྲུལ་བར་རྣམ་རིག་པས་ཀྱང་ལེན་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འོན་
གཞུང་འདིའི་དགོངས་པ་ཇི་ལྟར་ཞེ་ན། ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ན།
དབང་ཡིད་ཀྱི་མངོན་སུམ་གཉིས་པ་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་ལ་ཚད་མར་
རྣམ་རིག་པས་ཁས་བླངས་ཀྱང་། འདིར་བསྟན་གྱི་སྐབས་རེས་ཉིད་དེ་
དམ་གནས་ལུགས་ལ་དཔྱོད་པའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན་ལ། དེའི་
ཚེ། དབང་ཡིད་ཀྱི་མངོན་སུམ་གཉིས་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་ལ་ཚད་
མར་འགྱུར་བར་མི་སྲིད་པར། རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་
ཁོ་ནར་འགྱུར་བས། མངོན་སུམ་དང་པོ་གསུམ་ངོ་བོའི་སྒོ་ནས་
ཀྱང་གཅིག་ཅིང་། ཡུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་ཀྱང་གཅིག་པས་ན། རང་རིག་
མངོན་སུམ་དུ་བཞག་ལ། རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་ནི་ཡུལ་ཆོས་
ཉིད་ལ་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པས་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་དང་ངོ་བོ་གཅིག་
ཀྱང་། ཡུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་ཐ་དད་དུ་བཞག །མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་
ལ་བཞི་ཆར་ཡང་ཡུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་ཐ་དད་ཡིན་ཏེ། རང་རིག་མངོན་
སུམ་ནི་ཤེས་པ་དང་། དབང་མངོན་ནི་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་དང་། ཡིད་
མངོན་ནི་དེའི་ཡུལ་ལས་རྗེས་གཞན་པའི་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་དང་།
རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་ནི་ཡང་དག་པའི་དོན་ལ་ཚད་མར་འཇོག་
པ་ནི་གནས་ལུགས་ཀྱི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལྟར་
ཡང་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས། མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་སྐབས་འདིས་པ་ནི་མདོ་
སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས། ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་ཞལ་གྱིས་བཞེས་

པའི་ཚེ་ཡུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་བཞིར་ཕྱེ་སྟེ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པས་སོ། །
དེ་ལྟར་བྱས་ནས་ཚད་འབྲས་གཉིས་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་
ཚད་འབྲས་བཞག་པའི་ཚེ་རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་གསུངས་པ་
དང་། རིགས་གཏེར་རྒྱ་འགྲེལ་ལས། ཡུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་མངོན་
སུམ་ལ་བཞིར་ཕྱེ་བའི་ཚེ། ཕྱི་དོན་ཁས་བླངས་དགོས་པས།
མདོ་སྡེ་པ་སོ་སོའི་ལུགས་སུ་གསུངས་པ་རྣམས་གཞུང་གཅིག་ཏུ་
རྫོགས་པར་འགྱུར་བས། རིགས་གཏེར་རྒྱ་བའི་ཚིག་རྐང་གཉིས་
པ་དེའི་མགོར་ ཡུལ་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་ཞེས་པའི་ཚིག་འདི་སྦྱར་ཤེས་
ན་གནད་ཐམས་ཅད་རང་གྲོལ་དུ་འགྱུར་རོ། །གསུམ་པ་མཚན་
གཞི་སོ་སོའི་དོན་ལ་བཞི་ལས། དང་པོ་དབང་མངོན་ལ་ཡང་
བཞི་སྟེ། མཚོན་པར་བྱེད་པའི་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་གཞིའི་
དབྱེ་བ། མཚན་གཞི་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་ངེས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཚད་མ། མཚོན་
བྱའི་སྒྲ་དོན་ནོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། རང་གི་བདག་རྐྱེན་དབང་པོ་གཟུགས་
ཅན་པ་ལས་དངོས་སུ་སྐྱེས་པའི་གཞན་རིག་གི་ཤེས་པ་གང་ཞིག
རྟོག་བྲལ་མ་འཁྲུལ་བའོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ། བདག་རྐྱེན་གྱི་སྒོ་
ནས་མིག་གི་དབང་པོའི་མངོན་སུམ་ནས། ལུས་ཀྱི་དབང་པོའི་
མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་བར་ལྔ། དམིགས་རྐྱེན་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་གཟུགས་
འཛིན་དབང་མངོན་ནས་རེག་འཛིན་དབང་མངོན་གྱི་བར་ལྔ།
དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་རང་ངེས་དབང་མངོན་དང་། གཞན་
ངེས་དབང་མངོན་གཉིས་སོ། །གསུམ་པ་ལ་བཞི་སྟེ། དབང་པོ་
ལས་སྐྱེས་པའི་དང་། གཞན་རིག་གི་ཤེས་པའི་དང་། རྟོག་
བྲལ་གྱི་དང་། མ་འཁྲུལ་བའི་དོན་ངེས་པར་བྱ་བའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ།

བདག་སྐྱེ་ཉེ་དབང་པོ་ཐོས་བཟུང་བ་དང་། དེ་ལས་སྐྱེས་པར་
བསྒྲུབ་པ་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། རིགས་གཏེར་རང་འགྲེལ་
ལས། གྲུབ་མཐའ་འགའ་ཞིག་ལ་གྲགས་པའི་དབང་པོ་ནི་
འགྲུབ་ཀྱང་། རྟེན་གཟུགས་ཅན་འདི་དག་ལ་ཡོད་པའི་ཡུལ་
ལྷ་ལ་འཛིན་ནུས་ཤིག་ཡིན་ཏེ། ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་དང་ནུས་པ་
ཡི། །ངོ་བོ་གང་ཡིན་དབང་པོར་འདོད་ཡིན། །ཞེས་པས་སོ། །
ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་དེའི་དོན་ཡང་མངོན་པ་ལུགས་གྲགས་པ་ལྟར་
ཟར་མའི་མེ་ཏོག་ལྟ་བུ་སོགས་དང་། རྣམ་རིག་པ་ལྟར་ཀུན་
གཞིའི་སྟེང་གི་ནུས་པ་སོགས་འདི་ནི་རིགས་པས་མི་འགྲུབ་ཀྱང་།
རྐྱེན་གཞན་ཚང་ཡང་དབང་རྟེན་འདི་དག་ལ་ཡོད་པའི་ནུས་པ་
ཞིག་མཚོན་ན་དབང་ཤེས་མི་འབྱུང་བའི་རྟགས་ལས་ནུས་པ་
ཡོད་པར་གྲུབ་ཅིང་། ནུས་པ་དེ་ཡང་སེམས་ཤེས་གང་རུང་
ལས་མ་འདས་པ་ལས་ཤེས་པར་མི་འཐད་དེ། དབང་ཤེས་
ཡིན་ན། དབང་ཤེས་མ་སྐྱེས་པའི་སྔར་ནུས་ཡོད་པས་ཐུག་མེད་
དུ་འགྱུར་ཞིང་། ཡིད་ཤེས་ཡིན་ན་དབང་རྟེན་འདི་དག་ལ་བརྟེན་
མི་དགོས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་ཕྱིར་ཐེམ་པོར་གྲུབ་པས་གཟུགས་
ཅན་ཙམ་ཞིག་ཁས་བླངས་དགོས་པའི་དོན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། དེ་
ལས་སྐྱེས་པར་རྗེས་འགྲོའི་སྒོ་ནས་འགྲུབ་སྟེ། འདི་ལྟར་དབང་
མཐོང་བར་མ་ཆད་དང་། འབྲས་བུ་དབང་ཤེས་གཉིས་ཀ་མ་
དམིགས་པ་ལས། དང་པོར་དབང་མཐོང་བར་མ་ཆད་པར་དམིགས།
དེའི་རྗེས་སུ་ཡུལ་འཛིན་པའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་དམིགས་པས།
དེ་ལ་ཡོད་པའི་ནུས་པ་ཞིག་ལ་བརྟེན་པར་འགྲུབ་སྟེ། མེ་དུ

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བཞི་ནི། །ཡང་ན་ཕྱོགས་པས་ཀྱང་འགྲུབ་བོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི།
རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་འདོད་པ་མདོ་སེམས་གཉིས་
ཀ་མཐུན་ཀྱང་། མདོ་སྡེ་པས་དབང་པོའི་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་འཇོག་
པ་ནི། ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་ཡུལ་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་འཇོག་དགོས་པས།
གཞན་རིག་གི་ཤེས་པར་འདོད་ལ། སེམས་ཙམ་པས་རང་ལས་
གཞན་པའི་ཡུལ་ལ་ལྟོས་མར་མཐོང་བས་རང་རིག་ཉིད་དུ་འདོད་
དོ། །དེས་ན་གཞན་རིག་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། །རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུ་
ཡིན་པར་འདོད། །ཅེས་པ་ལྟར་རོ། །གསུམ་པ་ནི། ཚད་མ་
མདོར། མིང་དང་རིགས་སོགས་སྦྱོར་བ་ཡིས། །རྟོག་པ་དང་
བྲལ་མངོན་སུམ་མོ། །ཞེས་དམ་བཅའ་ཙམ་གསུངས་ཤིང་།
རྣམ་འགྲེལ་འདིར། །དེ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་མང་དུ་གསུངས་
ཀྱང་། རིགས་པའི་གཙོ་ བོ་ནི། དེ་ཕྱིར་དབང་པོ་ལས་སྐྱེས་
བློ། །ཐམས་ཅད་ཁྱད་པར་ཡུལ་ཅན་ཡིན། །ཞེས་པ་སྟེ། དབང་
མངོན་ཆོས་ཅན། རྟོག་བྲལ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཕྱི་དོན་རང་མཚན་གསལ་
བར་སྣང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། །ཞེས་པའོ། །བཞི་པ་
ནི། དབང་མངོན་ཚོས་ཅན། མ་འཁྲུལ་བ་ཡིན་ཏེ། འཁྲུལ་
རྒྱུས་འཁྲུལ་པ་བསྐྱེད་པ་མ་ཡིན་གྱི། དོན་རང་མཚན་གྱིས་རང་
ངོར་ནས་རང་འདྲའི་རྣམ་པ་གཏད་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར། བཞི་པ་ལ་སྒྲ་དོན་སྤྱིར་བསྟན་པ་དང་། དེ་ལས་འཕྲོས་
ནས་རྐྱེན་གསུམ་གྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། དབང་
མངོན་དེ་རྐྱེན་གསུམ་ཆར་ལས་སྐྱེས་པར་མཛོད་ལས་ཀྱང་། དམིགས་
རྐྱེན་དང་། དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་ཐ་སྙད་མི་བྱེད་པར། བདག་

རྐྱེན་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས་སྐྱེར་དབང་མངོན་དང་། བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་མིག་ཤེས་
ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་བྱེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཅི་ཡིན་སྙམ་ན། དབང་
པོ་ཐུན་མོང་མིན་རྒྱུའི་ཕྱིར། །དབང་ཤེས་ཡིན་ཏེ་རྔ་སྒྲ་བཞིན།།
ཞེས་གསུངས་ཏེ། བདག་རྐྱེན་དབང་པོ་གཟུགས་ཅན་པ་དེ་ཐུན་
མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པས། དེའི་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱིས་བདེ་བླག་ཏུ་གོ་
ནུས། གཞན་...གཉིས་དེ་ལས་བཟློག་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཚད་མ་
མདོར། ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་རྒྱུ་ཡི་ཕྱིར། །དེ་ཡི་ཐ་སྙད་དབང་པོས་
བྱས། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པས་སོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ་གསུམ་ལས།
དང་པོ་མཚུངས་པ་དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་ལ་ཡང་གསུམ་སྟེ། མཚན་ཉིད།
མཚན་གྱི་སྒྲ་དོན། མཚན་གཞི་ལ་དོགས་པ་བཅད་པའོ། །
དང་པོ་ནི། རིག་པ་གང་ཞིག །ཆོས་གཞན་གྱིས་བར་མ་ཆོད་པར་
རང་འབྲས་སུ་འགྱུར་པའི་རིག་པ་གཙོ་བོར་གསལ་ལ་རིག་ཏུ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་
དོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། རྒྱུ་འབྲས་གཉིས་ཤེས་པར་མཚུངས་པས་
ན་མཚུངས་པ། ཆོས་གཞན་གྱིས་བར་མ་ཆོད་པས་ན་དེ་མ་ཐག
ཏུ་སྐྱེད་པར་བྱེད་པས་རྐྱེན་ནོ། །གསུམ་པ་ནི། འོན་སྙོམས་
འཇུག་གཉིས་ལ་སོགས་པ་སེམས་མེད་པའི་གནས་སྐབས་ལྔ་
ལས་ལྡང་བའི་ལྡང་སེམས་ཀྱི་མཚུངས་པ་དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་གང་...
ཞེ་ན། ཁ་ཅིག །དང་པོའི་འཇུག་སེམས་དེ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་
པ་དང་། ཁ་ཅིག །ཀུན་གཞི་ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་པ་ནི་མི་འཐད་
དེ། དང་པོའི་འཇུག་སེམས་ནས་...དང་འབྲས་བུའི་བར་དུ་དུས་རིང་
པོར་...ཆོད་པ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། ཀུན་གཞི་རྣམ་རིག་པའི་...
ལུགས་ལ་འཐད་ཀྱང་མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་མི་འཐད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ།།

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དེ་ནི་གནས་སྐབས་དེ་དག་ཏུ་ཡིད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པ་མི་གསལ་བ་ཡོད་པས་
དེས་ལྡང་སེམས་ཀྱི་དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་ཡིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་བདག་རྐྱེན་
ལ་མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་གཞི། སྒྲ་དོན་དང་གསུམ་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི།
རང་གི་བདག་འབྲས་སུ་གྱུར་པའི་དབང་མངོན་ཡུལ་ལ་སོ་སོར་འཛིན་
ནུས་པའི་ཆ་གཙོ་བོར་དངོས་སུ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རྐྱེན་དེ། རང་གི་བདག་
འབྲས་སུ་གྱུར་པའི་དབང་མངོན་གྱི་བདག་རྐྱེན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད་དེ། །
གཉིས་པ་ནི། སྔར་བཤད་ཟིན་ཏོ། །གསུམ་པ་ནི། གང་གི་དབང་
གིས་དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་སྟེང་གི་ཡུལ་འཛིན་ནུས་རང་དབང་དུ་སྐྱེད་པར་
བྱེད་པས་ན་བདག་རྐྱེན་ནོ། །གསུམ་པ་དམིགས་རྐྱེན་ལ་མཚན་
ཉིད་དང་། མཚན་གཞི་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། རྣམ་ཤེས་དེའི་
སྟེང་གི་ཡུལ་གྱི་རྣམ་པའི་ཆ་གཙོ་བོར་དངོས་སུ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་དོན་
དེ་རྣམ་ཤེས་དེའི་དམིགས་རྐྱེན་གྱི་མཚན་ཉིད། རྣམ་རིག་པ་ལྟར་
ན། ཕྱི་དོན་གྱི་ཚབ་ཏུ་ནུས་པ་ཞེས་སྨྲ་སོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། ཆོས་
མངོན་པ་བ་རྣམས། དམིགས་པ་ཆོས་རྣམས་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ། །
ཅེས་ཆོས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་འདོད་ཀྱང་། འདིར་ནི་རྣམ་པ་གཏོད་
བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་དོན་ཉིད་ལ་འཛིན་དགོས་པས་གཟུགས་སོགས་དོན་
ལྔའོ། །དོན་ཀྱང་གཟུང་དོན་དང་འདི་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ནི། རྣམ་
པ་གཏོད་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་ཆ་ནས་དམིགས་རྐྱེན་དང་། རང་རྟོས་ནས་
རང་འདྲའི་རྣམ་པ་གཏོད་པའི་ཆ་ནས་གཟུང་དོན་དུ་འཇོག་པས།
གཟུང་དོན་ལ་དམིགས་རྐྱེན་གྱིས་ཁྱབ་ཀྱང་རྣམ་ཤེས་དེའི་དམིགས་
རྐྱེན་ལ་རྣམ་ཤེས་དེའི་གཟུང་དོན་གྱིས་མ་ཁྱབ་པོ། །གཉིས་པ་ཡིད་
ཀྱི་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་གསུམ་སྟེ། ངོ་བོ་ངོས་བཟུང་བ། རང་བཞིན་

གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ། རྩོད་པ་སྤོང་བའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ། མཚན་ཉིད།
དབྱེ་བ། རྒྱུན་གསུམ་ལ་དཔྱད་པ་དང་གསུམ་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི།
རང་གི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་བདག་རྐྱེན་དང་། དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་ཡིད་
དབང་ལས་དངོས་སུ་སྐྱེས་ཤིང་གཟུང་དོན་ཅན་གྱི་ཤེས་པའོ། །གཉིས་
པ་ནི། གཟུགས་འཛིན་ཡིད་མངོན་སོགས་ལྔའོ། །གསུམ་པ་ལ།
བདག་རྐྱེན་ནི། དབང་ཤེས་རྒྱུད་ལྡན་དུ་འབྱུང་བའི་ཚེ། དབང་
པོའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ལྔ། ཡིད་མངོན་གྱི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
བདག་རྐྱེན་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཡིད་མངོན་ཡིན་ན། དོན་རིག་ཡིད་མངོན་
ཡིན་དགོས་ཤིང་། ཡིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པས་དོན་རིག་ཡིད་མངོན་
གྱི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་ཡིན་པའི་བདག་རྐྱེན་བྱེད་མི་ནུས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེའི་
དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་དང་། བདག་རྐྱེན་གཉིས་རྫས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པ་གང་
ཞིག །དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་དེ་དབང་ཤེས་ཉིད་དུ། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་དེས་
གཉིས་ཆར་ལས་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་ནི་དེ་སྐད་
བཤད་པའི་བདག་རྐྱེན་དེ་ཉིད་ཡིད་མངོན་སྐྱེད་བགས་ལ་རིག་ཏུ
བསྐྱེད་པའི་ཆ་ནས་དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་དུ་འཇོག་སྟེ། རྣམ་ངེས་སུ།
དབང་ཤེས་དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་ལས། །རྒྱུད་ཞེས་དང་། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་
ལས། དེ་ཕྱིར་དབང་པོའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས། །དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་ལས་
བྱུང་ཅན། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པས་སོ། །དམིགས་རྐྱེན་ནི། དབང་
མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་དང་པོའི་དམིགས་རྐྱེན་ནི་ཡིད་མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་དང་
པོའི་དམིགས་རྐྱེན་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་ཡིད་མངོན་གྱི་དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་གྱི་
དུས་སུ་འདས་ཟིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། སྐད་ཅིག་ཉིད་ཕྱིར་འདས་པ་ཡིས། །
དོན་མཐོང་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།

དེས་ན་དེའི་རིགས་འདྲ་སྔ་ཕྱི་གཉིས་པ་དེ་ཡིད་མངོན་སྣང་ཅིག་དང་པོ་དང་། དབང་མངོན་སྣང་ཅིག་གཉིས་པ་གཉིས་ཀའི་གཟུང་དོན་ཡིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་རང་བཞིན་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ་ལ། སྐྱེ་བའི་ཚུལ། དེ་ཚད་མར་བསྒྲུབ་པ། སྐྱེ་བའི་གནས་སྐབས་ལ་དཔྱད་པ་དང་གསུམ། དང་པོ་ནི། དབང་མངོན་ལྷག་འགགས་པའི་རྗེས་སུ་ཡིད་མངོན་ལྔ་ཅིག་ཅར་སྐྱེ་འམ་མི་སྐྱེ། མི་སྐྱེ་ན་རྒྱུའི་ཁྱད་པར་ལས་འབྲས་བུའི་ཁྱད་པར་མི་འགྲུབ་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང་། སྐྱེ་ན་གང་ཟག་གཅིག་རྒྱུད་དུ་མར་ཐལ་ལོ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ལྟར་སྐྱེ་ཡང་གང་ཟག་གཅིག་རྒྱུད་དུ་མར་ཐལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། ནང་དུ་རང་རིག་གི་རྒྱུན་གཅིག་གིས་བསྡུས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཞན་དུ་ན་དབང་ཤེས་ལྔ་དང་རྟོག་པ་ཅིག་ཅར་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཚེ་གང་ཟག་གཅིག་རྒྱུད་དུ་མར་ཐལ་བའི་སྐྱོན་ཡོད་དོ། །འོན་སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ནི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པའི་རྒྱུད་རེ་རེ་བའོ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་དང་འགལ་ལོ་ཞེ་ན་སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། ཡིད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པའི་སྐད་དོད་བ་ན་ར་བལྟས་ལ་རང་རིག་གི་རྒྱུན་གཅིག་ལས་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ཡིད་མངོན་ལྔ་ལ་རྒྱུན་མེད་པས་དགེ་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བའི་རང་རིག་ལ་ཡང་རྒྱུན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། ཡིད་ཀྱི་མངོན་སུམ་དེ་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དོན་བདེན་པ་ཤེས་པ་མ་འཁྲུལ་བས་བཟུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། འོ་ན་ཀྱང་མངོན་སུམ་གཞན་བཞིན་དུ་རང་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་ངེས་པ་འདྲེན་མི་ནུས་ཏེ། རྒྱུན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་མི་བྱེད་དེ། དཔེར་ན་དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་རྡུལ་ཕྲ་རབ་ཡིན་ཡང་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡུལ་

ཕྱི་ཕྲ་སྣང་མི་བྱེད་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །གསུམ་པ་ལ་གསུམ་སྟེ། བཤད་
པའི་རྣམ་གྲངས་འགོད། འཆད་པའི་ཕྱོགས་ངེས་བཟུང་། དེ་ལ་
རྩོད་པ་སྤོང་བའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ། རྒྱུན་གྱིས་དང་པོར་དབང་མངོན་
སྣང་ཅིག་མ་གཅིག །དེ་ནས་ཡིད་མངོན་སྣང་ཅིག་མ་གཅིག །
དེ་ནས་དབང་མངོན་སྣང་ཅིག་མ་གཉིས་པ་སྐྱེ་བ་སོགས། མགོ་
དབང་མངོན་གྱིས་འཛིན་ཞིང་མཇུག་ཡིད་ མངོན་གྱིས་བརྟུལ་ལོ།
ཞེས་བཞེད་པར་ཁ་ཆེ་པཎ་ཆེན་དཔོན་སློབ་ཀྱི་གསུང་སྒྲོས་ལས
འབྱུང་ངོ་། །སློབ་དཔོན་ཆོས་མཆོག་གིས་དབང་མངོན་གྱི་རྒྱུན་རྗེས་སུ
པའི་མཇུག་ཏུ། ཡིད་མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་གཅིག་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡིན་གྱི་སྔ་
རོལ་དུ་མི་ཡིན་ཏེ། མིག་གཟུགས་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་གནས
སྐབས་ཀྱི་གཟུགས་གསལ་བར་སྣང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་
མིག་ཤེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། གཞན་དུ་ན་མིག་ཤེས་ཀྱི་མཚན་
གཞི་རྫོགས་པར་དཀའ་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་བཞེད་དོ། །བྲམ་ཟེ་ཆེན་པོས་
དང་པོར་དབང་མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་གཅིག་ཕན་སྐྱེ་ཞིང་། དེའི་རྗེས་
སུ་དབང་མངོན་གྱི་རྒྱུན་མ་རྫོགས་ཀྱི་བར་དུ། དབང་མངོན་དང་ཡིད་
མངོན་གྲངས་མཉམ་དུ་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡིན་ལ། དབང་མངོན་དེ་རང་གི་
རིགས་འདྲ་སྔ་མ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་རྒྱུན་ཡོད་ཅིང་། ཡིད་མངོན་དེ་
རང་གི་རིགས་འདྲ་ སྔ་མ་ལས་མ་བྱུང་བར་དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་དབང་
མངོན་ལས་བྱུང་བས་རྒྱུན་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་བཞེད་དོ། །དེ་ལྟར་
ལུགས་གསུམ་ལས། དང་པོ་རྒྱུན་གྱི་བཞེད་པ་དེ་མི་འཐད་དེ།
དབང་མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་དང་པོའི་དུས་སུ་དབང་མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་
གཉིས་པའི་རྐྱེན་གསུམ་ཚང་བས། དེ་དེས་རྒྱུ་ལས་དངོས་འབྲས་

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སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་སྲུས་ཀྱང་གེགས་མི་ནུས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། གཞན་དུ་ན་
དཔྱོད་པ་བས་དབང་ཤེས་སྤྱང་བྱ་སྤྱོང་བྱེད་སྤེལ་ནུས་སྐྱེ་བར་འདོད་
པ་ན། སློབ་དཔོན་ཕྱིས་རང་ཡུལ་བར་མ་ཆད་དུ་མི་སྣང་བར་ཐལ་
བའི་སྐྱོན་གསུངས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་འདི་ལ་ཡང་འཇུག་པའི་ཕྱིར་
རོ། །ཆོས་མཆོག་གི་བཞེད་པ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། དབང་མངོན་
གྱི་རྒྱུན་མ་རྫོགས་པའི་བོད་ཡིད་མངོན་གྱི་རྐྱེན་གསུམ་ཚང་བས་
ཡིད་མངོན་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་གེགས་བྱེད་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གལ་ཏེ་
དབང་མངོན་ཕྱིས་གེགས་བྱེད་དོ་སྙམ་ན་དེ་འང་མི་འཐད་དེ། དངོས་
རྒྱུ་ཡས་དངོས་འབྲས་སྐྱེ་བ་ལ་གེགས་མི་སྲིད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
གཞན་དུ་ན་རྒྱུན་གྱི་མཐར་ཡང་གེགས་བྱེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། །གཉིས་
པ་ནི། མདོ་ལས། དགེ་སློང་དག་གཟུགས་ཤེས་པ་ནི་རྣམ་པ་
གཉིས་ཏེ། མིག་དང་ཡིད་ལ་བརྟེན་པའོ། །ཞེས་དང་། ཚད་
མ་མདོར། ཡིད་ཀྱང་དོན་དང་། ཞེས་དང་། དེའི་འགྲེལ་པར།
ཡིད་ཀྱང་གཟུགས་ལ་སོགས་པ་ལ་དམིགས་ཤིང་ཉམས་སུ་
མྱོང་བའི་རྣམ་པས་འཇུག་པ་སྟེ། རྟོག་པ་མེད་པ་འབའ་ཞིག་གོ།
ཅེས་དང་། དེའི་དོན་རྣམ་ངེས་ལས། དབང་ཤེས་དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་
ལས། །སྐྱེ་ཞིང་དེ་དོན་དེ་མཐག །འཛིན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡིད་ཀྱང་
དེ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དོན་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ་ལ།
སྐྱེ་རྒྱུ་ལ་རྩོད་བཟློག་པ་དང་། མངོན་སུམ་སོགས་ཀྱི་འགྲོས་བརྗེ་བ་
གཉིས། དང་པོ་ནི། དབང་མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་མ་དང་པོ་དང་དུས་མཉམ་
པ་འང་སྔ་རོལ་དུ་སྐྱེ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཡིད་མངོན་ཡིན་ན། རང་གི་དེ་
མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་དབང་མངོན་ལས་སྐྱེ་དགོས་པར་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར།

ངེས་ན་དབང་མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་དང་པོའི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྱུང་ཞིང་། དེ་ལ་
ཡང་དབང་མངོན་གྱི་རྒྱུན་རྫོགས་པའི་མཐར་འབྱུང་བ་ནི་མ་ཡིན་
ཏེ། ཆོས་མཆོག་ལ་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱོན་གནས་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྒྱུན་མ་
རྫོགས་པར་འབྱུང་བ་ལ་ཡང་། རྒྱུན་ལྟར་སྤེལ་མར་འབྱུང་བ་མ་ཡིན་
པར། དུས་མཉམ་པར་འབྱུང་བ་ཡིན་ལ། རྒྱུ་ལ་ནི་དབང་མངོན་
སྐད་ཅིག་དང་པོས་བདག་རྐྱེན་དང་། དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་བྱས། དེ་དང་
དུས་མཉམ་པའི་ཕྱི་དོན་གྱིས་དམིགས་རྐྱེན་བྱས་ནས། དབང་
མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་གཉིས་པ་དང་དུས་མཉམ་པར་ཡིད་མངོན་སྐད་
ཅིག་དང་པོ་རྫས་ལོགས་སུ་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ནས་བརྒྱུད་མས་ཏེ་
དབང་མངོན་གྱི་རྒྱུན་མ་རྫོགས་པར་གྲངས་མཉམ་དུ་སྐྱེ་བ་ཡིན་ནོ།།
གཉིས་པ་ནི། དེའི་ཚེ་མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་འགྲོས་བརྩི་ན་འགྲོས་གསུམ་
དུ་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ཁ་ཕྱིར་བལྟས་ལ་དབང་མངོན་དང་། ཡིད་མངོན་
གྱི་འགྲོས་གཉིས། ནང་བལྟས་ལ་དེ་གཉིས་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་
བའི་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་འགྲོས་གཅིག་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར།
དམིགས་རྐྱེན་གྱིས་འགྲོས་ལྟར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། རྐྱེན་གསུམ་ཚང་
བ་ལྔ་ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་ཡོད་པའི་ཚེ། དབང་མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་གཉིས་
པ་ལྔ་དང་། ཡིད་མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་དང་པོ་ལྔ་སྟེ་བཅུ་སྐྱེ་ཡང་
གཟུགས་འཛིན་དབང་མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་གཉིས་པ་དང་། གཟུགས་
འཛིན་ཡིད་མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་དང་པོ་གཉིས་དམིགས་རྐྱེན་གྱི་སྒོ་
ནས་གཟུགས་འཛིན་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་གཅིག་ཏུ་འདྲེས་པའི་
ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེའི་ཚེ་ཡིད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་འགྲོས་བསྣན་ན་བཞི་རུ་འགྱུར་
ཏེ། ཡིད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་སྒོ་ནས་རང་ངེས་གཞན་ངེས་གཉིས་སུ་ངེས་

པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གསུམ་པ་རྩོད་པ་སྤོང་བ་ལ། མུ་སྟེགས་བྱེད་
ཀྱིས་ ······ རྩོད་པ་སྤོང་བ། འཕྲེལ་བྱེད་གཞན་གྱིས་རྩོད་པ་
སྤོང་བ། བོད་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་རྩོད་པ་སྤོང་བ་དང་གསུམ། དང་པོ་ནི།
སྐར་ཕྲེང་བ་ནི་འཛིན་པ་ན། །ཞེས་སོགས་ཏེ་གཞུང་དོན་ལས་
ཤེས་པར་བྱའོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། རྒྱན་ལ་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱོན་གྱིས་
མི་གནོད་དེ། ཡིད་མངོན་གྱིས་ཡུལ་ངེས་པའི་བྱ་བ་མི་བྱེད་ཅིང་
ཡུལ་མར་མི་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཆོས་མཆོག་ལ་བརྗོད་པའི་སྐྱོན་
གྱིས་མི་གནོད་དོ། དབང་མངོན་གྱི་རྒྱུན་མ་རྫོགས་པར་སྐྱེ་བ་
ཡིན་གྱི། རྒྱུ་རྫོགས་པའི་མཐར་ཁོ་ན་མི་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཕྱིར། མིག་
བྱེད་པ་དང་ལྡན་པའི་ཚེ་གཟུགས་གསལ་སྣང་ཅན་གྱི་ཤེས་
པ་ཐམས་ཅད་མིག་ཤེས་མིན་ན། མིག་ཤེས་ཀྱི་མཚན་གཞི་
མི་རྙེད་པར་ཐལ་བས་མི་གནོད་དེ། གཞན་དུ་ན་ཡིད་བྱེད་པ་
དང་ལྡན་པའི་གཟུགས་གསལ་སྣང་ཅན་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་ཐམས་
ཅད་ཡིད་མངོན་མ་ཡིན་ན། ཡིད་མངོན་གྱི་མཚན་གཞི་མི་རྙེད་
པར་མཚུངས་ཤིང་། མིག་ཤེས་ལ་གཟུགས་གསལ་བར་སྣང་
བའི་ཚེ། དེ་འཛིན་ལ་གཟུགས་གསལ་བར་སྣང་བ་ཡང་ནི་
མེད་པར་ཐལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གསུམ་པ་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། འཕྲོས་
གསུམ་གྱི་ཐ་སྙད་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ་བ་སྤོང་བ། ངེས་ཤེས་
འཛིན་མི་འཛིན་གྱི་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་པར་ཐལ་བར་སྤོང་བ་དང་
གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། ཉན་པོ་ན་རེ། འཕྲོས་གསུམ་གྱི་
ཐ་སྙད་མི་འཐད་དེ། ཕྱི་བལྟས་ལ་དོན་རིག་གི་འཕྲོས་གཉིས་
ཡོད་པ་ལྟར། ནང་བལྟས་ལ་དེ་གཉིས་རྣམས་སུ་སྨྲེང་བའི་

རང་རིག་གི་འཁྲུལ་གཉིས་སུ་ཏེ། ཡང་ན་འགྲོས་བཞིར་འགྱུར
ཞིང་། ནང་བལྟས་ལ་དེ་གཉིས་རང་རིག་ཏུ་གཅིག་པ་ལྟར།
ཕྱི་བལྟས་ལ་ཡང་དེ་གཉིས་དོན་རིག་ཏུ་གཅིག་པས་ཡང་ན་
འགྲོས་གཉིས་སུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན། འོན་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་
བཞིར་དབྱེ་བ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་པར་ཐལ། དབང་ཡིད་རྣལ་འབྱོར་
མངོན་སུམ་གསུམ། དེ་གསུམ་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བའི་རིག་མངོན་
སུམ་སྟེ། ཡང་ན་དྲུག་ཏུ་འགྱུར་ལ་དེ་གསུམ་རང་རིག་ཏུ་གཅིག
ན་སྔ་མ་གསུམ་དོན་རིག་ཏུ་གཅིག་པས་ཡང་ན་གཉིས་སུ་འགྱུར་
བའི་ཕྱིར། ཏྭན་ཚུར་མཐོང་ལ་དེའི་ཚེ་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་
མ་གཏོགས་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་འདུར་བཤད་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་
གསུམ་གཅིག་ཙར་དུ་སྐྱེ་བས་མངོན་སུམ་བཞིའི་ནང་ནས་མངོན་
སུམ་གསུམ་གྱི་འཁྲུལ་ཚང་ཞེས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ནོ། ཕྱིར་འགྲོས་
གསུམ་དུ་མ་ངེས་ཏེ། དམིགས་རྐྱེན་སོགས་ཀྱི་འཁྲུལ་བརྩི་ན་ལྔ་
དང་བདུན་དུ་ཡང་གྲངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། དབང་
མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་གཉིས་པ་ཕན་ཆད་དུ་དབང་མངོན་དང་ཡིད་མངོན་
གྲངས་མཉམ་དུ་སྐྱེ་ན། དེ་གཉིས་ལ་ངོས་པ་འདྲེན་ནུས་མི་ནུས་
ཀྱི་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། འདིའི་ལན་དུ་རིགས་གཏེར་
ལས། དབང་པོ་གཟུགས་ཅན་ལས་དབང་སྐྱེ། །ངེས་ན་དབང་
ཤེས་རྒྱུན་བཅས་ཡིན། །ཡིད་དབང་ལས་ནི་ཡིད་དབང་མིན། །
དེ་ཡི་ཕྱིར་ན་དེ་རྒྱུན་མེད། །ཅེས་དང་། དེའི་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས།
དབང་པོ་གཟུགས་ཅན་གྱི་སྐད་ཅིག་སྔ་མ་ལས་གཟུགས་ཅན་གྱི་
སྐད་ཅིག་ཕྱི་མ་སྐྱེ་བས་མུ་སྟེགས་པའི་རྒྱུན་ལྟ་བུ་རྟག་པ་མེད་ཀྱང་

རིགས་འདྲ་སྐྱེ་བ་བར་མ་ཆད་པའི་རྒྱུན་ཡོད་ལ། ཡིད་ཀྱི་དབང་
པོ་ནི་དབང་ཤེས་སྔ་མ་འགགས་མ་ཐག་པ་ཙམ་ཡིན་པས། ཡིད་
ཀྱི་དབང་པོ་གཞན་ལས་གཞན་མི་སྐྱེ་བས་རྒྱུན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར།
སོ་སོ་སྐྱེ་བོས་མཚམས་སྦྱོར་མ་ནུས་པས་རིང་ལས་ངེས་མ་ནུས་
པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་དོན་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག །སྔར་ཇི་བཞིན་ཉིད་
དུ་ཡིད་དབང་ལས་ཡིད་དབང་མི་སྐྱེ་བ། རིགས་གཏེར་གྱི་དགོངས་
པར་བྱས་ནས། དེ་འགོག་པའི་ཁས་བླངས་མེད་པའི་དགག་
པ་ལ་དགའ་བ་ཙམ་དུ་ཟད་དེ། ཡིད་དབང་ལས་ཡིད་དབང་མི་
སྐྱེ་བ་རིགས་གཏེར་གྱི་དགོངས་པ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཁ་ཅིག །
དེ་ཉིད་དགོངས་པར་བྱས་ནས་སྐབ་པར་བྱེད་པ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ།
དབང་པོའི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་ཡིད་དབང་ཡིན་ཅིང་། དབང་
ཤེས་སྔ་མ་ལས་ཕྱི་མ་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཁ་ཅིག །ཡིད་མངོན་གྱི་
བདག་རྐྱེན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཡིད་དབང་སྔ་མ་ལས་ཕྱི་མ་མི་སྐྱེ་བར་དགོངས
པར་འདོད་པ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། དབང་མངོན་སྐད་ཅིག་རེ་རེ་
བཞིན་དུ་ཡིད་མངོན་གྱི་བདག་རྐྱེན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ཁ་ཅིག །ཡིད་
མངོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཡིད་དབང་ལས་ཡིད་མངོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་ཡིད་
དབང་མི་སྐྱེ་བའི་དོན་དུ་འདོད་པ་ཡང་ཚིག་གི་དོན་ལ་མཁས་
ཏེ། དེ་ལྟར་ན་དབང་པོ་གཟུགས་ཅན་ལས་དབང་སྐྱེ། ཞེས་པའི་
དོན་ཡང་དབང་མངོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་དབང་པོ་གཟུགས་ཅན་ལས་
དབང་མངོན་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་དབང་པོ་གཟུགས་ཅན་སྐྱེ་ཞེས་པ་ལ་
སྦྱོར་དགོས་པར་ཐལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་དགོངས་པ་འདི་
ལྟར་ཡིན་ཏེ། དབང་མངོན་ལ་རྒྱུན་ཡོད་དེ། དབང་མངོན་གྱི་

དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་གྱི་རྗེས་རྒྱུན་ལས་ལོགས་སུ་གྱུར་པའི་བདག་རྐྱེན་
དབང་པོ་གཟུགས་ཅན་པ་སྔ་མ་ལས་ཕྱི་མ་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཡིད་
མངོན་ལ་རྒྱུན་མེད་དེ། ཡིད་མངོན་གྱི་དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་གྱི་རྗེས་
རྒྱུན་ལས་ ལོགས་སུ་གྱུར་པའི་བདག་རྐྱེན་ཡིད་དབང་སྔ་མ་
ལས་ཕྱི་མ་སྐྱེ་བ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཁྱབ་སྟེ། ཡིད་མངོན་གྱི་
དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་གྱི་རྒྱུན་དེ་དབང་མངོན་གྱི་རྒྱུན་ཡིན་གྱི་ཡིད་མངོན་
གྱི་རྒྱུན་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྔ་མའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་གྲུབ་སྟེ། ཡིད་
མངོན་གྱི་དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་དང་། བདག་རྐྱེན་གཉིས་རྗེས་གཅིག་
ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་ན་དབང་མངོན་གྱི་རྐྱེན་གསུམ་ལ་རྗེས་
རྒྱུན་མི་འདྲ་བ་གསུམ་སོ་སོར་ཡོད་ཅིང་། དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་གྱི་རྗེས་
རྒྱུན་དེ་དབང་མངོན་རང་གི་རྗེས་རྒྱུན་ཡིན་པས་དབང་མངོན་ལ་
རྒྱུན་ཡོད་ལ། ཡིད་མངོན་གྱི་དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་དང་། དམིགས་
རྐྱེན་གཉིས་ལ་རྗེས་རྒྱུན་སོ་སོར་ཡོད་ཀྱང་། དེ་མ་ཐག་རྐྱེན་དང་།
བདག་རྐྱེན་གཉིས་ལ་རྗེས་རྒྱུན་སོ་སོར་མེད་ཅིང་། དེ་མ་ཐག་
རྐྱེན་གྱི་རྗེས་རྒྱུན་དེ་ཡང་དབང་ མངོན་གྱི་རྗེས་རྒྱུན་ཡིན་གྱི། ཡིད་
མངོན་རང་གི་རྗེས་རྒྱུན་མ་ཡིན་པས་རྒྱུན་མེད་པ་ནི་བདག་ཉིད་
ཆེན་པོ་འདི་དེའི་དགོངས་པ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་མ་ལོག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འོན་ཀྱང་
འདི་རྟོགས་པས་སྨྲ་པཎྜི་ཏའི་རྗེས་སུ་ཞེ་པོ་ལས་གཞན་མཐུང་
ངོ། །གསུམ་པ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་ནི་ཚད་མ་མདོར། ཆགས་
ལ་སོགས། རང་རིག་རྟོག་པ་མེད་པ་ཅན། །ཞེས་པ་རྣ་འགྲེལ་
གྱི་དོན་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ་ལ་གསུམ་སྟེ། མཚན་ཉིད། མཚན་
གཞི། རྣམ་གཞག་ལ་དཔྱད་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་

ཡོངས་སུ་གཅོད་པར་བྱེད་པའི་འཛིན་རྣམ་སྟེ། དེ་ལ་བློ་ནི་ཡོངས་
གཅོད་པ། །འཛིན་པའི་རྣམ་པར་འདོད་པ་སྟེ། །ཞེས་སོ། །
གཉིས་པ་ནི། ཤེས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་རང་རིག་
མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། རང་ལྡོག་ནས་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་
མ་ཡིན་པས། ཤེས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱིས་མྱོང་བ་གསལ་རིག་
གི་ཆ་དེ། རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་མཚན་གཞི་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ལ་
གཉིས་སྣང་དང་བཅས་པ་དང་། གཉིས་སྣང་མེད་པའི་རང་
རིག་མངོན་སུམ་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། བློ་གཅིག་ཉིད་གཟུང་
རྣམ་དང་འཛིན་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་སྣང་བ་སྟེ། གཟུང་བར་སྣང་
བ་སྔུར་བྱ་དང་། འཛིན་པར་སྣང་བ་མྱོང་བྱེད་དུ་སྣང་བའི་གཉིས་
སྐབས་སུ་སྣང་བའི་རང་རིག་དེ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ལ། གཉིས་པ་ནི།
ཤེས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་སྟེང་གི་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་མྱོང་ཙམ་དུ་སྐྱེས་
པའི་ཆ་དེ་ཉིད་དོ། གསུམ་པ་ལ། ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་ན། རང་
གི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་མ་ཁྱབ་དཔྱད།
རང་རིག་དང་གཞན་རིག་འགལ་མི་འགལ་དཔྱད། རང་རིག་
ལ་ཡུལ་ཡོད་མེད་དཔྱད་པ་དང་གསུམ་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། སྔ་
རབས་པ་ཁ་ཅིག་ན་རེ། གཉིས་སྣང་ཅན་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་དེ་ལ།
རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་གསལ་ཙམ་གྱི་ཆ་དང་། ཡུལ་གཞན་རིག་པའི་ཆ་
གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། འཛིན་རྣམ་ཡིན་པས། རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་
ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་ལ། ཕྱི་མ་ནི། གཟུང་རྣམ་ཡིན་པས་
རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་མ་ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་སྨྲའོ། །འོན་
ཐེ་བྲག་པས། སངས་རྒྱས་པའི་ངོར་ཆོར་བབ་དེ་བ་ཆོས་ཅན།

རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཨེ་ཤིག་པར་ཐལ། ཕྱལ་བ་ཤུན་རིག་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་
པ་འདི་མ་འདོད་ཡོད་ནའང་དེའི་ངོས་རིགས་པར་ཉམས་པ་དང་། སྔོ་འཛིན་
དབང་མངོན་ཆོས་ཅན། སྔོན་པོ་མི་རིག་པར་ཐལ། རང་གི་
ངོ་བོ་མི་རིག་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་པ་འདི་རང་རིག་མེད་པར་འདོད་
པ་ལ་གནོད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་ཐལ་འགྱུར་ཡང་དག་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ་
ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདི་ཉིད། རྣམ་ངེས་ལས། དམིགས་
པ་མངོན་སུམ་མ་ཡིན་ན། དོན་ལ་མཐོང་བར་འགྱུར་མི་འགྱུར།
ཞེས་དང་། འདི་ནི་སྔོན་པོར་མི་རིག་ན། །ཇི་ལྟར་གཞན་གྱི་
ངོ་བོ་རིག །ཅེས་གསུངས་པ་དང་འགལ་ལོ། །རང་ལུགས་ལ་
ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་ན། རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་པས་
ཁྱབ་པར་རང་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་ལུང་རིགས་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི།
རང་མ་མཐོང་ན། རྟོག་པ་འང་རང་རིག་ཉིད་དུ་འདོད། །དོན་ལ་མ
ཡིན་དེ་རྟོག་ཕྱིར། །ཞེས་དང་། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་
སྒྲ་དོན་མིན། །དེ་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལ་ཀུན་མངོན་སུམ། །ཞེས་སོ། །གཉིས་
པ་ལ། སྣང་བྱེད་འགོད་པ་ནི། སྔོ་འཛིན་དབང་མངོན་དེ་རང་གི་
ངོ་བོ་ལ་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེའི་མྱོང་བྱར་གྱུར་པའི་ཉམས་
པ་དེ། སྔོ་འཛིན་དབང་མངོན་གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། རྒྱལ་
གཉིས་སྣང་བ་པར་བྱེད་པས་ཀྱང་། །རང་རིག་པ་ལ་ཆེར་གྲུབ་པ་
ཡིན། །ཞེས་སོ། །དེ་ཡང་གྲུབ་སྟེ། ཕྱིས་ཀྱི་དྲན་པའི་རྟགས་
ལས་སྔོ་འཛིན་དབང་མངོན་ལ་རང་དུས་སུ་མྱོང་བྱེད་ཡོད་པར་གྲུབ་
ཅིང་། མྱོང་བྱེད་རྫས་གཞན་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དྲན་པ་ལས་
ཀྱང་བདག་རིག་གྲུབ། །ཅེས་སོ། །རང་སྟོང་མེད་པ་ལ་བ་ནི་

བྱེད་བརྗོད་པ་ནི་བདེ་སོགས་ལ་སྒྲོན་བྱེད་རྫས་གཞན་གཅིག་ཡོད་
པར་ཐལ། དེ་ལ་སྒྲོན་བྱེད་ཡོད། རང་སྒྲོན་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
འདོད་ན། རང་དང་དུས་མཉམ་པའི་ཤེས་པ་རྫས་གཞན་གྱིས་
སྒྲོན་པ་ཡིན་ནམ། ཕྱིས་བྱུང་བའི་ཤེས་པ་རྫས་གཞན་གྱིས་སྒྲོན་
པ་ཡིན། ཞེས་དཔྱད་ནས། གཞུང་ལས་བཤད་པའི་གནོད་བྱེད་
རྣམས་བརྗོད་པར་བྱའོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། དེ་གཉིས་འགལ་ཏེ།
ཆོས་གཅིག་ལ་གཞན་རིག་གི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་ན། གཞན་རིག་ཡིན་
པས་མ་ཁྱབ་ཅིང་། རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་རང་རིག་ཡིན་ན། རང་རིག་
ཡིན་པས་མ་ཁྱབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་
ལ། དབང་ཡིད་གཉིས་པོ་དེ་གང་ལ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་སོང་བའི་
ཡུལ་རང་ལས་རྫས་གཞན་པ་ཡོད་པས། དོན་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་
ཡིན་གྱི། རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་མ་ཡིན་ལ། རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ལུགས་
ལ། དེ་གཉིས་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་སོང་བའི་ཡུལ་རང་ལས་རྫས་...
གཞན་མེད་པས་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་ཁས་ལེན་ནོ། །དེ་ལྟར་
བྱས་ན། རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ལུགས་ལ། མངོན་སུམ་གཉིས་སུ་
ངེས་པ་དང་། དམིགས་བརྟག་ལས། དབང་མངོན་གྱི་རྐྱེན་
གསུམ། སེམས་ཙམ་རང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ནས་ངེས་...
བཟུང་མཛད་པ་མི་འགལ་ཞིང་། ཚད་འབྲས་གཉིས་པར་དབང་
ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཚད་འབྲས་ལ་ཡང་རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་བཞག་པ་རྣམས
དོན་གཅིག་ཏུ་འདུས་པ་འབྱུང་ངོ་། །གསུམ་པ་ནི། རིགས་...
གཏེར་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས། རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་ཡུལ་མེད་
པར་བཤད་ཅིང་། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། རང་བདག་ཡུལ་དུ.....

བཞག་པ་ན། །གཞལ་བྱ་འཇལ་བྱེད་འབྲས་གནས་པ། །འདི་ནི་ཀུན་ལ་སྦྱར་བར་བྱ། །ཅེས་དང་། ངེས་པར་བློ་དང་ལྡན་ཅིག་ཏུ། །ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་ནི་སྐྱོད་འགྱུར་བའི། །ཡུལ་ནི་དེ་ལས་གཞན་ཉིད་དུ། །རྣམ་གང་གི་ནི་འགྲུབ་པར་འགྱུར། །ཞེས་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་སྐྱོང་བྱ་དེ་ཉིད་རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་ཡུལ་དུ་བཤད་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དགོངས་པ་གང་ཞེ་ན་འདི་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག །ཐ་སྙད་དང་དོན་དམ་སོ་སོར་མ་ཕྱེ་བར་རང་རིག་ལ་ཡུལ་མེད་པ་སྒྲ་ཇི་བཞིན་དུ་འཆད་པ་ནི་མི་རིགས་ཏེ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་རང་རིག་ལ་ཡུལ་མེད་ན་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་གཟུང་རྣམ་དེ་འཛིན་རྣམ་གྱི་གཞལ་བྱ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཁ་ཅིག །དོན་དམ་གྱི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ནས་ཀྱང་ཡུལ་ཡོད་དེ། འཇུག་ཡུལ་ལ་མི་བསླུ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་སྨྲ་བ་ནི། ཚད་མའི་མཚན་ཉིད། མི་བསླུ་བའི་ཤེས་པ་དང་། མི་བསླུ་བ་དེ་ཡང་། མི་བསླུ་ལས་དང་བྱེད་པོ་དང་། །བྱ་བ་གསུམ་གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་ཅན།། ཞེས་ཕྱེད་པར་གསུམ་ལྡན་དུ་གསུངས་པ་དང་། དབྱེ་ན་མངོན་རྗེས་གཉིས་སུ་ཡོད་པས། རང་སྤྱི་གཉིས་གཞལ་བྱར་བྱེད་ཅེས་པའི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀུན་དུ་ཐ་སྙད་པའི་ཚད་མའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པའི་དོན་མ་རྟོགས་པའོ། །གཞན་ཀྱི་དོན་ནི་འདི་ཡིན་ཏེ།། དོན་དམ་རིགས་པས་དཔྱད་པའི་ཚེ། རང་རིག་ལ་ཡུལ་མེད་དེ། དེའི་ཚེ་གཟུང་རྣམ་འཛིན་རྣམ་གྱི་ཡུལ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེའི་ཚེ་བློ་གཅིག་ལ་གཟུང་འཛིན་རིག་གསུམ་དབྱེར་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དཔེར་ན་དོན་དམ་རིགས་པས་དཔྱད་པའི་ཚེ། སྒྲོ་

གཅིག་ཉིད་ཀྱི་སྟེང་དུ་རྟགས་ཆོས་དོན་གསུམ་དབྱེར་མེད་པས་
བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་མེད་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །ཐ་སྙད་དུ་
རང་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་ལ་ཡུལ་ཡོད་དེ། ཐ་སྙད་དུ་གཟུང་འཛིན་
རིག་གསུམ་ལ་ཚད་འབྲས་གཞལ་གསུམ་བཞག་ཏུ་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་སྒྲ་གཅིག་ཉིད་ལ་རྟོག་པས་སྒྲ་བྱས་
མི་རྟག་པའི་ལྡོག་པ་གསུམ་སོ་སོར་ཕྱེ་ནས་རྟགས་ཆོས་དོན་
གསུམ་དུ་བཞག་པས། བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་
འཐད་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །དེས་ན་ དོན་དམ་ལ་དགོངས་ནས། རྣམ་
འགྲེལ་ལས། བློ་བདག་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེར་མེད་ཀྱང་། །ཞེས་
དང་། གཟུང་བ་འཛིན་པ་རིག་པ་དག །ཡོད་པ་མིན་ཡང་ཞེས་
དང་། རིགས་གཏེར་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས་ཀྱང་། རང་རིག་ལ་ཡུལ་
མེད་པར་གསུངས་སོ། །ཐ་སྙད་ལ་དགོངས་ནས་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་
གྱི་སྐབས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་གཉིས་དང་། འདི་གཉིས་ཀྱི་དེ་མ་ཐག་ཏུ།
མཐོང་བ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་རྣམས་ཀྱི། །གཟུང་བ་འཛིན་པ་རིག་པ་
དག །ཐ་དད་ལྡན་ཉིད་རྟོག་བྱར་འགྱུར། །ཞེས་དང་། གཞལ་
བྱ་དང་། །འཇལ་བྱེད་འབྲས་བུར་གནས་པ་འདི། །ཇི་ལྟར་
རྗེས་སུ་གནང་བཞིན་བྱ། །ཞེས་སོགས་གཟུང་རྣམ་འཛིན་རྣམ་
གྱི་ཡུལ་དང་གཞལ་བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་རྣམ་གཞག་མང་དུ་གསུངས་
སོ། །མདོར་ན་དོན་དམ་པར་བློ་གཅིག་ལ་གཟུང་འཛིན་རིག་
གསུམ་དང་། ཚད་འབྲས་གཞལ་གསུམ་བཞག་ཏུ་མེད་ཀྱང་།
ཐ་སྙད་དུ་དེ་དག་གི་རྣམ་གཞག་བྱེད་པར་གསུངས་པའི་རྣམ་
འགྲེལ་གྱི་གཞུང་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དོན་རྟོགས་ན། འདིའི་མཐའ་ཆོད་

པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང་། །འཆད་ཚུལ་གཞན་ལ་ནི་སྙིང་པོ་མ་མཐོང་
ངོ་། །ཞེ་ན་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་ནི། བདེ་བར་གཤེགས་
པས་ཆོས་རྣམས་ལ་ཆོས་ཀྱི་མིག་རྡུལ་མེད་ཅིང་དྲི་མ་དང་བྲལ་
བ་རྣམ་པར་དག །ཅེས་གསུངས་པ་དང་། ཚད་མ་མདོར།
རྣལ་འབྱོར་རྣམས་ཀྱི་བླ་མས་བསྟན། །ཀ་ར་དེས་པ་ཡི་དོན་
ཙམ་མཐོང་། །ཞེས་དང་། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། རྣལ་འབྱོར་
ཤེས་པ་སྔར་བཤད་པ། །དེ་དག་གི་དེ་སྒོམ་བྱུང་ཡིན།། ཞེས་
གསུངས་པའི་དོན་གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པ་ལ། གསུམ་སྟེ། རང་
བཞིན་ངོས་བཟུང་བ། ཡུལ་ལ་ཚད་མར་འགྱུར་ཚུལ། སྒྲུབ་
བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་གསུམ་སྟེ། མཚན་ཉིད།
དབྱེ་བ། རྒྱ་བསམ་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། རང་གི་ཐུན་མོང་མ་
ཡིན་པའི་བདག་རྐྱེན་ཡང་དག་པའི་དོན་ལ་སྒོམ་བྱུང་གཙོ་
བོར་གྱུར་པའི་ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་ཡང་དག་པའི་དོན་
ལ་མ་འཁྲུལ་བའི་རིག་པའོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ་རྟེན་གྱི་སྒོ་ནས།
ཉན་ཐོས། རང་རྒྱལ། ཐེག་ཆེན་འཕགས་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་
མངོན་སུམ་གསུམ། དེ་ལ་སློབ་མི་སློབ་ཀྱི་སྒོ་ནས་ལྔར་
འགྱུར་ཏེ། ཉན་ཐོས་སློབ་པ་དང་མི་སློབ་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་
མངོན་སུམ་གཉིས། རང་རྒྱལ་མི་སློབ་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་
མངོན་སུམ། ཐེག་ཆེན་སློབ་པ་དང་མི་སློབ་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་
མངོན་སུམ་གཉིས་རྣམས་སུ་འགྱུར་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལ་སྣང་
བཅས་སྣང་མེད་ཀྱི་སྒོ་ནས་བཅུར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ལྔ་པོ་རེ་རེ་ལ་
ཡང་མཉམ་གཞག་དང་རྗེས་ཐོབ་ཀྱིས་བསྡུས་པའི་རྣལ་

འཁོར་མངོན་སུམ་གཉིས་གཉིས་སུ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གསུམ་
པ་ལ། ཡེ་ཤེས་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ། དེ་མཐར་ཕྱིན་པའི་དུས། ཐབས་
ལ་བློས་པ་འབྲས་བུའི་ཁྱད་པར་རོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། བདག་
མེད་རྟོགས་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་དེས་ཉེར་ལེན་དང་། ཐབས་སྙིང་
རྗེ་ཆེན་པོས་ལྷན་ཅིག་བྱེད་རྐྱེན་བྱས་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་ཇི་ལྟ་བ་
མཁྱེན་པའི་ ཡེ་ཤེས་འགྲུབ་ཅིང་། དེ་ལས་ལྡོག་པས་ཇི་
སྙེད་པ་མཁྱེན་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་འགྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ།
ཉན་ཐོས་ཀྱི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་མཐར་ཕྱིན་པའི་དུས་ནི་
བརྩོན་འགྲུས་མྱུར་བས་ཚེ་གསུམ་ལ་མཐར་ཕྱིན་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
མྱུར་བསྒོད་པ་གསུམ་གྱི་མཐར། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར།
རང་རྒྱལ་གྱི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་བསྐལ་པ་བརྒྱས་མཐར་
ཕྱིན་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བསེ་རུ་བསྐལ་པ་བརྒྱ་ཡི་རྒྱུས། །ཞེས་
གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཐེག་ཆེན་གྱི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་
བསྐལ་པ་གྲངས་མེད་གསུམ་གྱིས་མཐར་ཕྱིན་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
གྲངས་མེད་གསུམ་ལ་སངས་རྒྱས། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་
ཕྱིར། གསུམ་པ་ནི། ཉན་རང་དགྲ་བཅོམ་པའི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་
མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་ཤེས་བྱ་ཐམས་ཅད་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་མ་རྟོགས་
ཏེ། དེས་མ་རིག་པའི་བག་ཆགས་མ་སྤངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ།
ཐབས་སྙིང་རྗེ་དམན་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྫོགས་པའི་སངས་རྒྱས་
ཀྱི་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་ཤེས་བྱ་ཐམས་ཅད་མངོན་
སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་ཏེ། དེས་མ་རིག་པའི་བག་ཆགས་སྤངས་པའི་
ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཐབས་སྙིང་རྗེ་ཆེན་པོ་བསྐལ་པ་གྲངས་མེད་གསུམ་

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དགོམས་པར་ཐལ་བའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ལྟར་ཡང་། རྣམ་པ་དུ་མར་
ཐབས་མང་པོ། །ཞེས་སོགས་དང་། ཉོན་མོངས་མེད་དང་ཉ
མེད་དང་། །ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱིས་སྟོན་ཏོ། །གཉིས་པ་ཡུལ་ལ་
ཚད་མ་འགྱུར་ཚུལ་ལ་ཁ་ཅིག །རྣམ་པ་ཐེན་སྣང་ཅིག་མ་དང་
པོ་ཚད་མ་དང་། གཉིས་པ་བཅད་ཤེས་སུ་འདོད་པ་མི་འཐད་དེ།
མངོན་སུམ་ཐམས་ཅད་རྟོག་བྲལ་མ་འཁྲུལ་བ་བའི་ཤེས་པར་གྲུབ་
པས། ཚད་མར་གྲུབ་པ་བཞིན་དུ་འདི་ཡང་ཚད་མ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར་རོ། །འོ་ན་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་རང་ཡུལ་མ་ངེས་ན། དེ་རང་
མཚན་ཡོད་མེད་ལ་འཇུག་ལྡོག་བྱེད་པ་མི་འཐད་ཅིང་། དེས་ན་
རྟོག་པར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན་སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། སོ་སོ་སྐྱེ་བོའི་ཚད་མས
རང་སྟོབས་དང་། གཞན་སྟོབས་གང་རུང་གིས་ངེས་པ་དྲངས་
པའི་སྒོ་ནས་འཇུག་ལྡོག་བྱེད་ཅིང་། འཕགས་པ་རྟོག་པའི་
བག་ཆགས་དང་མ་བྲལ་བ་རྣམས་རང་བཞིན་དུ་གནས་པའི་ཚེ།
སོ་སྐྱེ་དང་འདྲ་ལ། སྒོམ་གནས་མཉམ་པའི་ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན་ལ
སོགས་པ་ལ་གནས་པའི་ཚེ། ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན་གྱི་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས
འཇུག་ལྡོག་བྱེད་པ་ཡིན་ལ། རྟོག་པའི་བག་ཆགས་དང་བྲལ་
བ་རྣམས། །ཏིང་ངེ་འཛིན་ཡོན་ཏན་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་འཇུག་ལྡོག་བྱེད་
པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །འོ་ན་སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ཡེ་ཤེས་ངེས། འདས་པ་དང་
མ་འོངས་པ་མཁྱེན་ནམ་མི་མཁྱེན་ཞེ་ན། སྔར་བབས་པ་ཁ་ཅིག །
དེས་ད་ལྟར་བ་དངོས་སུ་མཁྱེན་ཅིང་། འདས་མ་འོངས་ཤུགས་
ལ་མཁྱེན་པ་ཡིན་ཞེས་དང་། ཁ་ཅིག །དེ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་
ཤར་བའི་སྒོ་ནས་མཁྱེན་པ་ཡིན་ཞེས་དང་། ཁ་ཅིག །སངས་

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རྒྱས་ཀྱིས་ཏེ་ཡེ་ཤེས་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ཞེས་ཟེར་བ། མི་འཐད་དེ།
མངོན་སུམ་པ་ཤུགས་རྟོགས་ཀྱིས་བཀག་བཞིན་ཅིང་། འདུས་མ་འདྲེས་
ཀྱིས་རང་ངོས་ནས་ནུས་པ་གཏད་པ་ཡིན་ན། དེ་གཉིས་རྫས་
སུ་གྲུབ་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང་། བག་ཆགས་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་རྣམ་པ་
ཤར་ན་ཡུལ་ཅན་རྟོག་པར་འགྱུར་ལ། ཕྱི་མ་ལྟར་ན་ཐམས་ཅད་
མཁྱེན་པའི་ཡེ་ཤེས་མེད་པར་ཐལ་ལོ། །དེས་ན་དེས་ཤེས་བྱ་
མཁྱེན་ཚུལ་ཇི་ལྟར་མཐོང་གི་ཕྱིས་དཔག་པར་མི་ནུས་ཏེ། དེ་ལ་དེ་
མཁྱེན་ཚུལ་པ་བོས་མཁྱེན་མི་ཁྱབ་པར་གནས་པའི་ཕྱིར། གསུམ་
པ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་ལ། ངོ་བོ་སྟོན་པ། མཚན་ཉིད་བསྟན་
པ། སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་མི་འཐད་པ་སྤོང་བ་དང་གསུམ། དང་པོ་ནི།
འདས་པ་ནི་བྱུང་ཟིན་བསྟན་པ། མངོན་སུམ་ནི་འབྱུང་འགྱུར་བ་
སྟོན་པ་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། ཚིག་གི་ཀྱང་པོར་ངེས་གྱུར་
ཏ། །སྔོན་བྱུང་བ་ཡང་དག་པར་ནུས། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །
རྣམ་གྲངས་བ་དང་གཞན་པ་འཆད་པ་ལ་དོན་དང་མཐུན་ཅིང་འགལ་
བ་མེད་ན། ཡུལ་དེ་མངོན་སུམ་དུ་རྟོགས་པས་ཁྱབ། དཔེར་
ན་རང་རང་གི་ཡུལ་འཆར་བ་བཞིན། གཞུང་འབུམ་པ་ལ་སོགས་
པ་རྫོགས་པ་པོ་རྣམས་ཀྱང་གཞན་ལ་འཆད་པ་ལ་དོན་དང་མཐུན་
ཅིང་འགལ་བ་མེད་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་
བརྗེ་ནས་ཡུལ་རྟོགས་པའི་ཚུལ་འགྲེང་མངོན་སུམ་སྟོན་དུ་
སོང་བར་གྲུབ་པོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ། རྟགས་འགོད་པ་དང་།
རྩ་བ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ནི། ངོ་བོ་ཕྱིར་ཡང་དག་ཡང་དག་
པར། །ཞེས་སོགས་དང་། འདི་ལྟར་གསེར་ལ་སྔོམ་དང་། །

ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱིས་སྟོན་ཏེ། སྟོང་ཉིད་བསྒོམ་པའི་བློ་ཆོས་ཅན།
སེམས་སྐྱེན་དང་མ་བྲལ་བར་ སེམས་པར་བྱས་ན་སེམས་བྱའི་
དོན་ལ་གསལ་སྣང་འབྱུང་བ་ངེས་ཏེ། རྟེན་བརྟེན་པ་སེམས་
པ་རང་གི་ངང་གིས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་དེ་བསྒོམས་པ་ཡིན་པའི་
ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་བསྒྲུབ་པ་དང་།
ཁྱབ་པ་བསྒྲུབ་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ། རྟེན་བརྟེན་པའི་བསྒྲུབ་པ།
སེམས་པ་ རང་གི་ངང་གིས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་བསྒྲུབ་པ།
དེ་བསྒོམ་པ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་དང་གསུམ། དང་པོ་ལ། རིག་པའི་
སྔོན་མཐའ་འཐུག་མེད་དུ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་དང་། ཕྱི་མཐའ་ཐུག་མེད་
དུ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། དེ་ཕྱིར་ངེས་པར་
གང་ཉིད་ཀྱི། །ཞེས་སོགས་དང་། རྣམ་ཤེས་མིན་པ་རྣམ་
ཤེས་ཀྱི། །ཉེར་ལེན་མིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཡང་གྲུབ། །ཅེས་པ་སྟེ།
སྐྱེས་མ་ཐག་པའི་རིག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། རིག་པ་སྔ་མ་སྔོན་དུ་སོང་
སྟེ། རིག་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། འདིའི་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་རང་གྲུབ་...
ལ་མྱོང་བས་གྲུབ་ཅིང་། ཁྱབ་པ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ལ། རྒྱལ་རོལ་མཛེས་
པ་བརྣམས་ནས། སྐྱེས་མ་ཐག་...པའི་རིག་པ་དེ་རིག་པ་སྔ་
མ་སྔོན་དུ་སོང་བས་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྐྱེ་བ་སྔ་མ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན།
འདིའི་ལན་དུ་ཚད་མ་གྲུབ་པའི་ལེའུར་གསུངས་པའི་སྐྱེ་བ་སྔ་
མ་མེད་པ་འགོག་པའི་རིགས་པ་རྣམས་སྦྱར་བར་བྱའོ། །གཉིས་
པ་ལ། བདག་འཛིན་དང་བཅས་པའི་གསལ་བསྟུད་མེད་དུ་
བསྒྲུབ་པ་དང་། བདག་འཛིན་མེད་པའི་གསལ་བ་ཐུག་མེད་དུ་
བསྒྲུབ་པ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ནི། དེ་ཕྱིར་བློ་ཀུན་ནས་པ་ཡི་རྟེན། །

ཞེས་སོགས་ཚིག་རྐང་གསུམ་གྱིས་སྟོན་ཏོ། །བདག་འཛིན་དང་བཅས་
པའི་འཆི་ཁ་མའི་རིག་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། རིག་པ་ཕྱི་མར་མཚམས་
སྦྱོར་བར་ངེས་ཏེ། རིག་པ་ཕྱི་མར་མཚམས་སྦྱོར་བའི་རྒྱུ་ཚོགས་
ཚང་ཞིང་གེགས་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། རྒྱུ་ཚོགས་ཚང་བ་ནི། བདག་
འཛིན་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་ལས་ཉོན་གཉིས་ཚང་བ་ཡིན་ལ།
གེགས་མེད་པ་ནི་བདག་མེད་རྟོགས་པའི་ཤེས་རབ་མེད་པའོ། །
གཉིས་པ་ནི། འདོད་ཆགས་བྲལ་བས་གནས་པ་ནི། །བརྩེ་
བའམ་ཡང་ན་ལས་ཀྱིས་ཡིན། །ཞེས་ཏེ། ལྷག་བཅས་མྱང་
འདས་ལ་གནས་པའི་ཉན་ཐོས་དགྲ་བཅོམ་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། འདིར་རིག་
པ་ཕྱི་མར་མཚམས་སྦྱོར་བའི་རྒྱུ་ཚོགས་ཚང་སྟེ། བདག་
འཛིན་མེད་ཀྱང་སྔ་མའི་ལས་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་སྦྱོར་བ་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར། ཐེག་ཆེན་དགྲ་བཅོམ་པ་རིག་པ་ཕྱི་མར་མཚམས་
སྦྱོར་བར་ངེས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེའི་རྒྱུ་སྙིང་རྗེ་ཆེན་པོ་ཡོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར་རོ། །འོན་ལྷག་མེད་དུ་མྱ་ངན་ལས་འདའ་བའི་ཚེ་རིག་
པ་ཕྱི་མར་མཚམས་སྦྱོར་བ་མེད་པས་རྟེན་བརྟན་པར་མི་
འགྲུབ་བོ་ཞེ་ན། འདིར་རྟེན་བརྟན་པ་ནི་སྐུའི་བདག་མེད་
རྟོགས་པའི་བློ་དེ་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་མ་བྱུང་གི་བར་དུ་རྟེན་
བརྟན་པར་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། དེ་སྐྱེས་ནས་རྟེན་བརྟན་པར་
བསྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་དགོས་པ་མེད་དོ། །སེམས་པས་བསྒྲུབ་པ་མེད་
ཅེས། །ཞེས་པའི་བར་དུ། རྟེན་བརྟན་པར་བསྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་
རོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། སེམས་ལས་བརྩེ་སོགས་གོམས་སྐྱེ་བ། །
ཅེས་སོགས་ཏེ། བརྩེ་བ་སྙིང་རྗེ་ཆེན་པོ་དང་བདག་མེད་རྟོགས་

པའི་བློ་ཅན་ནོ། །ཕྱིར་གོམས་པ་ལས་རང་གི་ངང་གིས་ཁྱད་
པར་དུ་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ལུས་ཀྱི་འབད་རྩོལ་ལ་མི་ལྟོས་པར་སེམས་
ཀྱི་སྟེང་དུ་འབད་མེད་ལྷུན་གྲུབ་ཏུ་འབྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཉིས་
པ་དེ་བསྒོམ་པ་ནི། རང་ རིག་མ་དོན་སྒོམ་གྱིས་གྲུབ་པོ༔
གཉིས་པ་ཁྱད་པ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ནི། རྟེན་བརྟན་པ་བསྒོམ་པ་རང་
རང་གི་ངང་གིས་ཁྱད་པར་དུ་འགྱུར་བ་དེ་བསྒོམ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ།
གོམས་བྱའི་དོན་ལ་གསལ་ལ་སྣང་འབྱུང་བར་ངེས་པས་ཁྱབ་སྟེ།
དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་བློ་དེ་གསལ་ལ་སྣང་མི་འབྱུང་ གི་བར་དུ་འགལ་རྐྱེན་
གྱི་གེགས་མེད་པ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་འདོད་འཇིགས་
གོམས་པའི་བློ་བཞིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་མཚན་ཉིད་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ནི།
རྟོག་བྲལ་དང་མ་འཁྲུལ་བ་གཉིས་ཀ་ཡང་། ཡང་དག་པའི་
དོན་ལ་གསལ་སྣང་ཐོབ་པས་འགྲུབ་སྟེ། སྤྱིར་གསལ་ལ་བར་
སྣང་བས་རྟོག་མེད་འགྲུབ་ཅིང་། བྱེ་བྲག་ཡང་དག་པའི་དོན་
གསལ་དང་སྣང་བས་མི་འཁྲུལ་བ་འགྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
གསུམ་པ་སྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་མི་འཐད་པ་སྤོང་བ་ལ། སྤྱིར་བསྟན་
ཚོགས་མི་འཐད་པ་སྤོང་བ་དང་། ཡེ་ཤེས་ལྷུན་ཚོགས་ཀྱི་
འཐད་པ་སྤོང་བ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ནི། ཉོན་མོངས་པ་གཏན་
ནས་སྤངས་པའི་སྤངས་པ་མེད་དེ། དྲི་མ་སེམས་ཀྱི་རང་
བཞིན་ཡིན་པས་སྤོང་མི་ནུས་པ་དང་། ནུས་ཀྱང་སྤོང་བའི་
ཐབས་མེད་པ་དང་། ཡོད་ཀྱང་མི་ཤེས་པ་དང་། ཤེས་ཀྱང་
སྤངས་པ་སླར་ལྡོག་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་རྩོད་པའི་རིགས་པ་བཞི་
ལས། ལན་ནི་རིགས་ཀྱང་བཞི་སྟེ། སེམས་ཀྱི་རང་བཞིན་

འོད་གསལ་ཏེ། །ཞེས་སོགས་དང་། སྟོང་ཉིད་ལྟ་དང་དེ་འགལ་
ཕྱིར། །ཞེས་སོགས་དང་། རྒྱུ་ཡི་དང་པོ་ཞིག་ཉམས་པ་ཡིན།།
ཞེས་སོགས་དང་། བདག་ལྟ་རིས་བོན་སྐྱང་པའི་ཕྱིར། །
ཞེས་སོགས་སོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ། སེམས་པ་མི་སྤྱོད་པ་སྤྱོད་
པ་དང་། སྙིང་ཀྱང་ཐབས་མཁས་མཚུངས་མཐུན་པ་མི་སྤྱོད་པ་སྤྱོད་པ་གཉིས།
དང་པོ་ནི། སྙིང་རྗེ་ཆེན་པོ་དང་། སྟོང་ཉིད་རྟོགས་པའི་བློ་སེམས
པ་ལས་མཐའ་མེད་དུ་འཕེལ་བ་ཀྱི་འབྱུང་ངོ། མཚོངས་པ་
སེམས་པ་ལས་མཐའ་ཡེ་དུ་མི་འཕེལ་བ་དང་། རྒྱུ་བསྒྲིམས་པ་
ལས་མཐའ་མེར་མི་འགྱུར་བ་དང་། གསེར་གྱི་ཞུ་བ་སྐྱུར་པར་
ལྡོག་པ་བཞིན། ཞེས་པའི་སྤྱོད་པའི་རིགས་གསུམ་ལས། ཡན་
གྱི་རིགས་ཀྱང་གསུམ་སྐྱེ། སེམས་ལ་བརྩེ་སོགས་སེམས་སྐྱེ་
པ། །ཅེས་སོགས་དང་། བརྩེ་དང་ས་བོན་ལས་བྱུང་བ། །ཅེས་
སོགས་དང་། སྔར་ཕྱོགས་སུ་དང་བར་འགྱུར་བྱས་གཏེ། །ཞེས་
སོགས་སོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། དེ་གཉིས་པ་སྒོམས་པ་ཡར་སེམས་
ཀྱི་དེའི་རང་བཞིན་དུ་འགྱུར་བསྐྱེད་ཀྱང་། ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པ་
ཉིད་དོ། །ཞེས་བྱའི་གྲང་སོ་ལ་མཐའ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཞེ་ན་དེའི་ལན་
ནི། དགོས་པའི་དོན་ཀུན་མཁྱེན་པས་ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པར་
བསྒྲུབ་པ་དང་། དེ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་ཤེས་བྱའི་དོན་ཀུན་མཁྱེན་པས་
ཐམས་ཅད་མཁྱེན་པར་བསྒྲུབ་པ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ནི། མི་ཤེས་
སྟོན་པར་བྱེད་པ་ལ། །ཞེས་སོགས་ཚིག་རྐང་བཅད་བཞི་ཡོ། །གཉིས་
པ་ནི། མདོར། ཡིད་ཆེས་ཚིག་ནི་མི་བསླུ་བའོ། །ཀྱི་ལས་རྟེན་
སུ་ང་བག་པ་ཉིད། །ཅེས་དང་། འདིར། སྔང་དང་ དོར་བྱའི་དེ་

ཉིད་ཀྱི། །ཞེས་སོགས་སོ། །མངོན་སུམ་ཡང་དག་པ་ནང་མི་[illegible]
ཀ།། ༀ །།གཉིས་པ་ལོག་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཚེ་ལུས་ལྟར་སྣང་ལ།
མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། དབྱེ་བ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ནི། འཁྲུལ་པའི་ཤེས
པའོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། རྟོག་པ་ཅན་དང་། རྟོག་མེད་མངོན་
སུམ་ལྟར་སྣང་ངོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་མཚན་ཉིད་ནི། རྟོག་པ་འཁྲུལ
པའི་ཤེས་པའོ། །དབྱེ་བ་ནི་མདོ་ལ་[illegible]ར་ནས། འཁྲུལ་པ་དང་ཀུན་
རྫོབ་ཤེས་པ་དང་། རྗེས་དཔག་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་པ་ལས་བྱུང་། དྲན
དང་མངོན་འདོད་ཚེས་ཀྱུ་ར། །ཞེས་དྲུག་ཏུ་གསུངས་པ་ནི། འཁྲུལ
པའི་ཤེས་པ་ནི། སྨིག་རྒྱུ་ལ་ཆུར་འཛིན་པ་དང་། ཕྱག་བྲལ
སྒྱུ་འཕྲུལ་འཛིན་པའི་བློ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །ཀུན་རྫོབ་པ་ཤེས་པ་ནི། བ
ཡོད་ཀྱི་སྤྱི་འཛིན་པའི་རྟོག་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །རྗེས་དཔག་དང་རྗེས
སུ་དཔག་པ་ལས་བྱུང་བ་གཉིས་ནི་རྟགས་ལ་བརྟེན་པའི་དབང་དུ
བྱས་པ་སྟེ། སྔ་མ་ནི་རྟགས་འཛིན་སེམས་པ་དང་། ཕྱི་མ་ནི
རྟགས་ཅན་རྗེས་དཔག་ཡིན་པར་རྒྱལ་དབང་བློས་བསྒྲུབ་ངས་སོ།།
དྲན་པ་དང་མངོན་འདོད་གཉིས་ནི། རྟགས་ལ་མ་བརྟེན་པའི
དབང་དུ་བྱས་པ་སྟེ། སྔ་མ་ནི་འདས་པའི་དོན་དྲན་པའི་དྲན་ཤེས
དང་། ཕྱི་མ་ནི་མ་འོངས་པའི་དོན་མངོན་པར་འདོད་པའི་བློའོ།
དེ་དག་དཔལ་ལྡན་གྲགས་པས་གསུམ་དུ་བསྡུས་པའི་ཚུལ་ནི
ཀུན་རྫོབ་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ཅན་གྱི་རྟོག་པ་དང་། འཁྲུལ
པའི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་དོན་གཞན་ལ་སྒྲོ་འདོགས་པའི་རྟོག་པ་དང་།
ཕྱི་མ་བཞི་པ་སྒྲིག་ཀུ་ར་བའི་དོན་ཅན་གྱི་རྟོག་པ། ཞེས་གསུངས
སོ། །དེ་དག་ཐ་མངོན་སུམ་ལྟར་སྣང་དུ་བསྟན་པའི་དགོས་པ་ནི།

དང་པོ་བྱིས་རིགས་པ་ཅན་པས་དབང་ཤེས་སུ་འདོད་པའི་ལོག་
རྟོག་ཡོད་པས་དེ་བཟློག་པའི་ཕྱིར་དུ་བསྟན་པ་ཡིན་ལ། ཕྱི་མ་
གཉིས་མངོན་སུམ་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཕྱི་རོལ་པས་ཀྱང་སྒྲུབ་མོད། སྔ་མ་
གཉིས་དབང་ཤེས་མ་ཡིན་པར་བསྒྲུབ་པའི་མཐུན་དཔེ་བསྒྲུབ་
པའི་ཆེད་ཡིན་ནོ། དབང་སྐྱེས་མིན་པར་གྲུབ་དེ་ནི་དུ། གཉིས་
བཤད་འགྲུབ་པར་མཐོང་ཕྱིར་རོ། ཞེས་སོ། གཉིས་པ་ལ།
མཚན་ཉིད་ནི། རྟོག་མེད་འཁྲུལ་བའི་ཤེས་པའོ། དབྱེ་ན།
དབང་ཤེས་འཁྲུལ་པ་དང་། ཡིད་ཤེས་འཁྲུལ་བ་གཉིས། དང་
པོ་ནི། སྒྲ་ཤད་འཛིན་སྣང་གི་དབང་ཤེས་ལྟ་བུ་སྟེ། མངོན་སུམ་
ལྟར་སྣང་རབ་རིབ་ཅན། ཞེས་པས་སྟོན་ཏོ། གཉིས་པ་ནི།
མི་ལམ་གསལ་སྣང་གི་ཤེས་པ་ལྟ་བུ་སྟེ། གཉིད་ལོག་པ་འམ་
སད་པ་ན། གསལ་བར་སྣང་བ་ཅན་གྱི་ཀང་། དེ་ནི་རྟོག་མེད་
ཅེས་པས་སྟོན་ཏོ། མངོན་སུམ་ལྟར་སྣང་བཤད་ཟིན་ཏོ།། ༄།།
གསུམ་པ་ཚད་མའི་འབྲས་བུ་བཤད་པ་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། ཚད་
འབྲས་གང་ལས་འཕྲོས་པའི་རྒྱུ་ལ་དང་། དེ་ལས་འཕྲོས་པའི་
ཚད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་གོ། དང་པོ་ནི། མདོ་ལས་དབང་དུ་བྱས་
ནས། མངོན་སུམ་དང་ནི་རྗེས་སུ་དཔག །ཚད་མ་དེ་མཚན་ཉིད་
གཉིས་གཞལ་བྱ། ཅེས་དང་། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་འདིར། གཞལ་
གཉིས་ཕྱིར་ཚད་མ་གཉིས། ཞེས་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་ཚད་མ་ལ་
གཉིས་སུ་གྲངས་ངེས་པའི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་དུ། གཞལ་བྱ་ལ་གཉིས་
སུ་གྲངས་ངེས་པ་བཀོད་པ་ན། ཚད་མ་གཉིས་པོ་དེས་གཞལ་བྱ་
གཉིས་པོ་དེ་ལ་གྲུབ་འམ། འབྲས་བུ་ཅི་ཞིག་བྱེད་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་

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ཕྱིས་གཞལ་བྱའི་གྲངས་ངེས་ཀྱིས་ཚད་མའི་གྲངས་ངེས་འགྲུབ་
པ་ཡིན་ཞེ་ན། ཚད་མ་གཉིས་པོ་དེ་ཡིས་གཞལ་བྱ་གཉིས་པོ་དེ་རྟོགས་
པའི་བྱ་བ་བྱེད་དེ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་རང་མཚན་རང་གི་ངོ་བོའི་
སྒོ་ནས་རྟོགས། རྗེས་དཔག་གིས་རང་མཚན་གཞན་སྤྱིའི་ཚུལ་
གྱིས་རྟོགས་པ་ཡིན། དེའི་དངོས་ཡུལ་ལ་སྐྱེ་ཙམ་ཅིག་རྟོག་ཀོ་
ར་འི་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པ་སྟེ། རྣམ་ངེས་ལས། ཡང་ཚད་མ་འདིའི་
འབྲས་བུ་གང་ཞིག་ཡིན། གཞལ་བྱ་རྟོགས་པའོ། །དེ་ནི་
ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་ཡང་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེ་ནི་
ཚད་མ་གང་ཞིག་ཡིན། གང་ལས་བར་ཆད་མེད་པར་གཞལ་
བྱ་རྟོགས་པ་འདས་དེ་ཉིད་འགྲུབ་པའོ། ཞེས་སོ། །མངོན་
སུམ་གྱིས་རང་མཚན་རང་གི་ངོ་བོའི་སྒོ་ནས་རྟོགས་པར་སྟོན་
པ་མངོན་སུམ་གྱི་ལུགས། རྗེས་དཔག་གིས་རང་མཚན་གཞན་
སྤྱིའི་སྒོ་ནས་རྟོགས་པར་སྟོན་པ་རང་དོན་དང་། གཞུང་དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་
ལུགས་ཡིན་པ་ལས། དང་པོ་ལ་ཡང་། རྟོགས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་མངོན་
སུམ་དེ་རི་ལྟ་བུ་རྟོགས་བྱའི་རང་མཚན་ཉི་གང་། དེས་དེ་རྟོགས་
པའི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཅི་ཞེ་ན། དང་པོ་སྟོན་པ་ནི། མངོན་སུམ་བཞི་
ཆར་གྱི་སྐབས་སུ་རྟོག་བྲལ་བསྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པ་རྣམས་
དང་། མངོན་སུམ་ལྟར་སྣང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཀྱིས་མ་འཁྲུལ་བ་སྟོན་པ་
རྣམས་སོ། །གཉིས་པ་སྟོན་པ་ནི། དབང་མངོན་གྱི་སྐབས་སུ།
རྡུལ་ཕྲན་ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་དམིགས་རྐྱེན་དུ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་དང་། ཡིད་
མངོན་གྱི་སྐབས་སུ། དབང་མངོན་གྱི་གཟུང་དོན་གྱིས་སྐད་
ཅིག་གཉིས་པ་གཟུང་དོན་དུ་བསྟན་པ་དང་། རང་རིག་གི་སྐབས་

སྐུ་ཀྱེད་གྱུར་ཞེས་པར་བསྟན་པ་དང་། རྣམ་འབྱོར་མ་རྟོགས་
ཀྱིས་སྐབས་སུ་ཕྱུལ་ཆེ་། སོ་ཅིའི་ཡང་དག་པའི་དོན་དུ་བསྟན་
པ་རྣམས་སོ། །ཀ་ལུ་ར་པ་སྔོན་པ་ནི་ཚད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་རྣམས
ཏེ། དོན་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་དོན་རང་མཚན་རྟོགས་ཏེ།
འདི་ལྟར་ རྟ་དང་འདྲེས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་པ་ནི། ཚད་འབྲས
དང་པོའི་གཞུང་དང་། རང་རིག་པ་དོན་སུམ་གྱིས་ཞེས་པ་དང་
མཚན་རྟོགས་ཏེ། དེ་ལྟར་བའི་ངོ་བོར་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་
པ་ནི། ཚད་འབྲས་གཉིས་པའི་གཞུང་རྣམས་སོ། །ཚད་
འབྲས་དང་པོའི་སྐབས་སུ་དོན་གྱི་རྣམ་ལྡན་དུ་སྐྱེས་པའི་རྒྱུ་
མཚན་གྱིས་དོན་རྟོགས་པར་འཇོག་པའི་ཞེས་པ་དེ་ཡང་
རང་ལ་དངོས་སུ་སྣང་བ་དེ་ཉིད། ཞེས་པར་གཞལ་བྱ་ཉིད་
ཡིན་པས་དོན་ལ་རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཞེས་པ་ནི།
ཕྱི་རོལ་དོན་ནི་ཡོད་ན་ཡང་། ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་རྣམས་
སོ། །ཚད་འབྲས་གཉིས་པའི་སྐབས་སུ། གཟུང་འཛིན་
རིག་གསུམ་ལ་ཚད་འབྲས་གཞལ་གསུམ་དུ་འཇོག་པ་དེ་ཉིད་
ཀྱང་བློ་འཁྲུལ་པའི་ངོར་གཟུང་འཛིན་རིག་གསུམ་ཐ་དད་དུ་
སྣང་བ་ཙམ་ལ་འཇོག་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། དོན་ལ་ཐ་དད་དུ་ཡོད་པ་
མ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཞེས་པ་ནི། བློ་བདག་ཉམས་པར་དབྱེར་མེད་ཀྱང་།།
ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་རྣམས་སོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ་གསུམ་སྟེ།
ཚད་འབྲས་གསུངས་པའི་དགོས་པ། དགོས་པ་ཅན་གྱི་
ཚད་འབྲས་ངོས། རྣམ་གཞག་དེ་ཉིད་ངེས་པར་བྱ་བའོ། །
དང་པོ་ནི་ཏེ། རྣམ་བཅད་ཀྱི་དགོས་པ་དང་། ཡོངས་

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གཙོད་ཀྱི་དགོས་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ། སྤྱིའི་དགོས་པ་དང་།
སོ་སོའི་དགོས་པ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ནི། སྤྱི་དོན་ལ་ཕྱས་བྱ་བྱེད་
རྟགས་གཞན་དུ་འདོད་པ་འགོག་པའོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། རང་
གཞན་གྱི་སྡེ་པ་ཁ་ཅིག །དབང་ཤེས་ལ་དོན་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་མ་
ཤར་བ་དང་། རང་རིག་མེད་པར་འདོད་པ་སྨྲ་དེ་གཉིས་འགོག་
པ་རིམ་པ་ལྟར་ཚད་འབྲས་དང་པོ་དང་གཉིས་པའི་གཞུང་
རྣམས་སོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། ཚད་མས་གཞལ་བྱ་རྟོགས་པའི་
སྐབ་བྱེད་བསྟན་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་གཞལ་བྱ་རྟོགས་པ་ཚད་མའི་
དོན་བཞིན་དུ་རྟོགས་པའི་ཆེད་ཡིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ་གཉིས་
ཏེ། ཚད་འབྲས་སྤྱིའི་རྣམ་གཞག་དང་། ཚད་འབྲས་སོ་སོའི་
རྣམ་གཞག་གོ །དང་པོ་ལ་གསུམ་སྟེ། ཚད་འབྲས་རྟགས་
གཞན་དུ་འདོད་པའི་ལུགས་དགག །རྟགས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་པར་
འདོད་པའི་ལུགས་བཞག །དེ་ལ་རྩོད་སྤོང་བའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་
འདོད་པ་བརྗོད་པ་དང་། དེ་དགག་པ་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི།
རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། དེ་ཕྱིར་མཐོང་དང་དབང་འབྲེལ་དང་། །
ཁྱད་པར་གྱིས་ནི་བློ་དེ་དག །ཅེས་ཚད་མ་དངོས་སུ་བསྟན་ཅིང་།
དེ་ཉིད་རིགས་གཏེར་ལས། ལྟ་དང་ངེས་པ་ཚད་འབྲས་དང་། །
ཕྲད་དང་དོན་རྟོགས་ཚད་འབྲས་འདོད། །ཁྱད་པར་ཁྱད་པར་
ཅན་དེར་སྨྲ། །ལ་ལ་དབང་ཤེས་ཚད་འབྲས་འདོད། །ཅེས་
ཚད་མ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་གཉིས་ཀ་བསྟན་ཏོ། །དེ་ཡང་ཕྱི་རོལ་
པ་རྣམས་བྱ་བྱེད་རྟགས་གཞན་དང་། ཚད་མ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་བསྐྱེད་
བྱ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་དང་། བློ་ལ་དོན་གྱི་རྣམ་པར་མ་ཤར་བར་འདོད་པ་

འགྲུབ་ལ་མི་འགྲུབ་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་ནི། དཔྱོད་པ་པས་དང་པོར་དོན་
ལ་ལྟ་བའི་རྟོག་མེད་ཀྱི་ཤེས་པ་ནི་ཚད་མ། དེའི་རྗེས་སུ་བྱུང་
བའི་རྣམ་རྟོག་ཅེས་དང་། རིགས་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་ལ་
ཞེན་པའི་བློ་ནི་འབྲས་བུར་འདོད་དོ། །རིགས་པ་ཅན་པས
དབང་པོ་དང་དོན་ཕྲད་པ་ཚད་མ། དེའི་རྗེས་སུ་བྱུང་བའི་དོན་
རྟོགས་པའི་བློ་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་ལ། དེའི་དོན་ཡང་དབང་པོ་
དོན་ཕྲད་དང་འབྲེལ་པ་དེ་ཉིད་རྟོགས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་གཞན་ནི་མ་
ཡིན་ནོ་ཞེས་འདོད་དོ། །བྱེ་བྲག་པས་ཡོན་ཏན་ལ་སོགས་པའི་
ཁྱད་པར་འཛིན་པའི་བློ་ཚད་མ། ཁྱད་པར་ཅན་རྫས་འཛིན་
པའི་བློ་འབྲས་བུར་འདོད་དོ། །བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་སྨྲ་བས་དབང་པོ་
གཟུགས་ཅན་པ་ཚད་མ། དེ་ལས་བྱུང་བའི་དོན་རྟོགས་པའི་
ཤེས་པ་འབྲས་བུར་འདོད་དོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ། ཕྱིར་དགག་
པ་དང་། སོ་སོར་དགག་པ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ནི། དེ་དག་མི་
འཐད་དེ། ཚད་མར་འདོད་པ་དེ་དག་གིས་འབྲས་བུར་འདོད་
པ་དེ་དག་བསྒྲུབ་པར་མི་ནུས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་གཉིས་རྫས
གཞན་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི། དཔྱོད་པ་པའི་ཚད་
འབྲས་མི་འཐད་དེ། བློ་ལ་དོན་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་མ་ཤར་བར་དོན་
ལ་ལྟ་བ་མི་འཐད་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱེ་བྲག་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་དེ
ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། ཡོན་ཏན་ལ་སོགས་པ་འཛིན་པའི་བློ་དེ་
ཡོན་ཏན་དང་རྫས་གཉིས་བཟུང་མ་བཟུང་གིས་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་
པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དེ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པར་མ་ཤར་བར་མཚུངས་པའི་
ཕྱིར། ཡང་ཚད་མ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་གཉིས་ཡུལ་ཐ་དད་ཡིན

ནམ་གཅིག་ཡིན། དང་པོ་ལྟར་ན། དེ་གཉིས་ཚད་འབྲས་མ་
ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ཕྱི་མ་ལྟར་ན། བློ་ཕྱི་མ་ལ་དགོས་པ་མེད་
པར་ཐལ་ལོ། །རིགས་པ་ཅན་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་དེ་ཡང་མི་
འཐད་དེ༑ མིག་གི་རྣམ་པར་ཤེས་པ་ཆོས་ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་
ཟུམ་པའི་གཟུགས་རྟོགས་པའི་ཚེ་དེའི་དྲི་ཡང་རྟོགས་པར་
ཐལ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་བདག་རྐྱེན་དུ་གྱུར་བའི་དབང་པོ་གཟུགས་ཅན་
པ་དེ། དེ་གཉིས་དང་ཕྲད་པར་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། བྱེ་
བྲག་ཏུ་སྨྲ་བའི་ཚད་འབྲས་ཀྱང་མི་འཐད་དེ། མིག་དབང་ཆོས་
ཅན། ཁྱོད་ཀྱིས་སྔོན་པོ་རྟོགས་པ་དང་། སེར་པོ་རྟོགས་
པའི་དོན་ལྡོག་སོ་སོར་འབྱེད་མི་ནུས་པར་ཐལ། ཁྱོད་སེར་པོ་
རྟོགས་པའི་དབང་ཤེས་དང་། སྔོན་པོ་རྟོགས་པའི་དབང་ཤེས་
གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པར་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི།
ཡུལ་ཅན་ཚད་མའི་བྱེད་པ་འཇུག་པའི་གཞི། བྱེད་པ་དངོས།
བྱེད་པ་འཇུག་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཏེ། ཚད་མའི་སྐྱེང་གི་བྱ་བྱེད་ལས་
གསུམ་ལ་ཚད་འབྲས་གཞལ་བྱ་གསུམ་དུ་འཇོག་པ་ཡིན་ལ། དེ་
ཡང་གཞལ་བྱ་ནི་བྱེད་པ་འཇུག་པའི་གཞི་སྟེ་སྔོན་པོ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །
འབྲས་བུ་ནི་བྱེད་པ་དངོས་ཏེ། སྔོན་པོ་རྟོགས་པ་ལྟ་བུའོ། །ཚད་
མ་ནི་བྱེད་པ་འཇུག་པའི་རྒྱུ་མཚན་ཏེ། སྔོན་པོའི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་
བ་ལྟ་བུ་སྟེ། དེས་ན་ཚད་མ་དང་འབྲས་བུ་གཉིས་རྣམ་པར་
བཞག་འཇོག་གི་རྒྱུ་འབྲས་ཡིན་གྱི། བསྐྱེད་བྱ་སྐྱེད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རྒྱུ་
འབྲས་ནི་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །མདོའི་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས། འདི་ལ་
ཕྱི་རོལ་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་གཞན་དུ་ཚད་མ་ལས་འབྲས་བུ་དོན་

གཞན་རྣ་བྱུར་པ་ཉི་མེད་ཀྱི་ཞེས་དང་། འདིར་ཡང་། དེ་རྣམ་
གཞག་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་ནི། །ཚད་མ་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་བཞག །
ཅེས་དང་། རིགས་གཏེར་ལས། དེས་ན་རྣམ་པར་བཞག་འཇོག་
གི །རྒྱུ་འབྲས་གཉིས་ལ་ཚད་འབྲས་འདོད། །ཅེས་སོ། །
སྐབས་འདིར་ཚད་མ་དང་། སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་དང་། བྱེད་པ་དང་།
མཚན་ཉིད་དང་། རྣམ་པར་འཇོག་བྱེད་རྣམས་དོན་གཅིག་
མིང་གི་རྣམ་གྲངས་ཡིན་ཞིང་། འབྲས་བུ་དང་། བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་
དང་། བྱ་བ་དང་། མཚོན་བྱ་དང་། རྣམ་པར་གཞག་བྱ་རྣམས་
དོན་གཅིག་མིང་གི་རྣམ་གྲངས་ཡིན་ལ། ལས་ནི་གཙོ་བོར་
གཞལ་བྱ་ལ་འཇུག་ཅིང་། སྐབས་འགའ་ཞིག་ཏུ་བྱ་བ་ལ་
འཇུག་པ་ཡང་ཡོད་དེ། ལས་ཀུན་བྱེད་པ་ནི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་དག །
ཅེས་པའི་སྐབས་ཀྱི་ལས་དེ་བྱ་བ་ལ་འཇུག་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་
ན་སྐབས་འདིར་གཞལ་བྱ་ལ་དོན་དང་ཤེས་པ་གཉིས། འབྲས་
བུ་ལ་དོན་རིག་དང་རང་རིག་གཉིས། ཚད་མ་ལ་གཟུང་རྣམ་
དང་། འཛིན་རྣམ་གཉིས་སུ་ངེས་ལ། འཛིན་རྣམ་ཚད་མར་
བྱས་པའི་ཚེ། འབྲས་བུ་རང་རིག་ཏུ་ངེས་ཀྱང་། གཟུང་རྣམ་
ཚད་མར་བྱས་པའི་ཚེ། འབྲས་བུ་དོན་རིག་ཏུ་མ་ངེས་ཏེ།
གཟུང་རྣམ་ཚད་མར་བྱས་ནས་དོན་རྟོགས་པར་བསྒྲུབ་པའི་
ཚེ། འབྲས་བུ་ལ་དོན་རིག་འབྱུང་ཞིང་། རང་ལ་ཏྲོས་སུ་
སྣང་བའི་རྣམ་པ་རྟོགས་པར་བསྒྲུབ་པའི་ཚེ། འབྲས་བུ་ལ་
རང་རིག་འབྱུང་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཅིའི་ཕྱིར་རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་
གྱི་ཚད་འབྲས་མ་བཤད་ཅེ་ན། ཚད་འབྲས་འདི་དག་ནི་ཀུན་

ཏུ་ཐ་སྙད་པའི་ཚད་མའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པ་སྟེ། རང་ངེས་གཞན་ངེས་བཞིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་ཚད་འབྲས་སོ་སོའི་རྣམ་གཞག་ནི། ཚད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་ཐ་སྙད་ལ་སྤྲོས་ཆེན་པོ་གསུམ་སྣང་སྟེ། སློབ་དཔོན་ཆོས་མཆོག་གིས་དོན་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་ལ་དང་པོ་དང་། རང་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་ལ་གཉིས་པ་དང་། ཕྱི་དོན་ཡོད་ཀྱང་རང་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་ལ་གསུམ་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་མཛད་ཅིང་། དེང་སང་བོད་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་གྲགས་ཆེ་བར་སྣང་མོད་ཀྱིས། ཚད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་རིགས་མ་ལུས་པར་འདུ་བའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་ན། དེ་ཡི་ངོ་བོ་ལས་དོན་ངེས༑ ཞེས་པའི་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་གྱིས་བསྟན་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་མ་ཚང་བས་གར་སོང་དྲིས་ན་མཛུབ་མོས་མཆོན་དགོས་སོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ལྷ་དབང་བློས། བྱ་བ་སྒྲུབ་པར་བྱེད་ཅེས་ཏེ། །ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལ་དང་པོ་ཞེས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་མི་མཛད་པར་དེ་བཀག་ནས། རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ཚད་འབྲས་ལ་གསུམ་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། དེ་ཕྱིར་གཞུ་ཅིག་ལ་རྒྱལ་གཉིས་ཡོད། །ཅེས་པས་བསྟན་པའོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། གང་ཚེ་རྣམ་རིག་རྒྱུ་ཡིས་ལུས། །ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱིས་བསྟན་པའོ། །གསུམ་པ་ནི། ཕྱི་རོལ་དོན་ནི་ཡོད་ན་ཡང་། །ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱིས་བསྟན་པའོ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ནི་རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་དགོད་ན། རང་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་དང་། ཐ་སྙད་དུ་དོན་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་དང་། དེ་ལ་ཡང་དཔྱད་ན་རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་འགྱུར་བ་དང་གསུམ་དུ་དབྱེ་བ་ནི་ལེགས་མོད་ཀྱི་སྐབས་ཀྱི་དོན་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས། ཚད་

འབྲས་ཀྱི་ཞོར་སུ་མི་འཐད་པ་དང་། ཚད་འབྲས་གསུམ་པ་
སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་ལུགས་སུ་འདོད་པའི་ཅུང་ཟད་མི་ལེགས་ཏེ།
གཞུང་འདིར་དག་སྣང་གི་མངོན་སུམ་དང་པོ་གསུམ་ཀར་གྱི་ཚད་
འབྲས་སྟོན་བྱེད་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་
དཔྱད་ན། རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་འགྱུར་བ་སྟོན་བྱེད་ཀྱི་གཞུང་
མེད་པར་ཐལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གང་དེ་སློབ་དཔོན་འདིའི་
ལུགས་ལ། གང་ཚེ་རྣམ་རིག །ཅེས་སོགས་དོན་རིག་འབྲས་
བུར་གསུངས་པས་ཚད་འབྲས་དང་པོའི་དོན་བསྒྱུར་འཆད་པ་
དང་། འཛིན་བདག་ཤེས་པའི་སྐྱོ། རྣམ་རིག་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་ཕྱོགས་
བཞིན་ནོ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས། ཚད་འབྲས་གསུམ་
པ་མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་སུ་སྦྱར་ནི། སློབ་དཔོན་འདིའི་དགོངས་
པ་ཕྱིན་ཅི་ལོག་ཏུ་བཀོད་པའོ། །འགྲན་ཟླ་ཀུན་བྲལ་ས་སྐྱ་
པའི་བཞེད་པ་ནི། ཚད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་གཙོ་བོ་དོན་རིག་དང་། རང་
རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་གཉིས་དང་། དེ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་ཡང་ཐ་སྙད་
ཏུ་དོན་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་བསྟན་པ་དང་། དཔྱད་ན་རང་རིག
འབྲས་བུར་བསྟན་པའི་སྐབས་བཞི་ལས། དང་པོ་གཉིས་པ་
ཚད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་གཙོ་བོ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྐབས་འདིར་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས
རང་མཚན་རྟོགས་པའི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་འཆད་པའི་སྐབས་ཡིན་པས།
མངོན་སུམ་དང་པོ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་དོན་རང་མཚན་རྟོགས་པའི་སྒྲུབ་
བྱེད་ནི། དོན་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་དང་། མངོན་སུམ་གསུམ་
པས། ཤེས་པ་རང་མཚན་རྟོགས་པའི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ནི། རང་རིག་
གི་ཚད་འབྲས་ཡིན་ལ། རྣལ་འབྱོར་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་ནི།

མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་བདག་གིས་དབེན་པའི་ཕུང་པོ་རང་
མཚན་རྟོགས་པར་འདོད་པས། སྔ་མ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་ལས་
མ་འདས་ཤིང་། དེ་རྟོགས་པའི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ལུང་ནི་འདི་ནི།
རྣལ་འབྱོར་རྟོགས་པ་བསམ་མི་ཁྱབ། །ཚེས་དང་། བསམ་
གྱིས་མི་ཁྱབ་ཡེ་ཤེས་ཅན། །དེ་ཡི་མཁྱེན་པ་དཔག་མི་ནུས། །
ཞེས་པ་ལྟར་ན། སྐབས་འདིར་དེའི་ཚད་འབྲས་མི་སྤྲོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར། དེ་ལྟར་གཉིས་ལས། སློབ་དཔོན་གྱིས་དེ་ཉིད་རིག་གི་
ཚད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་སྐབས་སུ། ཐེ་བྲག་སྨྲ་བ་བཀག་ནས། མདོ་
སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་བསྟན་པ་ན། བྱ་བ་སྒྲུབ་པར་བྱེད་ཅེས་ཏེ། །
ཞེས་པ་ནས། སྒྲ་འདོགས་པས་ནི་འདུག་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་
པའི་བར་རོ། །རང་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་ལ། ཕྱི་མར་རྣམ་
བདེན་བརྫུན་གཉིས་ཀར་གྱིས་ཁས་ལེན་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་
སྒྲུ་རིས་ནི། མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་བཀག་ནས་རྣམ་རིག་པའི་
ལུགས་བསྒྲུབ་པ་སྟེ། དོན་རིགས་གང་ཡིན། ཞེས་པ་ནས།
འདིའི་རྣམ་པ་གཉིས། ཞེས་པའི་བར་རོ། །སྒྲུ་རིས་འདི་རྣམ་
བདེན་བརྫུན་གཉིས་ཀར་གྱིས་ཁས་ལེན་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚན་གྱིས།
རྣམ་བདེན་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་གཟུང་རྣམ་བདེན་གྲུབ་གཞལ་བྱར་
བྱས་པའི་ཚེ་རང་རིག་མཚན་ཉིད་པ་འབྲས་བུ་དང་། རྣམ་
བརྫུན་པའི་ལུགས་ལ། གཟུང་རྣམ་སྒྲིབ་བཏགས་གཞལ་བྱར་
བྱས་པའི་ཚེ་རང་རིག་བཏགས་པ་བ་འབྲས་བུར་འཇོག་པར་
གསུངས་སོ། །འདི་ལ་རྣམ་བདེན་པའི་ལུགས་བཀག་ནས།
རྣམ་བརྫུན་པའི་ལུགས་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ནི། གང་གི་དངོས་པོ་རྣམ་

༡༦༨

དཔྱད་ན། །ཞེས་པ་མན་ཆད་ཀྱིས་སྟོན་ཏོ། །དེ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་
ཐ་སྙད་དུ། དོན་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་འགྱུར་བའི་ཚུལ་ལ། མདོར་
བསྡུ་བའི་ལུགས་ནི། ཚད་འབྲས་དང་པོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་སྟོན་ཏོ།
དེ་ནི་དོན་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་གསུངས་པ་ནི་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡིན་གྱི།
དཔྱད་ན་རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །རྣམ་རིག་པའི་
ལུགས་ནི། གང་ཚེ་ཉམས་རིག་རྒྱུ་ཡིས་ཡུལ། །ཞེས་སོགས་
ཚིགས་བཅད་གསུམ་གྱིས་སྟོན་ཏོ། མདོར། དེ་ཡི་ཐ་
ལས་དོན་དེས། །ཞེས་པ་རྩ་འགྲེལ་གྱི་དོན་ནོ། །ལུགས་
གཉིས་ཀར་གྱི་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་དོན་རིག་འབྲས་བུ་ཡང་དཔྱད་ན།
རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པ་ནི། །ཕྱི་རོལ་དོན་ནི་ཡོད་ན་ཡང་། །
ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱིས་སྟོན་ཏོ། དེ་དང་འདྲ་བ་འམ་གཞན་འདྲ་འང་
རུང་། །ཞེས་ཀྱི་དོན་གཞལ་བྱར་འཇོག་ཚུལ་གཉིས་གསུངས་
པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ལུགས་འདི་ཕྱོགས་གླང་གྲགས་པའི་དགོངས་
པ་ཡོངས་སུ་རྫོགས་པ་འཁྲུལ་པ་མེད་པར་སྟོང་བས་འདིའི་
རྗེས་སུ་འབྲངས་ནས་འཆད་པ་ལ་བཞི་ལས། དང་པོ་དོན་རིག་
གི་ཚད་འབྲས་ནི། འདི་ཉིད་ཚད་དང་འབྲས་བྱེད་པ། །དོན་གྱི་
ངོ་བོ་ལས་གཞན་མིན། །དེ་ཕྱིར་གཞལ་བྱ་རྟོགས་པ་ཡི། །
སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་གཞལ་བྱའི་རང་བཞིན་ཉིད། ། ཅེས་དང་། དེ་ཡིས་
བདག་ཉིད་འཛིན་པ་སྟེ། དོན་རྟོགས་པ་ཡིས་ཞེས་པའི་གཞལ་
བྱ་ཞེས་པ་དང་། དོན་ཞེས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་གཞལ་བྱ་སྟོན།
དོན་གྱི་ངོ་བོ་ཞེས་དང་། གཞལ་བྱའི་རང་བཞིན་ཞེས་དང་། དོན་
གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་ཅེས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཚད་མ་སྟོན། གཞལ་བྱ

རྟོགས་པ་ཡི་ཤེས་དང་། །དོན་རྟོགས་པ་ཡི་ཤེས་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས།
འབྲས་བུ་སྟོན་ཏེ། འདི་ལ་དགོངས་ནས། ཆོས་མཆོག་གིས་
དོན་གཞལ་བྱ། དོན་དང་འདྲ་བ་ཚད་མ། དོན་རྟོགས་པ་འབྲས་
བུ་ཞེས་པ་ཉིད་དང་པོའོ། ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །གཞལ་བྱ་ལ་
ཡང་། ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་དང་། ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་དུ་སྣང་བའི་
སྔོན་པོ་དང་། སྔོན་པོ་སྣ་གནམ་མོ་དང་། སྔོན་པོ་རྣམས་གང་
གཞལ་བྱར་བྱས་ཀྱང་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་དོ། །འདིར་ཚད་མ་ཡུལ་དོན་
གྱི་རང་པོ་དང་། དོན་གྱི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་གསུངས་པ་ནི་དོན་གྱི་རང་
ངོས་ནས་གཏན་པའི་རྣམ་པ་ལ་དགོངས་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་སྒྲ་ཇི་བཞིན་
པར་ནི་མི་བཟུང་ངོ་། །འབྲས་བུའི་སྐབས་སུ་གཞལ་བྱ་རྟོགས་
པ་དང་། དོན་རྟོགས་པའི་ཚད་མ་སྒྲ་ཇི་བཞིན་པ་ནི་མི་རུང་སྟེ།
དེ་དག་ནི་རྗེས་དཔག་ལ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དོན་དངོས་སུ་
རྟོགས་པའི་ཚད་མ་འབྲས་བུར་བྱེད་པ་ཡང་མི་འཐད་དེ། མངོན་
སུམ་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་རང་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་དོན་དངོས་སུ་མ་རྟོགས་
པའི་ཕྱིར། དོན་རྟོགས་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་འབྲས་བུར་བྱས་པའི་
ཚེ། རྟོག་བྲལ་མ་འཁྲུལ་པའི་རིག་པ་ཚད་མར་འཇོག་པ་ཡང་
མི་འཐད་དོ། མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་དོན་རྟོག་པ་བསྒྲུབ་པའི་སྐབས་
ཡིན་གྱི། མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་པའི་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་འགོད་པའི་སྐབས་
མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དེས་ན་འདིའི་ཚད་འབྲས་ནི། སྔོན་པོ་
གཞལ་བྱ། རང་གི་གཟུང་དོན་སྔོན་པོའི་སྟོབས་ལས་སྔོན་
པོའི་རྣམ་ལྡན་དུ་སྐྱེས་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ཚད་མ། སྔོན་པོ་རྟོགས་
པའི་མངོན་སུམ་འབྲས་བུའོ། །འདི་ནི་འདི་ལྟར་བསྟན་གྱི

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ཚད་འབྲས་གང་རུང་ཡིན་ན། དོན་རིག་མངོན་སུམ་ཡིན་པས་
ཁྱབ་པའི་དཔང་དུ་བྲིས་ཀྱི། གཞུང་གིས་བསྟན་ཚོད་ལྟར་ན།
སྔོན་པོ་གཞལ་བྱ། སྔོ་འཛིན་དབང་པོའི་མངོན་སུམ་གཟུང་
དོན་སྔོན་པོའི་སྣང་བས་ལས་སྐྱེས་པའི་རྣམ་ལྡན་དུ་སྐྱེས་པ་ཚད་
མ། སྔོ་འཛིན་དབང་པོའི་མངོན་སུམ་གྱིས་སྔོན་པོ་རྟོགས་
པ་འབྲས་བུ་ཚད་པར་སྣང་ངོ་། །གཉིས་པ་རྣམ་རིག་སྨྲ་བའི་
ཚད་འབྲས་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། དོན་དམ་རང་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་
དང་། ཐ་སྙད་དོན་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་གཉིས་སོ། །དང་པོ་ནི།
རིགས་གཏེར་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས། སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་ལུགས་
ལྟར་ན། གཟུང་བ་འཛིན་པ་རིག་པ་དག །ཡོད་པ་མིན་ཡང་
གཞལ་བྱ་དང་། །འཛལ་བྱེད་འབྲས་བུར་གནས་པ་འདི། །
རི་ལྟར་སྣང་བ་བཞིན་དུ་བྲིས། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ་ལྟར། རྣམ་
བཅས་པ་དག་གཟུང་བར་སྣང་བ་གཞལ་བྱ། དེར་འཛིན་
པར་སྣང་བ་ཚད་མ། རང་རིག་མཚན་ཉིད་པ་འབྲས་བུར་
འདོད་པས། གཞལ་བྱ་དང་ཚད་འབྲས་བདེ་སྡུག་མྱོང་བ་
ལྟར། དུས་དང་རྫས་གཅིག་ཏུ་འདོད་དོ། །རྣམ་བརྫུན་པས་
དོན་དུ་སྣང་བའི་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་གཞལ་བྱ། དེ་འཛིན་པའི་
ཤེས་པ་ཚད་མ། རང་རིག་བཏགས་པ་བའི་ཐ་སྙད་འབྲས་
བུར་འདོད་པས་གཞལ་བྱ་དང་༑ ཚད་འབྲས་གཉིས་སྣ་
ཚོགས་སྣང་བཞུར་གཅིག་པ་ཀཱག་པར་འདོད་དོ། །ཅེས་
གསུངས་པའི་དོན་ལ། ཕྱིར་བཟུང་རྣམ་གཞལ་བྱར་བྱས་
པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་མདོ་སེམས་གཉིས་ཆར་གྱིས་འདོད་ཀྱང་།

བཟུང་རྣམ་ལྔ་མི་འདྲ་བའི་ཁྱད་པར་ཡོད་དེ། མདོ་སྡེ་པས་ཕྱི་
རོལ་དོན་ལས་སྐྱེས་པའི་སྒོ་ནས་དེའི་རྣམ་པ་ཤར་བ་ལ་གཟུང་
རྣམ་དང་། རྣམ་བདེན་པས། ཕྱི་དོན་མེད་ཀྱང་བག་ཆགས་ཀྱི་
དབང་གིས་ཤེས་པ་ཉིད་བཟུང་བར་སྣང་བ་ལ་བཟུང་རྣམ་དུ་
འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་རྣམ་བདེན་པས། དེ་ཉིད་གཞལ་
བྱར་བྱས་ནས། དེ་ཡོངས་སུ་གཅོད་པར་བྱེད་པའི་འཛིན་རྣམ་
ཚད་མ་དང་། དེ་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བའི་རང་རིག་མཚན་ཉིད་པར་
འབྲས་བུར་འདོད་དོ། །བཟུང་རྣམ་གཞལ་བྱར་བྱས་པའི་ཚད་
འབྲས། རྣམ་བདེན་པ་ལ་སྦྱར་དུ་ཡང་འདི་ལ་དགོངས་ཏེ།
ཚད་འབྲས་གཉིས་པའི་སྐབས་ཀྱི་བཟུང་རྣམ་སྟེ། ཕྱི་དོན་མེད་
ཀྱང་བག་ཆགས་ཀྱི་དབང་གིས་ཤེས་པ་ཉིད། གཟུང་འཛིན་
གཉིས་སུ་སྣང་བའི་བཟུང་རྣམ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འདིར་འགའ་
ཞིག་ནི་འགའ་ཞིག་གི །བག་ཆགས་རབ་ཏུ་སད་བྱེད་པ། །དེ་
ཕྱིར་བློ་ནི་རྣམ་རིས་ཀྱི། །ཕྱི་རོལ་དོན་ལྟོས་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས
གསུངས་པས་སོ། །རྣམ་བརྫུན་པས། དོན་དུ་སྣང་བའི་བཟུང་
རྣམ་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་གཞལ་བྱ། དེ་ངོས་སུ་འཛིན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་
ཚད་མ། དེ་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བར་སྣང་བའི་དེ་ལ་རང་རིག་བཏགས་
པ་བ་འབྲས་བུར་བཞེད་དོ། །དེ་དེ་ངོས་སུ་འཛིན་པའི་ཤེས
པ་སྟེ། བཟུང་རྣམ་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་དེ་རང་མིན་པས་དེ་ལ་རང་རིག
བཏགས་པ་བ་ཡིན་ཀྱང་། རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ལ་རང་རིག་མཚན་ཉིད་
པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། རང་བདག་ཡུལ་དུ་བྱེད་པ་ན། །ཞེས་པའི་སྐབས
ནས་བསྟན་པའི་རང་རིག་མཚན་ཉིད་པ་ནི་ཚད་འབྲས་དེ། རྣམ་

བརྗོད་པས་ཀྱང་ཁས་ལེན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །མདོར་ན། བཟུང་
རྣམ་ཤེས་པ་བདེན་པ་མདོ་སྡེ་པ་དང་རྣམ་བདེན་པ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་
ལུགས་དང་། དེའི་ཤེས་པ་གང་དུ་ཡང་མི་བདེན་པ་རྣམ་བརྫུན་
པའི་ལུགས་སུ་རྟོགས་ན། གཟུང་རྣམ་གཞལ་བྱར་བྱས་
པའི་ཚེ། འབྲས་བུ་ལ་རང་རིག་མཚན་ཉིད་པ་དང་བཏགས་
པ་བ་འབྱུང་བའི་ཁྱད་པར་ལ་མི་དགོས་པ་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང་།
དེ་ཡང་ བཟུང་རྣམ་ཡིན་ན། ཤེས་པ་ཡིན་པས་ཁྱབ་པ་
རྣམ་བརྫུན་པར་ཡང་ལུགས་སུ་སྨྲ་བ་དེ་དག་གིས་ནི་བསྐལ་
པའི་བར་དུ་བཤད་ཀྱང་དོན་དེ་རྟོགས་པར་མི་འགྱུར་ལ། རྣམ་
བདེན་བརྫུན་གྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ལ་ཡང་དགོས་པར་ འགྱུར་རོ།།
གཉིས་པ་ནི། རྣམ་བདེན་བརྫུན་གཉིས་ཀས་ཀྱང་ཐ་སྙད་དུ།
ཕྱི་རོལ་དོན་དུ་འགྱུར་བའི་སྔོན་པོ་གཞལ་བྱ། བག་ཆགས་
བརྟན་བྱུང་གི་ཤེས་པ་ལ་སྔོན་པོ་གསལ་བར་སྣང་བའི་བཟུང་
རྣམ་ཚད་མ། ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་དོན་སྔོན་པོ་རིག་པའི་དོན་རིག་མངོན་
སུམ་འབྲས་བུར་བཞེད་དོ། འདི་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ལ་ལུང་གིས་བསྒྲུབ་
པ་དང་། རིགས་པས་བསྒྲུབ་པ་དང་། ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་དོན་བཤད་
པ་དང་གསུམ་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། དམིགས་བརྟགས་ལས།
ནང་གི་ཤེས་བྱའི་ངོ་བོ་ནི། །ཕྱི་རོལ་ལྟར་སྣང་གང་ཡིན་ཏེ།།
དོན་ཉིད་རྣམ་ཤེས་ངོ་བོའི་ཕྱིར། །དེ་རྐྱེན་ཉིད་ཀྱང་ཡིན་ཕྱིར་རོ།།
ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཚིག་རྐང་དང་པོ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས། ཐ་སྙད་དུ་
ཕྱི་དོན་འཛིན་པའི་གཞི་རྣམ་བཟུང་ནས། དོན་ཉིད་ཅེས་པས་
ཐ་སྙད་དུ་དོན་ཉིད་དུ་འཛིན་པར་བསྟན། རྣམ་ཤེས་ངོ་བོའི་

ཕྱིར་ཞེས་པས་དོན་ལ་ཞེས་པ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཡིན་པར་བསྟན། །
ཚིག་ཕྲད་ཐམས་ཅད་སྐབས་སུ་མེད་ན་མི་འབྱུང་གི་འབྲེལ་པ་གྲུབ་
པས་དམིགས་རྐྱེན་གྱི་མིང་ཅན་ལས་བཏགས་པར་བསྟན་ནོ། །
དེ་བཞིན་དུ་རྣམ་ངེས་ལས། དོན་གནས་པ་ནི། རང་རིག་
པའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡིན་པ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཕྱིར་རང་རིག་པ་ཡིན་ཡང་
འབྲས་བུ་ལས་འདི་ནི་དོན་རིག་པར་ཡིན་པར་སྣང་ངོ། །
ཞེས་དང་། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། དོན་འཛིན་དེ་ཡི་བདག
ཉིད་ཕྱིར། །རང་རིག་ཡིན་ཡང་དོན་རིག་འདོད། །ཅེས
གསུངས་པའི་དོན་ཡང་། ཐ་སྙད་དུ་དོན་རིག་ཏུ་འཇོག
པའི་དབང་དུ་ཤེས་འདི་ཉིད་ལ་རང་ངོས་སུ་སྣང་བ་དེ་དོན་ལ
ཤེས་པ་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ཡིན་ཡང་རང་ངོ་ཤེས་དེའི་འབྲས་བུ
ངོས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་བློའི་ངོ་བོར་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་ཡིན་པས་ཐ་སྙད
དུ་དོན་དུ་འཛིན་ཅེས་པ་སྟེ། འབྲས་བུ་པས་ཞེས་པ་ནི
དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་འབྲས་བུ་ངོས་ཤེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །
གང་ཅེ་ན་ཞེས་བྱ་དོན་དུ་འོ། །ཐལ་བ་ཕྱིར་ཞེས་དང་། དེ་ཉིད
དོན་དུ་ཉམས་པར་ངེས། །ཞེས་པ་རྒྱ་འགྲེལ་སྣར་ཐང་མས་པ་
རྣམས་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་དོན་གྲུབ་ཞལ་ལ་ཕྱུར་བསྟན་ཅིང་།
དེ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་དོན་བསྡུས་ནས་རིགས་གཏེར་རང་འགྲེལ་ལས།
ཐ་སྙད་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་མདོ་སྡེ་པ་ལྟར་དོན་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས
ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ཡང་འཛིན་དེ་ཡི་བདག་ཉིད་ཕྱིར། །རང་རིག
ཡིན་ཡང་དོན་རིག་འདོད། །ཅེས་གསུངས་པ། གང་ལྟར
ཡང་བློ་རྒྱལ་གཉིས་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །

གཉིས་པ་ནི། སྒྲུབ་མཐའ་སྨྲ་བ་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ། གནས་
ལུགས་དཔྱོད་པའི་རིག་ངོར་འཇོག་པའི་རྣམ་གཞག་དང་།
འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཐ་སྙད་ལ་ཇི་ལྟར་གྲགས་པ་ལྟར་འཇོག
པའི་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཡོད་པས། འདིར་ཡང་དེ་ཉིད་ངེས
པར་དགོས་ལ། དེ་ལ་བློ་ཚུལ་གཉིས་དང་། རང་རིག
བསྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པས་དཔྱད་པའི་ཚེ། དབང་ཤེས
ལ་སྔོན་དུས་སུ་སྣང་བ་དེ་ཕྱི་དོན་ཡིན་པ་ཁེགས་ཀྱང་།
འཇིག་རྟེན་གྱི་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་དེ་ཉིད་ལ་ཕྱི་དོན་གྱི་རྣམ་གཞག
བྱེད་དོ། གང་ཕྱིར་དེ་ལྟར་དོན་བདག་སྟེ། ཤེས་ལ
གནས་པ་དེ་ལྟ་བུ། །འདི་ནི་དེ་ལྟར་གནས་སོ་ཞེས། །
ངེས་བྱེད་བདག་ཉིད་རིག་པ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པ
ལྟར། དབང་ཤེས་ལ་རང་དུས་སུ་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཉིད་ལ།
འཇིག་རྟེན་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱིས་གཙང་མི་གཙང་དང་། སྔོན
པོ་ཡིན་མིན་སོགས་ཀྱི་ཐ་སྙད་བྱེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཐ
སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་དོན་ཡིན་པ་འདི་ལ་ཡང་། བག་ཆགས
བརྟན་པོའི་ཤེས་པ་དགོས་པར་རྣམ་ངེས་ཀྱི་ལུང་གིས
ཤེས་སོ། །གསུམ་པ་ནི། དོན་ཐ་སྙད་ཀྱི་དོན་གང
ཞེ་ན། སྒྲུབ་མཐའ་ལ་ཞུགས་མ་ཞུགས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ
ཐུན་མོང་དུ་ཡོད་པའི་ཚད་མ་གཉིས་ཀྱིས་དྲངས་པའི
ངེས་ཤེས་ལ་ངེས་པ་བློའི་ཐ་སྙད་དང་། ངེས་ཤེས
ངེས་དྲངས་པའི་བརྗོད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་སྒྲ་རྣམས་ལ། བརྗོད་པ
སྒྲའི་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་འཇོག་སྟེ། དེ་ལྟ་བུའི་ངེས་ཤེས

སྡངས་པའི་ཚད་མ་ལ། ཀུན་དུ་ཐ་སྙད་པའི་ཚད་མར་
འཇོག་པ་ནི། རྣམ་ངེས་ལས་གསལ་བར་འབྱུང་ཞིང་།
དེའི་དོན་རིགས་གཏེར་ལས་ཅི་ལྟ་བ་བཞིན་དུ་འབྱུང་གི།
བོད་གཞན་རྣམས་ལ་ཚིག་ཙམ་ཡང་མི་སྣང་ངོ། དོན་
ལྷ་ཧི་སྨོས་སོ། །འདི་ལྟ་བུའི་ཐ་སྙད་ ངེས་བྱེ་ཀྱེན།
དངོས་པོ་སྨྲ་བའི་ལུགས་ལ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཡོད་ན་ཡོད་པས་
མ་ཁྱབ་པ་ དང་། དབུ་མ་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་ཁྱབ་པ་ནི།
གནས་ལུགས་དཔྱོད་པའི་རིག་ངོར་ཡོད་པ་ཁས་ལེན་
མི་ལེན་གྱི་ཁྱད་པར་ཡིན་པ་ཡང་རྟོགས་པར་འགྱུར་རོ།།
གསུམ་པ་དོན་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་ལ་རྟོགས་པ་ དཔྱོད་
ནས་རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་བསྟན་པ་ལ་གསུམ་སྟེ།
མདོར་བསྟན། རྒྱས་པར་བཤད། རྩོད་པ་སྤོང་
བའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། རྣམ་ངེས་ལས། གང་གི་
རང་བཞིན་བཅིག་ཉིད་ལ་གཅིག་གིས་ཡོད་དུ་འོང་
གཞན་གྱིས་ནི་ཡོད་དུ་མི་འོང་བར་མཐོང་བའི་ཕྱིར་
ཞེས་དང་། གཞན་ལ་ཡང་ཐ་དད་པ་མེད་པའི་སྒྲ་
དང་། དྲི་ལ་སོགས་པའི་ཁྱད་པར་གྱིས་སྲོག་ཆགས་
ཀྱི་ལྕེ་ཐག་རྣམས་ཀྱི་དབང་པོ་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་བདེ་བ་མི་སྐྱོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་ཕྱི་རོལ་ཡུལ་གཅིག་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་
དབང་ཤེས་སོ་སོ་ལ་རྣམ་པ་ཐ་དད་དུ་གཏོད་པར་བཤད་
པས། སེམས་ཙམ་པ་ཕྱི་ནང་གི་ལུགས་མ་ཡིན་ལ།
སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་སྐབས་སུ་བཤད་

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ཅིང་། ལུགས་དེ་ལ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་དོན་གཞལ་བྱར་…
འཐད་པས། མདོ་སྡེ་པ་ཁོ་ནའི་ལུགས་ཀྱང་མ་
ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་གཉིས་ལས་གཞན་པའི་རང་ལུགས་
ཀྱི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་བསྟན་བཅོས་འདིར་མི་འབྱུང་བས།
དངོས་བསྟན་གྱི་ཚད་འབྲས་འདི་ནི། མདོ་སེམས་
གཉིས་ཀའི་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་བོ། །འོན་ཀྱང་ཕྱི་…
དོན་གཞལ་བྱར་འཇོག་ཚུལ་ལ་ཁྱད་པར་ཡོད་ཅིང་།
དེའི་སྐབས་ཀྱིས་བཟུང་རྣམ་ལ་ཡང་ཁྱད་པར་ཡོད་…
པས། རང་རིག་གི་སྐྱང་བྱ་ལ་ཡང་ཁྱད་པར་
ཡོད་དོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ། སྤྱི་ནི།
གཞུང་གི་སྐབས་དང་གཞལ་བྱ་ཡང་སླ་དང་། །ཚད་
མ་འབྲས་བུ་དཔྱད་དུ་དང་མ་དཔྱད་པར། །ཡིད་
ཆེས་ལུང་ལས་མདོ་སེམས་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ། །འབྲས་
རྟོགས་ཚུལ་འདི་འཐད་པར་ཞི་བོས་མཐོང་།
ཞེས་པ་སྟེ། འདི་ལ་དོན་
ཆེན་བདུན་ལས། དང་པོ་གཞུང་གི་…
སྐབས་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་སྦྱར་བ་ནི། མདོ་
སྡེ་པ་ཁོ་ནའི་ལུགས་ ཡིན་ན། དོན་རིག་
གི་ཚད་འབྲས་… རྟོགས་ནས་རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ཚད་…
འདས་མ་ཐང་གི་བར་དེར་འབྱུང་རིགས་ཏེ། མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་
དོན་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་ཁོ་ན་ལ་དགོངས་པ་དཔྱོད་བྱེད་ཡིན་ཞིང་།

སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །སེམས་ཙམ་པ་ཕོ་ནའི་ལུགས་ལ་ཡིན་ན
རང་རིག་ཙམ་ཞིག་རབ་ཏུ་བཞག །ཅེས་པའི་འོག་ཏུ་འབྱུང་བར་རིགས་ཏེ། །བློ་བདག་རྣམ
པར་དབྱེར་མེད་ཀྱང་། །ཞེས་སོགས་ཀྱི་གཞུང་དེ། བཟུང་རྣམ་གཞལ་བྱ་རབ་བྱས་པའི་ཚད་
འབྲས་ལ་དགོས་པ་དཔྱོད་བྱེད་ཡིན་པས། གཞུང་འདིས་བར་དུ་བཅད་པ་ལ་དགོས་པ་མེད་
པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་ཕྱི་དོན་གཞལ་བྱ་ལ། དོན་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་
བྱས་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་དང་། རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་བཟུང་རྣམ་གཞལ་བྱ་ལ། རང་རིག་འབྲས་
བུར་བྱས་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་དང་། ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་དོན་གཞལ་བྱ་ལ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་དོན་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་
བྱས་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་གཉིས་ཏེ། གསུམ་པ་ཤད་ཟིན་པའི་རྗེས་སུ། ཚད་འབྲས་འདི་འབྱུང་བས
བཟུང་རྣམ་གཞལ་བྱ་ལ་རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པར་མ་ཟད། ཕྱི་དོན་གཞལ་བྱ་རབ་བྱས་པ
གཉིས་པོ་ལ་ཡང་། རྗེས་ཀྱི་ངེས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་གཞན་དོན་ལ་ལྟོས་ནས་དོན་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་བཞག
པ་ཡིན་གྱི། འོག་ནས་འཆད་པའི་བློ་ཚུལ་གཉིས་དང་། རང་རིག་བསྒྲུབ་པའི་རིགས་པས
དཔྱད་ན། རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་རིགས་ཏེ། དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་རང་དུས་སུ་སྣང་བ་འདི་ཤེས་པ
རང་གི་བདག་ཉིད་དུ་གྱུར་པའི་བཟུང་རྣམ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། ཞེས་སྟོན་པས་འདིས་ཀྱང་
གཉིས་ཀའི་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་པོ། །གཉིས་པ་གཞལ་བྱ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་སྦྱོར་བ་ནི། མདོ་སྡེ་
པའི་ལུགས་ལ་ཕྱི་དོན་ལྐོག་ན་མོ་གཞལ་བྱ་དང་། རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ལུགས་ལ། ཐ་སྙད་དུ་
ཕྱི་དོན་གཞལ་བྱར་འཐད་པའི་ཚུལ། སྔར་བཤད་ཟིན་པས་འདིས་ཀྱང་གཉིས་ཀའི་ལུགས་
སུ་གྲུབ་པོ། །གསུམ་པ་ཡང་སྐབས་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་སྦྱོར་བ་ནི། མདོ་སྡེ་པ་ལ་སྦྱོར་བའི་ཚེ་བཟུང་
རྣམ་གཞལ་བྱ་ལ་རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་མ་ཟད་ཕྱི་དོན་གཞལ་བྱ་ལ་ཡང་ཞེས་སྦྱར་ལ། རྣམ་
རིག་པ་ལ་སྦྱོར་བའི་ཚེ་རིགས་པས་དཔྱད་པའི་ཚེ་ཕྱི་དོན་མེད་མོད། ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་དོན་ཡོད་
ན་ཡང་ཞེས་སྦྱོར་བར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་པས། འདིས་ཀྱང་གཉིས་ཀའི་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་པོ། །བཞི་
པ་ཚད་མ་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་སྦྱོར་བ་ནི། ཕྱི་དོན་གཞལ་བྱར་བྱས་པའི་ཚེ་བཟུང་རྣམ་ཚད་མ
ཡིན་པ་ནི། མདོ་སེམས་གཉིས་ཀ་ཆར་གྱིས་ཁས་ལེན་དགོས་ཏེ། སྔ་མས་ཕྱི་དོན་ལྐོག་ན་མོ

ག་ཞལ་བྲ་ར་བྲུས་པའི་ཚེ་དེས་བཞག་པའི་རྣམ་པ་མཚོན་མར་འདོད་ཅིང༌། ཕྱི་མས་ཐ་
སྙད་དང་ཕྱི་དོན་གཞལ་བྱ་ར་བྱས་པ་རི་ཚེ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་དོན་རིག་པར་འཇོག་དགོས་ལ།
།ང་དོན་གྱི་རྣམ་པ་ཅན་གྱི་བཟུང་རྣམ་པོ་ནས་འཛིན་རྣམ་ཀྱི་གཞན་གྱིས་འཇོག་མི་
ནུས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འདིས་ཀྱང་གཉིས་ཀའི་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་པོ། །ལྟ་བ་འབྲས་བུ་
གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་སྦྱར་བ་ནི། དཔྱད་ན་རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པ་ཡང༌། མདོ་སེམས་གཉིས་
ཅར་གྱི་ལུགས་ཏེ། མདོ་སྡེ་པས་ཕྱི་དོན་གཞལ་བྱ་ར་བྱས་པའི་ཚེ་ཚུལ་གཉིས་སྒྲུབ་པར་
འདོད་ཅིང༌། ཚུལ་གཉིས་སྒྲུབ་པས་རང་རིག་སྒྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། ཚུལ་གཉིས་སྒྲུབ་པར་
བྱེད་པས་ཀྱང༌། །རང་རིག་ཕལ་ཆེར་སྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང༌།
རྣམ་རིག་པ་ལ་གཟུང་འཛིན་རྫས་གཞན་པ་མེད་པས། དཔྱད་ན་རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུ་
ཡིན་པ་ལས་འོས་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་འདིས་ཀྱང་གཉིས་ཀའི་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་པོ། །རྟག་
པ་དཔྱད་མ་དཔྱད་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་སྦྱར་བ་ནི། མདོ་སེམས་གཉིས་ཅར་གྱིས་ཀྱང་དབང་
ཤེས་ལ། རང་དུས་སུ་སྣང་བ་འདི་མ་དཔྱད་ན་ཕྱི་དོན་ཡིན་པ་དང༌། དཔྱད་ན་ཤེས་པ་
རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་ར་འདོད་པར་ཁྱད་པར་མེད་དོ། མདོ་སྡེ་པས་ནི། ཕྱི་དོན་ལྐོག་ན་མོའི་རྣམ་
དཔེ་མི་ཤེས་པའི་གང་ཟག་གི་རྒྱུད་ཀྱི་ངེས་ཤེས་དེས་ཀྱང་སྔོ་ར་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་ངེས་པར་
འདོད་ཅིང༌། རྣམ་རིག་པས་ནི། བག་ཆགས་བརྟན་སྦྱུང་གི་དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱིས་དྲངས་
པའི་ངེས་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ངོ་ར་དབང་ཤེས་ལ་རང་དུས་སུ་སྣང་བ་ནི་ཕྱི་དོན་ཡིན་པར་འདོད་པའི་
ཕྱིར་དང༌། གཉིས་ཀས་ཀྱང་དཔྱད་པའི་ཚེ་བཟུང་རྣམ་དུ་འདོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །འདིས་ཀྱང་
གཉིས་ཀའི་ལུགས་སུ་གྲུབ་པོ། །སྤྱན་པ་ཡིད་ཆེས་པའི་ལུང་གཉིས་ཀ་ལ་སྦྱར་བ་ནི།
སྔར་དྲངས་པའི་དབང་ཤེས་ཀྱི་ཡུལ་ཐུན་མོང་བ་ཡོད་པའོ། རྣམ་ངེས་ཀྱི་ལུང་དང༌།
རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་དོན་ཡོད་པའི་ལུང་རྣམས་དང༌། འཆད་པར་འགྱུར་
བའི་བློ་ཚུལ་གཉིས་པ་དང༌། རང་རིག་བསྒྲུབ་པའི་གཞུང་རྣམས་ནི། ཕྱི་དོན་ཁས་བླང་
པ་དང་མ་བླངས་པ་ཙམ་མ་གཏོགས། མདོ་སེམས་གཉིས་ཅར་གྱི་ལུགས་ཡིན་པ་རྣམས

ནི༔ དངོས་བསྟན་གྱི་ཚད་འབྲས་མདོ་སེམས་གཉིས་ཆར་གྱི་ལུགས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་དང་། འགྱུར་
རོ༔ །དེ་དང་འདྲ་བའམ་གཞན་འདྲ་བ་དང་། །ཞེས་པས་ཀྱང་གཉིས་ཀའི་ལུགས་སུ་སྒྲུབ་སྟེ།
དེ་དང་འདྲ་བ་ཞེས་པ་ནི། ཕྱི་དོན་དང་འདྲ་བ་མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ལུགས་ཡིན་ལ། གཞན་འདྲ་ལ།
ལྟོས་མི་འདྲ་བ་ཞེས་པ་ལ་དང་ཅིང་། སྔ་རབས་པ་ཁ་ཅིག །གཞན་ནམ་རང་ཆ་ཤས་དང་འདྲ་བ་
ཞེས་པ་ཉིད་པ་དོན་གཅིག་ལ་སྦྱོར་སྟེ། རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ལུགས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །མདོར་
ན་དེ་ཐམས་ཅད་ཀྱི་དོན་བསྡུས་ནས་བདག་ཉིད་ཆེན་པོ་ས་སྐྱ་པཎྜི་ཏས། ཉན་ཐོས་སྡེ་
གཉིས་དང་སེམས་ཙམ་རྣམ་བདེན་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ཚད་འབྲས་བཞི་པ་ཤར་དྲི་ནས་ནས། དེ་ལྟར་
གྲུབ་མཐའ་བཞི་ལས། སློབ་དཔོན་ཉི་ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་ཁས་ལེན་པ་ན་མདོ་སྡེ་པ་ལྟར་མཛད་
ལ༔ ཤེས་བྱ་ནང་ལ་འཇུག་པ་ན་རྣམ་མེད་ཞལ་གྱིས་བཞེས་སོ། གཉིས་ཀ་ལྟར་ཡང་དོན་
དམ་པར་རང་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་ཡིན་ཏེ། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་དཔྱོད་པ་ན། །
རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པར་བཤད། ཅེས་གསུངས་པས་སོ། །ཐ་སྙད་ཀུན་རྫོབ་ཏུ་མདོ་སྡེ་
པ་ལྟར། དོན་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་ཡིན་ཏེ། དོན་འཛིན་དེ་ཡི་བདག་ཉིད་ཕྱིར། །རང་རིག་ཡིན་
ཡང་དེ་ནི་དོན་རིག་འདོད། །ཅེས་གསུངས་ལ། གང་ལྟར་ཡང་བློ་ཚུལ་གཉིས་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དོན་
རིག་ལྟར་ན་ཡང་། ཕྱི་རོལ་དོན་ནི་བརྟེན་ཅིང་མེད། །ཚུལ་གཉིས་བརྗོད་ཡིན།། ཞེས་གསུངས་
པས་དོན་ཤེས་པ་དང་། བློ་ཤེས་པའི་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཡིན་ལ། རྣམ་རིག་པ་ལྟར་ན། ཕྱི་རོལ་
དོན་ལྟོས་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེ་ཕྱིར་གཅིག་ལ་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཡོད། །ཅེས་གསུངས་པས་སོ། །
བློ་གཅིག་ལ་མ་རིག་པས་བསྒྲད་པས་ཡུལ་དང་ཤེས་པའི་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཁོ་བོ་ཅག
ཀྱང་ཆོས་ཀྱི་གྲགས་པའི་ཚུལ་འདིའི་རྗེས་སུ་འབྲང་ངོ་། །བོད་ཡུལ་ཆེ་རབ་བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་སྨྲ་བའི་རྗེས་
སུ་འབྲང་ངོ་། དེ་ནི་དངོས་པོ་སྟོབས་ཞུགས་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་ཞ་ཤེས་པར་ཟད་དོ། ཅེས་གསུངས་
སོ། །རིགས་གཏེར་གྱི་དགོངས་པ་འདི་ལས་གཞན་དུ་འཆད་པ་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ནི། རིགས་གཏེར་
རྩ་འགྲེལ་གང་ན་ཡོད་སྟོན་དགོས་སོ། །འོན་སྐབས་འདིའི་ཚད་འབྲས་ཇི་ལྟ་བུ་ཞེ་ན། ལྟར་གྱི་
དོན་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་གཉིས་ཀྱི་གཞལ་བྱ་དང་། ཚད་མ་གཞིར་བྱས་ནས་རྣམ་བྱུང་བའི་སྐབས

རྒྱ་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་དོན་སྤྱོད་པ་རིག་པ་ཡིན་ཡང་དཔྱད་ན་རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་རིག་པའི་མངོན་སུམ་འགྲུབ་ཚུལ་སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་དོ། །གསུམ་པ་ནི། རྒྱལ་དབང་བློས། རྣམ་པར་རིག་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་བདེན་དུ་འཛིན་པའི་རྣམ་པ་འདོད་པ་ཉིད་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཞེས་དང་། ལྷུས་འཛིན་བདག་ཞེས་པའི་སྐུ། རྣམ་པར་རིག་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་ཕྱོགས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་རྣམ་རིག་པ་དཔེར་བྱས་པ་དང་། ཤེས་བྱ་ནང་གི་རང་སྣང་བའི་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ལ་ས་པ་བསུ་བའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་རྣམ་རིག་པ་ཕྱོགས་སྔར་བྱས་པའི་ཕྱིར་ན་རྣམ་རིག་པ་ལ་སྐྱོན་དུ་མི་འཐད་དོ་ཞེ་ན། སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། སེམས་ཅན་པའི་ལུགས་ལ་ཕྱི་དོན་བཀག་ནས། རྣམ་རིག་པ་ཙམ་གྱི་ཚད་འབྲས་དང་། ཐ་སྙད་དུ་ཕྱི་དོན་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། བཟུང་རྣམ་གཞལ་བྱ་ལ། རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུ་ར་བྱས་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་ཉིད་དེ་ཡིན་པས། དེའི་ཕྱོགས་ས་བཞིན་དུ་རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་ན་འཛིན་རྣམ་ཚད་མ་ར་འགྱུར་རོ། ཞེས་དོགས་པ་བ་སུ་ཞིང་དེའི་ཡིན་པ་ཏུ་བ་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེ་ལས་གཞན་པའི་རྩོད་སྤོང་རྣམས་ནི། རང་ལུགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་རྟོགས་ན་ རང་གྲོལ་དུ་འགྱུར་བས་འདིར་མ་སྨོས་སོ། །བཞི་པ་རྣམ་རིག་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་ལ་ངོ་ས་པ་དཔྱད་ན། རང་རིག་མཚན་ཉིད་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་ངོས་བཟུང་བ་ནི། མདོར། དེ་ལྟར་ནུས་པ་དུ་མ་རིག་པའི་ཤེས་པ་དུ་མ་ཉིད་རང་སྣང་ས་པ་དེ་ལྟར་ཚད་མ་དང་། གཞལ་བྱ་ཉིད་དུ་ཤེས་པར་འདོགས་པ་དེ་ཉིད་སྐྱེས་པ། གང་ཚེ་སྣང་བ་དེ་གཞལ་བྱ། །ཚད་མ་དང་ཉིད་དེ་ཡི་འབྲས། །འཛིན་རྣམ་རིག་པ་དེ་ཡི་ཕྱིར། །དེ་གསུམ་ཐ་དད་དུ་མ་བྱས། །ཞེས་དང་། དེའི་དོན་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་འདིར། བློ་བདག་རྣམ་པར་དབྱེར་མེད་ཀྱང་། །ཞེས་པ་ནས། རང་རིག་ཅེས་ནི་དེར་བཏུ་བཤད། །ཅེས་པའི་བར་གསུངས་སོ། །དེ་ལ་གྲོ་བ་དགེ་ཚེས་སོགས་རི་ནས་བཅད་གསུམ་གྱིས། གཟུང་འཛིན་རིག་གསུམ་པོ་དོན་ལ་ཐ་དད་དུ་མེད་ཀྱང་། བློ་ལ་བྱུང་བ་ལ་ཐ་དད་དུ་སྣང་བར་བསྟན། གཟུང་བ་འཛིན་པ་རིག་པ་དག །ཅེས་སོགས་ཚིག་པ་བཅད་གཅིག་གིས་སྣང་བ་དེ་ལ་བརྟགས་ནས། ཚད་འབྲས་གཞལ་གསུམ་གྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་བྱས་པ་བསྟན་ནོ། །དེ་ལྟར་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ་ཞེས་སོགས་ཚིག་པ་བཅད་གསུམ་

ཕྱིར། །གཞུང་འདིར་ཉེ་རིག་གསུམ་གྱི་ཉིང་ཁུལ་ གཞུང་རྣམ་པ་དེ་ན་མེད་དུ་བསྒྲུབ་པའི
རིགས་པ་བསྟན། དེས་ན་སྔར་ཚད་འབྲས་གཉིས་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་རྒྱུད་རྣམ་གཞལ་བྱར
བཞག་པ་ཡང་བདེན་བརྫུན་མ་ཕྱེ་བ་ཡིན་ཞིང་། རང་རིག་འབྲས་བུར་བཞག་པ་ཡང་
དངོས་བརྟགས་མ་ཕྱེ་བ་ཡིན་པས། རྣམ་བདེན་རྫུན་གཉིས་ཀའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་པ་ཡིན
ལ། འདིར་ནི་བཟུང་རྣམ་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་སུ་བསྒྲུབ་པས་དེ་ལ་ལྟོས་པའི་རང་རིག་བརྟགས
པ་བ་ཡིན་པ་རྣམ་བརྫུན་པའི་ལུགས་བསྒྲུབ་པའོ། །དེ་གསུམ་དོན་ལ་ཐ་དད་དུ་མེད་ཀྱང་
འཕུལ་དོར་ཐ་དད་དུ་སྟོན་པ་ལ། སྔོན་པ་སྤྱོད་པ་ཡི། ཆོས་མཐུན་པ་ཉིད་མཐོང་ལས། །
ཞེས་སོགས་ཚིགས་བཅད་གསུམ་སོ། །འོན་རྣམ་བརྫུན་པའི་ལུགས་ཀྱི་རང་རིག་མཚོན་ཉིད
པ་འབྲས་བུར་བྱས་པའི་ཚད་འབྲས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་ཇི་ལྟ་བུ་ཞེ་ན། དེ་ལ་བློ་ནི་ཡོངས་གཅོད
པ། །ཞེས་སོགས་ཚིགས་བཅད་བཞི་སྟེ། འདི་ནི་གཞུང་གི་སྐབས་རྣམ་བརྫུན་པའི་ཡིན
ཀྱང་། རང་རིག་ཁས་ལེན་པའི་རང་རིག་གི་ཚད་འབྲས་ཐམས་ཅད་ལ་སྦྱར་བར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
རིགས་གཏེར་ལས། དེ་ལ་རང་རིག་ཚད་འབྲས་ནི། །རྣམ་པ་གཞལ་བྱ་འཛིན་པ་ཚད་ལ་རྗེས་མཐུན།
།ཞེས་པའི་སྐབས་སུ་འདིའི་གཞུང་ཞེས་བྱེད་དུ་འདྲེན་པར་མཐོང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཕ་རོལ་
པོ་བློ་ཚུལ་གཉིས་དང་། རང་རིག་བསྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་བཤད་པ་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། ཚུལ་
གཉིས་བསྒྲུབ་པ་དང་། རང་རིག་བསྒྲུབ་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་བཞི་སྟེ། གང་ཟག་གང་
གི་ངོར་བསྒྲུབ། བློ་གང་ཞིག་བསྒྲུབ། བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ། ཚུལ་གཉིས་སྒྲུབ
བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་བཤད་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། ཕྱི་དོན་ཁས་ལེན་པའི་རྗེས་ལ་གཉིས་སྒྲུབ
བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་ནི་སྔར་རྒོལ་མདོ་སྡེ་པ་དང་། ཕྱི་དོན་ཁས་མ་བླངས་པའི་ཚུལ་གཉིས
སྒྲུབ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིགས་པ་ནི། ཕྱིར་རྒོལ་སེམས་ཙམ་པས་ཕྱི་རོལ་བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་སྨྲ་བ་མན་ཆད
ཀྱི་ངོར་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ། བློ་རྣམ་མེད་དུ་འདོད་པའི་རྒོལ་བ་འི་ངོར་བསྒྲུབ་དགོས་པའི
ཕྱིར། གཉིས་པ་ནི། དོན་སྣང་གི་ཤེས་པ་ཐམས་ཅད་དེ་ལྟར་དུ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
དེ་ལ་རང་དུས་སུ་སྣང་བ་དེ་ཕྱི་དོན་ཡིན་ནམ་ཞེ་ན། ཞེས་པའི་ངོ་བོར་བསྒྲུབ་དགོས

པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གསུམ་པ་ནི། ཡུལ་དང་ཡུལ་ཅན་གྱི་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཙམ་ནི་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཕྱི་རོལ་ལ་གྲུབ་ཟིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། བློ་གཅིག་ཉིད་ལ་འང་མས་སུ་མྱོང་བ་འཛིན་རྣམ་གྱི་ཚུལ་དང་། ཡུལ་དུ་སྣང་བ་བཟུང་རྣམ་གྱི་ཚུལ་གཉིས་ཡོད་ཅེས། དང་པོ་ནི་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། ཕྱི་རོལ་ལ་གྲུབ་ཟིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་ཕྱི་མ་བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཡིན་ཏེ། དེ་དོན་རང་བཞིན་ཉིད་མ་གྲུབ། །དེ་ཡང་འདག་དྲན་ལས་གྲུབ། །ཅེས་གསུངས་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །བཞི་པ་ནི། སློབ་དཔོན་ཕྱོགས་གླང་གིས། ཡུལ་ཤེས་དེ་ཡི་ཤེས་པ་ཡིན། ཞེས་དང་། རྗེས་སུ་དྲན་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་སྟེ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་དོན་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། གཞུང་ལས་བཤད་ཚུལ་སྤྱིར་བསྟན། དཀའ་བའི་གནས་བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་བཤད་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ། གཞུང་དང་པོ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་བསྒྲུབ་པ་དང་། གཞུང་ཕྱི་མ་ལ་བརྟེན་ནས་བསྒྲུབ་པ་གཉིས། དང་པོ་ནི། གཞུང་དེའི་དོན་ལ་ཕྱོགས་གླང་གིས་བཤད་པའི་རིགས་པ་གཉིས་དང་། ཆོས་གྲགས་ཀྱིས་བཤད་པའི་རིགས་པ་ལྔ་སྟེ་བདུན་ཡོད་པར་མཛོད་ཏེ། ངེས་པར་བློ་དང་ལྡན་ཅིག་ཏུ། །ཞེས་པའི་སྐབས་འགྲེལ་དུ་ཕྱུས་ནས་དེ་དེ་ལྟར་ན་ཡུལ་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་རང་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བཤད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ངེས་པར་བློ་དང་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པས་བདག་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ལ་རིགས་པ་བཤད་ནས་སྐྱེ་ཟླ་པར་མཛད་དོ། །ཅེས་དང་། འདི་ར་ཡང་སྒྲུབ་ནི་ལྟར་ཞིབ་ནོ། །ཞེས་པའི་འགྲེལ་པར། ཡུལ་གྱི་ཤེས་པ་དེ་ཤེས་པ་ཞེས་བྱ་བ་ལ་སོགས་པ་བཤད་ན། རང་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཚུལ་གཉིས་རབ་ཏུ་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། ཞེས་གསུངས་པའི་རིགས་པ་ཕྱི་མ་ལྔ་པོ་ཕྱོགས་གླང་གི་གཞུང་གི་དོན་ལ་ཆོས་གྲགས་ཀྱི་རིགས་པས་ཚུལ་གཉིས་བསྒྲུབ་པ་ཡིན་པར་གསལ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། དྲན་པ་ལས་ཀྱང་བདག་རིག་གྲུབ། །ཅེས་སོགས་ཀྱིས་སྟོན་ཏོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ་བཞི་སྟེ། ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་ངེས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་འགོད་པའི་ཕྱི་རོལ་ངོས་བཟུང་བ། དགོད་བྱའི་རྟགས་ཀྱི་ངོ་བོ་ངོས་བཟུང་། དེ་ཉིད་ཀྱི་ཚུལ་བསྒྲུབ། དེ་ལ་རྩོད་པ་སྤོང་བའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། ཕྱི་དོན་ཁས་བླངས་པའི་ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་ངེས་དང་། ཁས་མ་བླངས་པའི་ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་ངེས་ཀྱི་རྟགས་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། མདོ་སྡེ་པའི་ཚུལ་གཉིས་

༡༨༣

སྣང་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རིག་ལ་པ། གཉིས་པ་ནི། སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་ཚུལ་གཉིས་སྣང་བ་བྱེད་ཀྱི་
རིགས་པ་ཡིན་པས། གཉིས་ཀ་ཡང་བྱེ་བྲག་ཏུ་སྣ་ཚོགས་ཅན་གྱི་ངོར་འགོད་པ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
བློ་རྣམ་མེད་དུ་འདོད་པའི་རྩོལ་བའི་ངོར་འགོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ་ཆོས་ཅན་གྱི་
དོན་ནི། དོན་དུ་སྣང་བའི་དབང་ཤེས་དང་། དེ་ལ་རང་དུས་སུ་དོན་དུ་སྣང་བ་གཅིག་
ཡིན་ནོ། །ཆོས་ཀྱི་དོན་ནི་རྣམ་ངེས་ལས། །སྔོ་དང་དེ་བློ་གཞན་མ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་དང་།
རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། ཡུལ་ནི་དེ་ལས་གཞན་ཉིད་དུ། །རྣམ་པ་ངེས་ནི་འགྲུབ་པར་འགྱུར།
ཞེས་པ་ལྟར་ན། རྫས་གཞན་དགག་པ་བསྒྲུབ་བྱའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་ཞིང་། ཡང་རྣམ་འགྲེལ་
ལས། སྔོན་པོར་སྣང་བ་མཐོང་བ་ཡིན། ཞེས་དང་། རྣམ་ཤེས་འཁྲུལ་བས་ཟླ་བ་གཉིས།
།ཞེས་པའི་འགྲེལ་པར། ལྟས་སྦྱོར་བ་ཡང་། གང་ཞིག་གང་དམིགས་པ་ན་དམིགས་པར
འགྱུར་བ་དེ་ནི་དེ་ཉིད་ཡིན་པར་འགྱུར་ཏེ། ཞེས་པ་ལྟར་ན། རྫས་གཅིག་ཡིན་པ་བསྒྲུབ་
བྱའི་ཆོས་ཡིན་ཏེ། སྔ་མ་ནི་རྣམ་བརྫུན་པ་དང་། ཕྱི་མ་ནི་རྣམ་བདེན་པའི་དབང་དུ་བྱས་
པའོ། །མཐུན་པའི་དོན་ནི། ཁ་ཅིག །ཟླ་བ་གཉིས་སྣང་གི་དབང་ཤེས་དང་། དེ་ལ་རང་
དུས་སུ་ཟླ་གཉིས་སུ་སྣང་བའི་རྣམ་པ་བཞིན་ཞེས་ཟེར་བ་མི་འཐད་དེ། དེ་ཉིད་བསྒྲུབ་
བྱ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དེས་ན་དབང་ཤེས་འཁྲུལ་པ་ལ་སྣང་བའི་ཟླ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པ་
བཞིན་ཞེས་པའི་དོན་ཡིན་ཏེ། དམིགས་བརྟག་ལས། རྫས་སུ་མེད་དེ་ཟླ་གཉིས་བཞིན།།
ཞེས་དང་། རྣམ་འགྲེལ་ལས། རྣམ་ཤེས་འཁྲུལ་པས་ཟླ་བ་གཉིས། །ཞེས་དང་། དེའི་
འགྲེལ་པར་ཡང་། དཔེར་ན་ཟླ་བ་གཅིག་ལ་མིག་འཁྲུལ་པ་ཅན་གྱིས། གཞན་གཉིས་འཛིན་
པ་དེ་བཞིན་ཞེས་དང་། ཆོས་མཆོག་གིས། ཟླ་གཉིས་ཀྱང་པ་ན་མཚུངས་པ་བཞིན་ནོ། ཞེས་དང་།
རིགས་གཏེར་ལས། རྫས་གཞན་ཡིན་ན་རྟགས་མི་སྲིད། །ཟླ་གཉིས་སྣང་བཞིན། ཞེས་
ཟླ་གཉིས་སུ་སྣང་བ་ནོན་དཔེར་བཟུང་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཏན་ཚིགས་ཀྱི་དོན་ནི་རྣམ་བརྫུན་
པ་ལྟར་ན། ལྷན་ཅིག་པ་ནི་ཡུལ་དུས་ཅིག་ཅར་དུ་སྣང་བ་ཡིན་ལ། དམིགས་པ་ནི་འཛིན་པ
ཡིན་ལ། ངེས་པ་ནི་ཁྲུག་པ་ཡིན་ནོ། །རྣམ་བདེན་པ་ལྟར་ན། དམིགས་པ་ནི་མྱོང་བ་ཡིན་ལ

གཞན་སྟོམ་དང་འདྲའོ། །དེས་ན་རྣམ་པ་རྫུན་པ་ལྟར་ན། དུས་མཉམ་ཐ་དད་དུ་སྣང་བའི་
ཐ་སྙད་ཡུལ་ཡུལ་ཅན་གང་ཞིག །ཅིག་ཅར་སྣང་བ་འཛིན་པས་ཁྱབ་པ། རྣམ་བདེན་
པ་ལྟར་ན་སྒྲོ་བཏགས་ཁྱབ་པའོ། །གསུམ་པ་ནི། ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ནི། རང་རིག་……མངོན་སུམ
གྱི་སྟོབས་ཀྱིས་གྲུབ་ཅིང་། རྗེས་ཁྱབ་ནི། མཐུན་དཔེ་དབང་ཤེས་འཁྲུལ་པ་ལ་སྣང་བའི་
ཟླ་གཉིས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་པའི་སྟེང་དུ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། གཏན་ཚིགས་ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་ངེས་དང་།
བསྒྲུབ་ཆོས་རྫས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་པ་གཉིས་དེ་ལ་རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་བའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ལྡོག་ཁྱབ
ནི། མི་མཐུན་དཔེ་རྫས་གཞན་ལ་གཏན་ཚིགས་ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་ངེས་འགོག་པར་བྱེད
དེ། ཕྱིར་ཐ་དད་ལ་དུས་མི་མཉམ་པ་དང་མཉམ་པ་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། དུས་མི་
མཉམ་པ་ཉིད་ལ་ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་ངེས་ཁེགས་ལ། གཉིས་པ་ལ། ལྡོག་པ་ཐ་དད་
དང་། རྫས་ཐ་དད་གཉིས་ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། འདིའི་མཐུན་དཔེ་ཡིན་པ། ཕྱི་མ་ལ།
ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་ངེས་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཁེགས་ཏེ། དེ་གཉིས་དུས་མཉམ་རྫས་གཞན་
ཡིན་པས་འབྲེལ་པ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར། བཞི་པ་རྩོད་པ་སྤོང་བ་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། རྟགས་ཀྱི་
ཚུལ་ལ་རྩོད་པ་སྤོང་བ་དང་། སེམས་ཙམ་པའི་གྲུབ་མཐའ་ལ་རྩོད་པ་སྤོང་བའོ།
དང་པོ་ནི། ཕྱི་བྲག་ཏུ་སྨྲ་བའི་སློབ་དཔོན་དགེ་བསྙེན་ལ་ན་རེ། ཁྱོད་ཀྱི་ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས
ངེས་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་དེ་མི་འཐད་དེ། དེ་ལ་མ་གྲུབ་པ་དང་། འགལ་བ་དང་། མ་ངེས་པའི
སྐྱོན་གསུམ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། །ལྷན་ཅིག་བརྒྱུད་བས་གཉིས་འཛིན་བློ། །
གཅིག་པར་འདོད་ན་དེ་མ་གྲུབ། །ཅེས་ཏེ། སྐྱེས་བུ་དུ་མས་པན་ཚུན་ཟླ་བ་གཅིག་ལ
དམིགས་པ་ན། པན་ཚུན་ཟླ་བ་འཛིན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་མ་དམིགས་ཀྱང་ཟླ་བ་གཅིག་དམིགས
པ་བཞིན་ནོ། སྙམ་ན་སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། སྐྱེས་བུ་དུ་མ་ལ་ཟླ་བ་གཅིག་སྣང་བ་ན་བག་ཆགས
མཐུན་པར་སད་པ་ཡིན་གྱི། ཟླ་བ་གཅིག་དུ་མར་སྣང་བ་མ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། དཔེར་ན་སྐྱེས
བུ་དུ་མས་མི་ལམ་མཐུན་པར་མཐོང་བ་བཞིན་ནོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། གཏན་ཚིགས་འདི་འགལ
གང་གི་ཕྱིར། །འཇིག་རྟེན་ན་ནི་ལྷན་ཅིག་སྒྲ། །གཞན་མ་ཡིན་པ་དག་ལ་མེད། །དེ་ཕྱིར

ལྡོག་པས་ཁྱབ་པ་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་ཏེ། ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་ངེས་ཀྱི་གཏན་ཚིགས་ནི་འགལ་
ཏེ། ལྷན་ཅིག་ཡིན་ན་དུས་ཡིན་དགོས། དུས་ཡིན་ན་རྫས་གཞན་མིན་པ་འགལ་དགོས
པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། སྔ་མ་སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། འདིར་ལྷན་ཅིག་པའི་དོན་ནི། །གཉིས་སུ་སྣང་ཡང་
གཉིས་སུ་མི་བདེན་པ་ལ་འཇོག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གསུམ་པ་ནི། ཐ་དད་ཡིན་ན་མ་ངེས་ཏེ། །
སངས་རྒྱས་ཡེ་ཤེས་གཞན་སེམས་དང་། །སེམས་དང་སེམས་བྱུང་དག་གིས་ཀྱང་། །
གཏན་ཚིགས་འདི་ནི་འཁྲུལ་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཞེས་ཏེ། སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ཡེ་ཤེས་དང་། སོ་སྐྱེའི་ཤེས
པ་གཉིས་པོ་ཆོས་ཅན། རྫས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་ངེས་ཡིན་
པའི་ཕྱིར། སེམས་དང་སེམས་བྱུང་དང་། སྣང་བ་དང་། གཟུགས་ཚོགས་ཅན།
རྫས་གཞན་མ་ཡིན་པར་ཐལ། ལྷན་ཅིག་དམིགས་ངེས་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར། སྔ་མ་ལ།
ཐལ་བ་དང་པོའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་མ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། སོ་སྐྱེའི་ཤེས་པ་ཉམས་སུ་མྱོང་བའི་རང་
རིག་མངོན་སུམ་ཆོས་ཅན། སངས་རྒྱས་ཀྱི་ཡེ་ཤེས་དམིགས་པར་ཐལ། སོ་སྐྱེའི་ཤེས་
པ་དམིགས་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཐལ་བ་གཉིས་པ་ལ་འདོད་དེ། མདོ་སྡེ་པ་ཡན་ཆད་ཀྱི་གྲུབ
མཐའ་ལ་སེམས་དང་སེམས་བྱུང་རྫས་གཞན་དུ་མེད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །ཐལ་བ་གསུམ་པ
ནི། གཟུགས་དམིགས་པ་སྣང་བ་ལ་ལྟོས་པའི་གང་ཟག་གི་དོར། དེ་གཉིས་རྫས་གཞན
མ་ཡིན་འདོད་དེ། ལྕགས་སྒོང་དམར་འབར་བར་སྦྱར་བ་བཞིན་ནོ། །གཟུགས་དམིགས་པ
སྣང་བ་ལ་མ་ལྟོས་པའི་བྱི་ལ་ལྟ་བུའི་དོར། གཏན་ཚིགས་མ་གྲུབ་སྟེ། དེའི་གཟུགས་མ·····
དམིགས་པའི་ཚེ་སྣང་བ་དམིགས་པ་ཡང་ཡོད། སྣང་བ་དམིགས་པ་ན་གཟུགས་མ···
དམིགས་པ་ཡང་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི། གལ་ཏེ་ཕྱི་དོན་མེད་ན། ས་བོན་གྱི་ས
མྱུ་གུ་སྐྱེད་པ་སོགས་རྒྱུ་འབྲས་དང་། དུ་བའི་རྟགས་ལས་མེ་དཔོག་པ་སོགས་ཤེས་བྱ
ཤེས་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་མེད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ། ཞེ་ན། སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་དོན་མེད
ཀྱང་བག་ཆགས་བརྟན་པའི་ཤེས་པ་ལས་བོན་དང་མྱུ་གུ་སྣང་བ་དང་། དུ་བ་དང་མེར་སྣང
བ་ལ་རྒྱུ་འབྲས་དང་ཤེས་བྱ་ཤེས་བྱེད་སོགས་འཇོག་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། འདི་ལྟར་ཁྱེད་རང་གི་ནོ

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ཡོད་པར་འདོད་པའི་ལུགས་ལ། ས་བོན་དང་མྱུ་གུ་དོན་གཞན་སྔ་ཕྱི་རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་ལྡོག་བྱས
དང་བྱེད་པ་པོ་ལ་རྒྱུ་འབྲས་སུ་འཇོག་པ་དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ཕྱི་དོན་མེད་ཀྱང་བག་ཆགས་ས་བརྟན་པའི
ཤེས་པ་ལས་བོན་དུ་སྣང་བའི་རྣམ་རིག་དང་། མྱུ་གུ་སྣང་བའི་རྣམ་རིག་དོན་གཞན་སྔ་ཕྱི
རྗེས་སུ་འགྲོ་ལྡོག་བྱས་དང་བྱེད་པ་པོ་རྒྱུ་འབྲས་སུ་འཇོག་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གལ་ཏེ་མེ་དུ་
སོགས་དེར་སྣང་བའི་རྣམ་རིག་ལ་འཇོག་ན་དུ་བའི་རྟགས་ཀྱིས་མེ་དཔོག་པ་མེད་པར་ཐལ།
མེར་སྣང་གི་བློ་དེ་དུར་སྣང་གི་བློ་ར་འབྲས་བུ་ཡིན་པའི་ཕྱིར་ཏེ། དུར་སྣང་གི་བློ་དེ་མེར་སྣང
གི་བློས་སྔ་རོལ་དུ་གྲུབ་པའི་ཕྱིར་རོ། །གལ་ཏེ་མེར་སྣང་གི་བློ་དེ། དུར་སྣང་གི་བློའི་བག
ཆགས་སད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རྐྱེན་ཡིན་པས་སྐྱོན་མེད་དོ་སྙམ་ན། དེ་ལྟ་ན་དུར་སྣང་གི་བློ་དེ་
ཡང་མེར་སྣང་གི་བག་ཆགས་སད་བྱེད་ཀྱི་རྐྱེན་ཡིན་པས་རྒྱུ་རྟགས་སུ་བཀོད་ནས་འབྲས
བུ་བསྒྲུབ་པའི་གཏན་ཚིགས་སུ་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། དེའི་ལན་ལ་མེ་དུ་སོགས་རྒྱུ་འབྲས
སུ་འཇོག་པའི་ཚུལ་དང་། དེས་ན་འབྲས་རྟགས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་གཞག་འཐད་པའི་ཚུལ་གཉིས
ལས། དང་པོ་ནི། ལར་སྣང་གི་བག་ཆགས་ཀྱི་སྙིང་པོ་ཅན་གྱི་ལར་སྣང་གི་བློ་དེ་དུར
སྣང་གི་བློའི་རྒྱུ་ཡིན་པས་ཐ་སྙད་དུ་མེ་ལས་དུ་བ་སྐྱེས། ཞེས་འཇོག་པ་ཡིན་གྱི་ཕྱི་རོལ
དོན་དུ་གྲུབ་པའི་མེ་ལས་དུ་བ་སྐྱེ་བ་མ་ཡིན་ཞིང་། མེར་སྣང་གི་བློ་ལས་དུར་སྣང་གི་བློ
སྐྱེ་བ་ཡང་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ། སེམས་རྒྱུད་དེར་དུང་བག་ཆགས་ཀྱི། །སྙིང་པོ་ཅན་ཉིད་དུ་བར་ནི།།
སྣང་བའི་བློ་ནི་སད་བྱེད་པ། །དེས་ན་མེ་ལས་དུ་བ་ཡིན། །ཞེས་སོ། །གཉིས་པ་ནི།
དུར་སྣང་གི་བློ་གསལ་བར་སད་པའི་རྟགས་ལས་ལར་སྣང་གི་བློའི་སྟེང་དུ་བག་ཆགས
གསལ་བ་སད་པ་ཅན་གྱི་མེར་སྣང་གི་བློ་སྐྱེད་པའི་ནུས་པ་ཡོད་པར་རྟོགས་པར་བྱེད
པ་སྟེ། དེ་ལ་འདྲ་དུ་བར་སྣང་བའི་བློ། །བག་ཆགས་གསལ་བ་སད་པ་ཅན། །མེར
སྣང་བ་ཡི། བློ་ཉིད་ནི། །རྟོགས་འགྱུར་མེ་ཉིད་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །ཞེས་གསུངས་སོ། །
འོན་འགོད་པའི་ཚོད་ལྟར་དུ་འགོད་དམ་ཞེ་ན། མེ་དུ་སྣང་བ་ལས་གཞན་མེ་དུ་མ
གྲུབ་པ་འདོད་པ་ལྟར་ན། དུ་ལྡན་གྱི་ལར་སྣང་བར་ཆོས་ཅན། མེར་སྣང་བ་ཡོད་དེ།

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དུབ་སྣང་བ་ཡོད་པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་འགོད་ཅིང༌། གདགས་མེད་དུ་ཡོད་ཅིང༌། དེ་ཤེས་པའི་
བདག་ཉིད་དུ་འདོད་པ་ལྟར་ན། དུ་ལྡན་གྱི་ལ་ལ་ཚོགས་ཅན། མི་ཡོད་དོ། དུབ་ཡོད་
པའི་ཕྱིར། ཞེས་འགོད་དོ། །སློབ་དཔོན་ལུ་ཀྱ་བློ་ལ་སོགས་པ་ནི། ཕྱི་རོལ་གྱི་མེ་
དཔོག་པ་ན་དཔྱར་ཁ་ཡིན་ལ། སེམས་ཀྱི་མེ་དཔོག་པ་ནུམ་འོངས་པ་ཡིན་ཞིང༌།
གེགས་མེད་ན་མི་བསྒྲུབ་པར་གཉིས་ཀ་མཚུངས་སོ། །དེས་ན་མེར་སྣང་གི་བློ་སྐྱེད་ནུས་
.... པའི་ཤེས་པ་ལས་སྐྱེ་བའི་དུབ་སྣང་བའི་བློ་མེ་ལས་སྐྱེས། ཞེས་བརྗོད་ཀྱི་ནི
དངོས་ལས་མ་ཡིན་ནོ། །དེས་ན་རྒྱུ་ཆོས་དཔོག་པ་རི་འབྲས་རྟགས་ཡིན་ནོ། ཞེས་
གསུངས་སོ། །མངོན་སུམ་བརྟག་པའི་རབ་ཏུ་བྱེད་པ་སྟེ། རབ་བྱེད་དགུ་པ་བཤད་
ཟིན་ཏོ།། ༄ །།གཉིས་པ་རྗེས་དཔག་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། རང་དོན་རྗེས་དཔག་དང༌།
གཞན་དོན་རྗེས་དཔག་གོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། མཚན་ཉིད་དང༌། རང་བཞིན་
གཏན་ལ་དབབ་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། ཚུལ་གསུམ་ཚང་བའི་རྟགས་ལས་བསྐྱེད་བྱ
རྟོགས་པའི་བློ་སྟེ། ཚད་མ་མདོར། རྗེས་དཔག་རྣམ་གཉིས་རང་དོན་ནི། །ཚུལ་གསུམ
རྟགས་ལས་དོན་མཐོང་བའོ། །ཞེས་སོ། །རང་དོན་རྗེས་དཔག་དང༌། རྗེས་དཔག་ཚད་མ་
རྣམས་ནི་མིང་གི་རྣམ་གྲངས་ཡིན་པས་མཚན་ཉིད་ལོགས་སུ་མི་དགོས་སོ། །གཉིས་པ་ལ་
གཉིས་ཏེ། གང་གིས་རྟོགས་པའི་རྟགས་དང༌། དེས་རྟོགས་པའི་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་བཤད་པའོ།
།དང་པོ་ལ་གཉིས་ཏེ། ཕྱོགས་གཞི་ཕྱོགས་གསུམ་བཤད་པ་དང༌། དེ་ལ་ལྟོས་པའི་རྟགས
ཀྱི་རབ་ཏུ་དབྱེ་བའོ། །དང་པོ་ལ་གསུམ་སྟེ། ཚུལ་དང་པོའི་ལྟོས་གཞི་ཕྱོགས། རྗེས་
སུ་འགྲོ་ལྡོག་གི་ལྟོས་གཞི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས་དང་མི་མཐུན་ཕྱོགས། དེ་དག་ལྟོས་གཞིར་
འཇོག་པའི་འཐད་པའོ། །དང་པོ་ནི། གལ་ཏེ་གཏན་ཚིགས་ཕྱོགས་ཀྱི་ཆོས་སུ་གྲུབ
ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་གྲུབ་ན་
ན་བསྒྲུབ་བྱ་གྲུབ་ཟིན་པར་འགྱུར་ཞིང༌། མ་གྲུབ་ན་ཕྱོགས་ཆོས་ཞེས་པའི་ཐ་སྙད་
ཀྱང་མི་འཐད་པར་འགྱུར་རོ་ཞེ་ན། སྐྱོན་མེད་དེ། ཕྱིར་རྟོག་གེའི་བསྟན་བཅོས་ལས།
ཕྱོགས་དང༌། རྗེས་སུ་དཔག་བྱ་དང༌། བསྒྲུབ་པར་བྱ་བ་ཅེས་གསུངས་པ་རྣམས་ནི

TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT

ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS USED IN THE TRANSLATION

Ālaṁkāra	Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajnākaragupta, R. Sānkṛityāyana, ed., Patna, 1953.
PS. Prat.	Pratyaksa chapter of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, Sanskrit text found in Appendix to M. Hattori, Dignāga, On Perception, Harvard University Press, 1968.
P.Vin. Prat.	Pratyaksa chapter of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya as found in T. Vetter, Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścaya: 1 kapitel, Pratyakṣa, Wien, 1966.
PV. Prat.	Pratyaksa chapter of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikā, Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi, 1968.
PV. Sid.	Pramāṇasiddhiḥ chapter of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika, Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi, 1968.
PV. Svārtha.	Svārthānumana chapter of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika, Dwarikadas Shastri, ed., Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi, 1968.
Pyn.	Pramāṇayuktinidhi (Tshad ma rigs gter) of Sa-skya Paṇḍita, Sa-skya pa'i bka-'bum, Vol. 5, Tokyo, 1968
S.C.	Go-rams-pa's Rigs gter gsal byed, Sakya College, Mussoorie, India, 1975.
T.	Go-rams-pa's Rigs gter gsal byed, Sa-skya pa'i bka-'bum, Vol.11, Tokyo, 1969.

In the translation the symbols + and * refer to the Sakya College edition and to the Sa-skya pa'i bka-bum edition of the Rigs gter gsal byed, respectively. These two symbols have been placed within the translation at the place where the respective editions begin new pages; the specific page is then noted at the bottom of the sheet.

A. Direct perception: Here there are three sections:*

1. Right direct perception (samyak-pratyakṣa).[1]

2. Falsification of perception (pratyakṣābhāsa).[2] +

3. Authority-as-result (pramāṇa-phala).[3]

1. Right direct perception: This has three subsections:

A. The definition (lakṣaṇa).[4]

B. The variegation of what is defined (lakṣya).[5]

C. The meaning of each term.[6]

A. The definition: Here there are two concerns:

1. Rejecting (the incorrect definitions of others).

2. Establishing (our own definition).

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* T. p.322, Fol. 61.b.; + S.C. p.125.

1. mṅon sum yaṅ dag.

2. log phyogs mṅon sum ltar snaṅ.

3. tshad ma daṅ 'bras bu.

4. mtshan ñid.

5. mtshon bya.

6. mtshan gźi. The exact relationship between mtshan ñid, mtshon bya, and mtshan gźi is an important one for the understanding of the Buddhist logical system. Taking as an example a discussion of 'fire''; here 'fire' is the mtshon bya, that is to say, what is to be defined. And 'the heat of fire' is the mtshan ñid or the definition of what is defined. While 'a gas fire' or 'wood fire' would be the mtshon gźi, to wit, a specific term or instance of that which is defined. Regarding the correlation of the Tibetan terms mtshan ñid and mtshon bya with the Sanskrit terms lakṣaṇa and lakṣya, respectively, of this there is little doubt. Cf. Alex Wayman, "A guided tour through the seven books of Dharmakīrti", (forthcoming in A Millennium of Buddhist Logic [4th to 14th],) p. 20. However, concerning the term mtshan gźi there is less certainty; a possible correlate may be the term upalakṣaṇa.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mnon sum, 1.a.:
myoṅ bas sgro 'dogs gcod 'khrul/
[A pratyakṣa] which decides superimposition due to the immediate experience is mistaken.)

1. Rejecting (the incorrect definitions of others): Phya pa[1] and others have divided direct perception (pratyakṣa) and direct perception as authority (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa). The definition of the first (i.e. pratyakṣa) is explained as "an awareness (saṁvid) which is free from constructive thought (kalpanā) and without delusion (bhrānti)." The definition of the latter (i.e. pratyakṣa-pramāṇa) is explained (according to Phya pa and others) as "(a pratyakṣa) which decides superimposition[2] due to the immediate experience (anubhava) of a previously uncomprehended object." (The division of pratyakṣa and pratyakṣa-pramāṇa) is wrong; because the division into two is not proved from the texts (i.e. Pramāṇasamuccaya, etcetera). And because there does not exist any deciding in relation to a pratyakṣa experiencing a previously uncomprehended object; nor is there a pratyakṣa which decides superimposition established, due to the exclusion of itself.[3]

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1. Phya-pa chos-kyi seng-ge was born in 1109 and died in 1169. There does not seem to be any of his works which have survived. However there are a number of quotations and paraphrases of his works and ideas which can be found in much of the native Tibetan literature on epistemology and logic. For an interesting introductory discussion see L.W.J. van der Kuijp, "Phya-pa Chos-kyi seng-ge's Impact on Tibetan Epistemological Theory," Journal of Indian Philosophy, 5, 1978, 355-369.

2. samāropa.

3. There cannot be any kind of deciding in the domain of

2. Establishing (our own definition): Here there are two sections:

   A. Establishing the real definition (of right direct perception).

   B. Establishing the purpose (artha) of that (definition).

   (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 1.b.:
   mṅon sum rtog bral ma 'khrul ba/
   Direct perception is free from constructive thought and without delusion.)

A. Establishing the real definition: When one is concerned with dispelling misunderstandings,[1] (the definition is) "a cognition which is free from constructive thought and without delusion". Otherwise, when one is concerned with the exclusion (vyāvṛtti) of the heterogenous class (jāti), (the definition is) "a cognition which is without delusion".[2]

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pratyakṣa. Since the presence of deciding would imply the preśence of constructive thought (vikalpa), and the presense of vikalpa would violate the definition pratyakṣa. Therefore, a deciding direct perception is not posśible because it would be self-contradictory; or as Go-rams-pa states "due to the exclusion of itself". Tsoṅ-kha-pa in fact mentions this phrase when he discusses the variegations of fallacies of the definition in his Sde bdun, cf. Alex Wayman, "A guided...,"p. 26.

1. log rtog sel ba. The equivalency of the term log rtog with the term log śes has been implied by Sa-skya Paṇḍita. While commenting on a verse segment which reads Bcad śes log śes the tshom lṅa, Sa-skya Pandita has changed the term log śes to log rtog. This change in terminology was criticized by Śakya mchog-ldan in his Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter-gyi dgoṅs rgyan rigs pa'i 'khor los lugs ṅan pham byed, Collected Works, Vol. 10.p.101-102.... p.101-102. It should be remembered that log śes is one of the five varieties of non-authority (aprāmana; tshad min); for a discussion of log śes and the other varieties see above Introduction, Part I.

2. The heterogenous class is apramāṇa.

Therefore, the definition of a direct perception as authority (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa) is the same as the definition of direct perception (pratyakṣa); because (the definition) is stated in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (Prat. 4.a.) as:

> pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam /
> Direct perception is devoid of constructive thought and is without delusion.

Surely that (i.e. pratyakṣa) is recognized as being an authority; because it is not stated that there is a different definition for direct perception as authority.

B. Establishing the purpose of the definition: This has three sections:

1. Establishing the purpose of "devoid of constructive thought".
2. Establishing the purpose of "without delusion".
3. Establishing the purpose of both (kalpanāpoḍha and abhrānta taken together).

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, l.c.:
rtog pa sgra[1] don 'dzin pa yin/
Constuctive thought apprehends the auditory object.)

1. Establishing the purpose of "devoid of constructive thought": The constructive thought which should be absent (in pratyakṣa) is the constructive thought which apprehends the "auditory object" (śabda-artha), that is

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1. MS. sga.

to say; as in the Pramāṇavārttika (Prat. 287.a-b):

> śabdārthagrāhi yad yatra tajjñānaṁ tatra kalpanā/ *
>
> Whatever the cognition and wherever is its apprehension of an auditory object, in that, there is constructive thought.

And as it is stated in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (by Dharmakīrti + while commenting on verse I. 4.b.):

> abhilāpasaṃsargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā /
>
> Constructive thought is a distinct cognition which is capable of commingling with verbalization.

Now then, suppose it is remarked, "what is the necessity of speaking of 'capable'?"[1] Some Indians[2] say it is for the purpose of including the constructive thought-continuum (saṁtāna) of a young child who is ignorant about the conventional meaning of signs; because that (i.e. the constructive thought-continuum of the young child) is not pervaded by the cognition which apprehends the "auditory object". This manner of speaking is similarly applicable in another case also (i.e. concerning an elderly man's continuum); because the constructive thought-continuum of an elderly man, who has had recourse to the conventional meaning of signs, is not pervaded by the cognition capable

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* T. p.322, Fol. 62.a.; + S.C.126.

1. ruṅ ba; yogya

2. Go-rams-pa may be referring to Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla who discuss this topic in the Tattvasaṃgraha (verse 1216) and its Pañjikā.;

of apprehending (the "auditor-object"). If one says that there is no fault (doṣa)[1] in recognizing the class (of cognitions) "which is capable" (of commingling), then as in the previous instance (of the young child), it is similar also (for the instance of the elderly man); because of recognizing the class (of cognitions) which apprehends the mixture, to wit, the "auditory object".

Briefly, the definitions of constructive thought which should be excluded from this system are as follows;[2]

----A cognition apprehending a mixture of "auditory object".

----A cognition capable of apprehending a mixture of "auditory object".

----A cognition apprehending "auditory object".

----A cognition apprehending the generalizing object (sāmānya-artha).

These should be known as being without distinction (abheda). The manner of separating (pratyakṣa) from that (constructive thought) is its simply not having the characteristic of constructive thought, due to the exclusion of itself. And that means, when something is recognized as a term (e.g. a specific variety of pratyakṣa), it lacks the characteristic (of constructive thought) previously mentioned.

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1. sgyon.

2. Cf. Tsoṅ-kha-pa's variegation of constructive thought as found in A. Wayman, trans. "A guided...,"p.15. and Tsoṅ kha-pa, Sde bdun...,p.24.

2. Establishing the purpose of "without delusion": Some scholars, according to the Vijñānavādin point of view, accept 'abhrānta' (in the definition of pratyakṣa) as meaning non-deceptive (avisaṃvāda).[1] And some scholars accept 'abhrānta' as making the absolute-meaning (paramārtha) as the object (viṣaya). And some scholars, accept 'abhrānta' (as meaning simply a cognition which is without delusion regarding) the apprehended object (grāhya-artha). But, these opinions are contradicted by logic (yukti-viruddha).

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, l.d.:
> ma 'khrul pa de rnam pa bźi/
> Abhrānta is of four different kinds.)

Therefore, our opinion is (that the pratyakṣa which is abhrānta is) not produced as delusive through the causes of error (vibhramakāraṇa)[2] situated in a sense organ[3] (indriya-gata), the one situated in the object[4] (viṣaya-gata), the one situated in a place (bāhyāśraya), etcetera; as explained in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (by Dharmakīrti while commenting on I.4.a):

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1. Go-rams-pa may here be referring to Vinītadeva and Kamalaśīla; See Tattvasaṃgraha-pañjikā, verse 1312; and Vinītadeva's Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā, p.40.

2. 'khrul rgyu.

3. dbaṅ po.

4. yul.

tatra abhrāntam timiraśubhramaṇanauyānasaṃkṣobhādy-anāhitavibhramam /

In that (pratyakṣa), 'without delusion' is not having delusion invested through: the effect of cataracts: quick whirling (e.g. a fire-brand): traveling in a boat: confusion, etcetera.

Now then, suppose it is said that 'constructive thought'+ also would be without delusion, because it is not brought* forth as delusion by those causes of error (mentioned above). That it is the case is not proved (asiddha). (Dharmakīrti) has included the word "etcetera" (ādi) (in his discussion of abhrānta) in order to draw upon the causes of error explained on the ocassion of his stating (PV. Svārtha. 205 a-b) thus:

anādivāsanodbhūtavikalpapariniṣṭhitaḥ /

(The 'auditory object') is seated throughout constructive thought arisen from beginningless habit-energy.

And (PV. Prat. 29. c-d) thus:

bhrāntiḥ sā anādikālīnadarśanābhyāsanirmitā /

Delusion has been created by the repetition without beginning of seeing at a particular time.

+ S.C. 127; * T. p.322, Fol. 62.b.

3. The purpose of both "devoid of constructive thought" and "without delusion" (taken together): Now then, suppose it is asked, "are both 'devoid of constructive thought' and'without delusion' intended to exclude the heterogenous class,[1] or, are they intended to exclude misunderstandings?" Actually, a cognition which is 'without delusion' is able to exclude all heterogeneous classes. Therefore, the mention of 'devoid of constructive thought' (as a pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇa) is for the purpose of contradicting the Vaiśeṣika[2] and the Naiyāyaka,[3] who mistakenly accept sense cognition (indriya-vijñāna) as 'without delusion' while possessing'constructive thought'. Furthermore, 'devoid of constructive' is also mentioned for the purpose of contradicting some scholars, who mistakenly consider (any knowledge) which is 'without delusion' concerning the apprehensible object (grāhya-artha)[4] to be conclusively established as being 'without delusion'. Consequently, is inference(anumāna) also 'without delusion'?

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1. rigs mi mthun; asajātīya.
2. bye brag pa. The bye brag pa should not be confused with Buddhist bye brag smra ba (Vaibhāṣika).
3. rigs pa can.
4 'jug yul.

B. <u>The variegation of what is defined</u>: This has five parts:

1. The basis of what is variegated.
2. The bare nature of what is variegated.
3. The object-sign by which the variegation is made.
4. The significance of the manner of making the variegation.
5. What is the proper number of the variegation.

1. <u>The basis of what is variegated</u>: This is only a non-delusive cognition.[1]

2. <u>The bare nature of what is variegated</u>: This has four sections, namely:

A. (Outer) sense direct perception (<u>indriya-pratyakṣa</u>).[2]

B. Mental direct perception (<u>mānasa-pratyakṣa</u>).[3]

C. Introspective direct perception (<u>svasaṁvedana-pratyakṣa</u>).[4]

D. Yogin's direct perception (<u>yogi-pratyakṣa</u>).[5]

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1. It should be noted that 'devoid of constructive thought' is not here included as the basis of variegating <u>pratyakṣa</u>. Since it is understood that we are speaking about direct perception is not necessary to include 'devoid of constructive thought' in order to differentiate it from inference.

2. <u>dbaṅ po mṅon sum</u>.

3. <u>yid gyi mṅon sum</u>.

4. <u>raṅ rig gyi mṅon sum</u>. While the Tibetan consistently uses <u>raṅ rig gyi mṅon sum</u>, the Sanskrit tends to four different terms, to wit; <u>svasaṁvitti</u>, <u>sva-saṁvid</u>, <u>sva-saṁvedana</u>, and <u>ātma-saṁvedana</u>.

5. <u>rnal 'byor gyi mṅon sum</u>. This is the usual order of presenting the four varieties of <u>pratyakṣa</u>. See above <u>Introduction, Part II, The Variegation of Direct Perception.</u>

(Here Go-ramspa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mnon sum, 2.a-b.:
yul daṅ rten daṅ gaṅ zag gi/
sgo nas mṅon sum rnam par dbye/
Direct Perception is variegated
as different kinds in terms of
object, basis, and person.)

3. The object-sign by which the variegation is made:

α In terms of the object; there are the two direct perceptions (e.g. indriya and mānasa) which cognize the external object.[1] They cognize an outer object.[2] There is introspective direct perception which cognizes an inner[3] (object). And, there is the yogin's direct perception which lacks the cognition of an inner or outer (object).[+]

β In terms of the basis; there are the two perceptions[*] (i.e. indriya and mānasa) which cognize the external object. They depend on the sense organs. Introspective direct perception is merely not independent of dependent phenomenon. The yogin's direct perception depends on intense contemplation (samādhi).[4]

γ In terms of the person[5] there are two; the perceptions of ordinary people and the perceptions of the Āryas.

+ S.C.128; T. p.322, Fol. 63.a.

1. don; artha.

2. yul gźan. Literally a 'separate object' but here gźan is taken as contrasting with raṅ (sva).

3. raṅ. Here raṅ is not used in a reflexive sense, but rather in a subjective sense.

4. tiṅ ṅe 'dzin.

5. gaṅ zag; pudgala. The Tibetan term is defined according to Das as "that which becomes full and then undergoes decay."

4. The significance of the manner of making the variegation: (The four perceptions) are not separated (bhinna) (merely) to deny unity, because all the four (pratyakṣa-s) are on-going. Nor is it merely a different divergence in a single thing, because (any one of the four perceptions) is a different entity from the other three perceptions. Yet, (the significance of the variegation) is not the different entity, because the three other perceptions (i.e. indirya, mānasa, and yogin) are a single state with introspective direct perception (svasaṁvedana-pratyakṣa). Although those three are in a single state with introspective direct perception, they are separate in terms of their object.

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 2.c-d.:
> mṅon sum bźi po mdo ste'i lugs/
> bye brag smra gsum rnam rig gñis/)

5. What is the proper number of the variegation: This is stated (by Sa-skya Paṇḍita, in his Pramāṇayuktinidhi, 162. Fol. 16. a.) as follows:

> There are four authoritative direct perceptions in the view of the Sautrāntika; three according to the Vaibhāṣika; and two according to the Vijñānavādin.[1]

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1. Cf. Tibetan Buddhist Studies of Kloṅ rdol bla-ma, I, p. 375.

Some scholars interpreting (Sa-skya Paṇḍita's statement) literally, say that both sense direct perception and the mental direct perception are not admitted in the view of the Vijñānavādin. Therefore, the fourfold variegation is the view of only the Sautrāntika.

That interpretation is not correct. Since the Ālambana-parīkṣā explains the three conditions (pratyaya) of sense direct perception (indriya-pratyakṣa) according to the view of the Cittamātra, their acceptance of sense direct perception is implied.[1] And even from the self-commentary (sva-vṛtti) of the Pramāṇayuktinidhi it is explained that if sense direct perception is accepted, then, it is necessary to accept mental direct perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa).

Some scholars explained the meaning of that statement[+] as concerning the "perception which is without delusion regarding its object of appearance". But that is wrong, because it is necessary that both the sense direct perception and mental direct perception be accepted by the Vijñānavādins as without delusion regarding that object of appearance[2] upon which they became authoritative direct perception.[*]

+ S.C. 129; * T. 323, Fol. 63.b.

1. There are two different translations of the Ālambana-parīkṣā available; there is one by N. Aiyaswami Sastri which was published by the Adyar Library in 1939 and includes Dignāga's Vṛtti and Dharmapāla's commentary. The second is that of A. Wayman. He has translated the eight verses which comprise this work in his article "Yogacara and the Buddhist Logicians".

2. snaṅ yul. I have not been able to find an example the Sanskrit for this term, perhaps ābhāsa-viṣaya.

Well now, suppose it is asked, "what then is the intention of this statement (of Sa-skya Paṇḍita)?" When according to the conventional view, both sense direct perception and the mental direct perception are accepted by the Vijñānavādins as authorities (pramāṇa) concerning the external object (bahyārtha).[1] But, the number (of variegations) which is indicated here is regarding the examination of the 'absolute meaning' (paramārtha). Therefore, neither the sense direct perception nor the mental direct perception can possibly become authoritative for the external object.[2] There is only the introspective direct perception (svasaṁvedana-pratyakṣa) of its bare nature (svarūpa).[3] Hence, in terms of the nature (bhāva),[4] the first three direct perceptions are identical. And similarly, in terms of the object (viṣaya), they are also identical. In consequence of which, when recognized as introspective direct perception, the yogin's direct percption (yogi-pratyakṣa) is the authority for the true nature (dharmatā)

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1. phyi rol gyi don; bāhyārtha.

2. Cf. above Intro. Part II, Authority and Direct Perception; For the Vijñanavadin all cognitions of an external object are delusive; hence, they cannot be authoritative. See also A. Wayman, "Yogacara abd the Buddhist Logicians".

3. This would be authoritative because it is perceiving inwardly. However, it is not necessarily; this is evidenced by the fact that the Vijñānavādin are divided into two groups according to those who claim the image as true (satyakāravādin) and those who claim the image as false (alīkākāravādin). See Rigs gter gsal byed, p.167 ff.

4. ṅo bo.

of the object. That being so, its (i.e. yogi-pratyakṣa) nature is also identical with introspective direct perception. Although, in terms of its object it is recognized as different.[1]

According to the view of the Sautrāntika all four direct perceptions are different by way of their object; introspective direct perception is recognized as the authority (pramāṇa) for the cognition (jñāna);[2] sense direct perception is assigned as the authority for the external object; mental direct perception is recognized as the authority relying on the external object which is a different 'material'[3] from the object of that sense direct perception. And the yogin's direct perception is recognized as the authority for a privileged object.[4]

Moreover, it is explained in the Pramāṇayuktinidhi-svavṛtti as follows:

> Concerning the view of the Sautrāntika, when accepting the presence of the external object, the proper number of the variegation of direct[+] perception is divided as four, by way of the object.[5]

+ S.C. 130

1. See the discussion on p. 151 of the Rigs gter gsal byed.
2. śes pa.
3. anyadravya; rdzas gźan.
4. samyag-artha; yaṅ dag pa'i don.
5. See Sa-skya Paṇḍita, Tshad ma rigs gter gyi raṅ gi 'grel pa, Vol. 5. p.220, Fol.32.a.

In this way, when one recognizes the authority-as-result (pramāṇa-phala) of the sense-cognition (indriya-jñāna) at the time of the second authority-as-result, then, introspection is explained as the result (phala). And from both the Pramāṇayuktinidhi and the root commentary, when direct perception is divided into four by way of the object, then it is necessary to accept the external object. Therefore, the explanations regarding the view of only the Sautrāntika* should be understood together with this essential point. And if one knows to apply the expression "by way of the object" at the beginning of the two verses of the Pramāṇa-yuktinidhi, then all the points of view are self-revealing.

C. The meaning of the terms:[1] Here there are four sections:

1. Sense direct perception (indriya pratyakṣa).
2. Mental direct perception (mānasa pratyakṣa).
3. Introspective direct perception (svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa).
4. Yogin's direct perception (yogi-pratyakṣa).

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* T. p.323, Fol. 64.a.

1. mtshan gźi. Having discussed the definition, to wit, "free from constructive thought and without delusion", and the variegation of what is defined; it remains to examine the specific terms or instances of what has been defined. That is to say, the four terms of direct perception.

(Here Go-rams-pa comments on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon Sum, 3.a-b.;
phye nas mtshan ñid 'jog pa 'khrul/
des na dbaṅ śes ma 'khrul ba'o/
Having divided (the definition of sense direct perception and its authority, many Tibetans)[1] mistakenly establish the definition (of sense direct perception). (In our view) therefore, it is a non-delusive sense cognition.

1. Sense direct perception also has four sections, to wit:

A. The definition of the definable.

B Variegation of the terms.

C. The authority (pramāṇa) which ascertains (niścāyaka) the definition in the individual term.

D. The Literal definition of the definable.

A. The definition of the definable: Whatever outward-directed cognition (jñāna), free from constructive thought (kalpanā) and devoid of delusion (abhrānta), arisen directly from the formed sense organ, and a governing condition (adhipati-pratyaya).[2]

B. Variegation of the terms: By way of the governing condition there are five varieties; that is, from the sense direct perception of the eyes[3] (cakṣu) to the sense direct perception of the body[4] (śarīra). By way of the support-condition[5] (ālambana-pratyaya) there are five

1. See Sa-skya Pandita's Raṅ gi 'grel, p220, Fol.32.a.

2. Cf. Wayman, trans., "A guided tour", p.12. Tsoṅ-kha-pa and Go-rams-pa's definition of sense direct perception is exactly the same; giving the impression that they both referred to the same source as an authority.

3. mig gi dbaṅ po'i mṅon sum.

4. lus.

5. dmigs rkyen.

varieties; that is, from the sense direct perception apprehending form (rūpa) to the sense direct perception apprehending touch (sparśa). By way of the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya)[1] there are two varieties; that is, the sense direct perception which is inwardly certain and the sense direct perception which is outwardly certain.

C. The authority which ascertains the definition in the term: Here there are four sections, to wit;

1. Making certain the meaning of "arisen from the formed sense organ".[2]
2. Making certain the meaning of "outward-directed perception".[3]
3. Making certain the meaning of "free from constructive thought".
4. Making certain the meaning of "devoid of delusion".

1. Making certain the meaning of "arisen from the formed sense organ": Here there are two concerns;[+]

A. Determining the sense which is the governing cognition.

B. Proving (sādhaka) what is arisen from that.

\+ S.C. p.131

1. de ma thag rkyen.

2. dbaṅ po gźugs can; indriya-rūpin. The Tibetan affix "can" is in this case most likely the equivalent to the Sanskrit suffix -in. Similar also is the case of dharmin and chos can.

3. gźan rig gi śes pa; parasaṃvitti.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 3.c-d;
dbaṅ po yul la 'dzin nus te/
rjes su 'g ldog ṅes pas 'grub/)
The sense, being able to apprehend the sense-object, is established with certainty through positive concomitance and negative concomitance.

A. Determining the sense which is the governing condition:

Quoted from the Pramāṇayuktinidhi-sva-vṛtti as follows;

> The sense (qua adhipati-pratyaya) which is well known among some tenet systems (siddhānta)[1] is not proved. But the (sense qua adhipati-pratyaya) is that which is present in these bases (āyatanas) that possess the forms and is able to apprehend the five objects. Thus the substance which is capable of being the co-operating condition (sahakārin) is also the sense organ.

And the intention of that statement is to demonstrate that (the sense qua adhipati pratyaya) which is well known to some tenet systems is not proved by means of logic; such as the well known notion that from the Abhidharma system (that adhipati pratyaya) is equal to the sesame flower[2] etc. And according to the Vijñānavādins (i.e. the āgama-anusārin)* it is the capability which is in the store-consciouness (ālaya-

* T. P.323, Fol.64.b.


1. grub mtha';siddhānta. Generally four in number; Vaibhāsika, Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Cittamātra, and Mādhyamika.

2. zar ma. Mahāvyutpatti and Das , A Tibetan-English Dictionary, present atasī and umaka as the Sanskrit terms for zar ma. I have referred to Yośomitra's Abhidharma-kośa-Vyākhyā and have found only a reference to the term tila, which according to Monier-Williams's Sanskrit Dictionary appears to be more the sesame seed than the sesame flower. In this instance the "sesame flower"appears to

vijñāna),[1] etcetera. Because, when the other conditions are

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refer to the shape of the visual sense. As to the other senses, W.M.McGovern, A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, p.120-121, presents their description as indicated by Vasubandhu and Buddhaghosa. The visual sense (caksurindriya): according to Buddhaghosa it is comparable to the louse's head: for Vasubandhu it consists of atoms diffused over the surfface of the eye, like particles of flour spread over the water. The auditory sense(śrotrendriya): Buddhaghosa states that there are units of the auditory sense in the physical ear, and they are well supplied with fine reddish hairs; Vasubandhu states that they are like wound up bark of a tree as soon as it is peeled from the trunk. The olfactory sense(ghranendriya): According to Buddhaghosa they are particles inside the nostrils and look like goat's hoofs: Vasubandhu visualizes them as claws whose points face downwards. The gustatory sense (jihvendriya): Buddhaghosa reports that they are particles above the middle of the tongue and shaped like the upper part of the lotus leaf: for Vasubandhu they are shaped like a half-moon. The tactile sense (kāyendriya):Buddhaghosa states that they are spread over the whole body: Vasubandhu reports that each molecule of the body contains at least one tactile sense. Moreover, he states that the shape of these tactile senses are not the same for men and women. For Vasubandhu's discussion of this topic see de La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa, Paris, 1931, p.89-96. While I was studing Buddhist epistemology with a Gelugpa Lama during the summer of 1977 he drew the shapes of the five senses. They more closely resemble the description presented by Vasubandhu. The following are the representations of those senses:


caksurindriya


śrotrendriya


ghranendriya


jihvendriya


kāyendriya

1. According to these Vijñaptimātrins there are eight consciousnesses; the first five consciousnesses correspond to the five senses, sight, etc. The sixth is the sense-centre consciousness (manovijñāna) and the seventh is thought consciousness. The root consciousness is the eighth or store-consciousness.

complete and the capability existing in these sense-bases is lacking, then the sense-cognition (*indriya-jñāna*) does not arise. Evidence (*liṅga*) such as this proves the existing capability. Yet that capability which is proper is not different from either the cognition (*jñāna*) or unconscious matter (*jaḍa*). But to say it is cognition is not right, because, if the sense-cognition (is capable of being the *adhipati -pratyaya*) it is present prior to the arising of the sense-cognition. Therefore, there is the possibility of the fallacy of *ad infinitum*. And, if the mental-cognition (*mano-vijñāna*; is capable of being the *adhipati-pratyaya*), then it is not necessary for it to depend on these sense-bases. Because of that (the *adhipati-pratyaya*) is proved as material, since the accepted meaning is only 'the formed sense organ.'

B. Proving what is arisen from that (sense): What is arisen from that (*indriya*) is proved by way of positive concomitance (*anvaya*). For example, both the immediate sense perception and the sense-cognition which is the result (*kārya*) are not perceived together. In the first place, the immediate sense perception is perceived; after that the cognition which apprehends the sense-object (*viṣaya*) is perceived. Therefore, it is proved as dependent on the capability present in that (*indriya*). That is to say,+

\+ S.C.132

like fire (agni) and smoke (dhūma). Or, it (what is arising from that) is proved also by negative concomitance (vyatireka).[1]

2. Making certain the meaning of 'outward-directed perception': Both the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra similarly accept introspective direct perception (sva-saṁvedana pratyakṣa) as regarding the bare nature (sva-rūpa).[2] Now the Sautrāntika when establishing the sense direct perception (indriya-pratyakṣa), require the establishment to depend on an 'external object' (bahyārtha), therefore, they claim there is an outward-directed perception. But the Cittamātra accept the introspection itself, since there is no authority for an object other than oneself. As it is explained (by Dharmakīrti in PV. Prat. 332.c-d) thusly:

> tadānyasaṁvido 'bhāvāt svasaṁvit phalamiṣyate //
>
> Then, because of the absence of a cognition of other (outside) objects, the cognition within oneself is accepted as a result.[3]

---

1. The anvya-vytireka paradigm is an alternate manner of stating the three characteristics of the logical mark, see Y. Kajiyama, An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy, Kyoto, 1966, p.65-70. Go-rams-pa's use of anvaya-vytireka is an interesting example of the actual employment of the inferential system to establish a point.

2. This statement needs to be qualified because the Sautrāntikas who follow Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and the Cittamātrins who follow Asaṅga's Yogācārabhumi do not accept the introspective direct perception.

3. This verse is included among those verses which are establishing the Vijñaptimātra's view, see below.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mnon sum, 4.a.:
gsal bar snan bas rtog med 'grub/
[Sense direct perception] is established as free from constructive thought by means of clearly focusing.)

3. Making certain the meaning of 'free from constructive thought': This is explained as an axiom in Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya as follows, Prat. 2.c-d:

pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍhaṃ nāmajātyādiyojanā //[1]
Direct perception is free from constructive thought which expresses a name, class, etcetera.

Regarding this statement of Dignāga the Pramāṇavārttika[*] explained in detail the logic which proves it. But, the principal reason is explained (in PV. Prat. 127. a-b.) thusly:

tasmāt viśeṣaviṣayā sarvaivendriyajā matiḥ /
Therefore, every cognition individuated by a sense organ has a particular as object.

That is to say, when sense direct perception (indriya-pratyakṣa) is taken as the factual base (dharmin), freedom from constructive thought is taken as (the feature:dharma). Because it is the cognition which clearly focuses on the external object as particular (svalakṣaṇa).[2]

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* T. 323. Fol.65.a.

1. This Sanskrit fragment appears in the Appendix of M. Hattori's Dignāga, On Perception, Harvard Univ., Press, 1968.

2. raṅ mtshan. The raṅ mtshan is always the object for a pratyakṣa.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 4.b.:
raṅ mtshan 'dzin phyir 'khrul pa med/
[Sense direct perception] is devoid of delusion because it apprehends a particular.)

4. Making certain the meaning of 'devoid of delusion': When sense direct perception is taken as the factual base, devoid of delusion is taken as (the feature); but it is not delusively produced by a delusive cause. Because it is the cognition (jñāna) which focuses on an image (ākāra) like the one the external object as particular has on its own side.

D. The literal definition of the definable: Here there are two parts;

1. Defining the definable in general, and,
2. In addition to that, the establishment of the three conditions (pratyaya).

1. Defining the definable in general: The sense direct perception is equally arisen from the three conditions. But what then is thought to be the reason (hetu) for designating sense direct perception in general and eye cognition in particular according to the governing condition (adhipati-pratyaya);+ and not designating (the

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distinction) according to the support-condition (ālambana-pratyaya) and the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya). (The correct reasoning is) explained (by Sa-skya Paṇḍita in Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 4.c-d) as follows:

> dbaṅ po thun moṅ min rgyu'i phyir/
> dbaṅ śes yin te rṅa sgra bźin//
> Because a sense organ is an unshared cause (asādhāraṇa-hetu), there is a sense cognition, like the sound of the drum.[1]

When the formed sense organ which is the governing condition is the unshared cause, then one can easily understand it by its designation; because it is excluded from those two other (conditions). As it is explained in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, Prat.3. a-b:

> asādhāraṇahetutvādakṣaistadvyapadiśyate /[2]
> Its name ('pratyakṣa') is designated by the sense organs because of their being unshared causes.

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1. This same metaphor is used a millennium earlier by Harivarman in his Satyasiddhiśāstra, see the English translation of Harivarman's work by N.A. Sastri in vol. 165 of the Gaekwad's Oriental Series, p.99-100. Also compare the sprout metaphor and the designation of the sense organs.

2. For Sanskrit fragment see Hattori, Dignāga...,Appendix.

2. Establishment of the three conditions:[1] Here there are three sections.

A. The similar immediately preceding condition:[2] This also has three sections, to wit;

1. The definition (of a similar immediately preceding condition).
2. The literal definition of that which is defined.
3. Removal of doubts concerning the individual terms.

1. The definition (of a similar immediately preceding condition) is a consciousness which mainly generates, as a clear cognition,[3] a perception which is its result (phala), uninterrupted by another feature (dharma).

2. The literal definition of that which is defined: Both the cause (hetu) and the result are similar as a cognition;* therefore,it is defined as similar. It is uninterrupted by another feature; therefore, it is defined as immediate (anantara). Because it generates, it is defined as a condition (pratyaya).

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* T.324. Fol.65.b.

1. Like Go-rams-pa, Tsoṅ-kha-pa only discusses three conditions; leaving out a discussion of the hetu-pratyaya. When discussing the three conditions Tsoṅ-kha-pa refers to it as variegating the condition in a general way (spyir rkyen la dbye na), see Tsoṅ-kha-pa, Sde bdun..., p.6. and Wayman, "A guided...",p.3.

2. samanantara-pratyaya; mtshuṅs pa de ma thag rkyen.

3. pratīti; gsal rig. The term snaṅ ba'i śes pa is also used for the pratīti. This gsal rig is capable of uniting with verbalization, in which case it is constructive thought. Cf. Pramāṇaviniścaya, Prat. 4.b.

3. Removal of doubts concerning the term: Now if it is asked, "what is the similar immediately preceding condition of the consciousness (citta) arising from the five unconscious[1] conditions, such as, asaṁjñā-samāpatti[2] and nirodha-samāpatti."[3] (In answer to this) some accept that it is just the initial occurrence of consciousness; and some accept that it is only the store-consciousness (ālayavijñāna).[4] These (theories) are not correct. (The former is unacceptable) because of the possibility of a lengthy interval between the result and the initial occurrence of consciousness; and although the ālayavijñāna is cogent in the view of the Vijñānavādin, it is not cogent in the view of the Sautrāntika. (In our view): therein,[+] in those (unconscious) conditions, an indistinct (avyakta) mental-consciousness is present. Therefore, that (indistinct mental-consciousness) is that which immediately precedes the arising consciousness.

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1. sems med pa; niścitta.

2. 'du śes med pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa.

3. 'gog pa'i sñoms par 'jug pa. According to David Kalupahana nirodhasāmapatti is the same as the Palī saññāvedayita-nirodha, see D. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, The University of Hawaii, 1975, p181. What exactly constitutes the remaining three unconscious conditions is not clear; since there are more than five samapatti conditions we cannot be certain that Go-rams-pa is referring to some of them as making up part of that unconscious condition.

4. kun gźi'i rnam par śes pa.

B. <u>The governing condition</u> (<u>adhipati-pratyaya</u>)[1] has three sections:

1. The definition (of a governing condition).
2. The term.
3. The literal meaning.

1. <u>The definition (of a governing condition)</u> is the sense direct perception which is its individual result, to wit; that condition which mainly and directly generates the part able to apprehend each object of sense direct perception which is its individual result.[2]

2. <u>The term</u> has been previously explained.

3. <u>The literal meaning</u>: Because it is the sense which generates independently the ability to apprehend the object in the sense-cognition it is defined as the governing condition.

C. <u>The support condition</u>[3] has two sections:

1. The definition thereof, and,
2. The term.

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1. <u>bdag rkyen</u>; <u>adhipati-pratyaya</u>. This term has sometimes been translated as "dominant cause", however, in this study we have distinguished between <u>hetu</u> and <u>pratyaya</u>. Taking the former as indicating cause and the latter condition. Moreover, the dominant seemed slightly overbearing as a description of the <u>adhipati-pratyaya</u>.

2. Cf. Wayman, trans., "A guided...", p.3.; and Tsoṅ-kha-pa Sde bdun...,p.6.

3. <u>ālambana-pratyaya</u>; <u>dmigs rkyen</u>.

1. The definition: The support-condition of the perception (vijñāna)[1] is defined as that 'external object' which directly generates the principal image[2] of the object in the perception. If applied according to the system of the Vijñānavādin, (the ālayavijñāna) can be substituted for the external object.

2. The term: The Abhidharmists[3] accept all phenomena, thus it is expressed (by Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośa, ch.2 v. 62):[*]

ālambanaṁ sarvadharmāḥ /

All dharmas are the support-condition.[4]

But here (in the system of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti) it is necessary to recognize just the external object which delivers the aspect. Therefore, there are the five objects, form, etcetra. But now, concerning the distinction between the apprehended object and these (five objects); from the point of view of only delivering the image

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* T. p.324, Fol.66.a.

1. rnam śes.

2. rnam pa'i cha gtso bor; pradhānākāra.

3. chos mṅon pa ba rnams.

4. The entire verse reads as follow: cittacaittā acaramā utpannāh samanantaraḥ/ ālambanaṁ sarvadharmāḥ kāranākhyo 'dhipaḥ smṛtaḥ/. In this verse Vasubandhu is initially defining the śamanantara, ālambana, and the adhipati condition. An alternate reading of the verse segment delimiting the ālambana-pratyaya can be found in de La Vallée Poussin, L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, Paris, 1923-1931, p. 306, to wit; dharmā ālambanam sarve/. The fragment used above was taken from Yaśomitra's Sphutārthābhidharmakosavyākhyā, p.165.

it is recognized as the support-condition. And again in the sense of only delivering an image like the one the external object as particular has on its own side, it is recognized as the apprehended object. Therefore, the apprehended object is pervaded (vyāpta)[1] by the support-condition, but the support-condition of the perception (vijñāna) is not pervaded by the apprehended object of the perception.

2. Mental direct perception (mānasa pratyakṣa) has three sections, to wit;

A. Determining its bare nature.

B. Establishing its self-presence (svabhāva).[2]

C. Answering challenges.[3] +

A. Determining its bare nature: Here there are three subsections;

1. Pondering its definition.
2. Pondering its variegation.
3. Pondering the three conditions.

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1. khya ba. Literally meaning to fill.

2. raṅ bźin.

3. rtsod pa spoṅ ba.

(Here Go-rams-pa begins commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 5.:
yul daṅ dbaṅ śes rnam gñis kyi/
de ma thag las skyes pa yid/
de la brten nas ma 'khrul ba'i/
śes pa yid kyi mṅon sum yin/
Mind arises immediately from two images,
to wit, the sense object and the sense perception.
The non-delusive cognition having a basis on
that (mind) is mental-direct perception.

1. Pondering its definition: The dèfinition is a cognition which has the apprehensible object; arisen directly from the mind sense organ (mana -indriya) and the immediately preceding condition which is its own unshared governing condition.[1]

2. Pondering its variegation: This is fivefold, that is to say, the mental direct perception through the mind organ apprehending form, and the other sense objects.

3. Pondering the three conditions: The governing condition: When arising during the sense-cognition duration the five sense-perceptions (indriya-vijñana) are the unshared governing condition of the mental direct perception. Because when there is mental direct perception it is necessarily a mental direct perception cognizing the

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1. This is the standard definition which is found in almost all materials. Cf. Wayman, trans., "A Guided...,"p.12. and also Kajiyama, An Introduction...,p.45. The discussions of mental direct perception are numerous: I refer the interested reader to Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, two vols., Dover ed., 1962, II, 311-335, S. Mookerjee, The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, University of Calcutta, 1935,p.311-315, and Hattori, Dignāga, p.92-94.

external object; since the mind-consciousness (mano-vijñāna) is not able to be the unshared governing condition of a mental direct perception cognizing the external object. As it is explained in both the Pramāṇavārttika and the Pramāṇaviniścaya, the immediately preceding condition of that (i.e. mental direct perception) as well as the governing condition are a single 'material'[1] which is the immediately preceding condition itself, to wit, the sense consciousness.

The immediately preceding condition is that governing condition itself, explained as what is posited as the immediately preceding condition in the sense of generating[*] the mental direct perception as a clear experience. That is to say, as explained in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (Prat. v.19.a.) "arisen from the immediately preceding condition which is the sense-cognition." And the Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. v.243 a-b., explains

> tasmādindriyavijñānānantarapratyayodbhavam /[2]
>
> Therefore, (the mental direct perception) produced from the immediately preceding condition, which is the sense-perception....

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* T.324. Fol.66.b.

1. dravya; rdza

2. It is interesting to note that Dharmakīrti uses the term anantara-pratyaya and not samanantara-pratyaya. The sense arises from the formed sense organ; hence, there is a similar (sama) immediately preceding condition. There is no mental sense, however, arising by way of a mental sense; hence, there is not a similar immediately preceding condition, merely an immediately preceding one.

The support condition: The support condition of the first moment[1] of sense direct perception is not the support condition of the first moment of the mental direct perception, because that is completely passed away at the time of the immediately preceding condition of mental direct perception. As it is explained (in PV. Prat. 240 a-b.):

> kṣaṇikatvādatītasya darśanasya na sambhavaḥ /
> Because it is momentary, there is no possibility of an elapsed glimpse.

Therefore, its affiliated second moment is the apprehensible object (grahyārtha) of both the first moment of mental direct perception and the second moment of sense direct perception.[2] +

B. Establishing its self-presence has three sections:

1. The method of arising.
2. Proving it as an authority.
3. Pondering the occasion of its arising.

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1. skad cig: kṣaṇa.

2. This brief discussion above by Go-rams-pa touches upon the extremely important theory of momentariness and in turn the Buddhist view of the impermanence of everything in the phenomenal world. For examinations of this topic I refer the interested reader to D.Kalupahana, Causality.., p.152-154, and to the article by Rita Gupta entitled, "The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness and Its Presuppositions", Journal of Indian Philosophy 8 (1980), p.47-68. While Kalupahana's discussion focuses on Early Buddhism, Ms. Gupta's article concentrates on the topic of momentariness as it is put forth by Dharmakīrti in his Hetubindu.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mnon sum, 6. a-b:
yid kyi mnon sum du ma yan/
dban ses bzin du ran rig gcig/
Although there are various mental direct perceptions according to the sense cognitions; there is a single introspection.)

1. Method of arising: If it is said, "after the cessation of (any one of) the five sense direct perceptions the (respective one of the) five mental direct perceptions either arise at once or they do not arise at once. If they (never) arise at once, then a distinct result (phala) would not be accomplished as arising from a distinct cause (hetu). And if they (always) arise (at once), then there is the fallacy of many personal continuua[1] in a single person." Though arising in this way, that fallacious fault of 'many personal continuua in a single person' is not present, because (that person) is an aggregation with a single continuity of inner self-intuition (sva-saṁvitti).[2] If it is otherwise, that is, when the five sense direct perceptions and constructive thought arise with one accord, then there is the fallacious fault of many personal continuua in a single person. Now, suppose someone says that (the Buddha's teaching which states)

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1. rgyud; saṁtāna.

2. This is important in light of the statement made by Dkon-mchog-'jigs-med-dbaṅ-pa, in his brief Grub mtha work, and translated by Dr. Wayman in his article "Reflections on the Study of Buddhist Logic," Indologica Taurinensia, Vol. V, 1977, p.302, to wit, "the followers of reason believe in the mano-vijñāna as the basic characteristic of the personality."

"sentient beings[1] are each a single continuum (saṃtāna) of perceptions"[2] contradicts the above explanation. We reply that there is no fault (doṣa), because when examined inwardly upon the mind-based perception (manovijñāna) (the continuum) is not by way of a single continuity of self-intuition. Since the five mental direct perceptions are without continuity, the self-intuition (=introspection) which experiences (anubhava)[3] them is also without continuity.[*]

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 6.c-d:
> 'khrul pa med phyir tshad ma yin/
> rgyun med phyir na ṅes ma nus/
> [Mental direct perception] is an authority because it lacks delusion. But because it lacks continuity [mental direct perception] is unable to be certain.)

2. Proving it as an authority: Mental direct perception is actually an authority because of apprehending with a non-delusive cognition. But, as an outward-direct perception it is unable to bring forth certainty by its own

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* T. p.324,Fol. 67.a.

1. sems can; sattva.

2. rnam par śes pa'i rgyud; vijñāna-saṃtāna. I have not yet found the exact source of this quotation. However, the absence of an enduring personality to which this verse alludes is extensively discussed from the earliest Buddhist materials throughout its development. See for example, H.C. Warren, Buddhism in Translations, Atheneum, 1972, p.146-147; 149;150. During our discussions Dr. Wayman pointed out that the vijñāna-saṃtāna was different from the mano-vijñāna.

3. myoṅ ba; anubhava.

force, because it is without continuity. Therefore, it does not make a convention, to wit, "the authority according to worldly convention." For example, the atom[1] (paramāṇu) is the object of sense cognition, but in convention[2] it is not mentioned as the object.[3]

3. Pondering the occasion of its arising has three sub-[+] sections, to wit:

   A. Laying out the various explanations.

   B. Determining the valid position.

   C. Eliminating disputes.

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 7:
> dbaṅ po gzugs can las dbaṅ skye/
> des na dbaṅ śes rgyun bcas yin/
> yid dbaṅ las ni yid dbaṅ min/
> de yi phyir na de rgyun med /

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1. rdul phra rab.

2. tha sñad; saṁvṛti. This term is most often correlated with paramārthā or the absolute sense. Throughout a good deal of the Buddhist materials the dichotomy of conventional meaning and absolute meaning can be found. For example in the present case;

3. Cf. A. Wayman, "Reflections...,",p.299. In that article Prof. Wayman translates a passage from Dharmottara's Pramāṇaparīkṣa in which Dharmottara is discussing the object of direct perception--the efficient entity. In that passage Dharmottara declares the subtle atom as the efficient entity and color (varṇa) as its nature, but not shape (saṃsthāna). Furthermore, Dharmottara states that"shape exists conventionally (saṃvṛtitas) while color exists in the absolute sense (paramārthatas)."

> The sense arises from the formed sense organ; therefore, the sense cognition (indriya-jñana) has continuity. There is no mental sense (mana indriya) by way of a mental sense; therefore, it lacks continuity.[1]

A. Laying out the various explanations: According to the (Pramāṇavārttika) Ālaṁkāra,[2] initially there is one moment (kṣaṇa) of sense direct perception; after that one moment of mental direct perception arises, and after that the second moment of sense direct perception arises, so on and so forth. At the beginning there is apprehending by the sense direct perception, at the end mental direct perception concludes. This attribution to the Ālaṁkāra is due to the Kaśmīrian Paṇḍita and his disciples.

According to Ācārya Dharmottara,[3] at the end of the on-going of (a particular) direct sense perception one moment of mental direct perception arises, but not before. Because every cognition which clearly illuminates a form (rūpa) when the eye is apprehending a form amounts to eye cognition. Otherwise, it would be difficult to justify[4] the term 'eye cognition'. So he (Dharmottara) claims.

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1. This verse represents the view which Go-rams-pa identifies as the one put forth by the Great Brahman.

2. It is a fairly common practice for native Tibetan materials to refer to Prajñakaragupta's Pramāṇavārttikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṁkara simply as Ālaṁkārā. Besides Sa-skya Paṇḍita and Go-rams-pa, cf. 'Jam-dbyaṅs-bźad-pa, Blo rigs, p.360, Fol. 26.b. Also see Kajiyama, An Introduction, p. 48.

3. In addition to the commentary on the Nyāya-bindu Dharmottara also wrote a commentary on the Pramāṇa-viniścaya. This is a detailed work which is quite difficult to work with.

4. rñed pa. Das defines this as to find, discover.

According to the Great Brahman,[1] initially only one moment of sense direct perception arises. And after that there arises an equal number[2] of sense direct perceptions and mental direct perceptions, until the continuity of the sense direct perception is complete.* But, the sense direct perception arises from the previous (formed sense organ) equal to its own class (jāti). Therefore, it has continuity. And the mental direct perception did not arise from a prior (condition) equal to its own class. It arises from the sense direct perception which is the immediately preceding condition. Therefore, it has no continuity. Thus is the view of the Great Brahman.

> (Here Go-rams-pa comments on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 8.a-b:
> spel ma daṅ ni rgyun gyi mtha'/
> gñis ka la yaṅ gnod byed yod/
> And both the alternation (theory of Prajnākaragupta and the completion (theory of Dharmottara) bring about contradiction.)

Accordingly, from among the three views: the first, the view of the Ālaṁkāra is not right. Because the three conditions of the second moment of sense direct perception are complete in the first moment of sense direct perception, nothing whatsoever is able to obstruct the direct result+

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* T. p.325, Fol.67.b. + S.C. 138

1. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, I,p. 42, identifies Śaṅkarānanda as the Great Brahmin. All that remains of the Great Brahmin's unfinished commentary on the Pramāṇavārtika is his incomplete commentary on the Svārthānumana chapter.

2. graṅs mñam.

arising from the direct cause (complete in the first moment).[1] Otherwise, if one accepts as do the Mīmāṁsaka, that the sense cognition arises having alternated between that which is experienced and that which is the experiencer, than all the fallacies discussed by the ācarya (Dignāga)[2] concerning (a sense cognition) not continuously illumining its own object are permitted in this instance also.

Even the view of Dharmottara (above this section A.) is not right.[3] Since the three conditions for the mental direct perception are fulfilled before the completion of the continuity of the sense direct perception, there is nothing obstructing the mental direct perception's arising (during the sense direct perception).[4] If it is thought that (the mental direct perception's arising) is obstructed by the sense direct perception, that also is not right. Because

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1. The three conditions (pratyaya) referred to are; samanantara-pratyaya, adhipati-pratyaya, and ālambana-pratyaya. See above Rigs gter gsal byed, p.133-134 and Introduction Part II, Sense Direct Perception.

2. For Dignāga's examination of the Mīmāṁsaka theory of perception and his criticism thereof see Hattori, Dignāga,..., p. 63-70 and p. 161-72.

3. Dharmottara's theory of perception, however, closely resembles the threshold concept of perceptual change which is current in moderen psychology. Cf. Robert Isaacson, et al., Psychology: The Science of Behavior, Harper and Row, New York, 1965, p.164-168. Also see above Introduction Part II, Mental Direct Perception.

4. Note that the Ālaṅkāra's theory was invalid because the conditions for the second moment of sense direct perception were present, in this case, it is the three conditions of the mental direct perception which are present. For a discussion see above Introduction Part II, Mental Direct Perception.

it is impossible[1] to obstruct the direct result's arising from the direct cause. If it were otherwise, then it would be obstructed even at the conclusion of the continuity (of the sense direct perception).

B. Determining the valid position: From the Sūtra it is stated:

> Bhikṣus the cognition of form (rūpa) is twofold--that based on the eye (cakṣus, etcetera) and that based on the mind (manas).[2]

And (Dignāga) states in the Pramāṇasamuccaya, (Prat.4.c.):

> There is also the mental (awareness) of the object.

And (Dignāga's) commmentary thereon:

> mānasam api rūpādi-viṣayālambanam avikalpakam anubhavākārapravṛttaṁ /[3]
>
> Also the mental (awareness) has a consciousness-support (ālambana) of the sense object form, etcetera; promoted by the image of experience, that is without constructive thought.

And the meaning of this, from the Pramāṇaviniścaya (Prat. 19. a-c):

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1. mi srid pa; asaṁbhava.

2. Cf. Saṃyutta Nikaya, ed. L. Feer, six vols., London, 1884-1904, vol.I., p.29.

3. Sanskrit fragment available in the Appendix of Hattori, Dignāga....

dbaṅ śes de ma thag rkyen las /

byuṅ źiṅ de don de ma thag /

'dzin par byed pa'i yid kyaṅ ṅo /

Also the mental (awareness) arises from the sense cognition which is the immediately preceding condition, and it freshly apprehends the object.

When establishing the meaning of these explanations there* are two sections:

1. Determining the method of arising, and,
2. Considering the procedure of direct perception, etcetera.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 8.c-d:
des na dbaṅ po dbaṅ śes kyi/
rgyu yin yid kyi rkyen du 'gyur/
Therefore, while the sense organ is the cause (hetu) of the sense perception, it becomes the condition (pratyaya) of the mental [direct perception].) [2]

1. Determining the method of arising: It (mānasa-pratyakṣa)

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* T. p.325, Fol. 68.a.

1. It should be noted that Go-rams-pa has not referred to the Pramāṇavārtika in order to clarify the verse he presented from the Pramanasamuccaya. This is significant in light of the debate over whether or not the Pramāṇavārtika was composed by Dharmakīrti as a commentary on the Pramāṇa samuccaya. Cf. A. Wayman, "Reflection...," p.292-296.

2. Sa-skya Pandita's usage of the two terms rgyu (hetu) and rkyen (pratyaya) sheds some new light on the question as to significance of these two terms. From Sa-skya Pandita's verse it can be seen that the rgyu and the rkyen are indicating different functions. According to Das, A Tibetan-English Dictionary, rgyu is the primary cause as distinguished from rkyen, the secondary or co-operating cause. According to Kalupahana,

is not born prior to or simultaneously[1] with the first moment of sense direct perception. Because it is explained that when there is a mental direct perception, it is necessarily arisen[2] from the sense direct perception which is its immediately preceding condition. Therefore, (mental[+] direct perception) arises after the first moment of sense direct perception. And in that case, (the view that mental direct perception) arises at the finish of the continuity of sense direct perception is not right. Because of the fallacious condition[3] already mentioned regarding Dharmottara.

Although (the mental direct perception) arises before the (sense direct perception) continuity is complete, they (indriya and mānasa pratyakṣa) do not arise alternately as the (Pramāṇavārttika) Ālaṁkāra (says they do). In fact they arose at the same time, in the following manner:

--the first moment of sense direct perception having both the governing condition (adhipati-

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p.56., it is almost certain that these two terms were used synonymously in the Pali Nikāyas and Chinese Āgamas. Kalupahana, however, is in the minority regarding the similarity of hetu and pratyaya; he presents a summary of misled scholars who recognize a difference between hetu and pratyaya (See Kalupahana, p.56-57). Tsoṅ-kha-pa like Sa-skya Paṇḍita differentiates rgyu and rkyen.

+ S.C. 139

1. dus mñam pa 'an sṅa rol.

2. byun dgos par.

3. skyon gnas pa.

pratyaya) and the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya), and,

--the external object which is contemporaneous with that (first moment of sense direct perception) having become the support condition (ālambana-pratyaya):

--the first moment of the mental direct perception which is contemporaneous with the second moment of the sense direct perception arises as a divergent 'material' (dravya).

Thereupon, they arise in equal number until the continuity of the sense direct perception is complete.

> (Here Go-rams-pa comments on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 9.a-b:
> raṅ rig yin phyir rgyu[1] gźan[2] med/
> des na mṅon sum 'gros gsum pa/
> Because it is an inner awareness it lacks an outer cause. Therefore, it is the third procedure of direct perception.

2. Considering the procedure of direct perception: When considering the procedure of a direct perception, then there are three procedures, because there are the two procedures of the sense direct perception and the mental direct per-

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1. The Tokyo manuscript had rgyud which made little sense; however, xylographic print of the Tshad ma rigs gter printed from blocks preserved at Simtokha, Bhutan had the rgyu which fit the context, p. 30.

2. gźan; para. Literally another, but here in the same sense as gźan rig, outward direct perception.

ception concerning the external appearance, and the single procedure of introspective direct perception (svasaṁvedana-pratyakṣa) which experiences those two in inner examination.[1]

By way of the support-condition there would be five procedures.[2] When the set of three conditions are present simultaneously for (each of the) five (sense direct perceptions), then ten arise, that is to say, the five second moments of the five sense direct perceptions and the five first moments of mental direct perception. But, according to the support-condition both the second moment of the* sense direct perception apprehending form and the first moment of mental direct perception apprehending form are posited as a single direct perception apprehending form. When the procedure of the mental function is added, then there would be seven, because through the mental function there is a twofold certainty, that is, inner certainty (of the mental sense) and the outward-directed+ certainty (of the sense organ).

C. Eliminating Disputes: Here there are three subsections:

1. Eliminating the disputes of Outsiders (tīrthika).
2. Eliminating the disputes of other commentators.

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* T. 325, Fol. 68.b. + S.C. 140

1. naṅ bltas.

2. To wit, that of indriya, and the other senses.

3. mu stegs; tīrthika. There are many divisions of the Outsiders; briefly, however, they are generally known as consisting of five schools of philosophers, Vaiṣṇava, Aiśvara, Jaina, Kāpila, and Bārhaspatya. They are also known according to six fundamental schools, Vaiśeṣika, Naiyāyika, Sāṁkhya, Mīmāṁsaka, Nirgrantha, and Lokāyata or Cārvāka.

3. Eliminating the disputes of other Tibetans.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 9.c-d:
yul gźan 'dzin daṅ dbaṅ po la/
ltos phyir 'di la skyon gñis med/
Because [mental direct perception] apprehends a separate sense object and because it depends on the sense organ, it lacks both faults [explained in PV.Prat.239].)

1. Eliminating the disputes of Outsiders (tīrthika): This should be known from the text (of the PV. Prat.239), etc.:

pūrvānubhūtagrahaṇe mānasasyāpramāṇatā /
adṛṣṭagrahaṇe 'ndhāderapi syādarthadarśanam /
When apprehending the previously experienced,
the mind would have non-authoritativeness.
When apprehending the not yet perceived,
then there would be perception of the object-
entity even by the blind, etcetera.[1]

2. Eliminating the disputes of other commentators: (Our theory about the occasion of the arising of mānasa-pratyakṣa) is not contradicted by the criticism pronounced towards

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1. Go-rams-pa indicates his lack desire to dispute with the non-Buddhist schools by this sections paucity. The First criticism contained in this verse is aimed at pointing out a violation of the requirement that a pratyakṣa must apprehend its object newly in order to be considered an authority; see D. Shastri, Pramāṇavārtika, p.8. The latter criticism attempts to show the absurd result which would follow if indeed the mental direct perception did apprehend a different object from the sense direct perception. Even though a blind person's mental apparatus may be functioning correctly, his eye sense organs are not; hence, as Sa-skya Pandita's verse (9.c-d) indicates, because the mental direct perception depends on the sense organ the fault that the blind person would see is not present. As to the non-Buddhist proponent behind these criticisms see above Introduction,Part II, Mental Direct Perception.

the (Pramāṇavārttika) Ālaṁkāra. (In our view mānasa-pratyakṣa) does not act on an ascertained object, because it is not born mingled (with the sense direct perception).

Nor, is (our view) contradicted by the criticism which Dharmottara has pronounced. Because the duration of the sense direct perception can be produced while (mānasa-pratyakṣa) is not complete, but only when (the direct perception) is not produced at the conclusion (of the mānasa-pratyakṣa).

(According to Dharmottara) when there is eye activity, then all cognitions which clearly perceive form must be eye-cognition (cakṣur-vijñāna). Otherwise, there would be the absurdity of not finding (a pratyakṣa) termed "eye-cognition".[1] (We say Dharmottara's argument) does not contradict our theory. Because, if it is otherwise (than the preceding), then when there is mental orientation[2] (as in samādhi), none of the cognitions which clearly perceive form would be mental direct perception. Because, there would be the similar absurdity of not finding it (i.e. mental orientation) termed "mental direct perception". And there would be the absurdity that when a form clearly

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1. yid byed; manaskāra. For an examination of the various kinds of mental orientation and their procedure I refer the interested reader to Alex Wayman's translation of the śamatha (źi gnas) and vipaśyanā (lhag mthoṅ) sections of Tsoṅ kha pa's Lam rim chen mo. In this work, published under the title Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real (Col. Univ. Press, 1978), there are several sections which focus on manaskāra.

2. mig śes.

appears in eye-cognition, then the form cannot also clearly appear in samādhi.

3. Eliminating the disputes of other Tibetans: Here there are two sections:

A. Eliminating the fallacies amounting to the incorrect designation of the three procedures (of direct perception).

B. Eliminating the fallacy that there is no distinction between arousing and not arousing a certain cognition.

A. Eliminating the fallacies amounting to the incorrect designation of the three procedures (of direct perception):

N̆a dpon[1] says that (our) designation of the three procedures[2] is incorrect. Because (he says), as there are the two procedures (of indriya and mānasa) which know the object externally,[3] there are two procedures of self-intuition (svasaṁvitti) which experiences those two internally.[4] In this way, there would be four procedures. Or (he says), as there is the single self-intuition of those two (indriya and mānasa) internally, externally also those two are a

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* T. 325, Fol.69.a. + S.C. 141

1. I have not been able to identify this person. N̆a dpon is most likely an abbreviated form of the full name. Traditionally a Tibetan name may be abbreviated to the first and third syllables, for instance, Sa-skya Paṇḍita is sometimes shortened to Sa paṇ.

2. 'gros gsum.

3. phyi ba.

4. naṅ ba.

single procedure which knows the object. In this way, there would be two procedures.

Now then (we say) even (Ña dpon's) fourfold variegation of the procedure of direct perception is a fallacious incorrect designation. Because, (according to his own view) as there are the three direct perceptions: sense, mental and yogic[1] (which know the object externally), there is the introspective direct perception which experiences those three. In this way, (according to his view) there ought to be six procedures. Or,[2] as there is the single self-intuition (=introspection) of those three (internally), like before, (externally) the three are a single procedure which knows the object. In this way there would be two procedures. Therefore, when perceived here, the three direct perceptions explained in the direct perception section, excluding the yogin's direct perception, arise as a single (procedure). Thus, the procedure of the three direct perceptions from among the four direct perceptions is the complete meaning of the statement. But, generally there is no certainty concerning the three procedures, because when considering the procedures according to the support-condition, etcetera, it is explained as five and seven also.[3]

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1. dbaṅ yid rnal 'byor.

2. yaṅ na; athavā.

3 Go-rams-pa mentioned the idea of five and seven procedures according to the support condition previously in the section entitled "Considering the procedure of direct perception."

B. <u>Eliminating the fallacy that there is no distinction between arousing and not arousing a certain cognition</u>:

Suppose someone argues (about our theory of the arising of mental direct perception) that, "when there arises an equal number of sense direct perceptions and mental direct perceptions after the second moment of sense direct perception, then there would be no distinction between what can and what cannot arouse certainty concerning those two (direct perceptions)". In reply to this,[1] the *Pramāṇa-yuktinidhi* (pg. 162. Fol.16b.) states:

/dbaṅ po gzugs can las dbaṅ skye /
/des na dbaṅ śes rgyun bcas yin /
/yid dbaṅ las ni yid dbaṅ min /
/de yi phyir na de rgyun med /

> The sense arises from the formed sense organ; therefore, the sense-cognition (*indriya-jñāna*) has continuity. There is no mental sense (*mana - indriya*) by way of a mental sense; therefore, it lacks continuity.[2]

And Sa-skya Paṇḍita's self-commentary (*sva-vṛtti*) on this verse states (pg. 221. Fol. 34.b.):

> From the earlier moment of the formed sense

1. *'di'i lan du*.

2. It should be remembered that this verse was already presented as verse 7 of the Mṅon sum chapter; see above the section entitled "Laying out the various explanations."

organ arises the later moment of the formed sense organ. Therefore, it does not have the eternalism (śāśvata) like the outsider's (kind of) continuity.[1] But it does have the continuity of uninterrupted production in the same class (sajāti).[3] The[*][+] mental sense organ only arises immediately upon the cessation of the earlier sense-cognition (indriya-jñāna). Since a later (mental sense) does not arise from a former mental sense, it lacks continuity. Hence, (the mental senses) of each individual[4] cannot be conjoined, in consequence of which they cannot ascertain anything other than their own (province).

Regarding the meaning of (Sa-skya Paṇḍita's) statement: --Some Tibetans have interpreted literally[5] the purport of the Pramāṇayuktinidhi; namely, the notion that the mental sense does not arise from the mental sense. To refute that we need only be happy that they were denying what was

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* T. 326 + S.C.142

1. For a discussion of the eternalism of the Outsiders, see D.N. Shastri, Critique of Indian Realism, Agra, 1964, p.126-154.

2. skye ba bar ma cad pa'i rgyun.

3. 'gags. From 'gag pa- to stop, or to cease.

4. so so sgye bo

5. sgra ji bźin ñid.

never held by us in the first place. Because it does not amount to the purport[1] of the *Pyn* that the mental sense does not arise from the mental sense.[2]

--Some Tibetans have equated the purport with it (i.e with the literal sense). But that formulation[3] is wrong, because the later arises from the earlier sense-cognition, and likewise the mental sense arises from the sense perception.

--Some Tibetans take the purport to be that the later does not arise from the earlier mental sense which is the governing condition (*adhipati-pratyaya*) of mental direct perception. But this is wrong, because each moment of the sense direct perception is the governing condition of the mental direct perception.

--Some Tibetans take the purport to be that the mental sense as a mental direct perception does not arise from the mental sense as a mental direct perception. But we do not agree that this is the purport of the verse, because if it is like that it reduces to the fallacy (*prasaṅga*) that one is required to formulate the meaning of the passage, "the sense arises from the formed sense organ" (quoted above,V.7.), as that formed sense organ[4] which

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1. *dgoṅs pa*.
2. *yid dbaṅ las yid dbaṅ mi skye ba*.
3. *sgrub par byed pa; vidhi*.
4 *dbaṅ po gzugs can*.

is the direct sense direct perception arises from the formed sense organ which is the direct sense perception.[1]

Therefore, the purport of (Sa-skya Pandita's) statement is thus:

--The sense direct perception has continuity, because the later one arises from the earlier formed sense organ as[+] the governing condition, and is apart from the 'material'-continuity of the immediately preceding condition of the sense direct perception.

--The mental direct perception lacks continuity, because there is no later one arising from an earlier mental[*] sense as governing condition, apart from the 'material'-continuity of the immediately preceding condition of the mental direct perception. There is logical pervasion, because the continuity of the immediately preceding condition of the mental direct perception is the continuity of the sense direct perception but is not the continuity of the mental direct perception. The first named reason (hetu) is proved because both the immediately preceding condition and the governing condition of the mental

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\+ S.C.143 * T. 326, Fol. 70.a.

1. It is interesting to note that Go-rams-pa has employed one of the logical fallacies in this case. Dignaga originally put forth nine possible logical reasons in his work entitled, Hetu-cakra. Of the nine possible logical reasons only two were valid, that is to say, met the three-fold requirement of the valid reason. The remaining seven were invalid for various reasons. In this case it appears to be the fallacy of the contrary reason (viruddha-hetu-ābhāsa). For a discussion of this fallacy and the remaining reasons see Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol. I, p.320-362.

direct perception are the same 'material'.[1] Therefore, the three conditions of the sense direct perception have three dissimilar 'material'-continuities.[2] And the 'material'-continuity of the immediately preceding condition is precisely the 'material'-continutiy of the sense direct perception. Therefore, the sense direct perception has continuity.

Both the immediately preceding condition and the support condition of the mental direct perception have different 'material'-continuities: while both the immediately preceding condition and the governing condition lack different 'material'-continuities. And the 'material'-continuity of the immediately preceding condition (of <u>mānasa-pratyakṣa</u>) is also the 'material'-continuity of the sense direct perception but not the 'material'-continuity itself of the mental direct perception. Therefore, that (mental direct perception) does not have its 'material' continuity is the incontrovertible purport of the <u>Mahātman</u>.[3] But after Sa-skya Paṇḍita there has been no other scholar than myself to understand[4] this.

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1. <u>rdzas gcig</u>; <u>ekadravya</u>.
2. <u>rdzas rgyun mi 'dra ba</u>.
3. <u>bdag ñid chen po 'di'i dgoṅs pa phyin ci ma log pa</u>.
4. <u>rtogs pa</u>; <u>adhigama</u>.

3. Introspective direct perception (svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa)[1] is stated in the Pramāṇasamuccaya[2] (Prat. 4 c-d.) as:

rāgādisvasaṃvittir[3]akalpikā /

Self intuition (=introspection) of passion, etcetera, is without constructive thought.[5]

When establishing the meaning of the basic commentary there are three sections, to wit:

A. Pondering the definition.

B. Pondering the term.

C. Pondering the establishment.

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1. It must be mentioned that Go-rams-pa does not focus on the discussion over the lack of svasaṃvedana's acceptance by certain Buddhists, to wit, those Yogācārins who follow the five divisions of Asaṅga's Yogācārabhumi; cf. A.Wayman, "Reflections...,"p.301-304. Furthermore, as to theory put forth in that article by Professor Wayman, that the Buddhist logicians' rejection of the ālayavijnāna was in the form of a replacement, i.e."the 'introspection' kind of direct perception is substituted for the ālayavijnāna"; based on the present work by Go-rams-pa's title can be said. Go-rams-pa's neglect of the Asaṅga type Yogacarins is understandable, however, since this work is concerned with explaining the system put forth by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.

2. tshad ma mdor; Pramāṇasūtra. Tibetan materials often refer to the Pramāṇasamuccāya as the Pramāṇasūtra.

3. raṅ rig.

4. The complete Sanskrit fragement which is available in the Appendix to Hattori's Dignāga..., reads as follows; mānasam cartharāgādisvasaṃvittirakalpikā. Cf. the translation of this verse in Hattori's Dignāga and Wayman's A Millennium of Buddhist Logic (4th to 14th) (forthcoming).

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mnon sum, 10.a-b:
rañ gi ño bo rig::pa ni/
mṅon sum yin par mkhas rnams bzed/
Learned ones assert that the perception 1
cognizing its bare nature is a direct perception)

A. Pondering the definition: (Svasaṁvedana) is the apprehending-image (grāhakākara) delimiting (paricchedaka) its bare nature (svarūpa),[2] that is to say, as stated (by PV. Prat. 364 a-b.) thusly:

tatra buddheḥ paricchedo grāhakākārasammataḥ /

Therein, the delimiting of a cognition is agreed to be the subjective-image.

B. Pondering the term: Every cognition (jñāna)[3] has an introspective direct perception regarding its bare nature. But its introspective direct perception is not due to an exclusion of itself;[4] because it is the part of the lucid* experience of any cognition that is specifically termed "introspective direct perception". Here there are two

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+ S.C. 144 * T 326, Fol 70.b.

1. Cf. Sa-skya Pandita's sva-vrtti (p.222.Fol.35.b.): rañ rig mṅon sum gyi mtshan ñid ni/ śes pa rañ gi ño bo la ma 'khrul pa'o/ de ñid tshad ma'i mtshan ñid kyañ yin no/

2. If we can understand Sa-skya Paṇḍita's and Go-rams-pa's interpretation of svarūpa as representing their understanding of the sva in Dignāga'a verse fragment presented above, then they are following the interpretation of Prajnākāraguta (see his PVBh, p.303-.24.). This is compared with Jinendrabuddhi who interprets Dignāga's fragment into artha-saṁvitti and rāgādi-sva-saṁvitti (see PST, 24b, 4-5).

3. ses pa thams cad.

4. This notion of "exclusion of itself" is quite difficult and I have not yet been able to determine its exact meaning.

kinds, an introspective direct perception having a dual appearance, and an introspective direct perception without a dual appearance. The first one is when a single cognition (*buddhi*)[1] appears as both the apprehensible-image (*grāhya-ākāra*)[2] and the apprehending-image (*grāhakākara*),[3] namely, it is just the introspection with an appearance of a situation that is appearing as the apprehensible appearance to be experienced[4] and what experiences the apprehended appearance.[5] The second one is just that part[6] in every cognition which merely experiences its bare nature.

C. *Pondering the establishment*: Here there are three. Given a cognition, then there is an introspective direct perception of its bare nature. Therefore, there are these:

1. Pondering whether there is pervasion (*vyāpti*)[7] or non-pervasion.
2. Pondering whether or not there is a contradiction[8] (*virodha*) between the self-intuition (*svasaṃvitti*)

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1. blo gcig.
2. *gzuṅ rnam*.
3. *'dzin rnam*.
4. *gzuṅ par snaṅ ba myoṅ bya*.
5. *'dzin pa snaṅ pa myoṅ byed*.
6. *cha de ñid*.
7. *khyab pa*.
8. *'gal pa*.

and the outward-directed perception (parasaṁvitti).

3. Pondering whether the object is present or absent in self-intuition (=introspection).

1. Pondering whether there is pervasion (vyāpti) or non-pervasion: Some earlier generations (of scholars) say, "from among the two parts in that cognition which has the dualistic appearance, that is, the part which is illuminated as its bare nature and the part cognized as a separate object, the first part is the subjective-image. Therefore, it has an introspective direct perception about its bare nature. The later is the objective-configuration, therefore, it does not have an introspective direct perception of its bare nature."[1]

Now then, the Vaiśeṣika say to the Buddhists,[2] "when a happy feeling is the factual base (dharmin), then it is fallacious to say that it is not cognized as its bare[+] nature, because it is cognized as a separate object." For it to be proper to agree to this statement is absurd.[3] And continuing, (the Vaiśeṣika say), "when sense direct perception apprehending blue is the factual base, then it is fallacious to say that there is no cognition of blue, because it is not cognized as its bare nature." Because

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1. The source of this quotation has not been located.

2. saṅs rgyas pa.

3. źes pa 'di la 'dod laṅ 'debs rigs par thal ba.

they adhere to a fallacy (of reason), they miss the point for contradicting those who deny self-intuition.

If you accept (the absence of self-intuition) it is contradicted by (the PVin. Prat. 55 c-d), thus:

> dmigs pa mṅon sum ma yin na/*
> don mthoṅ rab tu 'grub mi 'gyur//
> If there is not a direct perception of a meditative object then there is no proof of seeing an external entity.

And (from the Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 444.a-b.), thus:

> athātmarūpaṁ no vetti pararūpasya vit katham /
> But if (a direct perception) could not perceive a subjective nature, how could it perceive an objective nature?

In our view, when there is a cognition (jñana), there is an introspective direct perception of its bare nature. There are two methods which prove the pervasion (of sva-saṁvedana-pratyakṣa), to wit; scripture (āgama) and reason.

1. Scripture: This is expressed by the PS. (Prat. 5 c-d)

> kalpanāpi svasaṃvittāviṣṭā nārthe vikalpanāt /
> Even constructive thought is accepted as (object for) self-intuition, because the constructive thought (there) is not toward an (external) object.[1]

And from the Pramāṇavārttika (Prat.287), thus:

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* T.326, Fol. 71.a.

1. In this case kalpanā would be a svalaksana; since the object for pratyaksa is always a svalakṣaṇa. Here one may say that Dignāga is explaining the range of pratyakṣa's objects.

śabdārthagrāhi yad yatra taj jñānaṃ tatra kalpanā /
svarūpaṃ ca na śabdārthas tatrādhyakṣam ato 'khilam //
Whatever and wherever the cognition is apprehending the auditory object, therein is the constructive thought. But there is no auditory object in the own nature (of the constructive thought), because therein [where is the auditory object] all (svalakṣaṇa-s) belong to direct perception.

2. Reason: The established method of proof (sādhana) is that the sense direct perception apprehending blue has an introspective direct perception of its bare nature; because that image which constitutes the experience of it (=blue) is in fact the sense direct perception apprehending blue. (The Pramāṇavārttika, Prat.426.a-b.) states:

dvairūpyasādhanenāpi prāyaḥ siddhaṃ svavedanam /
Ordinarily svavedana is proved by a method of proof of two marks.[1]

It (self-intuition) is also proved from the evidence[2] of remembering a later one, because it (i.e. the recollection) is proved to experience the sense direct perception apprehending blue when it happened. And that which experiences is not a different 'material'. As (Pramāṇavārttika)

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1. The two marks are anvaya and vyatireka.

2. rtags; liṅga.

states (Prat.485.a.):

smṛterapyātmavit siddhā /

Also self-intuition is a proof of memory.

Suppose someone argues against the lack of self-experience,[+] they fall into the logical fallacy that pleasure, etcetera, are a different 'material' creating experience, because if it creates experience it cannot experience itself.

If it is accepted (that there is no self-experience), then one should ponder whether it is a different cognitive 'material' at the same time as it;[1] or whether it is experienced by a different cognitive 'material' arisen later[2] (than it).

As a result, one may say that those (alternatives) are the contradictions mentioned in the text (Pramāṇasamuccaya, etcetera).[3]

2. Inward Perception and Outward-directed Perception: Those two are opposed (in the position of this school), because when there is a cognition (jñāna) which is an outward-directed perception of a single feature,[4] then there is pervasion by an outward-directed perception; but when there[*]

+ S.C. 146 * T. 327, Fol.71.b.

1. raṅ daṅ dus mnam pa'i śes pa rdzas gźan.

2. phyis byuṅ ba'i ses pa rdzas gźan.

3. Cf. especially PS.,Prat.11.a-b.: śes pa gźan gyis nams myoṅ na/thug med de la 'aṅ dran pa ste/

4. chos gcig la gźan rig gi śes pa. The use of the terms gźan rig and raṅ rig for the outward-directed perception and inward perception work quite well in this section

is an inward perception of a bare nature, then there is non-pervasion by inward perception.[1] Therefore, in the view of the Sautrāntika, what is the perceptual object for both the sense organs (*indriya*) and the mind (*mānasa*), is a different 'material' from itself. Consequently, they accept the direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) which cognizes an object (in that sense); but, they do not accept an inward-directed perception.[2]

In the view of the Vijñānavādin, what is the perceptual object of those two (*indriya* and *mānasa*) is not a 'material' different from them.[3] Therefore, they accept inward direct perception. In this way, according to the Vijñānavādin, the two direct perceptions (i.e.outward-directed and inward) are certain. And from the *Ālambanaparīkṣā* the three conditions (*pratyaya*) of sense direct perception are explained according to the Cittamātrins' own system, thus no opposition is

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1. According to both manuscripts, that is to say, the Sakya College edition and the Tokyo edition, in both the instance of outward-directed perception and inward perception there is non-pervasion. However, after discussing the situation with Professor Wayman it was decided that the context of the textual discussion suggested the presence of a comparison through opposition. Therefore, the non-pervasion (*ma khyab pa*) in the outward-directed perception was altered to pervasion (*khyab pa*). Incidentally, this change was also pointed out to me by one of the Lamas of Sakya College during my stay there in 1978.

2. There are two types of Sautrāntikas; those following scripture and those following reason. It is those Sautrāntika who follow scripture, to wit Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, who do not accept *svasaṁvedana*.

3. That is to say, the perceptual object is their consciousness.

recognized. And it (the Ālambanaparīkṣā)takes in the same sense the two authorities, to wit, the authority of the sense cognition as result and the authority of svasaṁvedana as result.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 10.c-d, and 11.a-b;
raṅ skye sṅon med skye ba yin/
raṅ rig bems po bzlod tsam yin/
des na raṅ rig raṅ skye gñis/
mtshuṅs pa'i go skoms yod ma yin/
Svasaṁvedana's arising without a prior inner arising merely contradicts the (presence) of a receptacle.. Therefore, both svasaṁvedana and inner arising do not have similar spheres.

3. Presence or Absence of an Object in Self-intuituion: The self-commentary of the Tshad ma rigs pa'i gter explains that introspective direct perception does not have a sense object (yul) [of its own].[1] But from the Pramāṇavārttika (Prat. 365) it is stated:

tatrātmaviṣaye māne yathā rāgādivedanam /
iyaṃ sarvatra saṃyojyā meyamānaphalasthitiḥ //
This rule of sanctionable, authority, and result is applicable everywhere, for example the experience of+ rāga, etcetera, when the authority has an inner object.[2]

And from the Pramāṇavārttika (Prat. 388) thus:

sakṛt saṁvedyamānasya niyamena dhiyā saha /
viṣayasya tato 'nyatvaṃ kenākāreṇa sidhyati //
Given an introspective object simultaneous with a cognition that is certain, the otherness from it is

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+ S.C. 147

1. Cf. Sa-skya Paṇḍita, ran 'grel, p. 222, Fol.110.b.

2. Regarding the use of ātma- as "inner", cf. adhyātma-vidyā, A. Wayman, Introduction to the Buddhist Tantric System,p.73.

proved by whatever the imagery.

Thus, just that which is the experiential of introspective direct perception[1] is referred to as "object of introspective direct perception."

If it is asked, 'what is the intention of those statements'? Regarding this, some scholars, without distinguishing the conventional (saṃvṛti) and the absolute (paramārtha),[2] say that self-intuition (=introspection) does not have an object. This explanation is not correct, because, conventionally, if self-intuition is without an object, then conventionally there is the fallacy that the apprehensible-image (grāhya-ākāra) is not the sanctionable (prameya) of the apprehending-image (grāhaka-ākāra). Some scholars say that even in the absolute sense (introspection) has an object, because it is a cognition which is non-deceptive (avisaṁvādin) about the functional object (pravṛtti-viṣaya)[3],i.e. since it is

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* T.327. Fol.72.a

1. rañ rig mnoñ sum gyi myañ bya de ñid.

2. tha sñad dañ don dam. One also finds the term kun rdzob (saṃvṛti) used quite often in conjunction with don dam.

3. 'jug yul. 'Jug yul is often contrasted with snañ yul or the object of appearance. In direct perception both the 'jug yul and the snañ yul can be the same. In a conceptual cognition these two cannot be the same. For example, in direct perception the "perceived table" is both 'jug yul and snañ yul; the object that appears is the actual objective table. In a conceptual cognition, however, the snañ yul is a mental image such as an idea of a table or of a far away place. Go-rama-pa has an interesting discussion of the 'jug yul and the snañ yul in the first chapter of the Rigs gter gsal byed (i.e. The Object of the Cognition). I am now planning to begin a study of that chapter within the near future.

an authority (pramāṇa). Concerning what they say, the definition of authority is the cognition which is non-deceptive (avisaṁvādi jñānam), and the non-deception moreover, has three ingredients, to wit, act (karma)[1], agent (kartṛi)[2], and function (kriyā)[3]. Thus it (pramāṇa) is stated as having a threefold distinction. And, in variegation (of pramāṇa) there are two kinds-- 'direct perception' (pratyakṣa) and 'inference' (anumāna). Therefore, that which is sanctionable (prameya) is twofold--'the inherent character' (svalakṣaṇa) and the 'generalizing character' (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). Therefore, (concerning what they say) does not understand the object (artha) in the dominion of conventional authority.

The central meaning is as follows: at the time one ponders with the absolute principle self-intuition does not have an object, because at that time, the objective aspect is not the (sense) object (viṣaya) of the subjective aspect;[4] and because at that time, a single cognition (buddhi) is not separated into the three: apprehended, apprehender, and the awareness. For example, when examined by the absolute principle, a single sound is not separated[+]

\+ S.C. 148

1. las.

2. byed po.

3. bya ba. Cf. arthakriyā.

4. This is quite right, the sense object (viṣaya) was the object for the sense direct perception (indriya-pratyakṣa) at its own time.

into the three: the evidence (*liṅga*), the feature (*dharma*), and the object-entity (*artha*). Therefore, there is no determination of that which is to be proved (*sādhya*) and that which proves (*sādhaka*).

Conventionally, introspective direct perception has an object, because, conventionally, the three: the objective aspect, the subjective-aspect, and the awareness, are recognized as the authority (*pramāna*), the result (*phala*), and the sanctionable (*prameya*). For example, with the conventional imagination that sound is a unity, exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*) analyzes (the sound) into the three,[1] to wit, sound (*śabda*)[2], produced (*kṛtaka*)[3], and impermanent (*anitya*),[4] and posits them as the evidence (*liṅga*), the feature (*dharma*), and the object (*artha*).[5] In consequence of which, the positing of that which is to proved (*sādhya*) and that which proves (*sādhaka*) is valid.

Therefore, implying the absolute principle, the *Pramāna*-

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1. For textual discussions of the inferential system of the Buddhists, see Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, p.47-243, and also A.Wayman, trans., "A guided...,"p.28-43.

2. *sgra.*

3. *byas*.

4. *mi rtag pa.*

5. In this case *śabda* is posited as the *artha*, or object under discussion. Impermanent is the *feature* *(dhrama;chos)* which is to be present in the *artha*; a relationship referred to as *pakṣadharma* (here Go-rams-pa seems to be using *artha* instead of *pakṣa*). The evidence is the *artha*'s being produced.

vārttika (Prat. 354 a.) states:

avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātma /

While the faculty of cognition is impartite...

And (Prat. 357. c [second-half] and d) states:

'vidyamānāpi grāhyagrāhakasaṃvidām / *

Even though (the triad) of the apprehensible, apprehension, and the intuition is not present...

Accordingly, the Pramāṇayuktinidhi-svavṛtti sets forth that introspective direct perception does not have an object.[1]

Implying the conventional sense the following two verse portions are stated immediately after the two previous ones of the Pramāṇavārttika, (Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 354 b-d):

viparyāsitadarśanaiḥ /

grāhyagrāhakasaṃvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate //

Because of inverted views it is characterized as though possessing the difference of the apprehensible, the apprehension, and the intuition.

And (Prat. 357 a-c [first half]) thus:

yathānudarśanaṃ ceyaṃ meyamānaphalasthitiḥ /

kriyate /

And according to the view which follows after (the difference), this rule of the sanctionable,

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* T.327. Fol.72.b.

1. That is to say, it does not have an object according to the absolute principle.

the authority, and the result operates.

Thus, we have sufficiently established that the objective-aspect is both the object of the subjective-aspect and the sanctionable. Briefly, there is no positing[1] in the absolute sense, that the three: the objective-aspect, the subjective-aspect, and the intuition, in a single cognition, are the authority, the result, and the sanctionable. But conventionally, if one understands the meaning of the position of the Pramāṇavārttika as stating the establishment of those[+] (relations), then one would conclude that a different method of explanation does not see the main point.

Yogin's Direct Perception

4. The yogin's direct perception (yogi-pratyakṣa) is referred to by the Sugata[2] thusly:

> chos rnams la chos kyi mig rdul med ciṅ dri ma
> daṅ bral ba rnam par dag /
>
> (The yogin's direct perception) is the eye (cakṣus) of dharma toward dharma; it is pure, free from stain and without dust.[3]

+ S.C. 149

1. bźag tu; sthiti.

2. bde bar gśe gs pa. The Sanskrit Sugata comes from the prefix su (good, well,etc.) plus gata, the passive participle of the root √gam (to go).

3. Cf. A. Wayman, "The Buddhist Theory of Vision," Añjali: a Felicitation Volume Presented to Oliver Hector de Alwis Wijesekera on his sixtieth birthday (University of Ceylon, Peradeniya, 1970), pp.27-32, In that article compare the discusion which shows the equivalance of the "knowledge eye" to the "eye of dharma".

And the _Pramāṇasamuccaya_ (Prat.5a-b.):

yogināṁ gurunirdeśāvyatibhinnārthamātradṛk /[1]

The yogin's seeing just the object unmixed with the guru's instruction.

And the _Pramāṇavārttika_ (_Prat_. 281.a-b) states:

prāguktaṁ yogināṁ jñānaṁ teṣāṁ tad bhāvanāmayam /

As previously mentioned,[2] the cognition of those yogins consists of creative contemplation.

In order to make certain the meaning of these explanations there are three sections, to wit:

A. Determining the self-presence (_svabhāva_).

B. The rule by which (_yogi-pratyakṣa_) is an authority toward an object.

C. The reasons proving (_yogi-pratyakṣa_).

A. _Determining the self-presence_: Here there are also three sections, that is:

1. The definition of _yogi-pratyakṣa_.
2. The variegation of _yogi-pratyakṣa_.
3. Pondering the cause (_hetu_) of _yogi-pratyakṣa_.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on _Tshad ma rigs gter_, Mṅon sum, 11.c-d, and 12.a:

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1. Sanskrit fragment available in the Appendix to Hattori's _Dignāga_...

2. The yogins contemplation was previously discussed in the "Pramāṇasiddhi" chapter.

phye nas mtshan ñid 'jog 'khrul/[1]
bsgom byuṅ 'khrul med mṅon sum ste/
'khrul pa can rnams ltar snaṅ yin/
Having divided [the definition of yogic-direct perception and its authority, many Tibetans][2] mistakenly establish the definition [of yogic-direct perception]. [In our view the definition is] a non-delusive direct perception arisen in contemplation; those possessing delusion are falsification (ābhāsa).

1. The definition of yogi-pratyakṣa: A cognition which is non-delusive regarding the 'privileged object' (samyag-artha);* having consciousness-support in the salient sāmadhi arisen in that contemplation of the 'privileged object' amounting to its own specific governing-condition.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 12.b-d, and 13.a:
'phags pa gsum gyi mṅon sum gsum/.
slob daṅ mi slob sgo nas lṅa/
de dag snaṅ bcas snaṅ med gyi/
dbye bas gñis gñis rnam bcu/
There are the three direct perceptions of the three ārya-s. By way of those who are undergoing training and those who are beyond training, there are five. Divided according to whether they have appearance or they are without appearance, there are ten paired images.

2. The variegation of yogi-pratyakṣa: By way of the receptacle (āśraya) there are three, that is:

--The yogi-pratyakṣa of the Hearer (śrāvaka).

--The yogi-pratyakṣa of the Solitary Realizer (pratyeka-buddha).

--The yogi-pratyakṣa of the Mahāyāna Nobles (ārya).[3]

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* T. 327. 73.a

1. Note that this is the same verse fragment (that is 11.c.) that appears in verse fragment 3.a. above.

2. Cf. Sa-skya Paṇḍita's raṅ 'grel, p.222. Fol.111.a.

3. The definition and variegation of yogi-pratyakṣa presented

Considering those who are undergoing training and those beyond training, they add up to five. Because according to the Hearers there is both the yogin's direct perception of those undergoing training and those beyond training.[1] And there is the yogic direct perception of the Solitary Realizer who is beyond training. And according to the Mahāyāna there is both the yogic direct perception of those undergoing training and those beyond training.

Among those (five) there are ten, according to whether they have the appearance (of worldly natures) or are without the appearance (of worldly natures). Because each of the five have both the yogin's direct perception incorporated in equipoise (samāpatti)[2] and the yogin's direct perception incorporated in subsequent attainment.[3]

3. Pondering the cause of yogi-pratyakṣa: There is[+] the differnce of the result (phala) depending on:

--The cause of the two knowledges (jñāna).

--The time for its completion.

--The means (upāya).

\+ S.C. 150

here is quite similar to the one which Tsoṅ-kha-pa accepts; Cf. A. Wayman, trans., "A guided...," p.13.

1. That is to say, those undergoing religious training. The arhat is beyond training because he has overcome the influence of passions (āśrava-kṣaya); Cf. Abhidharmakośa, chapter, IV.

2. mñam gźag.

3. rjes thob.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 13.b-d, and 14.a:
thabs daṅ śes rab legs sbyaṅs pa/
phan tshun rgyu daṅ rkyen gyur bas/
ji lta ba daṅ ji sñed pa'i/
ye śes gzags pa 'grub par 'gyur/
The well practiced means and insight are mutually the cause and the condition, when they are established as bestowing the knowledge of noumenon and phenomena.)

A. The cause of the two knowledges: Having support on the material cause (upādāna-kāraṇa) which is the insight (prajñā) which understands selflessness (nairātmya) and on the cooperative condition (sahakārin-pratyaya) which is great compassion (mahākaruṇā) as the means, establishes the knowledge which realizes noumenon.[1] And on the other hand, the reverse establishes the knowledge which realizes all apparent phenomena.[2]

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 14.b-c:
tshe gsum bskal pa brgya daṅ ni/
graṅs med gsum gyis de mthar phyin/
Final emancipation [is attained] in three life times, in one hundred eons, and in three incalculable eons.)

B. The time necessary for attaining the yogin's direct perception: The time for the attainment of the yogic-direct perception of the Hearers is reached in three life

1. ji lta ba; yathāvad-bhāvikatā. With regard to meditation, Tsoṅ-kha-pa has defined noumenon as the reality and the thusness of the meditative object; Cf. A. Wayman, trans., Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, Columbia Univ. Press, 1978, p.105.

2. ji sñed pa; yāvad-bhāvikatā. Again Tsoṅ-kha-pa has defined phenomenon as all the constructed which is comprised in the five personality aggregates, all the natures comprised in the eighteen realms and in the twelve sense bases, and all the knowable entities composed in the four noble truths; Cf. A. Wayman, Calming, p. 105.

times by one who is extremely zealous;[1] because it is explained (in the Abhidharmakośa, Ch.VI. 24.d.) thus:

ksipram moksas tribhir bhavāiḥ /

Deliverance is quickest in three existences.

The yogic-direct perception of the Solitary Realizer is finally attained in one-hundred eons (kalpa); because it is explained (again in the Abhidharmakośa, Ch. III, 94.d.)thus:

khaḍgaḥ kalpasatānvayaḥ /

The Rhinoceros[2] has a preceeding cause of one hundred eons.

The yogic-direct perception of the Mahāyānist is finally attained in three incalulable eons, as stated (in the Abhidharmakośa,Ch. III,93. d.-94.a.):

tadasaṃkhyatrayodbhavam/ buddhatvam.

Buddhahood occurs after three incalculable eons.[3] *

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* T. 328. Fol.73.b.

1. brtson 'grus myur ba.

2. bse ru. According to A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, M. Monier-Williams, India, 1974, the Solitary Realizer is referred to a Rhinoceros because he dwells as a solitary being like a rhinoceros.

3. It is curious that the Mahāyānist's attainment should take so much longer than the pratitioner of the Hīnayāna path. The point may be that the difficulty of the Mahayāna practice requires more time; while the time required for attainment of the Hīnayānist is less, their attainment is also less.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 14.d, and 15.a-c.:
thabs ǵzan pas na rnam grol gñis/
bag chags bcas phyir ston min/
thabs la goms pas dṅos kun gsal/
bag chas spaṅs phyir kun mkhyen yin/
When there are separate means, there are two deliverances. Because of possessing propensities there is no indication. By means of practicing the means any entity is clear. Because of having abandoned propensities there is omniscience.

C. The means: No knowables (jñeya) are comprehended as direct perception (pratyakṣa) in the Hearers and Solitary Realizers Saints' (arhat) yogi-direct perception; because they have not abandoned the propensities (vāsanā)[1] of nescience (avidyā)[2], and because their means is provided with meager compassion (karuṇā). On the other hand, all knowables are comprehended in direct perception by the perfectly accomplished Buddhas' (saṃyaksaṃbuddha) yogic-direct perception; because they have abandoned the propensities of nescience, and they have practiced the means imbued with great compassion (mahākaruṇā) for three incalcuable eons.[+] And in agreement, (Prmāṇavārttika, Pr.Sid. 138.c-d; 139; 140. a-b) shows it thus:

bahuśo bahudhopayāṁ kālena bahunāsya ca /
gacchantyabhyasyatastatra guṇadoṣaḥ prakāśatām //

\+ S.C. 151

1. From the Sanskrit root √vās--to perfume; this term has been variously rendered as propensity, habit-enegry, impression: Cf. D.T. Suzuki, Eassays in Zen Buddhism, Samuel Weiser, 1970, and also N. Dutt, Aspects of Mahāyana Buddhism, Luzac and Co., London, 1930.

2. ma rig pa. This is the first term the twelve-fold Dependent Origination (pratītya-samutpāda).

buddheśca pāṭavāddhetorvāsanātaḥ prahīyate //
parārthavṛtteḥ khaḍgāderviśeṣo 'yaṁ mahāmuneḥ /
From his (i.e. the Bodhisattva) practicing repeatedly the means in various ways and abundantly for a long time, virtues and vices[1] here become perfectly clear. Moreover, from his sharpness of intellect, this distinction of the mahāmuni is released from the propensity-cause (of suffering). And this distinction of him who engages for others' sake is the distinction from the Rhinoceri, etcetera (i.e. the pratyekabuddha-s and the śrāvaka-s).[2]

And (by the Pramāṇavārttika, Pr. Sid. 143. d; 144.a-c.) thus:

śeṣamakleśanirjvaram kāyavāgbuddhivaiguṇyaṁ /
mārgoktyapaṭutāpi vā aśeṣahānamabhyāsād //
'Remainder' is not defilement or disease, but is the imperfection of body, speech and mind,

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1. skyon dan yon tan; guṇadoṣa.

2. This is one of the clear distinctions between the Hīnayāna ideal of the arhat and that of the Mahayāna ideal of the bodhisattva. Both the Pratyekabuddha, who has gained enlightenment by himself residing in solitude, and the Śrāvaka, who gained enlightnment through others' teachings, are content with gaining their own individual deliverance. For them there is no active interest in the welfare of others. The Māhayāna ideal of the Bodhisattva, however, stresses time and again that the Bodhisattva makes the deliverance of all his goal. He delays his own entrance into the final state of Nirvana in order to work for the others' sake of deliverance. See the Śikṣā Samuccaya of Śantideva, ed.,Bendell (Bib. Budhiča,I).

or lack of sharpness in expressing the path. This (remainder) is abandonded without remainder from the repeated practice.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on <u>Tshad ma rigs gter</u>, Mṅon sum, 15.d., and 16.a-c.:
bcad śes daṅ ni ṅes pa gñis/
rtog pa yin phyir mṅon sum min/
des na rnal 'byor mṅon sum kun/
mṅon sum yin phyir tshad mar grub/
Both the deciding cognition and the certainty [cognition] are not direct perceptions, because they have constructive thought. Therefore, every yogic direct perception is authoritative, because it is a direct perception.)

B. <u>The rule by which (yogi-pratyakṣa) is an authority toward an object</u>: Regarding this topic, some accept the first moment (<u>kṣaṇa</u>) of omniscience (<u>sarvajñatā</u>) as an authority and the second moment as a deciding cognition (<u>bcad śes</u>).[1] This is wrong, because every direct perception is a cognition devoid of constructive thought and without delusion and constitutes an authority. And so this other (i.e. the second moment of omniscience) is also an authority.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on <u>Tshad ma rigs gter</u>, Mṅon sum, 16.d, and 17.a-c.:
so so skye bo'i tshad ma ni/
ṅes pa ñid las 'jug ldog byed/
'phags pa rtog pa bral ba rnams/
tiṅ ṅe 'dzin las byed par gsuṅs/
It is explained that the ordinary man's authority engages and disengaes through

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1. Deciding cognition is one of the five non-authority cognitions; Cf. A. Wayman, trans., "A Guided...," p.10, and also Go-rams-pa's <u>Rigs gter gsal byed</u>, chapter II,p.15.ff.

> the certainty [of each perceptual experience].[1] Those ārya's released from constructive thought [engage and disengage] through concentration.)

Now then, suppose it is objected, "If direct perception does not ascertain its own object, then it is not right to say that it (pratyakṣa) engages (pravṛtti) the inherent character (svalakṣaṇa) and disengages (vyavṛtti) the generalizing character (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). And therefore, it might be constructive thought." (We say:) this fault is not present. The ordinary man's authority ascertains (the object) by whatever means suitable, through outward-directed perception (parasaṁvitti) and introspective direct perception (svasaṁvitti). Thus he engages and disengages by way of what is presented (to him).

The Noble (ārya) who is imbued with the propensities (vāsanā) of constructive thought, when he remains in his natural state (svabhāva) (i.e. non-meditative), then he is like the ordinary man. But, when he dwells in the concentration (samādhi) which knows by way of aspiration (i.e the Buddhist aspiration), then he engages and disengages by dint of the concentration. But those (ārya['s]) who are released from the propensities of constructive thought, engage and disengage by dint of only the concentration (i.e. as though in it all the time).*

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* T. 328. Fol. 74.a.

1. Cf. Sa-skya Paṇḍita's raṅ 'grel, p.163. Fol. 113.b.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 17.d., and 18.a.:
bsam gyis mi khyab ye śes can/
de yi mkhyen pa dpag mi nus/
The understanding of him who has the [divine] knowledge, is inconceivable and unfathomable.)

Well then if it is asked, does the cognition (jñāna) of a Buddha know or does it not know the past (atīta) and the future (āgamana).[1] Some previous scholars say, "that (cognition of a Buddha) knows the present thing (vartamāna) directly, and knows the past and future by implication (śugs)." Some say, "(the cognition of a Buddha) has the knowledge (of past and future) by way of the image of those two arising (in consciousness)."[+] And some say, "there is no cognition (jñāna) in the Buddha bhūmi."[2] These are wrong. The direct perception (pratyakṣa) which understands something by implication has already been rejected.[3] And if the past and the future confer their image (ākāra) by themselves, then these two would be a continuing-thing (dravya). And if the image arises by dint of propensities, then the subject (viṣayin) (to wit, the Buddha's cognition) would be con-

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+ S.C. 152

1. 'das pa daṅ ma 'oṅs pa.

2. sa. Literally both the Sanskrit term bhūmi and the Tibetan term sa are defined as the earth, soil or ground. In Buddhism bhūmi has come to represent the stages of the spiritual path. Usually the literature refers to ten bhūmi-s or stages of spiritual perfection; Cf. the Annotated Translation of the Dasabhūmika-sūtra, revised by Prof. Johannes Rahder, Studies in South, East, and Central Asia, International Academy if Indian Culture, New Delhi, 1968.

3. This is rejected because there would be constructive thought involved.

structive thought. And according to the last, there is the fallacy of not having an omniscient cognition. Therefore, the method by which that (cognition of a Buddha) knows a knowable (*jñeya*) cannot be fathomed by the ordinary person's intellect; because the method of knowing that (knowable) by that (cognition) exists beyond the reach of human intellect.

C. *The reasons for proving yogic direct perception*: This has three divisions;

1. Proving the nature (*svarūpa*).
2. Realizing the definition (*lakṣaṇa*).
3. Refuting those who claim we have incorrectly realized (*yogi-pratyakṣa*).

1. *Proving the nature*: Here there are two subsections;

   A. Proving(the nature) of what has already passed away.

   B. Proving(the nature) of what will occur in the future.

A. *Proving (the nature) of what has already passed away*: This is explained (in *Tshad ma rigs gter*, Mṅon sum, 18.b-c.) thus.

> tshig gi khyad par ṅes gyur na /
> sṅon byuṅ ba yaṅ dpag par nus //
> When one is certain about the particular sentences,
> then he can fathom what has occurred before.[1]

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1. This verse is not set off from the text because Go-rams-pa quotes it in full.

(The <u>Pramāṇavārttika</u>) <u>Ālaṁkara</u> (of Prajñākaragupta) states that "when an object-entity being explained to another person does not contradict (experience) and agrees with reason, then it is understood as being directly perceived. For example, it is like explaining one's individual sense object (to another person).

The composers of such scriptures as the one hundred thousand lines (=<u>Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā</u>)[1], also mention the situation when the explanation to another person does not contradict (experience) and agrees with reason. When one gives due consideration to that, (one[*] must grant that) the yogin's direct perception which comprehends the sense object, proves (in terms of subsequent speech) what has previously happened.

B. <u>Proving (the nature) of what will occur in the future</u>:

Here there are two subsections;

1. Presenting the evidence, and,

2. The proving rules.

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on <u>Tshad ma rigs gter</u>, Mṅon sum, 18.d., and 19.a.:
> goms pa rdzogs nas de gsal ba/
> mtha' gźan bkag pa'i ṅes pas 'grub/
> Having completed the contemplation, clarification is established through the certainty of obstructing a different conclusion.

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* T. 328. Fol.74.b.

1. For a survey of the <u>Prajñāpāramitā</u> literature see E. Conze, <u>Selected Sayings from the Perfection of Wisdom</u>, 1955.

1. *Presenting the evidence*: This is shown (by *PV*, *Prat*. 285.) thus:

> tasmād bhūtam abhūtam vā yad yad evābhibhāvyate /
> bhāvanāpariniṣpattau tat sphuṭākalpadhīphalam //
> Therefore, whatever one contemplates directly, whether real or unreal, that, upon the conclusion of the contemplation, results in a clear and non-constructive cognition (in someone else).

And by (the *PV*, *Sid*. 132) thus:

> tathā hi mūlam abhyāsaḥ pūrvaḥ pūrvaḥ parasya tu /
> kṛpāvairāgyabodhādeścittadharmasya pāṭave //
> It is this way: each previous repetition is the foundation (i.e.cause) for the clarification of such mind-natures (*citta-dharma*) as compassion, aversion, and awareness.

When the cognition which contemplates voidness (*śūnyatā*)[+] is the factual base (*dharmin*), and the repeated practice does not lack its (laid down) conditions, then there certainly occurs a clarification regarding the object of the practice. Because that contemplation becomes distinct spontaneously[1] due to the repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) having steadfast basis.

+ S.C. 153

1. *raṅ gi ṅaṅ gis khyad par du 'gyur pa*.

2. The proving rules: This has two sections:

   A. Proving the pakṣadharma.

   B. Proving the pervasion.

A. Proving the pakṣadharma: Here there are three concerns, to wit;

   1. Proving the 'steadfast basis'.

   2. Proving that which 'becomes distinct spontaneously due to repeated practice'.

   3. Proving 'that contemplation'.

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 19.b-d,-20.a.; and 20.b-c.:
> 'di la kha cig rten brten pa /
> rig pa'i thog mtha' rnam gñis /
> me daṅ sgron ma dper byas nas /
> mṅon sum ñid kyis 'grub ces zer /
> thug med raṅ rig gis mi 'grub /
> me daṅ sgron ma dper mi ruṅ /
> Concerning the steadfast basis, some scholars say that the two distinct ends of cognition are established by just the direct perception; having taken as an example fire and lamp. [We say they are wrong:] That one does not encounter an end is not established by introspection. And furthermore the example of fire and lamp is not suitable.)[1]

1. Proving the 'steadfast basis': There are two topics in this section;

   A. Proving that one does not encounter the end of previous cognitions.

   B. Proving that one does not encounter the end of later cognitions.

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1. That Sa-skya Paṇḍita states the inadequacy of the fire-lamp metaphor is quite interesting. This is the metaphor which many of the opponents cite in their arguments against the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti system. The point of this metaphor is that the lamp's fire illuminates the lamp while it also illuminates the other objects surrounding the lamp.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 20.d.-21.a.:
sems las gźan la ltos med kyi/
rtags kyis sṅon mtha' thug med 'grub/
That one does not encounter the end of previous [cognitions] is established by means of the evidence that [consciousness] does not depend on what is separate from consciousness.)[1]

A. Proving that one does not encounter the end of previous cognitions: This is stated thus (PV. Sid.80):

tasmāt svasyāiva saṁskāraṁ niyamenānuvartate /
tannāntarīyakaṁ cittamataścittasamāśritam //
Since, consciousness certainly follows its own motivation which is necessarily connected to it, it depends on consciousness.[2]

And (again PV. Sid. 166 c-d.) states:

avijñānasya vijñānānupādānācca sidhyati //
And it is proved because there is no resort to a perception belonging to what is not a perception.[3]

When the awareness (saṁvid) of a newly born child is the factual base, it follows from the previous awareness, because it has awareness. And the presence of the feature in this locus is proved by the immediate experience at

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1. This verse could have been rendered differently in light of the two textual examples Go-rams-pa presents. I have rendered it more in line with the later example which suggests a dependence of perception on perception. However, Das, A Tibetan-English Dictionary, has glossed the term ltos med as "in a continual stream or flow", and rendering the verse according to this understanding would follow Go-rams-pa's earlier example.

2. This example is indicating the anvaya-vyāpti or positive concomitance, presence in similar cases.

3. This example is indicating the vytireka, absence in dissimilar cases.

its own time. Regarding the method of proving the pervasion, the Cārvākas[1] say, "the awareness of a newly born child does not follow from the previous awareness, because (the newly born child) does not have a former life". To respond one must apply the reasons found in the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter (of Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika) that refute the arguments for the absence of former lives.[2]

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 21.b-c.:
> rgyu tshogs tshab źin gags med pa'i/
> rtags gyis phyi mtha' thug med 'grub/
> That one does not encounter the end of later [cognitions] is established by means of the evidence that there is the complete assemblage of causes and there are no obstacles.)

B. Proving that one does not encounter the end to later cognitions: Here there are two concerns;*

1. Proving that there is no clear encounter (of the end to later cognitions) possessing the positing of self.

2. Proving that there is no clear encounter (of the end to later cognitions) lacking the positing of self.[3]

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* T. 328. Fol.75.a.

1. tshul rol mdzes pa. According to the Cārvāka or Lokāyatas there was no Self or entity beyond the material body and its needs. It is also interesting to note that this school is the only Indian system to accept pratyakṣa as the sole authority.

2. Cf. Pramāṇavārttika, Pramāṇasiddhi chapter, verse 48.ff.

3. The point of presenting these two sections is to indicate that the notion of self does bear on this argument.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 21.d.-23.c.:
las daṅ lus sems 'khor ba'i rgyu/
gn̆is po spaṅs phyir dka' spyod zar/
mi nus mi phan mi dgos bas /
las daṅ lus 'dzad lam ma yin/
skye rgyu ma rig de las gyaṅ/
ñon mṅos las daṅ 'khor bar 'byun/
skye mched 'di las skye mched gźan/
de yi bzaṅ ṅa las kyis byed/
(Others say:) Because of the abandonment of the two causes of the world, to wit, bodily karma and mental karma one is called an ascetic. They are powerless, useless, and unnecessary, therefore, exhausting karma and the body is not the path. (Our view states: Generally) even for that one ignorant of the cause of arising, the world arises from klesa and karma. (Specifically the cause of sense cognition's arising is) discerning between the good and evil of this source of origin of the sense from another source of the sense organ.

1. Proving that there is no clear encounter (of the end to later cognitions) possessing the positing of self:

This is indicated by six padas (from the Pramāṇavārttika, Sid. 42.a-d. and 43 a-b.) thus:

tasmāt sthityāśrayo buddherbuddhimeva samāśritaḥ /+
kaścinnimittamakṣāṇāṁ tasmādakṣāṇi buddhitaḥ //
yādṛśyākṣepikā sā 'sīt paścādapyastu tādṛśī /
Hence, the basis of the continuity of the cognition depends solely on the cognition. Whatever is the object-sign for the eyes, from it, i.e. the cognition, there are the eyes. As that (cognition) forecast, later in just such a manner it shall be.[1]

+ S.C. 154

1. This resembles the thought put forth in the Yogācāra Paramartha-gatha, to wit, get rid of lust in the eye and the eye will disappear.

When the awareness of a dying person, possessing positing of self, is the factual base, it (his awareness) is certain to connect with the following awareness (in his next life). Because he has the complete assemblage of causes, without any obstacles, for connecting together (the final moment of awareness in the present life) with the following awareness (in the next). The complete assemblage of causes is fulfilled by both 'action' (karma) and the defilement (kleśa)[1] arisen from the positing of self. And the fact that there is no obstacles, does not show the insight (prajnā) which perceives the selflessness (of persons and things).

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum,23.d.-25.c:
> byams sogs bdag daṅ mi 'gal phyir/
> 'khor ba'i rtsa ba gcod nus min/
> bdag med bdag daṅ 'gal bas na/
> bdag med mthoṅ bas de sun 'byen/
> sa bon thog ma yod min yaṅ/
> mes bsreg pa na phyi mtha' ma thoṅ/
> de bźin 'khor ba thog med kyaṅ/
> bdag med mthoṅ na phyi mtha' grub/
> [An adversary states:] Because one does not contradict the idea of self having kindness, etc., one is not able to avoid the world. [To refute this conclusion we state:] [If one understands the argument as] contradicting the lack of self, or self, then [the Mahāyānist's] seeing the lack of self refutes that. Although the earliest seed is not existing, when burned by fire its later end is seen. Accordingly, although the earliest world is lacking, when one sees the lack of self, the later end is established.)

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1. The Buddhists recognize differing numbers of defilements. In his Sanskrit-English Dictionary, M.Monier-Williams, lists ten; three of body, four of speech, and three of mind. For a brief exposition of the various lists of kleśa-s see A. Wayman, Calming the Mind...,p.447,n.83.

1. Proving that there is no clear encounter (of the end to later cognitions) lacking the positing of self:

This stated (in Pramāṇavārttika, Sid. 195 a-b.) thus:

> avasthā vītarāgāṇāṁ dayayā karmaṇā 'pi vā /
> Those who are free from lust have a worldly state by their compassion or by their 'action'.

When the Śrāvaka Arhat continues (in the world) while being in nirvāṇa without remainder (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa), there is the complete assemblage of causes for connection (the present) awareness with the later awareness. This is because even without positing a self there is the connection (with the later awareness) by the force of his previous action. And the Māhayāna Arhat is certain to connect (the present awareness) with the later awareness; since he has 'great compassion'[1] as its cause.

Now then if it is said, "when one attains nirvāṇa without remainder (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa)[2] there is not (the complete assemblage of causes) to connect (the present awareness) with the later awareness. In consequence, (cognition) is not operating as the steadfast basis." In this instance the steadfast basis is the cognition which comprehends the selflessness of persons (pudgala-nairātmya). That (i.e. the cognition of the selflessness of persons) operates as the steadfast basis until the yogi-direct

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1. sñiṅ rje chen po; mahākaruṇā.
2. lhag med du mya nan 'das pa.

perception arises. But, that (yogi-pratyakṣa) having arisen it is not necessary to operate (with it) as the steadfast basis. Because he (i.e. Dharmakīrti) brings in the (the notion of) the steadfast basis in answer (to the materialists' remark quoted in the PV. Sid. 36 c) thus:

asiddho 'bhyāsa iti ced /

If it be argued that repeated practice is not successful.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 25.d.-26.a.:
gsal bskyad la rgyu tshaṅ źiṅ /
gags med phyir na bskyed bar ṅes/
Becuase when there is the complete cause without obstacle in the clear production, then it is a certainty production.)

2. Establishing that which becomes distinct automatically due to the repeated practice: (PV. Sid. 126) states thusly:

kāṣṭhapāradahemāderagnyāderiva cetasaḥ /
abhyāsajāḥ pravarttante svarasena kṛpādayaḥ //

Compassion, etectera, produced by repeated practice of the mind, proceeds automatically; just as in the case of fire (applied to) wood, quicksilver, and gold, etcetera.

When the cognition, which comprehends the selflessness (of persons and phenomena) and great compassion, is the[+] factual base,[*] it becomes distinct automatically from re-

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+ S.C.155 * T.329. Fol.75.b.

peated practice; because it arises en masse and effortlessly in thought, independent of bodily effort.

3. Establishing "that contemplation": The contemplation is established by introspective direct perception (svasaṃvedana-pratyakṣa).[1]

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 26.b.:
> 'jid sogs goms las gsal snaṅ daṅ/
> The clear appearance from the contemplation of the destruction [of what is composite], etc.

B. Proving the pervasion: This is explained as follows: When there is the contemplation which becomes distinct automatically by the repeated practice which has a steadfast basis, then there is certain to arise a clear appearance of the object of the repeated practice. On that account there is pervasion; because a cognition of that kind does not hinder the antagonistic condition as long as the clear appearance has not yet arisen. For example, (it does not hinder) the repeatedly practiced cognition of lust and fear.

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 26.c.:
> gzuṅ 'dzin med phyir 'khrul med 'grub/
> Because it lacks the apprehensible and the apprehension, [yogi-pratyakṣa] is established as lacking delusion.)

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1. This is significant in light of those materials which hold introspection to be superior to the yogin's perception: Cf. the Līlavajra's Guhyagarbha-mahātantrarāja, and also Sarvarahasya-nāma-tantrarāja. I am indebted to Prof. Wayman for drawing my attention to these materials.

2. Realizing the definition (of yogi-pratyakṣa): It (yogi-pratyakṣa) is defined as both lack of constructive thought and lack of delusion. And these are realized by obtaining a clear appearance of the privileged object. Because, generally it is realized as lack of constructive thought by the clear appearance. And particularly, it is realized as lack of delusion by the clear appearance of the privileged object.[1]

3. Refuting those who claim we have incorrectly realized (yogi-pratyakṣa): This has two sections:

   A. Refuting those (who claim our) "perfection of abandonment" is not valid.

   B. Refuting those (who claim our) "perfection of knowledge" is not valid.

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 26.d.-27.a.:
> mi nus mi śes mi brtan phyir/
> spaṅs ba'i grol ba med ce na/
> Some say there is no deliverance of abandonment, because it is not able, one cannot know it, and it is not steadfast.)[2]

A. Refuting those (who claim our) "perfection of abandonment" is not valid: (Some scholars say) that there is no permanent abandonment of defilements (kleśa); because (they claim that) impurity is inherent in consciousness. Therefore, (according to them) (the consciousness) is not able (to permanently drop defilements). And even if it were able

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1. yaṅ dag pa'i don; samyag-artha. In this case the samyag-artha=svalakṣaṇa. In the yogi-pratyakṣa the svalakṣaṇa plays the role of the meditative object.

2. Cf. Sa-skya Paṇḍita's Raṅ 'grel, p.227.Fol.121.a.

(to drop them), the means (upāya) does not exist. Moreover, even if the means does exist, one cannot know it. And even if one knows (the means) and does abandon (the defilements), they will return.[1]

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 27.b-c.:
> raṅ bźin min phyir thabs yod phyir /
> rgyu spon phyir na rnam grol 'thad/
> (We respond:) Because it is not the self-existence, because the means does exist, and because one may abandon the cause, deliverance is accepted.)

To these four kinds of contentions stated above (Dharmakīrti) presents four kinds of rejoinders, to wit, (to refute the first, PV. Sid. 208. c-d) states:

> prabhāsvaramidaṁ cittaṁ prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ //+
>
> This mind is intinsically clear. Its impurities are adventitious

And (to refute the second contention PV. Sid.214.d-215.a-b) states:

> tadvirodhācca tanmayaiḥ /
> virodhaḥ śūnyatādṛṣṭeḥ sarvadoṣaiḥ prasidhyati //
>
> And because there is an opposition to that, the doctrine of voidness effects the contradiction of all faults which are made up of that.

And, (to refute the third contention the Pramāṇavārttika,

+ S.C. 156

1. Sa-skya Paṇḍita's Raṅ 'grel identifies the proponents of this view merely as phyi rol pa (outsiders), meaning both Buddhist and non-Buddhist. Possibly the Mahāsaṁghika and the Cārvāka, respectively.

Sid. 145 a-b.) states:

hetusvabhāvajñānena tajjñānamapi sādhyate /

And the knowledge of that (means, i.e the doctrine of voidness which quells all faults) is accomplished by knowing the nature of their cause.

And, (to refute the fourth contention the Pramāṇavārttika, Sid.141 a-b.) states:

ātmadarśanabījasya hānādapunarāgamaḥ / *

The non-returning (of defilements) is due to the destruction of their seeds, namely, the view of self.

B. Refuting those (who claim our) "perfection of knowledge" is not valid: Here there are two subsections:

1. To refute those who deny the possibility of repeated practice.
2. To refute those who deny omniscience (sarvajñā), even given repeated practice.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 27.d.-28.a.:
mchoṅs daṅ chu daṅ gser gyi dpes/
goms pa srid pa min źe na/
By using the example of jumping, water, and gold, some say that contemplation is not possible.)

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* T.329. Fol. 76.a.

1. The denial of repeated practice: Those who say we are wrong that the cognition which comprehends "great compassion" (mahākaruṇā) and "voidness" (śūnyatā) increases endlessly from repeated practice, present three kinds of arguments, to wit:

1. One's jumping (ability) does not increase endlessly from practice.
2. Water having been warmed does not become fire in the end.
3. Even after melting gold it returns (to a solid state).

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 28.b.-c.:
> 'bad la ltos phyir mi brtan phyir /
> slar 'byuṅ bskyed phyir dper mi ruṅ /
> (We say:) Because it depends on exertion, and because it is not steadfast, and because generation is a re-existence, the examples are not proper.)

And (Dharmakīrti) presents three kinds of rejoinders, to wit, (Pramāṇavārttika. Sid. 126.) states:

> kāṣṭhapāradahemāderagnyāderive cetasaḥ /
> abhyāsajāḥ pravarttante svarasena kṛpādayaḥ //
> Compassion, etcetera, produced by repeated practice of the mind, proceeds automatically; just as in the case of fire (applied to) wood, quicksilver, and gold, etcetera.

And (in response to the second argument Pramāṇavārtika,

Sid.129) states:

krpā svabījaprabhavā svabījaprabhavairna cet /
vipaksairbādhyate citte prayātyatyantasātmatām //
If compassion, which arises from its own cause,
is not hindered by the opponents (i.e. hatred,
etcetera) which also arise from their own causes,
then it proceeds to a perfect role for itself
in consciousness.

And (in response to the third argument Pramānavārttika, Sid. 57 b-d.) states:

pratyāneyastu yatkrtah /
vikārah syāt punarbhāvah tasya hemni kharatvavat //
But rebirth is a change where what was done is
recovered, like solidity in the case of gold.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mnon sum, 28.d.-29.c.:
stoṅ ñid sñin rje goms pa las /
de yi ṅaṅ du 'gyur srid mod /
śes bya kun la mtha med phyir /
kun mkyen bsgrub pa dka, źes zar /
Though indeed it is possible that the contemplation of voidness and great compassion may become the nature of one's (cittasamtāna); omniscience is difficult to establish, because there is no end to all that may be known.

2. The denial of omniscience (sarvajña) even given repeated practice: (Here we are to refute those who say) "even if it is possible that the contemplation of those two (i.e. mahākaruna and śunyatā) becomes the nature of one's stream of consciousness (cittasamtāna),

there is no possibility of omniscience; because there is no end to the number of things which may be known." The answer to this is two-fold:

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 29.d.-30.a.:
> gtso bo'i don la mi slu ba/
> kun mkhyen yin te kun tshogs bźin/
> (Knowledge) which is non-deceptive about the principal meanings, is (defined as) omniscience; according to the entire accumulation.)

A. The knowledge of all required meanings is established as (the definition of) omniscience.

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 30.b.-31.b.:
> dgos pa'i don kun śes pa la/
> mkhas rnams thams cad mkhyen źes zer/
> thams cad 'dus nas ñan pa la/
> ba laṅ med kyaṅ skyon ma yin/
> bar skabs kyi tshigs bcad do/
> The wise ones who know all the required meanings are called omniscient.
> Having compiled everything, upon hearing even without (knowing each)bullock (one can abandon it . There is no fault. I composed this section.)

B. Hence, the wise ones who know all the required meanings of what may be known are established as omniscient.

The first is explained by four verses (from Pramāṇavarttika. Sid.30-34) thus:

> jñānavān mṛgyate kaścit taduktapratipattaye /
> ajñopadeśakaraṇe vipralambhanaśaṅkibhiḥ //
> tasmādanuṣṭheyagataṁ jñānamasya vicāryatām /
> kīṭasaṁkhyāparijñānaṁ tasya naḥ kvopayujyate //

heyopādeyatattvasya sābhyupāyasya vedakaḥ /
yaḥ pramāṇamasāviṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakaḥ //
dūraṁ paśyatu vā mā vā tattvamiṣṭaṁ tu paśyatu /
pramāṇaṁ dūradarśī cedeta gṛdhrānupāsmahe //

With fears of being misled into ignorant instructions, one seeks out a knowledgeable person to practice according to his counsel. Therefore, his knowledge related to religious duties is among what deserves to be considered. If he knows about the number of insects, where is the use to us?

He who knows the truth of what is to be rejected and what is to be accepted, together with the means, is accepted as the authority; but not one who knows everything.

Let him see far or not, but let him see the desired truth. If far seeing would be an authority we should honor the vulture.[1]

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mnon sum, 31.c.-33.a.:
yaṅ na rjes su dpag pa yis/
thams cad mkhyen pa grub pa yin/
bskal pa'i bar du brjod rgyu yaṅ/
me loṅ naṅ du cig char 'char/
de bźin śes bya mtha' med pa/
mkhyen pa'i skad cig gcig gis mkhyen/
bar skabs kyi tshigs su bcad pa'o/
Or, omniscience is established by means of inference. Between periods the causal expressions arise together within reflection.

1. Cf. Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṁgraha, ed. by Jha, p. 1400.ff.

Accordingly, (although) knowables are without end, they may be known by one moment of knowing; hence, between the composed verse.

B. The second is explained tersely (from Pramāṇavārttika, Svārtha. 216 a-b.) thus:

āptavādāvisaṁvādasāmānyādanumānatā /

There is inference due to the master's pronouncements and the non-deceptive generalization.

And then (Pramāṇavārttika, Svārtha. 217) states:

heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitaḥ /

pradhānārthāvisaṁvādādanumānaṁ paratra vā //

There is anumāna due to acknowledgement of the truth of heya-upādeya along with the means or in the case of the other one, due to non-deception as the principal aim.

Thus the explanation of right direct perception (samyak-pratyakṣa) is concluded.[1] [+]

2. Falsification of direct perception: Here there are two sections:

A. Definition, and,

B. Variegation.

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 33.b-c.:
'khrul ba'i śes pa thams cad ni/
mṅon sum ltar snaṅ nid du 'dod/
Every delusive cognition is accepted
as just a falsification of direct perception.)

+ S.C. 157

1. This completes the first major section which presented the basic structure of direct perception. The last few sections in Yogi-pratyaksa are quite difficult, since Go-rams-pa referred extensively to outside sources without presenting them in full.

A. Definition of direct perception falsification is a cognition which is delusive (bhrānta).[1]

(Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 33.d.-34.a.:
de la rtog pa rtog med gñis/
rtog med la yaṅ yid dbaṅ gñis/
In that (i.e. falsification of direct perception) there are two, to wit, attended with constructive thought and not attended with constructive thought. And in that attended with constructive thought there are two, to wit, that of the mind and that of the sense.)[2]

B. Variegation of falsification of direct perception:

Here there are two subsections, to wit:

1. Falsification of direct perception attended with constructive thought, and,
2. Falsification of direct perception which is not attended with constructive thought.*

1. Falification of direct perception attended with constructive thought is a delusive cognition with constructive thought.

The variegations of it are stated by the author (i.e. Dignāga) of the Sūtra (Pramāṇasamuccaya, Prat.6a-c) thus:

bhrāntisaṁvṛtisajjñānamanumānānumānikaṁ /
smārtābhilāṣikaṁ ceti /

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* T. 329. Fol. 76.b.

1. Compare this with Go-rams-pa's statement on p. 127 of the Rigs gter gsal byed; to wit, the basis of what is variegated as a direct perception is "only a non-delusive cognition."

2. Go-rams-pa actually comments on the later portion of this verse (i.e. rtog med la yaṅ yid dan dban gnis) below in a later section. But since Sa-skya Pandita presents it immediately following the verse explaining the two divisions of direct perception falsification, it was presented here.

(The varieties are) (a) delusive cognition, (b) cognition of conventional existence, (c) inference, (d) what is derived from inference, (e) what is derived from memory, and (f) what is derived from belief.

The explanation of these six varieties is as follows:

a. A delusive cognition is like the cognition which apprehends a piebald rope as a snake,[1] or a mirage (off in the distance) as water.[2]

b. The cognition of conventional existence[3] is like the constructive thought which apprehends the generalizing character of the bullock .

c. Both inference and what is derived from inference[4] rely upon the evidence (liṅga). The former is the thought (citta) apprehending the evidence. And the latter is explained by Jinendrabuddhi as the inference which possesses the evidence.[5]

d. Both that which is derived from memory and

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1. thag khra la sbrul du.

2. smig rgyu la chur. Tsoṅ-kha-pa states that this is a variegation by way of stipulation (dgos); cf. A. Wayman, trans., "A guided...,"p.16.

3. kun rdzob; saṁvṛti.

4. rjes dpag rjes su dpag las byuṅ; anumānānumānika. Both inference and what is derived from inference are stated by Tsoṅ-kha-pa as instances of constructive thought of an entity that is out of sight (parokṣa); Cf. Wayman,trans., "A guided...,"p.16.

5. Cf. Pramāṇasamuccayaṭika of Jinendrabuddhi,27.b.-28.b.

that which is derived from belief do not rely upon evidence. The former is a cognition through the rememberance of a past memory-object. And the latter is a cognition derived from the belief about a future object.

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 34.b.:
> rtog pa gsum yin drug bśad pa/
> Explaining the six as being three having constructive thought.)

The method of subsuming these (six) under three, put forth by the Venerable Dharmakīrti, is explained as follows:[1]

a. The cognition of conventional existence is the constructive thought which has sign-support (saṁketasaṁśraya).[2]

b. The delusive cognition is the constructive thought which superimposes (samāropa) one object on another object.

c. And the latter four are the constructive thought which has an object which is sense-transcendent (parokṣa).[3]

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 34.c.:
> log rtog ldog phyir phye ste gsuṅs/
> The classification is explained in order to exclude misunderstandings.)

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1. This is based upon Dharmakīrti's interpretation of Dignāga's verse found in PV. Prat. 288; tri-vidhaṁ kalpanā-jñānam āśrayopaplavodbhavam/ avikalpam ekaṁ ca pratyakṣābhaṁ catur-vidham. Moreover, Go-rams-pa mentioning this view leads on to conclude his acceptance of it.

2. brda rten can.

3. Inference, etc.; designated as c-f in Dignaga's verse above.

The necessity of explaining these as falsification of direct perception is as follows:

a. The first two are explained for the purpose of[+] clarifying the Naiyayika's misunderstanding that accepts those two as sense cognition.[1]

b. That the latter four are not direct perception is frequently proved even by the non-Buddhists. Therefore, that the former two are not sense direct cognition is for the purpose of proving the concordant example (<u>sādharmyadṛṣṭānta</u>).[2] It is explained (by Dharmakīrti in the <u>Pramāṇavārttika</u>, <u>Prat</u>. 289 a-b) as follows:

> anakṣajatvasiddyarthamukte dve bhrāntidarśanāt /
>
> Those two (i.e. inference and what is derived from inference) are stated for the sake of proving they are not a product of the sense organs; because one can witness their delusion.[3]

\+ S.C.158

1. This concerns the Naiyayika's acceptance of two kinds of perception, to wit; <u>nirvikalpaka</u> and <u>savikalpaka</u>: For a discussion of this topic I refer the interested reader to D.N. Shastri, <u>Critique of Indian Realism</u>, chapter XII, "Epistemology Adapted to Realism". This discussion contrasts the Naiyayika position with that of the Dignāga school.

2. According to Tsoṅ-kha-pa the <u>sādharmadrstānta</u> "is defined as a certainty substratum preceded by a certainty of <u>sādhya</u> and then the <u>anvaya</u>-pervasion (presence in all similar cases)."; Cf. A. Wayman, "A guided...,"p.44.

3. For Dharmakīrit <u>anumāna</u> is attended with <u>bhrānti</u> as well as <u>kalpana</u>.

2. <u>Falsification of direct perception which is not attended with constructive thought:</u>[1] The definition is a delusive* cognition which is devoid of constructive thought.

In variegation there are two types, to wit:

1. Delusive sense cognition, and,
2. Delusive mental cognition.[2]

The first is like the sense cognition seeing through falling hair;[3] that is to say, as shown (in *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, *Prat.* 6.d.) thus:

> pratyakṣābhāsam sataimiram //
>
> The falsification of direct perception along with sensory affliction.[4]

The second is like the (mental) cognition which amounts to clear imagery in a dream,[5] that is to say, (as explained

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* T. 329. Fol. 77.a.

1. Go-rams-pa here begins his commentary on *Tshad ma rigs gter*, Mṅon sum ,34.a. which was presented above in order to follow Sa-skya Paṇḍita's context.

2. Tson-kha-pa also has variegated two types of falsification of direct perception lacking constructive thought.

3. While Go-rams-pa uses the more opaque example of the sense cognition seeing through falling hair, Tsoṅ-kha-pa employes the more common example of the sense cognition with appearance of double moon;Cf. A. Wayman, "A guided...,"p.16.

4. Go-rams-pa has clearly understood the term *sataimiram* in Dignaga's verse as indicating a separate instance of *pratyaksabhasa*, to wit,the delusive sense cognition lacking coṅstructive thought. This position in contrary to the position of Kamalaśīla and in turn that of M. Hattori; Cf. *Tattvasaṁgraha*, p.661. and Hattori, Dignaga, p.95-97.

5. In this case both Go-rams-pa and Tsoṅ-kha-pa present the same example of the cognition which amounts to clear imagery in a dream. Cf. A. Wayman, "A guided...,"p.17.

by Dharmakīrti in *Pramāṇavārttika*, *Prat*.299) thus:

> suptasya jāgrato vāpi yaiva dhīḥ sphuṭabhāsinī /
> sā nirvikalpobhayathāpyanyathaiva vikalpikā //
> Just that cognition which has a clear imagery of a dreamer or one awake is devoid of constructive thought. Otherwise, in both cases there is to be constructive thought.

This concludes the explanation of the falsification of direct perception.[1]

3. *Authority as result*: In order to explain the authority as result (*pramāṇa-phala*) there are two sections, to wit:

   A. Establishing the method by which the authority proceeds as result.

   B. Establishing the authority by what it proceeds as result.

A. *Establishing the method*: This is explained according to the *Sūtra* (i.e. the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, *Prat*. 1. a-b and first half c.) thus:

> pratyakṣam anumānaṁ ca pramāṇe lakṣaṇadvayam /
> prameyaṁ /[2]
> There are two authorities--direct perception and inference. The sanctionable is two characters.

And the *Pramāṇavārttika* reasons the exact number of author-

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1. This completes the second of three major sections of the *pratyakṣa* chapter.

2. Once again the Sanskrit for this verse fragment is available in the Appendix of Hattori, *Dignāga....*

ities as two when (Dharmakīrti, Prat. 1.a) states:

mānaṁ dvividhaṁ viṣayadvaividhyāt /

Authority is twofold because the object is twofold.

When establishing the exact number of the sanctionable (prameya) as two, it may be asked; "what is the cause (kārya) and the result (phala) brought forward by those two author-+ ities regarding those two sanctionables. And for what reason is the exact number of authorities accomplished by the exact number of sanctionables." (We say:) both of those authorities amount to causing the comprehension of those two sanctionables. Direct perception comprehends the inherent character (svalakṣaṇa) by way of its bare nature (svarūpa). Inference is the comprehending by way of the other method of generalizing the inherent character, because its concrete object is recognized as the generalizing character (sāmānyalakṣaṇa).[1] As (Dharmakīrti explained in the Pramāṇaviniścaya, Prat. Vetter page 78) thus:

yaṅ tshad ma 'di'i 'bras bu gaṅ yin / gźal bya rtogs pa'o// de ni śes pa yin la de yaṅ 'bras bu yin pa'i phyir // da ni tshad ma gaṅ źig yin / gaṅ las bar chad med par gźal bya rtogs pa 'di'i[2]

\+ S.C. 159 T. 330. Fol. 77.b.

1. The fact that pratyaksa comprehends the svalaksana is present in many sources. However, Go-rams-pa's indicating that inference also comprehends the svalaksana indirectly by means of comprehending the generalizing character (sāmānyalaksana) has not been stated in other commentarial materials I have seen. His point seems to be correct according to Dignaga's presentation in the anumāna chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya.

2. Both S.C. and T. 'dis.

de ňid 'grub pa'o /

Moreover, what is the result (phala) of this authority? The sanctionable (prameya) which it comprehends; because when that is the cognition that also is the result. What then is the authority? What establishes the reality of of this, i.e. comprehending the sanctionable without interruption.

The "Direct Perception" chapter explains that direct perception cognizes the inherent character by way of its bare nature. The chapters' "Inference foreone's own sake" (svārthānumāna) and "Inference for the sake of others" (parārthanumāna) explain that inference comprehends the inherent character (svalakṣaṇa) by the other way, i.e. the generalization (sāmānya).[1]

And concerning that cognition by direct perception, someone may ask:

1. Of what nature is that direct perception which makes (the svalakṣaṇa) cognized?
2. What is the inherent character to be cognized?
3. What is the method of proving the cognition of that (svalakṣaṇa) by that (pratyakṣa)?

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1. Go-rams-pa is probably referring to all three of the texts which he has mentioned above. Each of those works have all three chapters mentioned.

To clarify the first query: There are the principles of proving that at the time of any of the four direct perceptions they are devoid of constructive thought; and there are (the principles of proving) that they (the four) are without delusion using the object of the falsification of direct perception.

To clarify the second query: At the time of 'sense' direct perception (indriya-pratyakṣa), (the inherent character) is proved as the support condition (ālambana-pratyaya) which is the particular atom.[1] And at the time of 'mind' direct perception (mānasa-pratyakṣa), (the inherent character) has been taught as the apprehensible object (grāhya-artha) which is the second moment of the apprehended object following the sense direct perception. At the time of introspective direct perception (svasaṁvedana-pratyakṣa) (the inherent character) is taken as the cognition (jñāna) which is comprehensible (saṁvedya). And at the time of the yogin's direct perception (yogi-pratyakṣa), (the inherent character) is proved as the privileged topic (artha) which is the most important object.[+]

To clarify the third query which contains the essential points[2] of the authority as result (pramāṇa-phala), namely: (1) the direct perception which perceives the object cognizes

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+ S.C. 160

1. rdul phren; paramāṇu.

2. gźuṅ rnams.

the inherent character of the object,[1] because of arising having that image.[2] This is the first essential point of of authority as result. (2) And the introspective direct perception cognizes the inherent character of the cognition,[3] because of arising as the bare nature of the cognition.[4] This is the second essential point of authority as result.[5]

Because of arising having the image of the object at the first occasion of authority as result, even that cognition which is recognized as comprehending the object is just that (cognition) appearing directly to itself, cognizing itself. Therefore, the introspection is actually the result.* This is the conclusion stated (by Dharmakīrti in the Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 341) thus:

> vidyamāne 'pi bāhye 'rthe yathānubhavameva saḥ /
> niścitātmā svarūpeṇa nānekātmatvadoṣataḥ //
> Even when an external object is in point, it is ascertained according to the (introspective) experience; because there is no fault of multiplicity (of objects) by way of its bare nature.

At the second occasion of authority as result, the

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* T. 330. Fol. 78.b.

1. don rig mṅon sum gyis don raṅ mtshan rtogs.
2. de'i rnam ldan.
3. raṅ rig mṅon sum gyis śes pa raṅ mtshan rtogs.
4. de myon ba'i ṅo bor.
5. Compare these two essential points with Pramāṇasamuccaya, Prat. 10.a-b.; viṣayajñānatajjñānaviśeṣāt tu dvirūpatā.

three: the apprehensible (grāhya), the apprehension (grāhaka), and the intuition (saṁvid)[1] are the same as those three recognized as the authority (pramāṇa), the result (phala), and the sanctionable (prameya)[2]. Although, delusive cognition[3] takes those three: the apprehensible, the apprehension, and the intuition to appear separately, in fact they do not exist separately. Thus as stated in the texts (i.e. Pramāṇavārttika, Prat.354 and Pramāṇaviniścaya, Prat. 45):

> avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmā viparyāsitadarśanaiḥ /
> grāhyagrāhakasaṁvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate //
> Although the individual cognition is impartite, by inverted views it is characterized as though having differences as the apprehensible, the apprehension, and intuition.

B. Establishing the authority-as-result: Here there are three sections, to wit:

1. The requirement for stating the authority-as-result.
2. The given authority-as-result which possesses the requirement.
3. Certifying the establishment as reality.

1. The requirement for stating the authority as result: This has two subsections:

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1. gzun 'dzin rig gsum la.

2, tshad 'bras gzal gsum. This phrase and the one in the above note are an excellent example of Go-rams-pa's supposition of the readers knowledge of the topic under discussion.

3. blo 'khrul.

A. The requirement for the exclusion (of what is incorrect), and,

B. The requirement for the inclusion (of what is correct).[+]

A. Exclusion: Here there are two topics, to wit:

1. The general requirement for exclusion.

2. The respective requirement for exclusion.

1. The general requirement for exclusion: This is to refute those Outsiders who believe that the function (vyāpāra) and the functor (vyāpāraka) are separate realia.

2. The respective requirement for exclusion: Some (Buddhist) sects other than ourselves believe that the image of the object does not arise in the sense cognition and that introspective direct perception does not exist.[1] Therefore, to refute those two (positions) respectively, there are the first and second essential points of authority as result.

B. Inclusion: This is for the purpose of comprehending the comprehension of the sanctionable as the self-presence of the authority: by way of the essential point which proves the comprehension of the sanctionable by the authority.

2. The given authority as result: Here there are two sections:

A. Establishment of the authority as result in general.

B. Establishment of the respective authority as result.

\+ S.C.161

1. This is most likely referring to the Vaibhāsika, who believe that the sense cognition perceives itŝ sense object nakedly without taking on the image. They also do not accept introspection as an authority; Cf. Dkon mchog 'jigs med dbañ po, Grub mtha' rin chen phreñ ba, Dharmsala, p.23.

A. Establishment in general: This has three subsections:

1. The refutation of the schools which claim the authority as result as being separate realia.[1]
2. The establishment of the schools which claim (that the authority as result) are not separate realia.
3. To answer challenges concerning that.

1. The refutation of the schools which claim the authority as result as being separate realia: Here there are two topics:

A. To state their claim, and,*
B. To refute that (claim).

A. To state their claim: The Pramāṇavārttika (Prat. 310) directly teaches as follows:

> ālocanākṣasambandhaviśeṣaṇadhiyāmataḥ[2] /
> neṣṭaṁ prāmāṇyametaṣaṁ vyavadhānāt kriyāṁ prati //
> We deny the authoritativeness of the (following) notions: of the perceiving (act), and the connection of the sense organ (with its object), and the distinction; because there is a logical im-

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* T 330 Fol. 78.b.

1. rdzas gźan. This term has been most troublesome to render satisfactorily. During my discussions with Professor Wayman we have considered such translations as different 'material', different'material-continuity', separate material, and separate realia. None of the terms are completely satisfactory. The notion which should be felt through the term is that of a 'continuing thing'. This may be understood from the Sanskrit term for rdzas, to wit, dravya; from the Sanskrit root √dru to run or to flow.

2. S.C. and T. read khyad par gyis ni blo de dag/; Peking reads khyad par gyi ni blo de dag/

pediment to the activity.[1]

And the Tshad ma rigs gter (Mṅon sum,34.d-35.c) explains both authority and result thus:

lta daṅ ṅes pa tshad 'bras daṅ /
phrad daṅ don rtogs tshad 'bras 'dod /
khyad par khyad par can der smra /
la la dbaṅ śes tshad 'bras 'dod // [2]

(The Tīrthika)[3] accepts the authority as the visual act and the result as the (following) ascertainment. (The Naiyāyika) accept the authority as the connection (of the sense and the object) and the result as the comprehension of the object. (The Vaiśeṣika) say that (the authority) is the distinction and (the result) is what carries the distinction. Some (Śrāvaka-Vaibhāṣikas) accept the sense organ as the authority and the (sense) cognition as the result.

Moreover, as to the Outsiders who accept the result kārya) and the agent (kāraka) as separate realia, and the cause and effect of the authority and the result, and the non-arising of the image of the object in the cognition,

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1. The proponents of each of these denied cognitive acts are made clear through Sa-skya Paṇḍita's verse and Go-rama-pa's commentary which follows immediately.

2. Sa-skya Paṇḍita's Raṅ 'grel reads la la dbaṅ śes tshad mar 'dod/

3. Cf. Sa-skya Pandita, Raṅ 'grel, 229. Fol. 125.b and 126.a., Sa-skyå·Pandita there indicates which system goes with each verse fråġment. And Go-rams-pa also confirms the ordering.

for them the distinction of the similarities and dissimilarities are as follows:

1. According to the Mīmāṃsaka, the cognition devoid[+] of constructive thought that first perceives the object is the authority, and the cognition arisen after that, which apprehends the distinction of the nature of the entity and of class (*jāti*), etecetera, is the result.[1]

2. According to the Naiyāyika, the relation of the object and the sense organ is the authority, and the cognition arisen after that, which cognizes the object, is the result. And they mean that the sense organ related with whatever object cognizes just that object and no other.[2]

3. The Vaiśeṣika accept the cognition which comprehends the distinctions of quality (*guṇa*), etectera, (= the list of the five remaining *padārtha*-s) as the authority, and the cognition which apprehends the distinguishable realia as the result.[3]

4. The Vaibhāṣika accept the formed sense organ as the authority, and the cognition arisen from that, which cognizes the object, as the result.[4]

\+ S.C. 162

1. Cf. Hattori, *Dignāga*...,p.63-69.

2. Cf. Ibid.p.36-41; And also *Nyāya Sutra*,I,i, 4:indriyārtha-saṁnikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam.... And again D.N. Shastri, *Critique*...,p.428-430.

3. Cf. Hattori, *Dignāga*, p. 42-51.

4. Cf. Dkon mchog 'jigs med dban po, *Grub mtha*...,p.14-29; especially p.22-23.

B. <u>The refutation of those claims</u>: Here there are two sections:

1. General refutation, and,
2. Respective refutation.

1. <u>General refutation of the Outsiders' claims</u>: Those claims are wrong because those (cognitions) accepted as authorities are not capable of establishing those (cognitions) accepted as results; because (they accept) those two as separate realia.

2. <u>Respective refutation of each Outsiders' claim</u>:

A. The <u>Mīmāṃsaka</u>'s notion of the authority and the result is wrong;* because when the image of the object is not arisen in the cognition it is not feasible to see the object.

B. The Vaiśeṣika's notion of the authority and the result is also wrong. Because that cognition which sanctions the quality, etectera, does not have the distinction by way of apprehending or not apprehending both the quality and the material; and because, likewise, they do not take account of the image of those two.

Furthermore, are both the authority and the result+ separate objects or are they the same? According to the former case, there is the fallacy that those are not the authority and the result. According to the latter case, there is the fallacy that the latter cognition is not required.

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* T. 330. Fol. 79.a. + S.C. 163

C. The Naiyāyika's authority and result are also wrong. If the eye-perception (caksur-vijñāna) is the factual base (dharmin), then when you cognize the form (rūpa) of a water jug there is the fallacy that one would cognize its odor (gandha). Because the formed sense organ is the governing condition (adhipati-pratyaya), there is no distinction between those two.

D. Even the Vaibhāṣika's notion of the authority andthe result is wrong. If the eye-sense (cakṣur-indriya) is the factual base, then there is the fallacy that one is not able to distinguish the respective objects of the cognition of something blue and the cognition of something yellow. Because the cause of the sense cognition (indriya-jñāna) which cognizes blue and the cause of the sense cognition which cognizes yellow is without distinction.

2. The establishment of the schools which claim that the authority and the result are not separate realia: This entails three concerns:

A. The basis for introducing the agent as the authority which has the subjective cognition.

B. The given agent.

C. The reason for introducing the agent.

On the basis of the authority, when identifying the triad of the function (vyāpāra), agent (kāraka), and action (karman) with the triad of the authority (pramāṇa), result

(phala), and sanctionable (prameya), then the sanctionable is the basis for introducing the agent, that is to say, like blue. The result is the given agent, like cognizing blue. The authority is the reason for introducing the agent, like the image of blue arising. Therefore, the two, authority and the result, are the cause (kāraṇa) and the result phala) in the sense of the establisher (vyavasthāpaka) and* the established (vyavasthāpya), but they are not the cause and the result in the sense of the producer (utpādaka)[1] and the produced (utpādya).[2,3]

In (Dignāga's) self-commentary of the (Pramāṇa) Sūtra it is stated:

> 'di la phyi rol pa rnams kyi bźin[4] du tshad mas las
> 'bras bu don gźan du gyur ba ni med kyi /
> Here we do not admit, as the Outsiders do, that
> the result differs from the authority.

And then (the Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 315) states:

> sādhyasādhanatābhāvaḥ sakṛdbhāve dhiyo 'ṁśayoḥ /+
> tadvyavasthāśrayatvena sādhyasādhanasaṁsthitiḥ //
> When there is simultaneity of the two parts of the
> cognition, there is the absence of the method of

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* T. 331. Fol, 79.b. + S.C. 164.

1. skyed byed.

2. bskyed bya.

3. This distinction which Go-rams-pa has pointed out is an important one. The relationship of the pramana and the phala is not one similar to the seed and the sprout.

4. S.C. and T. kyis gźan

proving what is to be proved. There is establishment of the method of proving what is to be proved, in the case when there is a basis for its establishment.

And the Tshad ma rigs gter (Mṅon sum, 35.d.-36.a.) states:

des na rnam par gźag 'jog gi/
rgyu 'bras gñis[1] la tshad 'bras bźed/
The authority as result is maintained for both the cause and the result in the sense of the establisher (vyavasthāpaka) and the established (vyavasthāpya).

Here 'authority' (pramāṇa) and 'method of proving' (sādhana) and 'agent'(kāraka) and 'definition' (lakṣaṇa) and 'establisher' (vyavasthāpaka) are various names which are in the same set.[2] And 'result' (phala) and 'what is to be proved' (sādhya) and 'function' (vyāpāra) and 'what is defined' (lakṣya) and 'established' (vyavasthāpya) are various names which are in the same set.[3] And 'action' (karman) is chiefly used for the sanctionable (prameya), but sometimes it is also used for 'activity' (kriyā); as 'karman' is used for 'kriyā' (by Dharmakīrti in the PV. Prat. 301) when stating:

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1. Tshad ma rigs gter, Vol. 5, Tokyo, reads ñid for gñis.

2. That is to say, they may all be understood to represent a similar idea whenever they are used in their respective situations.

3. The same is true for these four terms; when one encounters the term 'what is to be proved' for instance, it may be understood that it is the 'result' which is being considered.

> kriyāsādhanamityeva sarvaṁ sarasya karmaṇaḥ /
> sādhanaṁ na hi tat tasya sādhanaṁ yā kriyā yataḥ //
> Anything that is referred to as '<u>kriyāsādhana</u>' is due to all the <u>karman</u> , for that <u>sādhana</u> does not belong to a (<u>karman</u>),(rather) whatever the <u>kriyā</u>, the <u>sādhana</u> is from it.

Therefore, here, the sanctionable is certain as both the (external) object (<u>artha</u>) and the cognition (<u>jñāna</u>); the result is certain as both the intuition of the object (<u>artha-saṁvid</u>)[1] and self-intuition (<u>sva-saṁvid</u>);[2] the authority is certain as both the apprehended image (<u>grāhya-ākāra</u>)[3] and the apprehending-as-image (<u>grāhaka-ākāra</u>).[4] When the authoritative apprehending-as-image is mentioned, then the result is certain to be the self-intuition. But, when the authoritative apprehended image is mentioned, then the result certainly is not the intuition of the object. Because having mentioned the authoritative apprehended image when proving the cognition of the object, a result is the intuition of the object; but, when proving the cognition of the image as appearing directly to itself, then the result is self-intuition. If someone asks: "Why is not the authority-as-result of the yogin's direct perception explained?" (Response:) These are the authorities

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1. <u>don rig</u>.
2. <u>raṅ rig</u>.
3. <u>gzuṅ rnam</u>.
4. <u>'dzin rnam</u>.

as result regarding the authorities current in everyday+ life, that is to say, like the certainty of oneself * and and the certainty of another person.

B. Establishment of the respective authority-as-result is as follows:

Three great systematizers appear regarding the convention of the authority-as-result (pramāṇa-phala), to wit:

α. Dharmottara who makes for the first convention of the authority-as-result the cognition of the object (artha), and for the second convention of the authority-as-result the introspection (svasaṁvedana), and for the third convention of the authority-as-result the introspection while it has an external object (bāhya-artha):[1] those (three conventions) appear well known in all Tibet at the present time.[2] But if one takes together all (three) principles of authority-as result, then there is incompleteness in authority-as-result as explained by the root text (i.e. Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, Prat. 8), namely:

> svasaṁvittiḥ phalaṁ vātra tadrūpo hyarthaniśćayaḥ /
> viṣayākārataivāsya pramāṇaṁ tena mīyate //[3]

Furthermore, the introspection here is the result,

+ S.C. 165 T. 331 Fol.80.a.

1. Go-rams-pa is most likely referring to Dhramottara's commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniśćaya; this commentary is quite detailed and difficult to read.

2. den saṅ bod thams cad la grags che bar snaṅ. The time frame is the later half of the fifteenth century.

3. Sanskrit verse available in the Appendix to Hattori's Dignāga....

because its nature is certainty of the object.
That very image of the sense object by which one
authorizes, is the authority of this.

Then if one inquires, "in which (of the three) does it [" the incompleteness"] go, this must be shown explicitly [as follows].

β. Devendrabuddhi disallows the first mentioned convention (among Dhramottara's three): having refuted it by appealing to (Pramāṇavārttika, Praṭ. 301):

kriyāsādhanamityeva sarvaṁ sarvasya karmaṇaḥ /
sādhanaṁ na hi tat tasya sādhanaṁ yā kriyā yataḥ //
Anything that is referred to as 'kriyāsādhana' is due to all the karman, for that sādhana does not belong to a (karman), (rather) whatever the kriyā, the sādhana is from it.

From among the three (conventions) in the Vijñapti school, the first is explained by stating (Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 337):

tasmād dvirūpamastyekaṁ yadevamanubhūyate /
smaryate cobhayākārasyāsya saṁvedanaṁ phalam //
Hence, the way one experiences and remembers a two-fold formation as one, is the introspection of both images as result.

The second (convention) is explained by stating (Pramāṇa-

vārttika, 338):

> yadā niṣpannatadbhāva iṣṭo 'niṣṭo 'pi vā paraḥ /
> vijñaptiheturviṣayastasyāścānubhavastathā //
> When another thing has completed that presence, whether claimed or not claimed, the object is the cause of the vijñapti, and likewise one experiences that.

The third is explained by stating (Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 341) thus:

> vidyamāne 'pi bāhye 'rthe yathānubhavameva saḥ /
> niścitātmā svarūpeṇa nānekātmatvadoṣataḥ //
> Even when an external object is in point, it is ascertained according to the (introspective) experience; because there is no fault of multiplicity (of objects) by way of its bare nature.

When the foregoing is examined (by Devendrabuddhi) in terms of the Vijñapti school, the three-fold variegation[1] is relevant, namely, the authority-as-result as the introspection; and conventionally the authority-as-result as the cognition of the external object; and if that also is examined, what changes into introspection-as-result (=manas). But, on account of (Devendrabuddhi) not previously including the authority-as-result which cognizes the external object,[+] among the authority-as-result, for him to accept a three-fold variegation of authority-asresult in terms of the Citta-

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+ S.C. 166

1. gsum du dbye ba.

mātra (mind-only) school is not at all proper;[1] because these textual citations are indicating the authority-as-result of the first three direct perceptions explained previously.[2] And, because when examined according to the Sautrāntika[*] school, there is the fallacy that they do not have texts indicating what changes into introspection-as-result.

The school of this ācārya attributes cognition of external object as result to the passage "Gań tshe rań rig ...." (P.Vart. Prat.338.see above). Thus explaining the inclusion of external object as the first authority-as-result. And (that school) says "apprehending belongs to the subjective cognition, like the position of the Vijñaptimātra." And based thereon, to say that the third authority-as-result is in the Sautrāntika school, wrongly explains the purport of this ācārya (Dharmakīrti).

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on Tshad ma rigs gter, Mṅon sum, 36.b.-37.a.:
> de la rań rig tshad 'bras ni/
> rnam gźag grub mtha' phal cher mthun/
> don rig smra ba rań rań gi/
> grub mtha'i stobs kyis tshad 'bras 'jog/
> Therein, the tenet systems commonly agree that the authority-as-result as introspection is established. (However,) it is by the force of our own tenet system that we say the cognition of the external object be established as authority-as-result.)

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* T.331. Fol.80.b.

1. cun zad mi legs.

2. To wit, Go-rams-pa's earlier discussions of indriya, mānasa, and svasaṁvedana-pratyaksa.

y. The unrivaled view of Sa-skya Paṇḍita is as follows: Among the four phases, the chief authority-as-result is two-fold (category)--the authority-as-result as cognition of the external object and the authority-as-result as introspection.[1] And each of those (respectively), conventionally are explained as cognition of external object as result; and are explained as introspection-as-result upon examination.[2]

Since the first two are the chief authority-as-result, in this section there is a section which explains the manner of proving that the direct perception (pratyakṣa) cognizes the inherent character (svalakṣaṇa). The proof that the first two direct perceptions (i.e. indriya and mānasa) cognize the inherent character of the external object is authority-as-result as cognition of external object. And the proof that the third direct perception (i.e. svasaṁvedana) cognizes the inherent character of the cognition (jñāna) is authority-as-result as introspection.[3]

The Sautrāntika school claims the yogin's direct perception[+] (yogi-pratyakṣa) amounts to cognizing as its inhernet character, the aggregates (skandha) free from self.[4]

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1. This represents the more technical interpretation; taking authority-as-result as two-fold. In this interpretation the authority-as-result as the cognition of the external object includes both indriya and manasa.

2. This represents the more popular view; here mānasa is included in svasaṁvedana.

3. raṅ rig gi tshad 'bras.

4. bdag gis dben pa'i phuṅ po. Phuṅ po (skandha) are five in number; rūpa, vedanā, saṁjñā, saṁskāra, and vijñāna.

Therefore, it is not beyond the scope of the first two (i.e <u>don rig gi tshad 'bras</u> and <u>raṅ rig gi tshad ma 'bras</u>). (In the <u>Pramāṇavārttika</u>) the view regarding the proof of the (yogin's) cognition is stated (<u>PV</u>. <u>Prat</u>. 532):

> rūpādeścetasaścaivamaviśuddhadhiyaṁ prati /
> grāhyalakṣaṇacinteyamacintyā yogināṁ gatiḥ //
> This examination of the apprehended character of form, etcetera and consciousness, goes with one who has impure cognition. [In contrast] the understanding that yogins have is inconceivable.

And thus, because (Dharmakīrti) does not explain the yogin's authority-as-result in this case, (Sa-skya Paṇḍita, in the <u>Pramāṇayuktindhi</u>, <u>Prat</u>. 17.a) states:

> bsam gyis mi khyab ye śes can /
> de yi mkhyen pa dpag mi nus //
> The understanding of him who has the (divine) knowledge, is inconceivable and unfathomable.

Accordingly, from among the two (principal authorities-as-result), concerning the phase of the authority-as-result as the cognition of the external object, the <u>ācārya</u> (Dharmakīrti)* refutes the Vaibhāṣika while proving the Sautrāntika view, in the verses from (<u>PV</u>. <u>Prat</u>. 301-319). (Prat.301 is as follows):

> kriyāsādhanamityeva sarvaṁ sarasya karmaṇaḥ /
> sādhanaṁ na hi tat tasya sādhanaṁ yā kriyā yataḥ //

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* T. 331. Fol.81.a.

> Anything that is referred to as '<u>kriyāsādhana</u>' is due to all the <u>karman</u>, for that <u>sādhana</u> does not belong to a (<u>karman</u>), (rather) whatever the <u>kriyā</u>, the <u>sādhana</u> is from it.

(And <u>Prat</u>. 319 is as follows);

> evamprakārā sarvaiva kriyākārakasaṁsthitiḥ /
> bhāvasya bhinnābhimateṣvapyāropeṇa vṛttitaḥ //
> Every such kind of rule of activity and agent is due to a superimposition in terms of imagining a separation (into cause and effect) of a present thing.

Concerning the phase of the authority -as-result as introspection: At first (Dharmakīrti) presents a summary statement of the authority-as-result which is accepted by both those who claim the image as true (<u>satyākāravādin</u>)[1] and those who claim the image as false (<u>alīkākāravādin</u>)[2], while refuting the Sautrāntika's view and proving the Vijñaptimātra's view, in the verses (<u>PV</u>. <u>Prat</u>. 320-337).(Here <u>Prat</u>. 320 is as follows):

> kārthasaṁvid yadevedaṁ pratyakṣaṁ prativedanam /
> tadarthavedanaṁ kena tādrūpyād vyabhicāri tat //
> What is the perception of the external object? (Response:) Just this direct perception which respectively experiences, is the knowledge of an object. Why? It would be erroneous to assert identity [of the perception].

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1. <u>rnam bden pa</u>.

2. <u>rnam brdzun pa</u>.

And (PV. Prat. 337 is as follows):

tasmād dvirūpamastyekaṁ yadevamanubhūyate /
smaryate cobhayākārasyāsya saṁvedanaṁ phalam //
Hence, the way one experiences and remembers a two-fold formation as one, is the introspection of both images as the result.

This summary statement (i.e Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 320-337) is accepted by both those who claim the image as true and those who claim the image as false. Because in the view of those who claim the image as true, when the true apprehended image serves as the sanctionable (prameya), then it is the characteristic for introspection-as-result. And in the view of those who claim the image as false, when the superimposition[1] of the apprehended object is made the sanctionable, then superimposition would be for introspection-as-result.[2] That (Dharmakīrti finally) rejected the view of those who claim the image as true in this (i.e. Pramāṇavārttika), while accepting the view of those who claim the image as false, is shown later by the verse (PV. Prat. 360):

bhāvā yena nirūpyante tadrūpaṁ nāsti tattvataḥ /
yasmādekamanekaṁ ca rūpaṁ teṣaṁ na vidyate //

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1. sgro btags; āropa

2. Go-rams-pa is emphasizing that up to, this point, Dharmakīrti is interested in how the image is perceived by introspection. Hence, whether the internal image is considered to be a true image or a false superimosition does not matter. Throughout the remaining sections of this work Go-rams-pa presents material which is quite important for the study of the two types of Vijnāna-vadins; to wit, Satyākāravādin and Alīkākāravādin.

> That formation by which present things are formulated, does not exist in reality; for which reason, a formation whether single or multiple, is not found among them.

Conventionally[1], in both of those (i.e. the two chief[+] authorities-as-result), when the cognition of the object is the result, then the Sautrāntika's view[2] is indicated by only the first authority-as-result[3], because at that time, the explanation of the cognition of the object as the result is conventional. However, upon examination there is introspection-as-result. The Vijñaptimātra's view is signified by the root text (Pramāṇasamuccaya, Prat. 8) and the commentary (Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 338-340) stating thus:

> svasaṁvittiḥ phalaṁ vātra tadrūpo hyarthaniścayaḥ /
> viṣayākārataivāsya pramāṇaṃ tena mīyate //[4]
>
> Furthermore, the introspection here is a result, for its nature is certainty of the object. That very image of the sense object by which one authorizes, is the authority of this.

And as indicated by the three verses (of Dharmakīrti) as follows:

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1. tha sñad du.

2. mdo ste pa'i lugs.

3. To wit, the authority-as-result as the cognition of the external object.

4. The Sanskrit verse is available in the Appendix to Hattori's Dignāga....

> yadā niṣpannatadbhāva iṣṭo 'niṣṭo 'pi vā paraḥ /
> vijñaptiheturviṣayastasyāścānubhavastathā //
> yadā saviṣayaṁ jñānaṁ jñānāṁśe 'rthavyavasthiteḥ /
> tadā ya ātmānubhavaḥ sa evārthaviniścayaḥ //
>
> yadīṣṭākāra ātmā syād anyathā vānubhūyate /
> iṣṭo 'niṣṭo 'pi vā tena bhavatyarthaḥ praveditaḥ //
>
> When another thing has completed that presence, whether claimed or not claimed, the object is the cause of the vijñapti, and likewise one experiences that. When jñāna has a sense object such that there are two parts of jñāna for the fixing of the external object, at that time whatever the subjective experience, precisely that is called the determination of the external object. Whether the claimed image is subjective or experienced otherwise; or whether (the ākāra) is claimed or not claimed, the external object is made known by that(cognition).[1]

Thus according to the conventional part of the schools (i.e.Sautrāntika and Vijñaptimātra) the cognition of the object is the result. Then, upon examination, there is introspection-as-result. This is indicated by (PV. Prat. 341):

> vidyamāne 'pi bāhye 'rthe yathānubhavameva saḥ /*
> niścitātmā svarūpeṇa nānekātmatvadoṣataḥ /

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* T. 332. Fol. 81.b.

1. It is important to note that there is no denial of the external object; the point is that it may be known only through the subjective experience (ātmānubhava) of it.

> Even when an external object is in point, it is determined according to the (introspective) experience; because there is no fault of multiplicity (of objects) by way of its bare nature.

It is explained that both systems recognize the 'external object' as the sanctionable as follows (PV. Prat. 352):

> tathāvabhāsamānasya tādṛśo 'nyādṛśo 'pi vā /
> jñānasya heturartho 'pītyarthasyeṣṭā prameyatā //
> Whether the external object which is the cause of the cognition is similar or dissimilar to the cognition so appearing, the state of the sanctionable is claimed for the given object.

This system (i.e. Sa-skya Paṇḍita) clarifies without error the complete purport of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. Therefore, we follow this system. Here there are four explanations:

1. The authority-as-result which cognizes the external object is stated (in Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 305-307) thus:

> arthena ghaṭayatyenāṁ na hi muktvārtharūpatām /
> anyaḥ svabhedājjñānasya bhedako 'pi kathaṁcana //
> tasmāt prameyādhigateḥ sādhanaṁ meyarūpatā /
> sādhane 'nyatra tatkāryasambandho na prasidhyati //
> sā ca tasyātmabhūtaiva tena nārthāntaraṁ phalam /
> dadhānaṁ tacca tāmātmanyarthādhigamanātmanā //
> Any other differentiator of a cognition from what is different from it, must not abandon

the authoritative viewing (rūpata) of the external object when one construes it (i.e.rūpata) with the external object. Hence, the proof of cognizing the sanctionable is the authoritative viewing of the sanctionable. Were the proof otherwise, the relation to its result is not proved. Not only is that (rūpata) the subjectification of that (the sanctionable), whereby the result does not have another object, but also, one preserves it (rūpata), when there is identity with understanding the object.

Thus, (in the above instances) the sanctionable (prameya) is indicated by the words 'sanctionable'[1] and 'external object'[2] (artha). The authority (pramāṇa) is indicated by the phrases 'different from it' (svabheda), 'the authoritative viewing of the sanctionable' (meyarūpata), and 'the subjectification of that' (tasyātmabhūta).[3] The result (phala) is indicated by the phrases 'cognizing the sanctionable' (prameyādhigati)[4] + and 'understanding the object (arthādhigamana).

Dharmottara having considered those (three, i.e. sanctionable, authority, and result), first explains "the external object as the sanctionable, the similarity with the external object as the authority and understanding the external object as

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1. gźal bya.

2. don; artha. Throughout this work the don (artha) is differentiated from the yul (visaya). The former being an external object while the later is the sense object.

3. don gyi bdag ñid.

4, gźal bya rtogs pa.

the result."[1] Besides, concerning the sanctionable: whether it is the external object,[2] the blue external object,[3] the hidden blue, or the blue, there is no difference.[4] In this case, concerning the authority: when explained as 'the authoritative viewing of the external object' and as 'the subjectification of that object'[5] it has the purport of an image focused internally vis-a-vis the object, but it does not have acceptance literally. In the phase of the result, it is not proper to take the word 'pramāṇa' literally for understanding the sanctionable and for understanding the external object; because those are present in inference (anumāna).[6]

Moreover, it is invalid to take as the result the author-* ity which understands an object concretely,[7] because in the Sautrāntika school the sense cognition (indriya-jñāna) does not understand an object concretely. Besides, at the time when the direct perception (pratyakṣa) taken as the result (phala) understands the external object, then it is invalid to establish the cognition which is devoid of constructive

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* T. 332. Fol. 82.a.

1. I have not been able to locate this quotation in Dharmottara's works.

2. phyi rol gyi don; bāhyārtha.

3. phyi rol don du gyur pa'i sṅon po.

4, khyad par med pa; nirviśeṣa

5. This is according to the Tibetan; the term tasyātmabhūta has been rendered by Go-rams-pa as don gyi bdag ñid, rather than something like de'i bdag ñid.

6. rjes su dpag pa. The is the second authority for the Buddhists.

7. don dṅos su rtogs pa.

thought and without error as the authority; because that is the manner of proving that the direct perception (authoritatively) understands the external object, but it is not the manner of establishing the proof of there being a direct perception [with its definition, namely, without constructive thought and without error].

Therefore, this authority-as-result is as follows: When blue is the sanctionable, the cognition arising having the blue image due to its own blue-apprehended object is the authority.[1] And the direct perception understanding blue is the result.[2]

It is shown here that whatever is able to be the authority-as-result,[+] that is the direct perception which cognizes the object. Therefore, recognizing the pervasion, the text's (i.e. Pramāṇavārttika's) explanation appears as follows: when blue is the sanctionable, the sense direct perception apprehending blue which arises having the blue image due to the blue-apprehended object, is the authority. The understanding of the blue by the sense direct perception-apprehending blue is the result.[3]

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1. sṅon po'i rnam ldan du skyes pa'i śes pa tshad ma.

2. sṅon po rtogs pa'i mṅon sum 'bras ba'o.

3. It should be noted that in this paragraph and the one directly before it, Go-rams-pa has made a sharp distinction between the cognition (śes pa) and the apprehending ('dzin) of blue on the one hand, and the understanding (rtogs pa) of blue which is the result ('bras bu; phala) on the other. This discussion of Go-rams-pa should

2. Auhtority-as-result as explained by the the Vijñāna-vādins: Here there are two sections:

   1. In the absolute sense (paramārtha) there is the authority-as-result as introspection.

   2. Conventionally, there is the authority-as-result as cognition of the external object.

1. The absolute sense is stated (by Sa-skya Paṇḍita in his) self-commentary to the Pramāṇayutinidhi (230, Fol.126.b) thus:

> Agreeing with the Cittamātra school, (Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika, Prat.357) states:
>
> yathānudarśanaṁ ceyaṁ meyamānaphalasthitiḥ /
> kriyate 'vidyamānāpi grāhyagrāhakasaṁvidām //
>
> This rule of meya[1], māna[2], and phala going with grāhya, grāhaka, and saṁvid,[3] even though not

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be compared with that Tsoṅ-kha-pa, in his Sde bdun...,p. 28; And also A. Wayman's translation of that work, "A guided...," p, 18. Once again Go-rams-pa and Tsoṅ-kha-pa are in agreement. In the section devoted to authority-as-result Wayman translates Tsoṅ-kha-pa's statement about the first phase of understanding the result as follows: "there is blue as the sanctionable...the authority is the new non-deceiving cognition (śes pa) of blue. The authority with on-going comprehension (rtogs) of blue, establishes the result." Note that Tson-kha-pa, like Go-rams-pa has distinguished between the cognition (śes pa) of blue as the authority and the comprehension (rtogs) (here I translated rtogs as understanding) of blue as the result.

1. 'jal. This term is used in this case rather than the more frequent gźal. Both terms literally meaning to weigh; hence, gźal bye (prameya) is that which is to be weighed by an authority (pramāṇa).

2. byed. Literally to make, to do; in this case taken for the Sanskrit māna (√mā) measuring.

3. Cf. Manorathanandin's Pramāṇavārttika-vṛtti, ed, by D. Shastri, Varaṇasi, 1966,p. 206, the commentary clear aligns grāhyakāra and meya, grahakāra and mana, and saṁvitti (which in the verse is written saṁvid) with phala.

[separable][1], operates according to appearance. Explained in that way, when the intropspection[2] appears as the apprehensible together with the image [ākāra], it is the sanctionable. Appearing as the apprehension it is the authority. And I accept the characteristic of the introspection as the result. Therefore, I accept the sanctionable* and the authority-as-result, like the experience of pleasure [sukha][3] and pain [duḥkha][4], as time and a bare nature in one[5] [i.e. newly].

Those who claim the image as false [alīkākāravādin] accept the superimposition appearing as the external object as the sanctionable.[6] Accept the cognition apprehending that as the authority. And accept the conventional imposition of the introspection as the result. Therefore, they deny that the two, sanctionable and authority-as-result, like the appearance of hair and so on, are in one [as were time

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* T. 332. Fol. 82.b.

1. Ibid. That is, in the absolute sense.

2. S.C. has omitted raṅ rig. However, T. states rnam bcas pa dag gzuṅ bar snaṅ pa'i raṅ rig gźal bya.

3. bde.

4. sdug pa.

5. dus daṅ ṅo bo gcig du. This is a difficult phrase to render.

6. Even though the image itself is considered to be false it can still serve as a sanctionable for direct perception. Once again it is not the reality of an external object which is debated, but the accuracy of the internal image.

and nature per the preceding].

Now as to the meaning of (Sa-skya Paṇḍita's) explanation: In general, both the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātrin accept that the authority-as-result establishes the apprehended image (grāhyākāra) as the sanctionable. But there are distinctive differences (between the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātrin)+ concerning the apprehended image. This is because the Sautrāntika accepts that image produced from the external object as the apprehended image, when it arises (in the mind); and because the Cittamātrin, even without the external object, accepts the cognition (jñāna) itself as the apprehended image, when it appears as the apprehended by dint of propensities (vāsanā).[1] Therefore, those who the claim the image as true having made just that (cognition) the sanctionable, accept the apprehending image (grāhakākāra) determining that as the authority; and accept the characteristic of the introspection which experiences that (apprehended image), as the result.

Although (the statement made above that) "the authority-as-result establishes the apprehended image as the sanction-

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\+ S.C. 171

1. What distinguishes the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātrin, in this case at least, is where each places the major factor determining the apprehended image. For the Sautrāntika this lies in the external object. The Cittamātra, however, taking into account the subjective psychological state influenced by the individual's vāsana-s, understand the major determinative factor to be within the individual's cognition itself. Hence, Go-rams-pa's stating "even without the external object" may be understood as meaning even without the external object serving as the major determinative factor.

able" applies to those who claim the image as true, the purport of this is that it is the apprehended image of the second phase of the authority-as-result.[1] Because even without the external object, the cognition itself by dint of propensities is the apprehended image appearing as both the apprehensible and the apprehension: as (<u>Pramāṇavārttika</u>, <u>Prat</u>. 336) explains:

> kasyacit kiṁcidevāntarvāsanāyāḥ prabodhakam /
> tato dhiyāṁ viniyamo na bāhyārthavyapekṣayā //
> For any (cognition) there is an awakening by way of an internal propensity. Therefore, it is limited to the mind without depending on an external object.

Those who claim the image as false[2] accept the sanctionable as the superimpostion of the apprehended image appearing as the object. They accept as the authority the cognition with an on-going apprehension[3] of that (apprehended image). And they accept as the result the imposition of the introspection on that which appears to experience that (apprehended image).

The cognition having an on-going apprehension of that (apprehended image) is not itself the superimpostion of the

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1. The second phase of the authority-as-result is authority-as-result as introspection. Cf. also A. Wayman, trans., "A guided...,"p. 18; there Prof. Wayman translates Tsoṅ-kha-pa's statement about the second phase of understanding the result.

2. <u>rnam brdzun</u> pa; <u>alīkākāravādin</u>.

3. <u>dṅos su 'dzin pa'i śes pa</u>.

apprehended image. Therefore, since it is the imposition of* the introspection on that (which appears to experience that apprehended image), it is the (imposition) on the characteristic of the introspection on its own nature. Now, even those who claim the image as false accept that the authority-as-result (pramāṇaphala) is the characteristic of the introspection in terms of what (Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 365) states:

> tatrātmaviṣaye māne yathārāgādi vedanam /
> iyaṁ sarvatra saṁyojyā mānameyaphalasthitiḥ //
> Among them, when the authority has an internal object, there is an experience, for example lust, etcetera. This rule of authority, sanctionable, and result is applicable in every case.

In brief[1] suppose one understands that in the view of+ both the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātrin who claim the image as true, the cognition of the apprehended image is ture: while in the view of the Cittamātrin who claim the image as false, even what cognizes the object is untrue. In that case, when establishing the sanctionable as the apprehended image, one would not be deluded[2] about the difference of the appearance of the imposition and the characteristic of the resultant

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* T. 333. Fol. 83.b. + S.C. 172

1. mdor na.

2. rmoṅs pa med par 'gyur. This is a good example of 'gyur ba taken as an auxiliary verb added to the terminative of the infinitive to form the future.

introspection. But nowadays, one is deluded even about the difference between the Cittamātrin who claim the image as true and the Cittamātrin who claim the image as false. For example, by those who say that even in the view of the Cittamātrin who claim the image as false, "when there is an apprehended image, then there is a cognition; therefore, there is pervasion," there would never be the cognition of the object, though they endeavour for an aeon.

2. The conventional sense (Authority-as-result as the cognition of the external object): Both those Cittamātrin who claim the image as true (satyākārin) and those Cittamatrin who claim the image as false (alīkākārin) assert conventionally that the blue which appears as the external object, is the sanctionable (prameya). They also assert that the appearance of the apprehended image (grāhyākāra) as the distinct blue in the cognition arisen from an inveterate propensity,is the authority (pramāṇa). Both those whc claim the image as true and those who claim the image as false assert conventionally that the cognition of the object as the cognition of the blue external object, is the direct perception-as-result.

In order to establish this (i.e. what is stated above) there are three sections, to wit:

1. Establishment by scripture (āgama).
2. Establishment by means of principle.
3. Setting forth the conventional meaning.

1. Establishment by scripture is explained by (Dignāga's) Ālambanaparīkṣa (verse 6) thus:

> yadantarjñeyarūpaṁ tu bahirvadavabhāsate/
> so 'rtho vijñānarūpatvāttatpratyayatayāpi ca//
> The form of the inner knowable, which appears as though it were external, is the object--because it is the form of the perception and because it is the conditional state of that (=Ālambana).

The first two padas (6.a-b) determine the basis[1] for conventionally establishing the external object. Thus, by stating "is the object" (Dignāga) demonstrates that it is[*] the object conventionally established. And so, by stating "because it is the form of the perception" (Dignāga) demonstrates that the object is the bear nature (svarūpa) of[+] the cognition. The last pada (6.d.) conventionally proves the relationship of necessary connection (avinābhāva).

In that way (Dharmakīrti) states in the Pramāṇaviniśćaya (Prat. Fol.263.a.):

> don gnas pa ni raṅ rig pa'i raṅ bźin yin pa ñid
> kyi phyir raṅ rig pa yin yaṅ 'bras bu las 'di ni
> don rig pa yin par blta'o//
> Since the nature of introspection is to dwell on the object, when there is intropsection, it inspects the object by way of result.

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* T. 333. Fol. 83.b. + S.C.173

1. gźi. This is the scriptual basis; hence, the Mahāvyutpatti's entry of āgama under the term gzi may be acceptable.

And in the Pramāṇavārttika (Prat. 350.c-d., Dharmakīrti) states:

arthasthitestadātmatvāt svavidapyarthavinmatā//[1]

Since it dwells on the object, it is identical with it. So we claim that introspection also is object-inspection.

And the meaning of these statements is as follows: This very sense cognition (indriya-jñana) which establishes the cognition of the object conventionally[2] and the object which appears at its own time,[3] is the bare nature (svarūpa) of the cognition. The buddhi (=svasaṁvedana) with certainty cognition that is the fruit of outer sense cognition has the external object in a bare form. So it is said that "it establishes the object conventionally." Because when (Dharmakīrti) said "by way of the result" it is the certainty cognition as result of the sense cognition.[4]

Moreover, the previous examples presented from the root-commentary[5] (i.e. Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 339) state:

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1. Artha-vid went to artha-vin due to the fact that in external combination, a final mute sonant before a nasal is changed to the nasal of its own class; hence, d (the dental mute sonant) went to n (the dental nasal).

2. Conventionally, here means at the time the five senses are functioning.

3. raṅ dus su. This is the time at which the external object appears to the five senses.

4. This paragraph is a prime example of the difficult style in which Go-rams-pa sometimes composed his thoughts. The entire paragraph was run together into one continuous five line long passage; without the presence of any metrical divisions such as //, called zad.

5. It is significant to note that Go-rams-pa has referred to the Pramāṇavārttika as the "root-commentary". Indicating

When jñāna has an external object....

And state:

...precisely that is called the determination of the external object.

These statements demonstrate conventionally that the external object is the sanctionable.

Summarizing the meaning of all these, (Sa-skya Paṇḍita) states in his self-commentary to the Pramāṇayuktinidhi (230 Fol. 126.b):

According to the Sautrāntika, conventionally there is the authority-as-result as the cognition of the external object, which is explained by (Dharmakīrti) thus:

Since it dwells on the object, it is identical with it. So we claim that introspection also is object-inspection.

According to which, it is the second rule of the cognition.

2. Establishment by means of principle: Each tenet-system[+] has both the rule which establishes it according to the cognition pondering the layout (of the void dharmadhātu) and the

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+ S.C. 174

his feeling that Dharmakīrti did compose the Pramāṇavarttika as a kind of commentary on Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya. For a discussion of this topic I refer the interested reader to D.Malvani, ed., Svārthānumānaparricheda by Dharmakīrti, Varanasi, 1959, Introduction, and also A. Wayman, "Reflections on the Study of Buddhist Logic," Indologica Taurinensia (Torino, Italy), Vol. V, 1977, p.292-296.

rule which establishes it as it is known according to worldly convention. Therefore, here also it is necessary to be certain about that. In regard to that, at the time when one ponders* with a principle of establishing the two methods of buddhi and svsaṁvedana, one establishes that the external object appears at its own time to the sense cognition and even when blocked, in worldly convention it would be the external object. Because as explained (in the Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 348) thus:

> yasmād yathā niviṣṭo 'sāvarthātmā pratyaye tathā/
> niścīyate niviṣṭo 'sāvevamityātmasaṁvidaḥ//
> Since that (image) constituting an object is determined as it was fixed in convention, so in that way it (the image as object) is determined as it was fixed (in the buddhi) belonging to introspection.

Accordingly, when this appears just at its own time to the sense; then it is conventionalized by the worldly as either pure or impure and as either blue or not blue. Conventionally there is an external object; but this is understood by the Pramāṇaviniścaya scripture as entailing a cognition with inveterate propensity. (vāsanā).

3. The conventional meaning: Now what is the conventional meaning? We set forth:

α. The conventional certainty cognition whose certainty is brought forth by two authorities (i.e. pratyakṣa and anumana) and are held in common by everyone, whether or not they

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* T. 333. Fol. 84.a.

use a tenet-system.

β. The conventional expressing words[1] which are the expressing words brought forth by that certainty cognition. So too it appears clearly in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, that the[+] authority which brings forth such and such certainty cognition is in every case established as the 'conventional authority'. And that meaning is exactly what one may see in (Sa-skya Paṇḍita's) *Pramāṇayuktinidhi*. But other Tibetans say even the words do not appear, how much less the meaning[2] (i.e in the *Pramāṇayuktinidhi*).

If one determines this kind of convention, then according to the Realists (*Vastusatpadārthavādin*)[3] if something has conventional existence one would understand that it is not (logically) pervaded by existence.[4] And according to the Mādhyamika school, if something has conventional existence one would understand that it is pervaded by existence:[5]

\+ S.C. 175

1. *brjod pa sgra'i tha sñad*.

2. bod gźan rnams la tshig tsam yaṅ mi snaṅ na/ don lta ci smos mo/.This is an interesting idiom.

3. This is most likely referring to the Sautrāntika. Prof. Wayman has noted in his *Calming the Mind*...,p. 458, note 59, that this Sanskrit name for the realists is found among the Sanskrit fragments published by M.H. Shastri of Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka* and Candrakīrti's Commentary, in Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, vol. III, no. 8 (1914).

4. In this case there is no necessity to prove anything--it exists period.

5. In this case there would be the use of syllogisms to prove the pervasion logically.

although it is the distinction of accepting and not accepting what exists according to the cognition pondering the layout (or natural state).[1]

3. Having pondered the purport of the authority as the cognition of the external object, in order to explain the introspection-as-result there are three sections, to wit;

1. Brief Explanation.
2. Extensive Explanation.*
3. Answer to Challenges.

1. Brief explanation: This is explained in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (Prat.262.b.) thus:

> gaṅ gi phyir raṅ bźin gcig ñid gcig gi yid du 'oṅ la gźan gyi ni yid du mi 'oṅ bar mthoṅ ba'i phyir ro /
>
> (The external object is the image of many perceptions, because one sees that the one self-presence (of the object) is agreeable to the mind (manojña) of one person and disagreeable to mind of another.

And thus (again 262.b.):

> gźan la yaṅ tha dad pa med pa'i sgra daṅ dri daṅ

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* T. 333. Fol. 84.b.

1. This is a direct reference to the Mādhyamika's believing in satyadvaya (the 'two truths'). While they may enter into discussion over what is pervaded or not pervaded by existence, it should be remembered that they are only engaging in such discussions from the conventional point of view. In the absolute sense (paramārtha) the Mādhyamika would not discuss the pervasion or non-pervasion of a thing by existence, but rather they would discuss the voidness (śūnyatā; stoṅ pa ñid) of self-existence (svabhāva; raṅ bźin) of a thing.
   It should also be mentioned that this is the only reference to the Mādhyamika school which Go-rams-pa makes in the entire "Direct Perception" chapter.

> ro la sogs pa'i khyad par gyis sgro chags kyi bye brag rnams kyi dbaṅ po ñid kyi dbe ba daṅ mi bda ba bsyed pa'i phyir ro//
>
> And in another respect, one and the same distinct word, odor, and taste, etcetera, produces pleasure and pain in the senses of particular living beings. (Therefore, the experience of the object is only the function of the introspection).[1]

In this way, because of explaining that the one external object focuses on each sense cognition as a separate object, it is not being explained as the only view of the Cittamātra. When being explained in the section of the Cittamātra author-[+] ity-as-result it is to indicate that in that school (i.e. Cittamātra), conventionally, the external object is accepted as the sanctionable (<u>prameya</u>). Therefore it is also not only the view of the Sautrāntika.

Because the explanation of the tenets of our school does not appear here different from those two (i.e. Sautrāntika and Cittamātra), this present explanation of the authority-as-result is established according to both the Sautrāntika school and the Cittamātra school.

\+ S.C. 176

1. These two passages from the <u>Pramānaviniscaya</u> are most striking in their similar tone to passages one may find in modern psychology texts. Cf.Walter Mischel, <u>Introduction to Personality</u>, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971, p.90-101; most particularly such theories as were put forth by the phenomenological psychologists,like K. Lewin's Field Theory.

However, there are distinctions (between the Cittamātra and the Sautrāntika) regarding the manner of determining the external object (bāhyārtha) as the sanctionable (prameya).[1] And in light of that, they also have distinctions regarding the aprehended image (grāhyākāra), and consequently they also have distinctions regarding what may be introspectively experienced.

2. Extensive explanation: Introductory remarks; We see these methods of understanding (introspection) as result to be acceptable to both the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra, to wit:

1. The essential point of the section.
2. The sanctionable.
3. Word (s).
4. Authority.
5. Result.
6. 'Pondered' or 'Not Pondered.
7. Testimony of scripture.

This means that from among the set of seven the first, the essential point of the section, applies to both (the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra). The essential point of the section being applied only to the school of the Sautrāntika appears reasonable so long as (the examination of) authority-as-result which is the cognition of the image is not subsequent

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1. This was discussed above, S.C. 170-171. There it was shown that for the Sautrāntika the major determinative factor was the external object, while the Cittamātra held the individual's cognition influenced by vāsanā-s to be the determinative factor.

to authority-as-result which is the cognition of the object (arthavid). Because for the Sautrāntika it is necessary only to make an examination of the authority-as-result which is the cognition of the object; and it is not (necessary) in the Cittamātra school.[1]

(On the other hand the essential point of the section) being only applied to the school of the Cittamātra appears[* +] reasonable (according to Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 367):

> grāhakākārasaṁkhyātā paricchedātmatātmani /
> sā yogyateti ca proktaṁ pramāṇaṁ svātmavedanam //
> The capability mentioned as the apprehension-image
> in oneself, the discrimination self, is explained
> as the introspection authority.

However, there is the essential point (of Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 354):

> avibhāgo 'pi buddyātmā viparyāsitadarśanāiḥ /
> grāhyagrāhakasaṁvittibhedavān iva lakṣyate //
> Although the individual cognition is impartite,
> by inverted views it is characterized as though having
> differences as the apprehensible, the apprehension,
> and the intuition.

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* T. 333. Fol. 85.a. + S.C. 177

1. Go-rams-pa is referring to the sections of the Pramāṇa-vārttika, etc. When Go-rams-pa states "it is not (neċessary) in the Cittamātra school," he means that it is not necessary to only discuss the authority-as-result as the cognition of the external object, but there must also be a discussion of the authority-as-result as introspection.

Therefore, it is necessary to make an examination of authority-as-result which takes the apprehended image as the sanctionable. That being so, there is no profit in differentiating between these (two) essential points.

Therefore, when the external object of the Sautrāntika school is the sanctionable, authority-as-result (pramāṇa-phala) amounts to the cognition of the external object as result. And when the apprehended image of the Vijñaptimātra school is the sanctionable, authority-as-result amounts to the introspection (svasaṁvedana) as the result. And in convention, when the external object is the sanctionable, then in convention, the two authorities-as-result amount to the cognition of the object as the result.

When authority-as-result arises after what we have explained as three,[1] then not only is introspection a result when the apprehensible image is the sanctionable, but also the cognition of the object (arthavid;don rig) amounts to a result when depending on the separate state of the subsequent certainty cognition in the case of the two (authorities as-result) which take the external object as the sanctionable. But, when pondered by the reasoning which establishes the introspection and the two methods of the mind explained below,[2] then the introspection is reasoned as the result. Because this (object) appearing at its own time for the sense cog-

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1. Go-rams-pa seems to be referring to the previous discussions where the individual cognition has been divided into three; sanctionable, authority, and result.

2. See below S.C. 181.

nition is the apprehensible image that is identical with this cognition.

2. The santionable: This applies to both (the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra). When it is accepted that a remote external object[1] is the sanctionable for the Sautrāntika and that in convention the external object is the sanctionable for the Vijñaptimātra school, this also is established in both schools by the previously completed explanation.

3. Word (s): This applies to both (the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra). When applied to the Sautrāntika, the words, "the introspection is not only the result when the apprehended image is the sanctionable, it is also (the result) when the external object is the sanctionable," are to be* applied. When applied to the Cittamātra, the words, "at the time[2] reasoning ponders there is no external object, even if in convention the external object exists," are to be applied. Therefore, these (words) also establish (introspection-as-result) in both schools.

4. Authority: This applies to both (the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra). When taking the external object (bahyārtha) as the sanctionable (prameya), both the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra necessarily accept an authority for the apprehensible image. When the former takes the romote external object as the sanctionable, it accepts an authority

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* T. 334. Fol.85.b.

1. phyi don lkog na mo. Das, A Tibetan-English Dictionary states lkog na mo as "that which is not evident."

2. This points to introspection.

for the image of apprehension. And when the latter take the external object as the sanctionable in convention, then in[+] convention, it is necessary to establish the intuition of the object. Because that (external object) can be established only by the apprehensible image that uses the image of the external object. But it can not be established by another means. Therefore this is established in both schools.

5. Result: This applies to both (the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra). When pondered, the introspection (svasaṃvedana) is the result. But as to both the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra: When the Sautrāntika take the external object as the sanctionable, they are accepting the two marks (dvairūpya) (anvaya-vyatireka) as proof. This is because introspection is established by means of the method of proof of those two marks. It is explained (by Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 426.a-b.) thus:

> dvairūpyasādhanenāpi prāyaḥ siddhaṁ svavedanam/
> Ordinarily introspection is proved also by the method of proof of the two marks.

And according to the Vijñaptimātra the apprehensible (i.e. the external image) and the apprehension (i.e. the internal image) are not separate materials. Therefore, because there is no possibility other than introspection being the result when pondered, this is established in both schools.

+ S.C. 178

6. 'Pondered' or 'Not Pondered'[1]: This applies to both (the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra). Both the Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra accept without distinction that this appearing at its own time to sense cognition (indriya-jñāna) is the external object, if it is not pondered. And if it is pondered they accept it (i.e the external object) as the bare nature (svarūpa) of the cognition. Because even that explicit cognition of the person who is ignorant[2] of the variegation of the remote external object, the Sautrāntika accepts in general as the certainty of the external object. When that* appears at its own time to the sense cognition, given a certainty cognition brought forth by the sense cognition arisen based on the inveterate propensity,[3] the Vijñapti-mātra accepts it as the external object. And because also, when pondered both (these schools) accept the apprehensible image (as the object). By this (explanation) also the understanding of introspection-as-result is established by both schools.

7. Testimony of scripture: This applies to both (the

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* T. 334. Fol. 86.a.

1. dpyad ma dpyad.

2. mi śes pa'i gaṅ zad. Mi śes pa can be contrasted with ma rig pa; the latter being the nescience which casts one into the cyclical flow, vis-a-vis, pratītyasamutpāda. The former is the more mundane ignorance or lack of knowledge about some topic. Moreover, mi śes pa is the term used for ajñā and ma rig pa for the term avidyā.

3. bag chag brtan

Sautrāntika and the Cittamātra). The previously cited Pramāṇaviniścaya text which takes the object of sense cognition as shared;[1] those texts among the Vijñaptimātra which present the external object as existing in convention; and the texts which establish introspection, and the two marks of the cognition which will be explained (below)--take no stand on acceptance or non-acceptance of an external object. The scriptures of the composite school of the Sautrāntika-Cittamātra are those scriptures of the composite school of the Sautrāntika-Cittamātra which take as the main thing the authority-as-result.[2]

Also, (testimony) is established in both (the Sautrāntika[+] and the Cittamātra schools) when stating (Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 352.b. and Pramāṇaviniścaya, Prat. 43.a):

tādṛśo 'nyādṛśo 'pi vā /

(Whether) similar (to it) or dissimilar (to it)....

Because "similar" (to it) means similar to the external object, for the Sautrāntika. And because "dissimilar" (to it)

\+ S.C. 179

1. S.C. and T. read: yul thun moṅ boཡོད་པའི / rnam ṅes....

2. This is quite an interesting statement which Go-rams-pa has made. Although there are no texts per se representing the composite school, if you take the passages which deal with authority-as-result; then, we can say that these are the texts which go with the composite school of the Sautrāntika-Cittamātra. Discussions about this composite school are quite infrequent in modern scholarly literature. An exception to this, however, can be found in Th. Stcherbatsky; cf. Buddhist Logic, vol. I., p.163. Moreover, we should note Stcherbatsky's remark later on in Vol. I, p.529, to wit, "The logicians compromised and established the hybrid school of the Sautrāntika-Yogācāras.

--- as previous scholars explain--"dissimilar by way of view (drsti)"[1]--and "similar to the propensity"--as explained by others--appears to have the same meaning for the Vijñapti-mātra.

Summarizing the entire meaning in brief, Mahātma Sa-skya Pandita concludes the explanation of the four authorities-as-result (pramāna-phala) of the two classes of Hearers (Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika) and those Cittamātrins who claim the image as true and those Cittamātrins who claim the image as false stating (Tshad-ma rigs pa'i gter pa'i rañ 'grel 230. Fol. 126.b.):

> Thus, from among the four tenet systems (siddhānta) the Ācārya (Dharmakīrti) writes according to the Sautrāntika system when he accepts an external object;[2] and he maintains a nirākāra position[3] when treating the inner knowable. Both (Sautrāntika and Nirākāravādin Cittamātra) take introspection as authority-as-result in the absolute sense (param-artha), which the Pramānavārttika,(Prat. 351.b-c)* states:
>
> svasamvedanam phalam uktam svabhāvacintāyām /
>
> "When pondering the bare nature (of the mental

* T. 334. Fol. 86.b.

1. S.C. and T. read: lhas for ltas.

2. Cf. A. Wayman, "Yogācāra and the Buddhist Logicians,"; particularly the discussion of the ālambana.

3. This is referring to the controversy over the manner

object), one refers to introspection as the result."
Conventionally, according to the Sautrāntika, there is the cognition of the object as the authority-as-result explained thus (Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 350.c-d):

arthasthitestadātmatvāt svavidapyarthavinmatā //

"Since it dwells on the object, it is identical with it. So we claim that introspection also is object-inspection."

According to this there are two marks of cognition. And regarding the cognition of the object (Dharmakīrti) explains (Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 398.b.-first half c.):

bāhyaṁ tvāśritya varṇyate / dvairūpyaṁ

"But (because the Sautrāntika) depends on the external object, the two marks are explained (by the Ācārya)."

Though there are the two marks of the cognition of the object and the cognition of the cognition (i.e. intropsection), according to the Vijñapti-mātra, (Dharmakīrti) explains (Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 336.d.-337.a.) as follows:

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in which consciousness takes something as an object. The nirākāra position is contrasted with the sākāra. For discussions of this important topic I refer the interested reader to the following; Yuichi Kajiyama, "Controversy between the sākāra and nirākāra-vadins of the yogācāra school -some materials", Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, University of Tokyo, XIV, 1, Dec., 1965, pp.26-37; An Introduction...,p.154-158. And also cf. A. Wayman, "Reflections...,"p.301-304.; "A guided...," p.4-6.

na bāhyārthavyapekṣā/ tasmād dvirūpamastyekaṁ /
"It is independent of the external object. Therefore, a single (cognition, i.e. introspection) has two marks."
(Some people) afflicted by ignorance regarding the "single cognition" take the two marks to go (respectively) with the object and the cognition. I myself follow Dharmakīrti's method. Indeed many Tibetans follow the Vaibhāṣika's method. That only amounts to ignorance of a principle guided by the facts.

Since there are explanations different from the purport of the Rigs gter, it is necessary to indicate what is found in the Rigs gter root-commentary.

Now then, what is the authority-as-result of this section? Previously we took as basis both the sanctionable and the authority, i.e. authority-as-result for the cognition of the external object. In the result phase, conventionally there is the cognition of the blue external object.[1] And when it is + pondered, one adds "the direct perception-as-result amounts to the bare nature of the cognition."

3. Answer to challenges: Jinendrabuddhi[2] states, "It is not

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\+ S.C. 180

1. phyi don sṅon po.

2. Jinendrabuddhi is the author of a commentary on Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, entitled Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccaya-ṭīkā, Tibetan version, Peking ed., Tibetan Tripiṭaka, No. 5766. We can place Jinendrabuddhi after the time Dharmakīrti only because he has mentioned Dharmakīrti in the salutation verse at the outset of his commentary; Cf. Viśālāmalvatī, Fol. 2.a.

right to accept the apprehension-image (grāhakākāra) according to the Vijñaptimātra." And Devendrabuddhi[1] states, "The cognition is identical with the apprehension, that is to say,* according to the Vijñaptimātra position."

Thus the Vijñaptimātra has been made as an example and one speaks of the inner knowable (jneya); because of encountering a doubtful position. Hence, if someone says, "considering how the Vijñaptimātra is treated by the former (Jinendrabuddhi) is it not right to use the Vijñaptimātra?" There is no fault.[2] When the Cittamātra school has refuted the external object,[3] there is (still) the authority-as-result of representation-only, and conventionally the authority-as-result which accepts the external object. The former (i.e. authority-as-result of representation-only) is as follows; when the apprehensible image is the sanctionable, authority-as-result is taken as introspection-as-result. That being so, when there is the introspection-as-result, then the apprehension-image would be the authority; because one makes answer when encountering

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* T 334. Fol.87.a.

1. Devendrabuddhi is the author of a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramanavarttika. Moreover, according to Stcherbatsky Devendrabuddhi was the initiator the philological school of commentators; the commentators of this school were interested in rendering the direct meaning of the commented text without loosing themselves in its deeper philosophical and religious implications. See Buddhist Logic, vol. I,p.39-40.

2. skyon med de.

3. That is to say, refuted the external object as being the perceptual object in the absolute sense.

a doubtful point. The answer to challenges other than that one are not gone into here; because if one understands the establishment of our school, they are automatically solved.

4. Determination of authority-as-result going with the definition of introspection: Having pondered the doubtful point regarding authority-as-result of representation-only, there is the determination of authority-as-result going with the definition of introspection. (Dignāga's Pramāṇa) Sūtra (commenting on Prat. 8.c-d.) explains:

> Accordingly, one metaphorically[1] takes the image, multiple experiential cognitions, and multiple apprehensibles, as the authority and the sanctionable. So in the following verse (Pramāṇsamuccaya, Prat.9.):
> yad ābhāsaṁ prameyaṁ tat pramāṇaphalate punaḥ /
> grāhakākārasamvittitrayaṁ nātaḥ pṛthak-kṛtam //
> "That which appears as the sanctionable, the authority, and the result is the triad, apprehension, image, and intuition. Not on that reason should one take those three as separate."

And the meaning (of Dignāga's statement) is explained in the (Pramāṇa)vārttika, the part from avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmā (Prat. 354.a.) down to pramāṇaṁ svātmavedanam (Prat.367.d.) [previously translated]. Among them, the three verses (i.e. Prat.354-356) stating, "while the individual cognition...", etcetera, explain that the triad, the apprehensible, the apprehension, and the intuition appear as separate to the delusive cognition, although

1. ne bar 'dogs pa; upacaryate.

they are in fact not separate. The single verse[1] (i.e. Prat. 357) stating, "(the triad) apprehensible, apprehension, and[*] intuition...", etcetera, explains that there is the establishment of the triad, authority, result, and sanctionable, regarding their appearance to that (delusive cognition).

The three verses (i.e. Prat. 358-360) stating, "Otherwise...", etcetera, explain the reasoning which proves that from among the triad, apprehensible, apprehension, and intuition,[2] the[+] apprehensible image is false. Hence, previously in the second phase of authority-as-result the apprehensible image is established as the sanctionable; and it was not variegated as either true or false. Alsc the introspection was established as the result; and it was not variegated as either substantive[3] or imaginary.[4] Thus, regarding both those who claim the image as true and those who claim the image as false, when establishing the apprehensible image as a superimposition,[5] and the introspection which sees it as an imposer, this is established as the Cittamātra followers who claim the image as false.

The three verses (i.e. Prat. 361-363) stating, "from seeing a 'feature agreement'", etcetera, answer the challenge

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* T. 335. Fol. 87.b. + S.C. 181

1. tshigs bcaṅ gcig.

2. gzuṅ 'dzin rig gsum gyi naṅ nas.

3. dṅos.

4. brtags. From rtog pa.

5. sgro btags; āropa.

regarding the triad delusively appearing as separate, though in fact not separate.

Now then, what is the establishment of the authority-as-result in which the definition of those who claim the image as true's introspection is taken as the result? (Answer:) The four verses(i.e. Prat.364-367) stating, "Therein (the Vijñaptimātra) accept the apprehension-image determining the cognition...", etcetera. Though being the section dealing with the image as false, those who accept the introspection should apply it to all cases of authority-as-result going with introspection. This is because when the Rigs gter (Mṅon sum, 36.b-c) states:

> Therein, the tenet systems commonly agree that the authority-as-result as introspection is established,

this scripture stresses (introspection) as cognizer.

3. The reasoning which established the introspection and the two marks of the cognition: Here there are two:
   A. Establishing the two marks.[1]
   B. Establishing introspection.

A. Establishing the two marks: Here there are four subsections;
   1. The method of establishment according to which personality.
   2. The method of establishment according to which cognition.

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1. tshul gñis.

3. The bare nature of the two marks which are to* be established.

4. The explanation of the reasoning which establishes the two marks.

1. The method of establishment according to which personality: The 'first speaker' (pūrvavādin)[1] who reasons the two marks while accepting the external object, was shown to be the Sautrāntika. And the 'first speaker' who reasons the two marks while not accepting the external object, was shown to be the Cittamātra. Now the 'respondent' (prativādin)[2] will be shown to be the Vaibhāṣika, because we must establish the 'speaker' who insists that a cognition is without imagery (nirākāra).

2. The method of establishment according to which cognition: All cognitions in which the object appears, are in that way established; because having rejected that it is the external object which appears as its own time in the cognition, it is necessary to establish the bare nature of the cognition.+

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* T. 335. Fol.88.a. + S.C.182

1. sṅar rgol.

2. phyi rgol. Just as a side note it may be pointed out that one is quite right in sensing the presence of a formal debating system from the terms 'first speaker' and 'respondent'. It is well documented that both India and Tibet had debate systems to decide doctrinal disputes, as well as other topics. One of the most well known debates is the one between Kamalaśīla and the Chinese teacher Hva-saṅ Mahāyāna; I refer the interested reader to The History of Buddhism in India and Tibet by Bu-ston, translated from the Tibetan by E. Obermiller, Heidelberg, 1932, p.193. Cf. also A. Wayman, "The Rules of Debate According to Asaṅga," Journal of American Oriental Society, 78:1, 1958, p.29-40.

3. The bare nature of the two marks which are to be established:

The two marks of the object (viṣaya) and the subject (viṣayin)[1] alone need not be proved; because the 'respondent' (i.e. Vaibhāṣika) already accepts them. From among the two marks, i.e. the apprehension-image which is perceived in just the cognition and the apprehensible image which appears as the object (viṣaya), the first (i.e. apprehension-image) need not be proved; because the 'respondent' already accepts it. However, the latter, (i.e. apprehensible image) needs to be proved; because (Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 423.c-d.) explains:

> tasyārtharūpatā 'siddhā sāpi siddhyati saṁsmṛteḥ /
> Also the unproved bare nature of the object of that (perception) is established from the remembrance.

4. The explanation of the reasoning which establishes the two marks: Ācārya Dignāga states (PS. Prat.10.a.):

> viṣayajñānatajjñāna /
> (There are two marks of cognition by the variegation of) a. the cognition of the sense object and b. the cognition of it (i.e. of that cognition).

And (Pramāṇasamuccaya, Prat. 10.c) states:

> smṛteruttarakālaṁ ca /
> And because of memory at a subsequent time.

As to the meaning (of Dignāga's) explanation, there are two sections, to wit:

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1. yul daṅ yul can.

A. The general explanation of the marks as explained from the scripture.

B. The particular explanation of the difficult points.

A. The general explanation of the marks as explained from the scripture: Here there are two subsections:

1. The method of proof with respect to the first scriptural passage.

2. The method of proof with respect to the second scriptural passage.

1. The first scriptural passage:[1] As to the meaning of that scriptural passage, Dignāga gives two reasons, and Dharmakīrti[*] gives five (more) reasons, hence clearly there are seven. According to Devendrabuddhi, (Dharmakīrti) explains (Dignāga's) statement, "the cognition of the sense object", etcetera, in the Pramāṇavārttika (Prat. 388):

> Given an introspective object simultaneous with a cognition that is certain, the otherness from it [=a cognition of the object] is established by whatever the imagery.

The words (in the foregoing citation), "the otherness from it", etcetera, indicates another reason. And Dharmakīrti explains (Dignāga's) statement, "the cognition of the sense object and the cognition of it", in the Pramāṇavārttika's

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* T. 335. Fol. 88.b.

1. This is referring to the passage quoted above, Pramāṇasamuccaya, Prat.10.a.

(Prat. 422.d.):

> (If they claim, "It is different at each moment",)
> the fault in this case is like previously.

Thus he (Dharmakīrti) has fully established the two marks, because it is clear that the five later reasons given by Dharmakīrti establish the two marks according to the Dignāga's meaning.[1]

2. The second scriptural passage:[2] This is indicated (when Dharmakīrti, Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 485) states:

> smṛterapyātmavit siddhā jñānasyānyena vedane /
> dīrghādigrahaṇaṁ na syād bahumātrānavasthiteḥ
> Self-intuition establishes a memory when there is intuition of a cognition by way of another. (Otherwise) There would be no apprehension of the long vowel, etcetera, because there is no locus of an extra-long vowel.

B. The particular explanation of the difficult points: This has four subsections:

1. Determination of the 'respondent' who uses the evidence (liṅga) of an associate consciousness-support as certain.
2. Determination of the bare nature of the evidence which is used.

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1. It is clear that Go-rams-pa has not explained all five of Dharmakīrti's reasons here, he may do so in a later chapter which is beyond the scope of this examination.

2. This refers to the passage quoted above, Pramāṇasamuccaya, Prat. 10.c.

3. The establishment of the marks of just that (evidence).

4. Answering challenges about that (evidence).

1. Determination of the 'respondent': Here there are two points:

A. Determination of who uses the evidence of associate consciousness-support as certain while accepting the external object.

B. Determination of who uses the evidence of associate consciousness-support as certain while not accepting the external object.

The first is the Sautrāntika reasoning which establishes the two marks of cognition. The second is the Cittamātra reasoning[+] which establishes the two marks of cognition. And the Vaibhāṣika use both as shown below,[1] because it is the 'respondent' that holds cognition to without imagery.[2]

2. Determination of the bare nature of the evidence: The factual base (dharmin) as object is at once the sense-cognition which appears as the object and the appearance of the object at its own time to that (i.e. the sense-cognition). The feature (dharma) as object is stated in the (Pramāṇa)viniścaya (Prat. 55.b.):

abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ /

+ S.C. 183

1. See Go-rams-pa's presentation of the position of the Vaibhāsika dGe-bSruns below on p. 184 of the Rigs gter gsal byed.

2. rnam med; nirākāra.

There is no difference between blue and its cognition.

And in the (Pramāṇa)vārttika, (Prat. 388.c-d.):

The otherness from it [=a cognition of the object] is established by whatever imagery.

Accordingly, the rejection of a different material is a* feature to be established. Furthermore, the (Pramāṇa)vārttika, (Prat. 335.c.) states:

darśanaṁ nīlanirbhāsam /

...the perception appears as the blue.

And (Pramāṇa)vārttika (Prat. 389.a-b.) states:

bhedaśca bhrāntavijñānairdṛśyetendāvivādvaye /

Although the moon is not two, it is seen as separate by deluded perceptions.

And Devendrabuddhi as well states:

Whatever and whatever its consciousness-support, the becoming a consciousness-support is that very thing.

Accordingly, the unity of material is the feature to be established. The former (i.e. deluded perceptions) is in the province of those Cittamātra who claim the image as false and the latter (i.e. identified with unity) is in the province of those Cittamātra who claim the image as true.

As to the concordant object, some people say, "it is like the sense cognition with appearance of the double moon, and it is like the image which appears as the double

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* T. 335. Fol.89.a.

moon at its own time of that (i.e. sense-cognition)." That is not right. Because real entities are to be established (as objects). Therefore, regarding the meaning of saying the double moon appears in the delusive sense cognition, the Ālambanaparīkṣa (2.b.) states:

> dravyābhāvāt dvucandravat /
>
> (Atoms are not the support of cognition,) because they are not a substance, like a double moon.

And the Pramāṇavārttika (Prat.389.a-b.) states:

> Although the moon is not two, it is seen as separate by deluded cognitions.

And Devendrabuddhi's commentary on that states:

> For, example, the deluded eye apprehends one moon as two separate moons.

And Dharmottara states:

> The two moons also are identical.

And the Rigs gter states:

> If (the consciousness-support) is a separate substance, then evidence is not possible, like the appearance of a double moon.

Thus the appearance of the double moon is apprehended only as an example.

According to those Cittamātra who claim the image as false, when the reason (hetu) is the object, the 'association' is the appearance at the same time and place, and the 'consciousness-

support' is the apprehension, while the 'certainty' is the pervasion.

According to those Cittamātra who claim the image as true, when the 'consciousness-support' is an experience, it is the same as the previous others (i.e. "association' and 'certainty'). Therefore, according to those Cittamātra who + claim the image as false, whatever the object and the subject, whether they are conventionally appearing separately or appearing together, there is pervasion; because the apprehension is at the same time. According to those Cittamātra who claim the image as true there is pervasion; because of the experience.[1]

3. The establishment of the marks of just that (evidence):

α. The pakṣadharma is established by way of introspective direct perception.

β. The anvaya-vyāpti is established in the concordant example,[2] to wit, the image of a double moon appearing in the delusive cognition; because there is anvaya-vyāpti in both cases, (a) when the reason is the associate consciousness-support as certain and (b) when the sadhyadharma is not a separate substance.

\+ S.C. 184 T. 336. Fol. 89.b.

1. For those Cittamātra who claim the image as false to use the experience to establish pervasion would constitute an erroneous reason, because for them the experience is false.

2. mthun dpe; sādharmyadṛṣṭānta. Cf. A. Wayman, trans., "A Guided...,"p.44.

γ. The vyatireka-vyāpti, (established) in the disconcordant example,[1] (i.e. when the sadhyadharma) is a separate substance, and denies that the associate consciousness-support is certain.

In general, when there is difference (bheda), there is the case of dissimilar time and the case of similar time. In the first case, the dissimilar time makes it impossible that the associate consciousness-support is certain. In the second case, when the time is similar, there are again two sub-cases, difference of exclusion (vyāvṛtti-bheda), and a different substance (dravya-bheda). A difference of exclusion is its concordant example. A different substance makes impossible the associate consciousness-support as certain; because when there are two, the same time, but different substances, there is no relation.[2]

4. Answering challenges about that (evidence): Here there are two sections:

   A. Answering challenges about the marks of evidence.

   B. Answering challenges about the tenets of the Citta-mātra.

A. Answering challenges about the marks of evidence: The Vaibhāṣika dGe-bSruṅs says:

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1. mi mthun dpe; vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta.

2. Whenever there is a difference (bheda) it is referring to something outside the set. In order for something to be in the same set there cannot be a bheda. A bheda makes the reason impossible; for a possible reason there must be a sāmānya. Cf. A. Wayman, trans., "A Guided...,"p.23.

Your reason (hetu), namely, the associate consciousness-support as certain, is not right; because it has the three faults (doṣa) of 'not proved' (asiddha), 'opposed' (viruddha) and 'uncertain' (anaikāntika).

The first (not proved): If one accepts that the two, apprehension and the cognition, are not different, because their apprehensible (i.e. consciousness-support) is an associate, that is not proved. For example, when many persons perceive a single common moon. Although each person's* apprehending cognition of the common moon is not a consciousness-support, there is a consciousness-support of a single moon.

(Our response:) If pondered, the fault is not present; because the appearance as a single moon is the awakening of similar propensities in many persons, but it is not the appearance as many single moons. For example, many persons dreaming a similar dream.

The second('opposed')is as told: Why is this reason opposed? (Answer:) In the world something is not another thing by associated words; because

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* T. 336. Fol. 90.a.

1. See Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, I, p.327-332, for a discussion of these three faults of the reason.

it is pervaded by exclusion. The reason, i.e. the+ associate consciousness-support as certain, is opposed; because, when there is an 'association', it requires a multiplicity: and when there is a 'multiplicity' a lack of different substance is necessarily opposed.

(Our response:) If pondered the fault is not present; because, in this case, when 'associate' is the object, while there is appearance as two, in truth they are not two.

The third ('uncertainty'): If there is a difference, then there is (the fault of) uncertainty; because a Buddha's knowledge (*jñana*) differs from (ordinary) thought, and because the reason is deluded by thought (*citta*) and mentals (*caitta* or *caitasika*). When a Buddha's knowledge and an ordinary person's cognition is the factual base, it is absurd that they are not separate materials, because the associate consciousness-support is certain. And when thought and mentals, and appearance and form are (respectively) the factual base, it is absurd that they are not separate materials, because the associate consciousness-support is certain.

(Our response:) If pondered, the reason for the initial fallacy is not proved. When the introspective direct per-

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+ S.C. 185

ception experiencing the ordinary person's cognition is the factual base, (formulating) a Buddha's knowledge as a consciousness-support is fallacious; because the ordinary person's cognition is the consciousness-support.

We accept the fallacy in the second example; because according to the tenets of the Sautrāntika explained above, thought and mentals are not separate materials.

As to the third fallacy, according to the personality* depending on the appearance when a form is the consciousness-support, those two are accepted as not being separate materials; for example, like the iron ball heated red. Taking into account, such creatures as a cat which do not depend on the appearance when a form is the consciousness-support, the reason is not proved; because even when a form is not the consciousness-support, there is appearance as consciousness-support. And even when there is appearance as consciousness-support, it is possible that form is not the consciousness-support.[1]

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on _Tshad ma rigs gter_, Mṅon sum, 37.b.-38 .a.:
> me yi raṅ mtshan[2] gźal bya la /
> du ba las byuṅ gźan sel blo /
> tshad ma ñid yin de rtogs pa /
> 'bras bu yin źes mkhas rnams bźed //
> The wise ones state, "the fire's own-character arises from the sanctionable, i.e. the smoke. Excluding a separate object , the cognition is just the authority and the understanding is the result."[3]

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* T. 336. Fol. 90.b.

1. It seems that Go-rams-pa is trying to "second guess a cat".

2. T. reads _raṅ mchan_ for _raṅ mtshan_.

3. Cf. Go-rams-pa's discussion above , S.C. p. 169-170.

B. Answering challenges about the tenets of the Cittamātra:[1] Suppose it be said, "If the external object is not existent, then there would not be the establishment of the Dāruharidrā sprout, etcetera, with its seed (bīja),[2] as cause (hetu) and effect (kārya). And likewise, there would not be the proof of fire, etcetera, from the evidence (liṅga) of smoke, as the knowable (jñeya)[3] and that which makes it known (jñāpaka)."[4] (Our response:) The fault is not present.[5] Because even without the presence of the external object, the notion of cause and effect and the knowable and that which makes it known are proved in the appearance as seed and sprout, and the appearance as smoke and fire respectively, from the presence of the cognition having obdurate propensities (vāsanā).

So, when your school accepts the external object as ex-[+]isting, you establish the seed and the sprout as the cause and the effect in the function and the agent, which connects and disconnects the prior and the latter, as separate objects. Accordingly, even without the presence of the external object, one establishes the consciousness appearing

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+ S.C. 186

1. Go-rams-pa's discussion which follows on the remaining pages is really quite interesting. He presents the perceptual process without depending on the external object.

2. sa bon.

3. śes bya.

4. śes byed.

5. skyon med.

as the seed and the consciousness appearing as the sprout as the cause and the effect in the function and the agent, which connects and disconnects the former and the latter, as separate objects; because of the presence of the cognition with an obdurate propensity.

(An opponent states:) If the fire, etcetera, is established in the consciousness appearing as that (fire), then there is the fallacy that one is not comprehending the fire from the evidence of the smoke; because the mind which appears as the fire is established as the mind which appears as the smoke. That is to say, because the mind appearing as the smoke was established previously by the mind appearing as the fire.

> (Here Go-rams-pa is commenting on <u>Tshad ma rigs gter</u>, Mnon sum, 38.b.-39.a.:
> mer snaṅ bag chags sñiṅ po las /
> du bar snaṅ ba'i bag chags skye /
> des na skyes bu mi bslu ba /
> rjes dpag yin źes mkhas rnams bźed //
> The wise ones state, " the propensity for [the mind] appearing as smoke arises from the propensity as birthplace [which is the mind] appearing as fire. Therefore, one infers their non-deception."

(Our response:) When you say, "the mind appearing as the fire is the condition which awakens the propensity for the mind appearing as the smoke," then there is no fault. When pondered in this way, also the mind appearing as the smoke* is the condition which awakens the propensity for the mind

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* T. 336. Fol. 91.a.

appearing as the fire. Therefore, having arranged the reason-evidence, it becomes the reason which establishes the result.

In that answer there are two methods, to wit:

1. The method which establishes the smoke and the fire as the cause and the effect.

2. The valid method which establishes the result-evidence.

1. The method which establishes the smoke and the fire as the cause and effect: The mind appearing as the mountain-peak which has a propensity as birthplace for the appearance as the mountain-peak, is the cause of the mind appearing as the smoke. Therefore, in convention, smoke arises from fire. But the smoke does not arise from the fire which appears as an external object.[1] And the mind appearing as smoke also does not arise from the mind appearing as fire, as stated (in Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 397.):

> tadyogyavāsanāgarbha eva dhūmāvabhāsinīm /
> vyanakti cittasantāno dhiyaṁ dhūmo 'gnitastataḥ //
> The stream of consciousness which has a propensity as birthplace capable of (generating) that (appearance of fire) awakens the mind appearing like smoke. Therefore, there is smoke because there is fire.

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1. Once again it may be pointed out that there is no denial of the external object. It is the place which the external object holds in the perceptual process that is questioned.

2. The valid method which establishes the result-evidence: From the evidence of the clearly awakened mind appearing as smoke, one is made to understand that upon the mind appearing as mountain-peak a clearly awakening propensity has the capacity to arouse the mind appearing as fire. So it is explained (in the Pramāṇavārttika, Prat. 396):

> tatrāpi dhūmābhāsā dhīḥ prabodhapaṭuvāsanām /
> gamyedagninirbhāsāṁ dhiyameva na pāvakam //
> In that place also, where is the mind with appearance of smoke, one should understand just the mind with awakening vivid propensity as appearance of fire, not (external) fire.

Now then, at the time of using (the evidence), does not one use (the evidence) in that way? According to those who claim that from an appearance as fire and smoke one does not establish a different fire and smoke, one can use a formulation, "given the appearance as the mountain possessing smoke to be the factual base, then there is the appearance as fire; because there is appearance as smoke." And according to those + who claim the existence of fire and smoke, and that they are the nature of cognition,[1] one can use a formulation, "given the mountain possessing the smoke to be the factual base, then there is the presence of fire; because there is the presence of smoke."

+ S.C. 187

1. This would be the position of the Cittamātra.

According to *ācārya* Śākyabuddhi[1] and others, if you[*] fathom the external fire, then it is present time. If you fathom the mental fire, then it is future time. And if there is no hindrance, the two are equally non-deceptive (*avisaṁvāda*). Therefore, if one says, "the mind appearing as smoke, which arises from the cognition capable of producing the mind appearing as fire, has arisen from the fire," it does not mean it has arisen from the real fire. Therefore, it is the result-evidence which fathoms the reason as the feature.

This concludes the ninth description, to wit, the description which examines direct perception.

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* T. 337. Fol. 91.b.

1. According to Th. Stcherbatsky, Śākyabuddhi was a pupil of Devendrabuddhi and like him was a member of the philological school of commentators. Śākyabuddhi commented on the *Pramāṇavārttika*; there is Tibetan translation of this work in the Tanjur, Mdo, vol. 97 and 98; Cf. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, I, p.39-40.

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